accident defense in Georgia

2022“The trial court therefore was not 5 required to give an accident instruction[.]” Id. at 11-12 (2) (e).

2021However, “a jury charge on the defense of accident to a strict liability traffic offense is available only where there is evidence, however slight, that the defendant did not voluntarily 22 State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6, 8 (2) (a) ( 734 SE2d 50 ) (2012) (citations and punctuation omitted). 23 Forte v. State, 302 Ga. 726, 729 (2) ( 808 SE2d 658 ) (2017). 11 commit the prohibited act.”24 Here, there was evidence of the bus’s speed and of the road’s features, but the trial court found there was no evidence presented related to an accident defense.

2024The State contends that slight evidence did not support the accident instruction because, in the context of the affirmative defense of accident, this Court has held that a defendant’s conclusory claims that the defendant “didn’t mean to do it” or that a particular act “was an accident” “are insufficient without more to authorize a charge on accident.” Mann v. State, 307 Ga. 696, 699 (2) (a) (838 SE2d 305) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted) 14 (holding that any error in failing to give requested accident instruction was harmless, although defendant indicated he intended to throw the seve

2024The State contends that slight evidence did not support the accident instruction because, in the context of the affirmative defense of accident, this Court has held that a defendant’s conclusory claims that the defendant “didn’t mean to do it” or that a particular act “was an accident” “are insufficient without more to authorize a charge on accident.” Mann v. State, 307 Ga. 696, 699 (2) (a) (838 SE2d 305) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted) 14 (holding that any error in failing to give requested accident instruction was harmless, although defendant indicated he intended to throw the seve

2023The court’s refusal to give an accident instruction was consistent with the law in effect at the time of trial, which held that the accident defense “generally requires an admission by the defendant that [he] committed the act that caused the victim’s death.” Kellam v. State, 298 Ga. 520, 522 (2) (783 SE2d 117) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023The court’s refusal to give an accident instruction was consistent with the law in effect at the time of trial, which held that the accident defense “generally requires an admission by the defendant that [he] committed the act that caused the victim’s death.” Kellam v. State, 298 Ga. 520, 522 (2) (783 SE2d 117) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted).

1999Busbee claims that issues of material fact remain unresolved as to his claim for “property damage because of the ‘accident’ exception to the economic loss rule.” “Accident” in this context means “a sudden and calamitous event which, although it may only cause damage to the defective product itself, poses an unreasonable risk of injury to other persons or property.” Vulcan Materials, supra. Although Busbee seeks to avail himself of the accident exception to the rule foreclosing recovery for pecuniary losses, he fails to offer any evidence of a calamity, sudden violence, collision with another o

1993Two exceptions exist to this general rule: (1) the accident exception, which allows a plaintiff to recover in tort when there is a sudden and calamitous event that not only causes damage to the product but poses an unreasonable risk of injury to persons and other property, Vulcan Materials Co., 251 Ga. at 388 ; and (2) the misrepresentation exception, which was defined by our Supreme Court as follows: “[0]ne who supplies information during the course of his business, profession, employment, or in any transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest has a duty of reasonable care and competence

2026See Fox, 321 Ga. at 415 (holding that where the evidence “supported trial counsel’s choice to pursue a self-defense strategy,” “[c]ounsel’s decision not to request an accident charge, which he believed would have undermined the all-or-nothing justification defense, was not patently unreasonable”).

2026See Fox, 321 Ga. at 415 (holding that where the evidence “supported trial counsel’s choice to pursue a self-defense strategy,” “[c]ounsel’s decision not to request an accident charge, which he believed would have undermined the all-or-nothing justification defense, was not patently unreasonable”).

