accident defense in California

2025(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 199, fn. 3 [“Defendants are mistaken in their assertion that ‘accident’ is an affirmative defense”]; People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989 , 997–998 [“‘The accident defense amounts to a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his or her actions a crime’”]; People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616 , 674–675 [“Generally, the claim that a homicide was committed through misfortune or accident ‘amounts to a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his or her actions a crim

2023“The accident defense is a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his actions a crime.” (People v. Gonzales (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 390 , disapproved in People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, fn. 3 [“to the extent [it] hold[s] a sua sponte instruction on accident is required when the defense is raised to negate the intent or mental element of the charged crime”].) “In each case, the defense of accident was raised to rebut the mental element of the crime or crimes with which the defendant was charged.

2023The statements were not made primarily for the purpose of producing evidence for a later trial . . . .” (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 422 .) Appellant Was Not Denied His Right To Effective Assistance of Counsel As to the charge of forcible sodomy upon Nicole E., appellant contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel did not request a jury instruction “on the defense of accident or misfortune.” (Bold and capitalization omitted.) “The accident defense amounts to a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his or her

2022A person is not guilty of a crime if the act charged was committed “through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, intention, or culpable negligence.” (§ 26 (5).) “The accident defense amounts to a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his or her actions a crime.” (People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 110 .) “For perfect self-defense, one must actually and reasonably believe in the necessity of defending oneself from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. [Citation.] A killing committed in perfect sel

2023“The accident defense is a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his actions a crime.” (People v. Gonzales (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 390 , disapproved in People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, fn. 3 [“to the extent [it] hold[s] a sua sponte instruction on accident is required when the defense is raised to negate the intent or mental element of the charged crime”].) “In each case, the defense of accident was raised to rebut the mental element of the crime or crimes with which the defendant was charged.

2021“The accident defense is a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his actions a crime.” (People v. Gonzales (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 390 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 998, fn. 3 ; accord, People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102, 110 .) It arises from section 26 which identifies classes of persons who are not legally deemed capable of committing crimes, including “[p]ersons who committed the act or made the omission charged through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design

1958As stated in Scalf v. Eicher, supra [ 11 Cal.App.2d 44 ( 53 P.2d 368 )], . . . : ‘Whether or not a violation of a statute or ordinance proximately contributed to an accident and whether the violation was excusable or justifiable are questions of fact except in a case where “. . . the court is impelled to say that from the facts reasonable men can draw but one inference and that an inference pointing unerringly to the negligence of the plaintiff contributing to his injury.” ’ (Citing cases.) ” The court also instructed as to the life expectancy of the plaintiff, but omitted the qualifying condi

1958As stated in Scalf v. Eicher, supra [ 11 Cal.App.2d 44 ( 53 P.2d 368 )], . . . : ‘Whether or not a violation of a statute or ordinance proximately contributed to an accident and whether the violation was excusable or justifiable are questions of fact except in a case where “. . . the court is impelled to say that from the facts reasonable men can draw but one inference and that an inference pointing unerringly to the negligence of the plaintiff contributing to his injury.” ’ (Citing cases.) ” The court also instructed as to the life expectancy of the plaintiff, but omitted the qualifying condi

2025(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 199, fn. 3 [“Defendants are mistaken in their assertion that ‘accident’ is an affirmative defense”]; People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989 , 997–998 [“‘The accident defense amounts to a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his or her actions a crime’”]; People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616 , 674–675 [“Generally, the claim that a homicide was committed through misfortune or accident ‘amounts to a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his or her actions a crim

2024If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter).” “A trial court must give a requested instruction only if it is supported by substantial evidence, that is, evidence sufficient to deserve jury consideration.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1 , 39–40; accord, Gonzalez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 199, fn. 3 .) Esqueda argues that even though he “primarily relied on a theory of self-defense, during closing argument [defense] counsel also argued that the stabbing of Harris was accidental.” Esqueda acknowledges that in most circumstan

1954In Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal.2d 581, 590 [ 177 P.2d 279 ], it is said, quoting from Scalf v. Eicher, 11 Cal.App.2d 44, 54 [ 53 P.2d 368 ]: “ ‘Whether or not a violation of a statute or ordinance proximately contributed to an accident and whether the violation was excusable or justifiable are questions of fact except in a case where “. . . the court is impelled to say that from the facts reasonable men can draw but one inference. . . .” ’ ” The question whether in this ease the matter was for the court or the jury must be decided according to federal law.

1954In Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal.2d 581, 590 [ 177 P.2d 279 ], it is said, quoting from Scalf v. Eicher, 11 Cal.App.2d 44, 54 [ 53 P.2d 368 ]: “ ‘Whether or not a violation of a statute or ordinance proximately contributed to an accident and whether the violation was excusable or justifiable are questions of fact except in a case where “. . . the court is impelled to say that from the facts reasonable men can draw but one inference. . . .” ’ ” The question whether in this ease the matter was for the court or the jury must be decided according to federal law.

