accident presumption in Pennsylvania

1954As Mr. Justice Maxey said in Morin v. Kreidt, 310 Pa. 90, 97 , 164 A. 799 , — “When a person is killed in an accident there is a presumption arising from the general knowl *629 edge of the strength of the instinct of self-preservation and the natural desire to avoid pain and injury to oneself that the deceased at the time of the accident was exercising due care.” In the absence of proof to the contrary, it must therefore be presumed that the pilot attempted to follow the correct procedure for 'one in his position.

1954As Mr. Justice Maxey said in Morin v. Kreidt, 310 Pa. 90, 97 , 164 A. 799 , — “When a person is killed in an accident there is a presumption arising from the general knowl *629 edge of the strength of the instinct of self-preservation and the natural desire to avoid pain and injury to oneself that the deceased at the time of the accident was exercising due care.” In the absence of proof to the contrary, it must therefore be presumed that the pilot attempted to follow the correct procedure for 'one in his position.

2018With regard to the first point, the Supreme Court stated that "[s]ince the employment of a subsequent remedial measure by definition occurs in a different time frame, the evidence is said to be of diminished relevance," id. at 1140 , in proving negligence or a product's defect; this is primarily because "it applies to conduct before an accident a standard of duty determined by after-acquired knowledge." Id. at 1137 n.7.

2018With regard to the first point, the Supreme Court stated that "[s]ince the employment of a subsequent remedial measure by definition occurs in a different time frame, the evidence is said to be of diminished relevance," id. at 1140 , in proving negligence or a product's defect; this is primarily because "it applies to conduct before an accident a standard of duty determined by after-acquired knowledge." Id. at 1137 n.7.

1999Therefore, unless the insurer is actually prejudiced by the insured’s failure to give notice immediately, the insurer cannot defeat its liability under the policy because of the non-prejudicial failure of its insured to give immediate notice of an accident or claim as stipulated by a policy provision.” Id. at 75 , 371 A.2d at 197 (quoting Miller v. Marcantel, 221 So.2d 557 (La.Ct.App.1969)).

1977Therefore, unless the insurer is actually prejudiced by the insured’s failure to give notice immediately, the insurer cannot defeat its liability under the policy because of the non-prejudicial failure of its insured to give immediate notice of an accident or claim as stipulated by a policy provision.” 221 So.2d at 559 .

2001Baron, 202 Pa. at 284 , 51 A. at 980 ; see also Columbia & Puget Sound RR Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207-08 , 12 S.Ct. 591, 592-93 , 36 L.Ed. 405 (1892) (stating that "[such] evidence is incompetent, because the taking of such precautions against the future is not to be construed as an admission of responsibility for the past, has no legitimate tendency to prove that the defendant had been negligent before the accident happened, and is calculated to distract the minds of the jury from the real issue, and create a prejudice against the defendant").

1965In the case of Baran v. Reading Iron Co., 202 Pa. 274 , this Court, in disapproving of evidence showing subsequent precautions, said: “It is not more likely to show that there was negligence before the accident than that the occurrence of the accident first suggested the use of methods or appliances not before thought of; it applies to conduct before an accident a standard of duty determined by after-acquired knowledge; it punishes a prudent and well-meaning defendant who guards against the recurrence of an accident he had no reason to anticipate, or who out of a considerate regard for the saf

1993While we recognize that a determination of dependency is not confined to conditions existing upon the exact date of the accident, Dindino v. Weekly Review Publishing Co., 188 Pa.Superior Ct. 606, 149 A.2d 475 (1959), but should be based on a reasonable period of time prior to the date of death, Cf. Smitti v. Roth Cadillac Co., 145 Pa.Superior Ct. 292, 21 A.2d 127 (1941), we note that the statute does not prescribe a period of dependency before which a claimant is ineligible and, absent clear legislative intent, we will impute none.

1959In Smitti v. Roth Cadillac Co., 145 Pa. Superior Ct. 292 , 21 A. 2d 127 , the Board made a finding of and an award for partial dependency, which was set aside by the court of common pleas.

2023In concluding that the evidence was admissible, the Ulatoski Court recognized previous decisions permitting prior bad acts evidence of “previous relations between a defendant and a homicide victim” for the “purpose of proving ill will, motive or malice.” Id. at 190 .

2015In Meussner , we clarified that the accident requirement does not mean that the vehicle itself must have been involved in an accident, but that the plaintiff must have suffered an injury. 745 A.2d at 722-23 .

1998Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 124 , 661 A.2d 352, 359 (1995), cert. denied, Travaglia v. Pennsylvania, 516 U.S. 1121 , 116 S.Ct. 931 , 133 L.Ed.2d 858 (1996). [5] Appellant's PCRA hearing pre-dated the 1995 amendments to Section 9543 of the PCRA. [6] Underlying Appellant's ineffectiveness claim is her contention that trial counsel had abandoned the accident defense during trial; therefore, he was ineffective in failing to present a diminished capacity defense.

