43 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hawthornegreen2 sentences2026Contrary to other cases finding harmlessness, see, e.g., Hawthorne, 474 Mich at 185 , the jury here was affirmatively told it had to consider defendant’s felony-murder charge first, could not consider the second-degree charge with the accident defense unless it could not resolve on felony-murder, and that accident was not a defense many times over. 2023After determining that the accident instruction should have been given, the Court reasoned reversal was unwarranted because “the jury instructions explaining the intent element of murder made it clear that a finding of accident would be inconsistent with a finding that defendant possessed the intent required for murder.” Id. (quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). | 5 | 8 |
People v. Cartergreen2 sentences2022See People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 503 ; 803 NW2d 200 (2011) (holding that defendant’s challenge to the jury instruction was waived by his lawyer’s explicit and repeated approval of the instruction given); see also People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215 ; 612 NW2d 144 (2000) (stating that waiver extinguished any claim of error, leaving nothing for this Court to review). 2. 2022See People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 503 ; 803 NW2d 200 (2011) (holding that defendant’s challenge to the jury instruction was waived by his lawyer’s explicit and repeated approval of the instruction given); see also People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215 ; 612 NW2d 144 (2000) (stating that waiver extinguished any claim of error, leaving nothing for this Court to review). 2. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Knappgreen2 sentences2017See Knapp, 244 Mich App at 376 . 2017See Knapp, 244 Mich App at 376 . | 2 | 2 |
People v. Keskimakigreen2 sentences2024See People v Keskimaki, 446 Mich 240, 248 ; 521 NW2d 241 (1994) (opining, “The legislative purposes underlying the accident exception [are] . . . to promote the safety of both the public and the drunk driver”). 2024See People v Keskimaki, 446 Mich 240, 248 ; 521 NW2d 241 (1994) (opining, “The legislative purposes underlying the accident exception [are] . . . to promote the safety of both the public and the drunk driver”). | 1 | 6 |
People v. Hessgreen2 sentences2025First, Hess concluded the accident defense was not available for involuntary manslaughter, 214 Mich App at 39 , and thus the above-quoted statement is dicta because it was not necessary to its holding, see Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557 , 568 n 8; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). 2023See, e.g., People v Hess, 214 Mich App 33, 38 ; 543 NW2d 332 (1995) (“Because voluntary manslaughter requires proof of intent, the defense of accident is applicable and the trial court in this case committed error requiring reversal in -8- instructing the jury that it was not.”).4 And if the majority is correct, an accident instruction need not be given in any specific intent case, despite that the instruction specifically provides that if the defendant “did not intend” to commit the charged crime, “he/she is not guilty.” Yes, an astute jury might have connected the dots on its own, but that n | 1 | 4 |
People v. Perlosgreen2 sentences1994B The legislative purposes underlying the accident exception were articulated in Perlos, supra, where we observed that subsection 9 was designed to promote the safety of both the public and the drunk driver. 1994B The legislative purposes underlying the accident exception were articulated in Perlos, supra, where we observed that subsection 9 was designed to promote the safety of both the public and the drunk driver. | 1 | 2 |
Koski v. Allstate Insurancegreen2 sentences2012Nevertheless, this Court unanimously reaffirmed the “well-established principle” of this state that “an insurer who seeks to cut off responsibility on the ground that its insured did not comply with a contract provision requiring notice immediately or within a reasonable time must establish actual prejudice to its position.” Id., citing Weller v Cummins, 330 Mich 286 ; 47 NW2d 612 (1951), and Wendel v Swanberg, 384 Mich 468 ; 185 NW2d 348 (1971); 1 see, also, Weller, 330 Mich at 292-293 (explaining that in Kennedy v Dashner, 319 Mich 491 ; 30 NW2d 46 [1947], this Court applied the above princi 2012I agree with the Court of Appeals that there is no persuasive reason to conclude that Koski should not apply in this context simply because this case involves a specific period in which notice was required, rather than a provision requiring notice “immediately,” “as soon as practicable,” or within a “reasonable time.” As Koski and other jurisdictions have recognized, a pur pose of requiring notice of an accident is to “ ‘give the insurance company knowledge of the accident so that it can make a timely investigation in order to protect its interests.’ ” Koski, 456 Mich at 444 , quoting Weller, | 1 | 2 |
