accident claim in New York

1928Co. ( 131 N. Y. 582 , at page 584), where we said: “ There is no proof in the case that rules for such a case had ever been promulgated by any other railroad company, or that it was reasonable or practicable to provide against the occurrence of such an accident by a rule.

1903Co. ( 131 N. Y. 582 ), where a person was injured while coupling cars, it was said (p. 584): “ There is no proof in the case that rules for such a case had ever been promulgated by any other railroad company, or that it was reasonable or practicable to provide against the occurrence of such an accident by a rule.

2014School Dist., 65 AD3d 1141, 1142-1143 [2009]; Matter of Scolo v Central Islip Union Free School Dist., 40 AD3d 1104 [2007]).

2009Furthermore, while a school official prepared an accident claim form on the day of the incident, that report, which merely indicated that Sanabria was injured on the jungle gym during recess, did not establish that the appellants had actual knowledge, within 90 days of the incident or a reasonable time thereafter, of the essential facts underlying the petitioner’s claim of negligent supervision (see Matter of Scolo v Central Islip Union Free School Dist., 40 AD3d 1104 [2007]; Matter of Doyle v Elwood Union Free School Dist., 39 AD3d 544 [2007]; Matter of Scott v Huntington Union Free School Di

2022The Court has further cautioned that requiring a petitioner to demonstrate that a condition was not readily observable in order to establish an accident is not the standard ( see id. at 685-686 n 3).

2022The Court further cautioned that requiring a petitioner to demonstrate that a condition was not readily observable in order to establish an accident is not the standard ( see id. at 685-686 n 3).

2021Defendants met their burden of showing that plaintiff was not a Bronx County resident when she commenced this action ( see CPLR 503[a]) by submitting her driver's license issued in 2017, a disability application from 2018, and an accident claim report from 2019, all showing that plaintiff lived in Milton, New York ( see Book v Horizon Asset Mgt. , 105 AD3d 661 [1st Dept 2013]; see also Furlow v Braeubrun , 259 AD2d 417 [1st Dept 1999]).

2021Defendants met their burden of showing that plaintiff was not a Bronx County resident when she commenced this action ( see CPLR 503[a]) by submitting her driver's license issued in 2017, a disability application from 2018, and an accident claim report from 2019, all showing that plaintiff lived in Milton, New York ( see Book v Horizon Asset Mgt. , 105 AD3d 661 [1st Dept 2013]; see also Furlow v Braeubrun , 259 AD2d 417 [1st Dept 1999]).

2014In addition, while a school official prepared an accident claim form the day of the incident and a school medical claim form was filled out the day following the incident, those reports, which merely indicated that Zachary hurt his right knee playing two-hand touch football during physical education class, did not establish that the appellant had actual knowledge within 90 days of the incident or a reasonable time thereafter, of the essential facts underlying the claims of negligent supervision and that the school field constituted a defective and dangerous condition (see Bazile v City of New

2014In addition, while a school official prepared an accident claim form the day of the incident and a school medical claim form was filled out the day following the incident, those reports, which merely indicated that Zachary hurt his right knee playing two-hand touch football during physical education class, did not establish that the appellant had actual knowledge within 90 days of the incident or a reasonable time thereafter, of the essential facts underlying the claims of negligent supervision and that the school field constituted a defective and dangerous condition (see Bazile v City of New

2014That plaintiff was the sole witness to the accident also does not bar summary judgment in his favor (see De Oleo v Charis Christian Ministries, Inc., 106 AD3d 521 [1st Dept 2013]).

2014That plaintiff was the sole witness to the accident also does not bar summary judgment in his favor (see De Oleo v Charis Christian Ministries, Inc., 106 AD3d 521 [1st Dept 2013]).

2013While Trottman’s account of the accident may provide a defense with respect to the plaintiffs causes of action against her, it did not raise a triable issue of fact with respect to any alleged negligence on Leary’s part (see Moore v Singh, 108 AD3d at 602 ).

2013While Trottman’s account of the accident may provide a defense with respect to the plaintiffs causes of action against her, it did not raise a triable issue of fact with respect to any alleged negligence on Leary’s part (see Moore v Singh, 108 AD3d at 602 ).