2026See Johnson v. State, 316 Ga. 672, 688 (2023) (holding that the failure to give an accident instruction was harmless under plain error where the appellant’s “primary theory at trial” was not accident but that someone else caused the injuries and although the 6 Moreover, even if the jury believed Bodie’s statement that she did not know how the gun fired, the jury also could have concluded—based on Bodie’s statement and the evidence that Brummett was shot in the chest—that after Bodie grabbed the gun, she pointed it at Brummett, which would constitute criminal negligence and preclude an accident

2026See Johnson v. State, 316 Ga. 672, 688 (2023) (holding that the failure to give an accident instruction was harmless under plain error where the appellant’s “primary theory at trial” was not accident but that someone else caused the injuries and although the 6 Moreover, even if the jury believed Bodie’s statement that she did not know how the gun fired, the jury also could have concluded—based on Bodie’s statement and the evidence that Brummett was shot in the chest—that after Bodie grabbed the gun, she pointed it at Brummett, which would constitute criminal negligence and preclude an accident

2024“When successful, an accident defense ‘negates the defendant’s criminal intent, whatever that intent element is for the crime at issue.’” Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 400, 406 (2) (877 SE2d 232) (2022) (citation omitted).

2024“When successful, an accident defense ‘negates the defendant’s criminal intent, whatever that intent element is for the crime at issue.’” Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 400, 406 (2) (877 SE2d 232) (2022) (citation omitted).

2011See, e.g., Hannah v. State, 278 Ga. 195, 197 , 599 S.E.2d 177 (2004) (explaining that, because "the jury was fully *456 charged on the State's burden to prove every element of the crime of murder, including intent," and "the jury believed Hannah to be guilty of malice murder, it could not have believed [the victim's] death to be the result of an act committed in the absence of criminal intent"); Phillips v. State, 247 Ga. 13, 13 , 273 S.E.2d 606 (1981) (holding that the failure to give an accident instruction did not require reversal because the jury's decision to convict the defendant of murd

2011See, e.g., Hannah v. State, 278 Ga. 195, 197 , 599 S.E.2d 177 (2004) (explaining that, because "the jury was fully *456 charged on the State's burden to prove every element of the crime of murder, including intent," and "the jury believed Hannah to be guilty of malice murder, it could not have believed [the victim's] death to be the result of an act committed in the absence of criminal intent"); Phillips v. State, 247 Ga. 13, 13 , 273 S.E.2d 606 (1981) (holding that the failure to give an accident instruction did not require reversal because the jury's decision to convict the defendant of murd

2017See Stinchcomb v. State, 280 Ga. 170, 174 (5) ( 626 SE2d 88 ) (2006) (trial counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to pursue a defense that “was not adjusted to the evidence of the case”).

2017See Stinchcomb v. State, 280 Ga. 170, 174 (5) ( 626 SE2d 88 ) (2006) (trial counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to pursue a defense that “was not adjusted to the evidence of the case”).

2012Cf. Ogilvie v. State, 313 Ga. App. 305, 308-310 (2) (a), (b) ( 721 SE2d 549 ) (2011) (ruling that the defendant in a vehicular homicide case was entitled to a jury charge for the jury’s determination of the accident defense); Morris v. State, 210 Ga. App. 617, 618 (2) ( 436 SE2d 785 ) (1993) (same).

2012Cf. Ogilvie v. State, 313 Ga. App. 305, 308-310 (2) (a), (b) ( 721 SE2d 549 ) (2011) (ruling that the defendant in a vehicular homicide case was entitled to a jury charge for the jury’s determination of the accident defense); Morris v. State, 210 Ga. App. 617, 618 (2) ( 436 SE2d 785 ) (1993) (same).

2012See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 255 Ga. App. 585, 591-592 (6) ( 565 SE2d 889 ) (2002) (trial court’s charges on accident and proximate cause proper and adjusted to evidence in case when boat passenger jumped in front of approaching boat on collision course with passenger’s boat).

2012See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 255 Ga. App. 585, 591-592 (6) ( 565 SE2d 889 ) (2002) (trial court’s charges on accident and proximate cause proper and adjusted to evidence in case when boat passenger jumped in front of approaching boat on collision course with passenger’s boat).