Robinson v. City of Detroitgreen2 sentences2006When that happens, a subsequent court, rather than holding to the distorted reading because of the doctrine of stare decisis, should overrule the earlier court's misconstruction. [ Id. ] Applying the Lukity/Rodriguez standard to this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating that the failure to instruct on the accident defense undermined the reliability of the verdict. 2001The delay of approximately 3½ hours between the accident and the test bears on the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. [12] We acknowledge the holding in Robinson v. Detroit, 462 Mich. 439, 456-457, 468 , 613 N.W.2d 307 , reh. den. 618 N.W.2d 590 (2000). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Kowalskigreen2 sentences2022See People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 503 ; 803 NW2d 200 (2011) (holding that defendant’s challenge to the jury instruction was waived by his lawyer’s explicit and repeated approval of the instruction given); see also People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215 ; 612 NW2d 144 (2000) (stating that waiver extinguished any claim of error, leaving nothing for this Court to review). 2. 2022See People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 503 ; 803 NW2d 200 (2011) (holding that defendant’s challenge to the jury instruction was waived by his lawyer’s explicit and repeated approval of the instruction given); see also People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215 ; 612 NW2d 144 (2000) (stating that waiver extinguished any claim of error, leaving nothing for this Court to review). 2. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Travergreen2 sentences2020See People v Traver, 502 Mich 23, 42 ; 917 NW2d 260 (2018). 2020See People v Traver, 502 Mich 23, 42 ; 917 NW2d 260 (2018). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ericksengreen2 sentences2016“Failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201 ; 793 NW2d 120, 125 (2010).5 Affirmed. /s/ Jane M. 2016“Failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201 ; 793 NW2d 120, 125 (2010).5 Affirmed. /s/ Jane M. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chapogreen2 sentences2016See People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 372 ; 770 NW2d 68 (2009). 2016See People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 372 ; 770 NW2d 68 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Hunt v. Drielickgreen1 sentence2014The Court of Appeals held that the property does not have to be attached to the semi-tractor at the time of the accident for the clause to apply; rather, the Court held that the clause applies “during an interval of time when the truck was employed for the purpose of carrying property in the trucking business.” Hunt, 298 Mich App at 556 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Weller v. Cumminsgreen2 sentences2012Nevertheless, this Court unanimously reaffirmed the “well-established principle” of this state that “an insurer who seeks to cut off responsibility on the ground that its insured did not comply with a contract provision requiring notice immediately or within a reasonable time must establish actual prejudice to its position.” Id., citing Weller v Cummins, 330 Mich 286 ; 47 NW2d 612 (1951), and Wendel v Swanberg, 384 Mich 468 ; 185 NW2d 348 (1971); 1 see, also, Weller, 330 Mich at 292-293 (explaining that in Kennedy v Dashner, 319 Mich 491 ; 30 NW2d 46 [1947], this Court applied the above princi 2012Nevertheless, this Court unanimously reaffirmed the “well-established principle” of this state that “an insurer who seeks to cut off responsibility on the ground that its insured did not comply with a contract provision requiring notice immediately or within a reasonable time must establish actual prejudice to its position.” Id., citing Weller v Cummins, 330 Mich 286 ; 47 NW2d 612 (1951), and Wendel v Swanberg, 384 Mich 468 ; 185 NW2d 348 (1971); 1 see, also, Weller, 330 Mich at 292-293 (explaining that in Kennedy v Dashner, 319 Mich 491 ; 30 NW2d 46 [1947], this Court applied the above princi | 1 | 1 |
| Rushford-Surine v. Grand Trunk Railway Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Prichard v. Battlegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ackley
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 386-387 . 2017Id. at 386-387 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Guajardo
green
1 sentence2025People v Guajardo, 300 Mich App 26, 34 ; 932 MW2d 409 (2013). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Dressel v. Ameribank
green
2 sentences2025First, Hess concluded the accident defense was not available for involuntary manslaughter, 214 Mich App at 39 , and thus the above-quoted statement is dicta because it was not necessary to its holding, see Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557 , 568 n 8; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). 2025First, Hess concluded the accident defense was not available for involuntary manslaughter, 214 Mich App at 39 , and thus the above-quoted statement is dicta because it was not necessary to its holding, see Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557 , 568 n 8; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2024The confrontation right “is implicated only for ‘testimonial’ evidence, because the Confrontation Clause applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those who 10 Indeed, Allen’s trial counsel specifically declined to request an accident instruction, stating: “I don’t see any evidence of accident.” 11 Even if Allen’s statement constituted hearsay, the statement likely would have been admitted under MRE 803(4)’s exception for “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing medical history.” -16- ‘bear testimony. 2024The confrontation right “is implicated only for ‘testimonial’ evidence, because the Confrontation Clause applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those who 10 Indeed, Allen’s trial counsel specifically declined to request an accident instruction, stating: “I don’t see any evidence of accident.” 11 Even if Allen’s statement constituted hearsay, the statement likely would have been admitted under MRE 803(4)’s exception for “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing medical history.” -16- ‘bear testimony. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Davis v. Washington