2025(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 199, fn. 3 [“Defendants are mistaken in their assertion that ‘accident’ is an affirmative defense”]; People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989 , 997–998 [“‘The accident defense amounts to a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his or her actions a crime’”]; People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616 , 674–675 [“Generally, the claim that a homicide was committed through misfortune or accident ‘amounts to a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his or her actions a crim

2021(Ibid.; see People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 674 (Jennings) [the claim of “accident ‘amounts to a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his or her actions a crime’ ”]; CALCRIM No. 3404 [“The defendant is not guilty . . . if (he/she) acted . . . without the intent required for that crime, but acted instead accidentally.”].) Because the accident defense seeks only to “rebut the mental element of the crime or crimes with which the defendant was charged” (Anderson, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 998 ), it is a pinpoint instruction that need only be giv

2021(Ibid.) Anderson’s rationale “applies with equal force to the defense of mistake of fact, or any other defense that operates only to negate the mental state element of the crime.” (Lawson, at p. 117; see People v. Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261 , 268–269.) 44 Terrell asks this court not to follow Anderson, arguing that Anderson relied on an erroneous “definition of pinpoint instructions” and drew “artificial distinctions between ‘real’ defenses and defenses that ‘merely’ negate criminal intent.” We read Anderson as resting on the principle that a “trial court’s sua sponte instructional dut

2021(Ibid.) Anderson’s rationale “applies with equal force to the defense of mistake of fact, or any other defense that operates only to negate the mental state element of the crime.” (Lawson, at p. 117; see People v. Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261 , 268–269.) 44 Terrell asks this court not to follow Anderson, arguing that Anderson relied on an erroneous “definition of pinpoint instructions” and drew “artificial distinctions between ‘real’ defenses and defenses that ‘merely’ negate criminal intent.” We read Anderson as resting on the principle that a “trial court’s sua sponte instructional dut

2021(Ibid.) Anderson’s rationale “applies with equal force to the defense of mistake of fact, or any other defense that operates only to negate the mental state element of the crime.” (Lawson, at p. 117; see People v. Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261 , 268–269.) 44 Terrell asks this court not to follow Anderson, arguing that Anderson relied on an erroneous “definition of pinpoint instructions” and drew “artificial distinctions between ‘real’ defenses and defenses that ‘merely’ negate criminal intent.” We read Anderson as resting on the principle that a “trial court’s sua sponte instructional dut

2021(Ibid.) Anderson’s rationale “applies with equal force to the defense of mistake of fact, or any other defense that operates only to negate the mental state element of the crime.” (Lawson, at p. 117; see People v. Hussain (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 261 , 268–269.) 44 Terrell asks this court not to follow Anderson, arguing that Anderson relied on an erroneous “definition of pinpoint instructions” and drew “artificial distinctions between ‘real’ defenses and defenses that ‘merely’ negate criminal intent.” We read Anderson as resting on the principle that a “trial court’s sua sponte instructional dut

1967(Coronet Credit Corp. v. West Thrift Co., 244 Cal.App.2d 631, 648 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 433 ]; Pry Corp. of America v. Leach, 177 Cal.App.2d 632, 637 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 425 ].) The trial court correctly concluded that Aerojet's conduct relative to the accident did not bar indemnity.

1967(Coronet Credit Corp. v. West Thrift Co., 244 Cal.App.2d 631, 648 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 433 ]; Pry Corp. of America v. Leach, 177 Cal.App.2d 632, 637 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 425 ].) The trial court correctly concluded that Aerojet's conduct relative to the accident did not bar indemnity.

1967(Coronet Credit Corp. v. West Thrift Co., 244 Cal.App.2d 631, 648 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 433 ]; Pry Corp. of America v. Leach, 177 Cal.App.2d 632, 637 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 425 ].) The trial court correctly concluded that Aerojet's conduct relative to the accident did not bar indemnity.

1967(Coronet Credit Corp. v. West Thrift Co., 244 Cal.App.2d 631, 648 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 433 ]; Pry Corp. of America v. Leach, 177 Cal.App.2d 632, 637 [ 2 Cal.Rptr. 425 ].) The trial court correctly concluded that Aerojet's conduct relative to the accident did not bar indemnity.

2014(People v. Jones (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1303, 1313-1316 , disapproved on other grounds in People v. Anderson, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 998, fn. 3 [trial court’s failure to instruct on defense of accident and misfortune deemed harmless where the jury necessarily resolved the underlying factual question of the defense against the defendant by finding him guilty of attempted premeditated murder].) 11 III Reiterating the arguments addressed in the preceding two sections, appellant asserts the cumulative effect of barring the use of his proposed videos in closing argument and the absence of an accide

2013(People v. Jones (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1303 , 1314- 1316.) The evidence presented at Soto’s trial did not warrant an accident instruction.