2012Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court for the January 2012 term and submitted for decision on the briefs. 2 But see DeLeon v. State, 289 Ga. 782, 783 ( 716 SE2d 173 ) (2011) (finding no error where witnesses “were not asked and did not testify as to whether they believed appellant acted in self-defense and so they did not express an opinion on the ultimate issue of fact”). 3 But see Stewart v. State, 261 Ga. 654, 654 ( 409 SE2d 663 ) (1991) (holding that the trial court was not required to give an accident instruction where the defendant said pre-tr

2012Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court for the January 2012 term and submitted for decision on the briefs. 2 But see DeLeon v. State, 289 Ga. 782, 783 ( 716 SE2d 173 ) (2011) (finding no error where witnesses “were not asked and did not testify as to whether they believed appellant acted in self-defense and so they did not express an opinion on the ultimate issue of fact”). 3 But see Stewart v. State, 261 Ga. 654, 654 ( 409 SE2d 663 ) (1991) (holding that the trial court was not required to give an accident instruction where the defendant said pre-tr

2012Cf. Ogilvie v. State, 313 Ga. App. 305, 308-310 (2) (a), (b) ( 721 SE2d 549 ) (2011) (ruling that the defendant in a vehicular homicide case was entitled to a jury charge for the jury’s determination of the accident defense); Morris v. State, 210 Ga. App. 617, 618 (2) ( 436 SE2d 785 ) (1993) (same).

2012Cf. Ogilvie v. State, 313 Ga. App. 305, 308-310 (2) (a), (b) ( 721 SE2d 549 ) (2011) (ruling that the defendant in a vehicular homicide case was entitled to a jury charge for the jury’s determination of the accident defense); Morris v. State, 210 Ga. App. 617, 618 (2) ( 436 SE2d 785 ) (1993) (same).

2003In essence, “an accident defense involves the lack of intent to do the act at all.” Fields v. State, 167 Ga. App. 816, 818 (3) ( 307 SE2d 712 ) (1983).

2003In essence, “an accident defense involves the lack of intent to do the act at all.” Fields v. State, 167 Ga. App. 816, 818 (3) ( 307 SE2d 712 ) (1983).

2021Co. v. Gingold, 249 Ga. 156 , 157- 158 (1) ( 288 SE2d 557 ) (1982) (When the insured under a vehicle liability policy failed to cooperate with the insurer by concealing his whereabouts, the insurer was unable to obtain the insured’s required consent to settle the accident claim and proceeded to trial.

2021Co. v. Gingold, 249 Ga. 156 , 157- 158 (1) ( 288 SE2d 557 ) (1982) (When the insured under a vehicle liability policy failed to cooperate with the insurer by concealing his whereabouts, the insurer was unable to obtain the insured’s required consent to settle the accident claim and proceeded to trial.

2019Similarly, Georgia's vehicular-homicide statute provides that a driver "who, without malice aforethought, causes an accident which causes the death of another person and leaves the scene of the accident in violation of subsection (b) of Code Section 40-6-270 commits the offense of homicide by vehicle in the first degree," OCGA § 40-6-393 (b), and " 'the term "cause" has been regularly construed as requiring proximate causation' " in that context, State v. Ogilvie , 292 Ga. 6 , 11, 734 S.E.2d 50 (2012) (quoting State v. Jackson , 287 Ga. 646 , 654, 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010) ).

2019Similarly, Georgia's vehicular-homicide statute provides that a driver "who, without malice aforethought, causes an accident which causes the death of another person and leaves the scene of the accident in violation of subsection (b) of Code Section 40-6-270 commits the offense of homicide by vehicle in the first degree," OCGA § 40-6-393 (b), and " 'the term "cause" has been regularly construed as requiring proximate causation' " in that context, State v. Ogilvie , 292 Ga. 6 , 11, 734 S.E.2d 50 (2012) (quoting State v. Jackson , 287 Ga. 646 , 654, 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010) ).

1998Therefore, the instruction on accident should no longer be given in civil cases in Georgia after January 21, 1993, the date this opinion is published in the advance sheets of the Georgia Reports. [Cit.]" (Footnotes omitted.) Tolbert v. Duckworth, supra at 623-624, 423 S.E.2d 229 .

1993Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338 ( 312 SE2d 835 ) (1983); see Tolbert v. Duckworth, 262 Ga. 622 ( 423 SE2d 229 ) (1992).