green
2 sentences2024“Statements are testimonial if the ‘primary purpose’ of the statements or the questioning that elicits them ‘is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’ ” People v Garland, 286 Mich App 1, 10 ; 777 NW2d 732 (2009), quoting Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 822 ; 126 S Ct 2266 ; 165 L Ed 2d 224 (2006). 2024“Statements are testimonial if the ‘primary purpose’ of the statements or the questioning that elicits them ‘is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’ ” People v Garland, 286 Mich App 1, 10 ; 777 NW2d 732 (2009), quoting Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 822 ; 126 S Ct 2266 ; 165 L Ed 2d 224 (2006). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Garland
green
2 sentences2024“Statements are testimonial if the ‘primary purpose’ of the statements or the questioning that elicits them ‘is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’ ” People v Garland, 286 Mich App 1, 10 ; 777 NW2d 732 (2009), quoting Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 822 ; 126 S Ct 2266 ; 165 L Ed 2d 224 (2006). 2024“Statements are testimonial if the ‘primary purpose’ of the statements or the questioning that elicits them ‘is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’ ” People v Garland, 286 Mich App 1, 10 ; 777 NW2d 732 (2009), quoting Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 822 ; 126 S Ct 2266 ; 165 L Ed 2d 224 (2006). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People of Michigan v. Carl Rene Bruner II
green
2 sentences2024The confrontation right “is implicated only for ‘testimonial’ evidence, because the Confrontation Clause applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those who 10 Indeed, Allen’s trial counsel specifically declined to request an accident instruction, stating: “I don’t see any evidence of accident.” 11 Even if Allen’s statement constituted hearsay, the statement likely would have been admitted under MRE 803(4)’s exception for “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing medical history.” -16- ‘bear testimony. 2024The confrontation right “is implicated only for ‘testimonial’ evidence, because the Confrontation Clause applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those who 10 Indeed, Allen’s trial counsel specifically declined to request an accident instruction, stating: “I don’t see any evidence of accident.” 11 Even if Allen’s statement constituted hearsay, the statement likely would have been admitted under MRE 803(4)’s exception for “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing medical history.” -16- ‘bear testimony. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Rockey
green
2 sentences2021“This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77 ; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). 2021“This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77 ; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Heft
green
2 sentences2016We disagree. “[A] defendant must move in the trial court for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing to preserve the defendant’s claim that his or her counsel was ineffective.” Because defendant did not move for a -19- Ginther[4] hearing, our review is limited to “mistakes apparent from the record.” People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80 ; 829 NW2d 266 (2012). 2016We disagree. “[A] defendant must move in the trial court for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing to preserve the defendant’s claim that his or her counsel was ineffective.” Because defendant did not move for a -19- Ginther[4] hearing, our review is limited to “mistakes apparent from the record.” People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 80 ; 829 NW2d 266 (2012). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Lukity
green
2 sentences2016See, People v Hawthorne, 474 Mich 174, 184 ; 713 NW2d 724 (2006); People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484 ; 596 NW2d 607 (1999); People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466 ; 620 NW 2d 13 (200), (setting forth the principle that defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the failure to instruct on the accident defense undermined the reliability of the verdict). 2016See, People v Hawthorne, 474 Mich 174, 184 ; 713 NW2d 724 (2006); People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484 ; 596 NW2d 607 (1999); People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466 ; 620 NW 2d 13 (200), (setting forth the principle that defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the failure to instruct on the accident defense undermined the reliability of the verdict). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Carbin
