87 California opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2026 33 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency v. Angela G.green2 sentences2026(In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 (Michael G.).) “The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts.” (Ibid.) We must “account for the clear and convincing standard of proof when addressing a claim that the evidence does not support a finding made under this standard,” as we do here. 2025Rather, we only look at whether the court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. “‘If such substantial evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.’” (Jameson v. Five Feet Restaurant, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 138, 143 , italics omitted.) Further, we do “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or indulge in inferences contrary to the findings of the trial court. [Citations.] The substantial evidence standard of review is generally co | 9 | 36 |
United States v. Salernogreen2 sentences2024A facial challenge to a legislative act is “the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be valid.” (United States v. Salerno (1987) 481 U.S. 739, 745 , italics added (Salerno).) The fact that an act “might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.” (Ibid.) This is because Supreme Court jurisprudence does not recognize “an ‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment.” (Ibid.) As we unde 2024Overbreadth Welch contends the shooting from a motor vehicle special circumstance is overinclusive and unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. 31 To prevail in a facial challenge, the appellant “ ‘must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [regulation] would be valid.’ ” (Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S. 292, 301 (Reno); see also New York v. Ferber (1982) 458 U.S. 747, 768 [explaining that this “practice also fulfills a valuable institutional purpose: it allows state cou | 7 | 13 |
Tobe v. City of Santa Anagreen2 sentences2016“A facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute[,] . . . ordinance [or policy] considers only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular circumstances of an individual. [Citation.]” (Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 (Tobe).) “A facial challenge is ‘“the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [provision] would be valid.”’ [Citation.]” (T.H. v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1281 .) The moving party “‘“cannot 2015(Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 .) A facial challenge to a statute is "the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid." (United States v. Salerno (1987) 481 U.S. 739, 745 .) Section 278.5(a), which defines the crime of malicious child abduction, was originally enacted "to encourage parents who are unhappy with custody or visitation provisions under existing conditions to return to the civil court to seek judicial clarification or modification of the order | 3 | 5 |
People v. Andersongreen2 sentences1976A difficult standard does not make a statute unconstitutionally vague. [Citation.] ‘[Statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.’ (United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 561, 565 , 83 S.Ct. 594 ]; see also People v. Seale, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at p. 115 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 811 ].) [If] Moreover, except when First Amendment interests are involved [citation], the constitutional certainty of a statute is not determined by reference to hypothetical facts. 1976A difficult standard does not make a statute unconstitutionally vague. [Citation.] ‘[Statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.’ (United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 561, 565 , 83 S.Ct. 594 ]; see also People v. Seale, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at p. 115 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 811 ].) [If] Moreover, except when First Amendment interests are involved [citation], the constitutional certainty of a statute is not determined by reference to hypothetical facts. | 3 | 3 |
United States v. National Dairy Products Corp.green2 sentences1976A difficult standard does not make a statute unconstitutionally vague. [Citation.] ‘[Statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.’ (United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 561, 565 , 83 S.Ct. 594 ]; see also People v. Seale, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at p. 115 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 811 ].) [If] Moreover, except when First Amendment interests are involved [citation], the constitutional certainty of a statute is not determined by reference to hypothetical facts. 1976A difficult standard does not make a statute unconstitutionally vague. [Citation.] ‘[Statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.’ (United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 561, 565 , 83 S.Ct. 594 ]; see also People v. Seale, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at p. 115 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 811 ].) [If] Moreover, except when First Amendment interests are involved [citation], the constitutional certainty of a statute is not determined by reference to hypothetical facts. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Sealegreen2 sentences1976A difficult standard does not make a statute unconstitutionally vague. [Citation.] ‘[Statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.’ (United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 561, 565 , 83 S.Ct. 594 ]; see also People v. Seale, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at p. 115 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 811 ].) [If] Moreover, except when First Amendment interests are involved [citation], the constitutional certainty of a statute is not determined by reference to hypothetical facts. 1976A difficult standard does not make a statute unconstitutionally vague. [Citation.] ‘[Statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language.’ (United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 561, 565 , 83 S.Ct. 594 ]; see also People v. Seale, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at p. 115 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 811 ].) [If] Moreover, except when First Amendment interests are involved [citation], the constitutional certainty of a statute is not determined by reference to hypothetical facts. | 3 | 3 |
People ex rel. Lockyer v. Fremont Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2022Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 520 (Fremont).) “[W]hen ‘a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.] [A defendant] raising a claim of insufficiency of the evidence assumes a “daunting burden.” ’ ” (Overstock.com, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1079 .) “ ‘The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the m 2022Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 520 (Fremont).) “[W]hen ‘a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.] [A defendant] raising a claim of insufficiency of the evidence assumes a “daunting burden.” ’ ” (Overstock.com, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1079 .) “ ‘The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the m | 2 | 2 |