2013The fact that a plaintiff is the only witness to an accident does not bar summary judgment where his or her testimony concerning the manner in which the accident occurred is neither inconsistent with nor contradicted by his own account provided elsewhere or other evidence (see Klein v City of New York, 222 AD2d 351 [1995], affd 89 NY2d 833 [1996]).

2013The fact that a plaintiff is the only witness to an accident does not bar summary judgment where his or her testimony concerning the manner in which the accident occurred is neither inconsistent with nor contradicted by his own account provided elsewhere or other evidence (see Klein v City of New York, 222 AD2d 351 [1995], affd 89 NY2d 833 [1996]).

2013Co. v Luhmann, 229 AD2d 438 [1996]).

2013Co. v Luhmann, 229 AD2d 438 [1996]).

2013The fact that a plaintiff is the only witness to an accident does not bar summary judgment where his or her testimony concerning the manner in which the accident occurred is neither inconsistent with nor contradicted by his own account provided elsewhere or other evidence (see Klein v City of New York, 222 AD2d 351 [1995], affd 89 NY2d 833 [1996]).

2013The fact that a plaintiff is the only witness to an accident does not bar summary judgment where his or her testimony concerning the manner in which the accident occurred is neither inconsistent with nor contradicted by his own account provided elsewhere or other evidence (see Klein v City of New York, 222 AD2d 351 [1995], affd 89 NY2d 833 [1996]).

2012Plaintiff’s argument that Wiesehof may have been changing lanes or merging at the moment of the accident in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128, is a feigned issue of fact, insufficient to defeat the motion (see Fernandez v Laret, 43 AD3d 347 [2007]).

2012Plaintiff’s argument that Wiesehof may have been changing lanes or merging at the moment of the accident in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128, is a feigned issue of fact, insufficient to defeat the motion (see Fernandez v Laret, 43 AD3d 347 [2007]).

2009Furthermore, while a school official prepared an accident claim form on the day of the incident, that report, which merely indicated that Sanabria was injured on the jungle gym during recess, did not establish that the appellants had actual knowledge, within 90 days of the incident or a reasonable time thereafter, of the essential facts underlying the petitioner’s claim of negligent supervision (see Matter of Scolo v Central Islip Union Free School Dist., 40 AD3d 1104 [2007]; Matter of Doyle v Elwood Union Free School Dist., 39 AD3d 544 [2007]; Matter of Scott v Huntington Union Free School Di

2005The accident claim form processed by the defendant two months after the accident failed to apprise the defendant of the plaintiffs claim that the defendant was negligent in supervising and managing its students and in failing to provide adequate safety equipment (see Matter of del Carmen v Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 7 AD3d 620 [2004]; Matter of Conroy v Smithtown Cent.

2024Moreover, the plaintiff supplied the correct date of the accident at the hearing pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h and Public Authorities Law § 1212(5) ( see Matter of DeVerna v Incorporated Vil. of Lynbrook , 67 AD3d 1009, 1010 ; Gatewood v Poughkeepsie Hous.

2024Auth. , 28 AD3d at 515 ).

2023Although it is unclear whether the plaintiff was crossing the entrance ramp in or near the crosswalk at the time that she was struck, Ramirez's failure to observe the plaintiff crossing the entrance ramp at the time of the accident was a violation of his common-law duty to see that which he should have seen through the proper use of his senses ( see Lieb v Jacobson , 202 AD3d at 1074 ).

2022Under these circumstances, the jury's verdict that the defendant driver was free from negligence was not supported by any fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Barbieri v Vokoun , 72 AD3d at 856 ; Larsen v Spano , 35 AD3d 820, 822 ).

2022Notwithstanding any alleged negligence on the part of the plaintiff, the defendant driver's failure to observe the plaintiff in the crosswalk prior to the accident was a violation of the defendant driver's common-law duty to see that which he should have seen through the proper use of his senses ( see Domanova v State of New York , 41 AD3d 633, 634 ; Larsen v Spano , 35 AD3d at 822).