1998Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 124 , 661 A.2d 352, 359 (1995), cert. denied, Travaglia v. Pennsylvania, 516 U.S. 1121 , 116 S.Ct. 931 , 133 L.Ed.2d 858 (1996). [5] Appellant's PCRA hearing pre-dated the 1995 amendments to Section 9543 of the PCRA. [6] Underlying Appellant's ineffectiveness claim is her contention that trial counsel had abandoned the accident defense during trial; therefore, he was ineffective in failing to present a diminished capacity defense.

1998Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 124 , 661 A.2d 352, 359 (1995), cert. denied, Travaglia v. Pennsylvania, 516 U.S. 1121 , 116 S.Ct. 931 , 133 L.Ed.2d 858 (1996). [5] Appellant's PCRA hearing pre-dated the 1995 amendments to Section 9543 of the PCRA. [6] Underlying Appellant's ineffectiveness claim is her contention that trial counsel had abandoned the accident defense during trial; therefore, he was ineffective in failing to present a diminished capacity defense.

1997(N.T. 135.) In Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35 , 268 A.2d 157 (1970), our Superior Court reversed a decision of a trial judge refusing to submit the issue of punitive damages in a case involving an intoxicated driver and wrote as follows: “Automobiles represent the most lethal and deadly weapons today entrusted to our citizenry.

1997(N.T. 135.) In Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa. Super. 35 , 268 A.2d 157 (1970), our Superior Court reversed a decision of a trial judge refusing to submit the issue of punitive damages in a case involving an intoxicated driver and wrote as follows: “Automobiles represent the most lethal and deadly weapons today entrusted to our citizenry.

1993While we recognize that a determination of dependency is not confined to conditions existing upon the exact date of the accident, Dindino v. Weekly Review Publishing Co., 188 Pa.Superior Ct. 606, 149 A.2d 475 (1959), but should be based on a reasonable period of time prior to the date of death, Cf. Smitti v. Roth Cadillac Co., 145 Pa.Superior Ct. 292, 21 A.2d 127 (1941), we note that the statute does not prescribe a period of dependency before which a claimant is ineligible and, absent clear legislative intent, we will impute none.

1988In such circumstances, the trial court “may not, because of the possible unfairness or inequity of the result, reverse the [Department] or modify the penalties imposed.” Id. at 460 , 528 A.2d at 1031 , 1032 (quoting Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Verna, 23 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 260, 262 , 351 A.2d 694, 695 (1976)).

1988In such circumstances, the trial court “may not, because of the possible unfairness or inequity of the result, reverse the [Department] or modify the penalties imposed.” Id. at 460 , 528 A.2d at 1031 , 1032 (quoting Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Verna, 23 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 260, 262 , 351 A.2d 694, 695 (1976)).

1987Hogey v. Morello Excavating Company Jnc., supra. Judge Nicholas in Hogey stated: “As to all injuries occurring in the scope and course of employment after 1972, such as decedent’s, the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy.” In eliminating the accident requirement and expanding the Workmen’s Compensation Act’s coverage to include all injuries arising in the course of employment, Hinkle, supra, the already narrow exception for intentional conduct by an employer, if not eliminated, certainly remains very limited and extends only to situations where there are clear allegations

1985In Minier v. State Farm Insurance Company, 309 Pa.Super. 53 , 454 A.2d 1078 (1982), this Court determined that the fact that a decedent had retired from employment at the time of the accident did not bar recovery of work loss benefits by his surviving spouse under the No-Fault Act.

1985In Minier v. State Farm Insurance Company, 309 Pa.Super. 53 , 454 A.2d 1078 (1982), this Court determined that the fact that a decedent had retired from employment at the time of the accident did not bar recovery of work loss benefits by his surviving spouse under the No-Fault Act.

1984In Commonwealth v. Beatty, 500 Pa. 283 , 455 A.2d 1194 (1983) the court held that under subsection 110(1) (ii) the prosecution for the misdemeanor charge of aggravated assault was not barred by the defendant’s plea of guilty before the district justice of the summary offense of leaving the scene of an accident in violation of a section of the Motor Vehicle Code, even though the summary offense arose out of the same incident as the aggravated assault and even though the prosecution knew of both violations at the commencement of the proceedings.

1984In Commonwealth v. Beatty, 500 Pa. 283 , 455 A.2d 1194 (1983) the court held that under subsection 110(1) (ii) the prosecution for the misdemeanor charge of aggravated assault was not barred by the defendant’s plea of guilty before the district justice of the summary offense of leaving the scene of an accident in violation of a section of the Motor Vehicle Code, even though the summary offense arose out of the same incident as the aggravated assault and even though the prosecution knew of both violations at the commencement of the proceedings.

1983The Supreme Court rejected this argument, saying “Not only was the charge correct, but the trial Judge after charging on misadventure specifically charged the jury that ‘the burden [of proof] is with the Commonwealth throughout the trial of the case.’ ” Id., 431 Pa. at 160 , 244 A.2d at 654 .

1983The Supreme Court rejected this argument, saying “Not only was the charge correct, but the trial Judge after charging on misadventure specifically charged the jury that ‘the burden [of proof] is with the Commonwealth throughout the trial of the case.’ ” Id., 431 Pa. at 160 , 244 A.2d at 654 .