1998Where, as here, the court charges the jury on the elements of the defense of accident, the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof in general, criminal intent, and the burden to prove the elements of the crimes alleged in the indictment, it is not error to fail to again instruct on the State’s burden in the context of the accident defense.” Ross v. State, 268 Ga. 122, 125 (7) ( 485 SE2d 780 ) (1997). (b) Redd contends that the trial court committed reversible error by not charging the jury that “an affirmative defense is a defense that admits the doing of the act charged but seeks to jus

1998Where, as here, the court charges the jury on the elements of the defense of accident, the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof in general, criminal intent, and the burden to prove the elements of the crimes alleged in the indictment, it is not error to fail to again instruct on the State’s burden in the context of the accident defense.” Ross v. State, 268 Ga. 122, 125 (7) ( 485 SE2d 780 ) (1997). (b) Redd contends that the trial court committed reversible error by not charging the jury that “an affirmative defense is a defense that admits the doing of the act charged but seeks to jus

2026See Harris, 292 Ga. at 496 .

2024The State contends that slight evidence did not support the accident instruction because, in the context of the affirmative defense of accident, this Court has held that a defendant’s conclusory claims that the defendant “didn’t mean to do it” or that a particular act “was an accident” “are insufficient without more to authorize a charge on accident.” Mann v. State, 307 Ga. 696, 699 (2) (a) (838 SE2d 305) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted) 14 (holding that any error in failing to give requested accident instruction was harmless, although defendant indicated he intended to throw the seve

2024The State contends that slight evidence did not support the accident instruction because, in the context of the affirmative defense of accident, this Court has held that a defendant’s conclusory claims that the defendant “didn’t mean to do it” or that a particular act “was an accident” “are insufficient without more to authorize a charge on accident.” Mann v. State, 307 Ga. 696, 699 (2) (a) (838 SE2d 305) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted) 14 (holding that any error in failing to give requested accident instruction was harmless, although defendant indicated he intended to throw the seve

2024See Stepp-McCommons, 309 Ga. at 403-404 (2) (a) (no error in 20 omitting accident instruction where defendant testified he shot the victim in self-defense without intending to “murder” the victim); Morris v. State, 303 Ga. 192, 199-200 (V) (C) (811 SE2d 321) (2018) (accident instruction unwarranted when evidence supported only a self-defense instruction); Dolensek v. State, 274 Ga. 678, 680 (6) (558 SE2d 713) (2002) (no error in omitting accident instruction when evidence demonstrated only that the defendant acted intentionally “to defend himself and to scare off his attackers”). 2.

2024See Stepp-McCommons, 309 Ga. at 403-404 (2) (a) (no error in 20 omitting accident instruction where defendant testified he shot the victim in self-defense without intending to “murder” the victim); Morris v. State, 303 Ga. 192, 199-200 (V) (C) (811 SE2d 321) (2018) (accident instruction unwarranted when evidence supported only a self-defense instruction); Dolensek v. State, 274 Ga. 678, 680 (6) (558 SE2d 713) (2002) (no error in omitting accident instruction when evidence demonstrated only that the defendant acted intentionally “to defend himself and to scare off his attackers”). 2.

2024The State contends that slight evidence did not support the accident instruction because, in the context of the affirmative defense of accident, this Court has held that a defendant’s conclusory claims that the defendant “didn’t mean to do it” or that a particular act “was an accident” “are insufficient without more to authorize a charge on accident.” Mann v. State, 307 Ga. 696, 699 (2) (a) (838 SE2d 305) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted) 14 (holding that any error in failing to give requested accident instruction was harmless, although defendant indicated he intended to throw the seve

2024The State contends that slight evidence did not support the accident instruction because, in the context of the affirmative defense of accident, this Court has held that a defendant’s conclusory claims that the defendant “didn’t mean to do it” or that a particular act “was an accident” “are insufficient without more to authorize a charge on accident.” Mann v. State, 307 Ga. 696, 699 (2) (a) (838 SE2d 305) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted) 14 (holding that any error in failing to give requested accident instruction was harmless, although defendant indicated he intended to throw the seve

2024McClain v. State, 303 Ga. 6, 9-10 (2) (810 SE2d 77) (2018); see also Sears v. State, 290 Ga. 1, 4 (3) (717 SE2d 453) (2011); Hannah v. State, 278 Ga. 195, 197 (2) (599 SE2d 177) (2004).

2024McClain v. State, 303 Ga. 6, 9-10 (2) (810 SE2d 77) (2018); see also Sears v. State, 290 Ga. 1, 4 (3) (717 SE2d 453) (2011); Hannah v. State, 278 Ga. 195, 197 (2) (599 SE2d 177) (2004).