2026In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the 10 credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether ‘there was evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982 [cleaned up].) CALCRIM No. 3404, the accident instruction, provides: “The defendant is not guilty of <insert crime[s]> if (he/she) acted [or failed to act] without the intent required for that crime, but acted instead accidentally.

2015(People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 984 .) The accident defense is a claim that the mental state required to commit the offense is absent.

2022Even if we assume that the trial court erred by declining to give an accident instruction, any error was undoubtedly harmless. “ ‘[W]rongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated in’ in [People v.] Watson [(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ].” (People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 830 .) Under Watson, we consider whether “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson, supra, at p. 836 (Watson).) “ ‘In dete

2022Even if we assume that the trial court erred by declining to give an accident instruction, any error was undoubtedly harmless. “ ‘[W]rongly omitted instructions that do not amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error standard articulated in’ in [People v.] Watson [(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 ].” (People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 830 .) Under Watson, we consider whether “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson, supra, at p. 836 (Watson).) “ ‘In dete

2015(People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 39 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84 , 931 P.2d 262 ].)” (People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 214-215 .) “ ‘In determining 7 whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether “there was evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 288 .) Defendant argues that an accident instruction was required in this case because his testimony constituted substantial evidence from which

2014In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether ‘there was 6 evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt . . . .’ [Citations.]” (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982-983 ; accord, People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 288 .) On appeal, defendant asserts substantial evidence supported an accident instruction.

2016(See Eid, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 883 .) And here, although defendant’s trial counsel did not 15 explicitly mention the accident defense during argument to the jury, defendant did not “ ‘effectively concede[] the issue.’ ” (Ibid.) Indeed, the issue of defendant’s intent was essentially the only issue that the jury had to decide, and the evidence did not overwhelmingly establish that defendant had the requisite “actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the act by its nature [would] probably and directly result in the application of physical force against another.” (Peop

2016A reasonable juror could have concluded that defendant may not have seen Officer Evans open the patrol vehicle’s door and step out before she engaged in the act of trying to drive around the patrol vehicle in order to get away and thus that defendant was not “aware of the facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that a battery would directly, naturally and probably result from h[er] conduct.” (See Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 788 .) Finally, the jury’s request for further instruction on the meaning of the terms “culpable” and “culpable negligence” strongly indicated that the j

2015(People v. Gorgol (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 281, 308 .) We find no error in the trial court not instructing on the accident defense.

1996(See, e.g., People v. Scott (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823 , 832 fn. 5 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 633 ]; People v. Calban (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 578, 584 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 441 ]; People v. Gorgol (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 281, 308 [ 265 P.2d 69 ].) If the crime charged requires general criminal intent, then the defense should apply to acts committed “through misfortune or by accident, when it appears there was no . . . [general intent] . . . ,” (§ 26, subd.

2024(See People v. Villanueva (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 41 , 50–51 (Villanueva).) He argues that the normal inconsistency in the two theories was not present in his case, however.

2021This approach dovetailed with his argument for acquittal on the charge of negligent discharge of a firearm on the ground the evidence was in dispute as to whether it was Mendoza or Dorton who caused the gun to fire, which required the jury to acquit on this charge.21 v. Villanueva (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 41, 54 [stating that if a defendant relies on an accident defense to an attempted murder charge, the jury should be instructed with CALCRIM No. 510].) 20 Indeed, during closing argument, the prosecutor argued that Dorton did not act reasonably in response to the incident and that bringing a gun

2024If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of (murder/ [or] manslaughter).” “A trial court must give a requested instruction only if it is supported by substantial evidence, that is, evidence sufficient to deserve jury consideration.” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1 , 39–40; accord, Gonzalez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 199, fn. 3 .) Esqueda argues that even though he “primarily relied on a theory of self-defense, during closing argument [defense] counsel also argued that the stabbing of Harris was accidental.” Esqueda acknowledges that in most circumstan

2015(People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 39 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84 , 931 P.2d 262 ].)” (People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 214-215 .) “ ‘In determining 7 whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether “there was evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 288 .) Defendant argues that an accident instruction was required in this case because his testimony constituted substantial evidence from which

2024(People v. Jo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1165-1168 [no duty to sua sponte instruct on defense if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case]; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 484 [no duty to instruct on 9 requested defense if it is not supported by substantial evidence].) Because counsel is not ineffective for failing to request an instruction that a court would properly deny, defendant’s attorney’s performance was neither deficient nor prejudicial.

