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10 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insuarnce v. Lindseygreen2 sentences2024Co. v. Lindsey, 182 Ariz. 329, 331 (1995). ¶11 The anti-stacking provision of the State Farm policies, quoted above, largely mirrors subsection (H), which provides: If multiple policies or coverages purchased by one insured on different vehicles apply to an accident or claim, the insurer may limit the coverage so that only one policy or coverage, selected by the insured, shall be applicable to any one accident. 2023See Lindsey, 182 Ariz. at 331 . 9 FRANKLIN v. CSAA GENERAL INSURANCE Opinion of the Court Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Act, 1982 Ariz. Sess. | 2 | 2 |
State of Arizona v. Penny Ann Westgreen1 sentence2023See West, 238 Ariz. at 487, ¶ 9 (finding substantial evidence the defendant caused the victim’s injury where the defendant was the only adult present when the injury occurred, the defendant’s accident defense was refuted by “virtually every doctor involved in [the victim’s] emergency care,” and there were inconsistencies in the defendant’s account); Payne, 233 Ariz. at 507, ¶ 77 (finding substantial evidence the defendant caused the victim’s injuries based on testimony that the injuries likely occurred while in the defendant’s care); see also State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, 494, ¶ 27 (1999 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fulminantegreen1 sentence2023See West, 238 Ariz. at 487, ¶ 9 (finding substantial evidence the defendant caused the victim’s injury where the defendant was the only adult present when the injury occurred, the defendant’s accident defense was refuted by “virtually every doctor involved in [the victim’s] emergency care,” and there were inconsistencies in the defendant’s account); Payne, 233 Ariz. at 507, ¶ 77 (finding substantial evidence the defendant caused the victim’s injuries based on testimony that the injuries likely occurred while in the defendant’s care); see also State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, 494, ¶ 27 (1999 | 1 | 1 |
State of Arizona v. Christopher Mathew Paynegreen1 sentence2023See West, 238 Ariz. at 487, ¶ 9 (finding substantial evidence the defendant caused the victim’s injury where the defendant was the only adult present when the injury occurred, the defendant’s accident defense was refuted by “virtually every doctor involved in [the victim’s] emergency care,” and there were inconsistencies in the defendant’s account); Payne, 233 Ariz. at 507, ¶ 77 (finding substantial evidence the defendant caused the victim’s injuries based on testimony that the injuries likely occurred while in the defendant’s care); see also State v. Fulminante, 193 Ariz. 485, 494, ¶ 27 (1999 | 1 | 1 |
United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Morrisgreen2 sentences2014See Morris, 154 Ariz. at 119 , 741 P.2d at 252 (adopting “[t]he better result” that “permit[s] the insurer to raise the coverage defense, and also permit[s] an *540 insured to protect himself from the risk of noncoverage or excess judgment” when insurer defends under a reservation of rights). 2014See Morris, 154 Ariz. at 119 , 741 P.2d at 252 (adopting “[t]he better result” that “permit[s] the insurer to raise the coverage defense, and also permit[s] an *540 insured to protect himself from the risk of noncoverage or excess judgment” when insurer defends under a reservation of rights). | 1 | 1 |
Banner Realty, Inc. v. Turekgreen2 sentences2010Precision, of course, disagreed and replied that any uncertainty over liability for the accident should not bar prejudgment interest if the amount of damages was certain, citing Banner Realty, Inc. v. Turek, 113 Ariz. 62, 64 , 546 P.2d 798, 800 (1976). 2010Precision, of course, disagreed and replied that any uncertainty over liability for the accident should not bar prejudgment interest if the amount of damages was certain, citing Banner Realty, Inc. v. Turek, 113 Ariz. 62, 64 , 546 P.2d 798, 800 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Brenner v. Aetna Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2007Co., 8 Ariz.App. 272, 276 , 445 P.2d 474, 478 (App.1968) (same). ¶ 16 In Transport Indemnity, the insurer argued, as CNA does here, that its policy provided no coverage because the acts of its insured did not cause the accident and therefore the claim was not one “arising out of’ the occupation of the named insured, as required for coverage under that policy. 2007Co., 8 Ariz.App. 272, 276 , 445 P.2d 474, 478 (App.1968) (same). ¶ 16 In Transport Indemnity, the insurer argued, as CNA does here, that its policy provided no coverage because the acts of its insured did not cause the accident and therefore the claim was not one “arising out of’ the occupation of the named insured, as required for coverage under that policy. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Samsel v. Allstate Insurance
green
2 sentences2006Cundiff asserts Samsel v. Allstate Insurance Co., 204 Ariz. 1 , 59 P.3d 281 (2002), “reaffirmed the expansive scope of Arizona’s collateral source rule.” Samsel , however, interpreted the meaning of a contract provision in finding an automobile insurer liable for medical expenses paid by the insured’s health care insurer and did not discuss the collateral source rule. 2006Cundiff asserts Samsel v. Allstate Insurance Co., 204 Ariz. 1 , 59 P.3d 281 (2002), “reaffirmed the expansive scope of Arizona’s collateral source rule.” Samsel , however, interpreted the meaning of a contract provision in finding an automobile insurer liable for medical expenses paid by the insured’s health care insurer and did not discuss the collateral source rule. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Matter of Mitchell
green
2 sentences1985Earlier in the opinion, the court had acknowledged that compensation could not be paid “if we strictly adhere to the accident rule laid down in the Pierce case.” Id. at 450 , 150 P.2d at 361 . 1985Earlier in the opinion, the court had acknowledged that compensation could not be paid “if we strictly adhere to the accident rule laid down in the Pierce case.” Id. at 450 , 150 P.2d at 361 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Young v. Industrial Commission
neutral
2 sentences1977In Young v. Industrial Commission, 19 Ariz.App. 304 , 506 P.2d 1089 (1973), this court stated that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission can be invoked only through compliance with statutory procedures and in order for the Industrial Commission to gain jurisdiction over a particular accident or claim, a formal application for benefits must be filed. 1977In Young v. Industrial Commission, 19 Ariz.App. 304 , 506 P.2d 1089 (1973), this court stated that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission can be invoked only through compliance with statutory procedures and in order for the Industrial Commission to gain jurisdiction over a particular accident or claim, a formal application for benefits must be filed. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Sandoval v. Chenoweth
green
2 sentences1967We have thoroughly considered appellant’s motion for rehearing who strenuously urges therein that “ * * * delay in giving notice of the accident is not a defense” in view of Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241 , 428 P.2d 98 (1967), decided by our Supreme Court subsequent to oral arguments in the instant cause. 1967We have thoroughly considered appellant’s motion for rehearing who strenuously urges therein that “ * * * delay in giving notice of the accident is not a defense” in view of Sandoval v. Chenoweth, 102 Ariz. 241 , 428 P.2d 98 (1967), decided by our Supreme Court subsequent to oral arguments in the instant cause. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.