green
1 sentence2016Carbin, 463 Mich at 600 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences2016See, People v Hawthorne, 474 Mich 174, 184 ; 713 NW2d 724 (2006); People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484 ; 596 NW2d 607 (1999); People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466 ; 620 NW 2d 13 (200), (setting forth the principle that defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the failure to instruct on the accident defense undermined the reliability of the verdict). 2016See, People v Hawthorne, 474 Mich 174, 184 ; 713 NW2d 724 (2006); People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484 ; 596 NW2d 607 (1999); People v Rodriguez, 463 Mich 466 ; 620 NW 2d 13 (200), (setting forth the principle that defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the failure to instruct on the accident defense undermined the reliability of the verdict). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Galloway
green
2 sentences2016People v Galloway, 307 Mich App 151, 157 ; 858 NW2d 520 (2014), rev’d in part on other grounds 498 Mich 902 (2015). 2016People v Galloway, 307 Mich App 151, 157 ; 858 NW2d 520 (2014), rev’d in part on other grounds 498 Mich 902 (2015). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Snider
green
1 sentence2015Snider, 239 Mich App at 425 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Kennedy v. Dashner green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Wendel v. Swanberg
green
2 sentences2012Nevertheless, this Court unanimously reaffirmed the “well-established principle” of this state that “an insurer who seeks to cut off responsibility on the ground that its insured did not comply with a contract provision requiring notice immediately or within a reasonable time must establish actual prejudice to its position.” Id., citing Weller v Cummins, 330 Mich 286 ; 47 NW2d 612 (1951), and Wendel v Swanberg, 384 Mich 468 ; 185 NW2d 348 (1971); 1 see, also, Weller, 330 Mich at 292-293 (explaining that in Kennedy v Dashner, 319 Mich 491 ; 30 NW2d 46 [1947], this Court applied the above princi 2012Nevertheless, this Court unanimously reaffirmed the “well-established principle” of this state that “an insurer who seeks to cut off responsibility on the ground that its insured did not comply with a contract provision requiring notice immediately or within a reasonable time must establish actual prejudice to its position.” Id., citing Weller v Cummins, 330 Mich 286 ; 47 NW2d 612 (1951), and Wendel v Swanberg, 384 Mich 468 ; 185 NW2d 348 (1971); 1 see, also, Weller, 330 Mich at 292-293 (explaining that in Kennedy v Dashner, 319 Mich 491 ; 30 NW2d 46 [1947], this Court applied the above princi | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance Co. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State Automobile Mutual Insurance v. Youler
green
1 sentence2012I agree with the Court of Appeals that there is no persuasive reason to conclude that Koski should not apply in this context simply because this case involves a specific period in which notice was required, rather than a provision requiring notice “immediately,” “as soon as practicable,” or within a “reasonable time.” As Koski and other jurisdictions have recognized, a pur pose of requiring notice of an accident is to “ ‘give the insurance company knowledge of the accident so that it can make a timely investigation in order to protect its interests.’ ” Koski, 456 Mich at 444 , quoting Weller, | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| People v. Ora Jones red | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Morrin green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Cornell green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Hawthorne green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Lester green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Carter green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Sands Appliance Services, Inc. v. Wilson neutral | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Stanaway green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Stapf green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Stubbs green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Stoney neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Tope v. Howe green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Smyth green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Martinson green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Graham green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Kaminski v. Wayne County Road Commissioners green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Gleason v. Lowe green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Spillman v. Weimaster neutral | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Butrick v. Snyder green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Oakland Motor Co. v. American Fidelity Co. green | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Berrigan v. . New York, Lake Erie and Western Rd. Co. neutral | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.