2023Accordingly, appellant has not shown error under Jo, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th 1128 .9 Appellant also argues the jury would have understood the accident instruction to relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving implied malice.

2015(People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 886-887 .) Under that test, an error is reversible only if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) Because the accident defense is intended to rebut the mental state required for assault with a firearm, when the trial court fails to give requested instructions on the defense in relation to that offense, no prejudice is ordinarily demonstrated if the jury was otherwise adequately instructed regarding the mental state required for

2015In evaluating the impact of the trial court’s refusal to give a pinpoint instruction on accident, we consider “the entire cause including the evidence,” defense counsel’s focus in closing argument on 8 the evidence supporting the defense theory, and whether any given instructions would have precluded the jury “from giving that evidence its due weight.” (People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 571-572 [failure to give requested pinpoint instruction on defense theory of provocation found harmless as given instructions did not preclude jury from finding provocation and defense counsel’s closing a

1996(See, e.g., People v. Scott (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823 , 832 fn. 5 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 633 ]; People v. Calban (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 578, 584 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 441 ]; People v. Gorgol (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 281, 308 [ 265 P.2d 69 ].) If the crime charged requires general criminal intent, then the defense should apply to acts committed “through misfortune or by accident, when it appears there was no . . . [general intent] . . . ,” (§ 26, subd.

1996(See, e.g., People v. Scott (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 823 , 832 fn. 5 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 633 ]; People v. Calban (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 578, 584 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 441 ]; People v. Gorgol (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 281, 308 [ 265 P.2d 69 ].) If the crime charged requires general criminal intent, then the defense should apply to acts committed “through misfortune or by accident, when it appears there was no . . . [general intent] . . . ,” (§ 26, subd.

1958(Jensen v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d 325, 329 [ 282 P.2d 7 ]; see Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, ante, pp. 153, 156-158 [ 323 P.2d 391 ] ; Phillips v. Noble, ante, pp. 163, 166-167 [ 323 P.2d 385 ] ; Barrera v. De La Torre, 48 Cal.2d 166 , 170 et seq. [ 308 P.2d 724 ]; cf. Brown v. George Pepperdine Foundation, 23 Cal.2d 256, 261-262 [ 143 P.2d 929 ]; England v. Hospital of Good Samaritan, 22 Cal.App.2d 226, 230 [ 70 P.2d 692 ] ; Ellis v. Jewett, 18 Cal.App.2d 629, 634 [ 64 P.2d 432 ].) Por the reasons set forth in the cited cases holding it is error to give the mere happening of the accident instru

1958(Jensen v. Minard, 44 Cal.2d 325, 329 [ 282 P.2d 7 ]; see Shaw v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, ante, pp. 153, 156-158 [ 323 P.2d 391 ] ; Phillips v. Noble, ante, pp. 163, 166-167 [ 323 P.2d 385 ] ; Barrera v. De La Torre, 48 Cal.2d 166 , 170 et seq. [ 308 P.2d 724 ]; cf. Brown v. George Pepperdine Foundation, 23 Cal.2d 256, 261-262 [ 143 P.2d 929 ]; England v. Hospital of Good Samaritan, 22 Cal.App.2d 226, 230 [ 70 P.2d 692 ] ; Ellis v. Jewett, 18 Cal.App.2d 629, 634 [ 64 P.2d 432 ].) Por the reasons set forth in the cited cases holding it is error to give the mere happening of the accident instru

1959(Ringo v. Johnson, 99 Cal.App.2d 124, 129-130 [ 221 P.2d 267 ] ; Bergman v. Bierman, 138 Cal.App.2d 692, 696 [ 292 P.2d 623 ].) The court in Scott v. Burke, supra, 39 Cal.2d 388 , held (p. 393) it was proper to instruct that “if the jury believed that defendant as a result of the shock of the accident was unable to remember and testify as to his own conduct or other facts of the accident then a presumption arose that he ‘was obeying the law and was exercising ordinary care and doing such acts as an ordinarily prudent person would have done in the same circumstances. ’ ’ ’ In Gioldi v. Sartorio

1959(Ringo v. Johnson, 99 Cal.App.2d 124, 129-130 [ 221 P.2d 267 ] ; Bergman v. Bierman, 138 Cal.App.2d 692, 696 [ 292 P.2d 623 ].) The court in Scott v. Burke, supra, 39 Cal.2d 388 , held (p. 393) it was proper to instruct that “if the jury believed that defendant as a result of the shock of the accident was unable to remember and testify as to his own conduct or other facts of the accident then a presumption arose that he ‘was obeying the law and was exercising ordinary care and doing such acts as an ordinarily prudent person would have done in the same circumstances. ’ ’ ’ In Gioldi v. Sartorio