In re Berrygreen2 sentences1975A difficult standard does not make a statute unconstitutionally vague. 8 (See People v. Seale, 274 Cal.App.2d 107, 115 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 811 ].) “[Statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language." (United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 561, 565 , 83 S.Ct. 594 ]; see also People v. Seale, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at p. 115.) Moreover, except when First Amendment interests are involved (In re Berry, 68 Cal.2d 137, 152, fn. 11 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 436 P.2d 273 1975A difficult standard does not make a statute unconstitutionally vague. 8 (See People v. Seale, 274 Cal.App.2d 107, 115 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 811 ].) “[Statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language." (United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 561, 565 , 83 S.Ct. 594 ]; see also People v. Seale, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at p. 115.) Moreover, except when First Amendment interests are involved (In re Berry, 68 Cal.2d 137, 152, fn. 11 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 436 P.2d 273 | 2 | 2 |
T.H. v. San Diego Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences2018"A facial challenge is ' "the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid ." ' " ( T.H. v. San Diego Unified School Dist . (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1267 , 1281, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 .) "To resolve a facial challenge, we consider 'only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular circumstances' of this case." ( Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197 , 218, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 358 , 303 P.3d 1140 ( Today's Fresh Start 2018"A facial challenge is ' "the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid ." ' " ( T.H. v. San Diego Unified School Dist . (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1267 , 1281, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 .) "To resolve a facial challenge, we consider 'only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular circumstances' of this case." ( Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197 , 218, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 358 , 303 P.3d 1140 ( Today's Fresh Start | 1 | 5 |
Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc.green2 sentences2014(E.g., Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968 .) The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts. 2014(E.g., Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968 .) The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most difficult standard of review for an appellant to meet because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts. | 1 | 3 |
Hatch v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2020But, as the parties have made no such argument, we do not further address the issue. 7 A facial challenge is “‘the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.’ [Citation.]” (Hatch v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 170, 193 , italics omitted.) In a facial attack, a person “‘“cannot prevail by suggesting that in some future hypothetical situation constitutional problems may possibly arise as to the particular application of the [provision].”’ [Citation.]” (Coffman Specialties, 2004(See Hatch v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 170, 192-193 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 453 ].) A facial challenge is “ ‘the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.' ” (Id. at p. 193.) The moving party must show that the challenged statutes or regulations “ ‘ “inevitably pose a present total and fatal conflict” ’ ” with applicable prohibitions. | 1 | 2 |
Howard v. Owens Corninggreen2 sentences2016(See Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396 , 405–406 (Zeth S.) [no exceptional circumstances to justify deviating from general rule that appeal reviews the correctness of judgment as of the time of its rendition].) 12 (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631 .) The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts. 2012(Bickel, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1053 ; Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 ]; Howard v. Owens Coming (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 386 ].) The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts. | 1 | 2 |
| Falcone v. Fykegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garcia v. Border Transp. Grp., LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reno v. Floresgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rodriguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Hansengreen | 1 | 1 |
| New York v. Ferbergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gonzalez v. Rebollo CA4/1green | 1 | 1 |
| Perez v. Torres-Hernandez CA1/4green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lortzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Jasmine D.green | 1 | 1 |
| Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Crystal R.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Allied Oil Corp.
green
2 sentences2011In United States v. Salerno (1987) 481 U.S. 739 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 697 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 ], our Supreme Court stated: “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. 2011This type of challenge “contemplates analysis of the facts of a particular case or cases to determine the circumstances in which the [measure] has been applied and to consider whether in those particular circumstances the application deprived the individual to whom it was applied of a protected right.” (Ibid.) Petitioner California Redevelopment Association concedes that it is making a facial challenge to Assembly Bill IX 27. 3 “A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumsta | 6 | 1990–2011 |
CADC/RADC Venture 2011-1 LLC v. Bradley
green
2 sentences2022(CADC/RADC Venture 2011-1 LLC v. Bradley (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 775, 787 .) “The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 .) The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that the judgment or order challenged on appeal is presumed to be correct, and “it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573 .) “ ‘All 2021(CADC/RADC Venture 2011-1 LLC v. Bradley (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 775, 787 .) “The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 .) 4 Plaintiffs have not raised the choice of law issue on appeal. 5 In this discussion we will: A) state the principles of law regarding petitions to vacate arbitration awards; B) summarize the relevant evidence presented by the parties in the trial court; and | 5 | 2018–2022 |
Denham v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2026(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 ; Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608–609 [judgment being challenged is presumed to be correct and error 26 We note that an even more difficult standard may apply to Voice. 2026(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 ; Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608–609 [judgment being challenged is presumed to be correct and error 26 We note that an even more difficult standard may apply to Voice. | 4 | 2022–2026 |
People v. Hung Hao Nguyen
green
2 sentences2024It’s the standard in every single criminal case.’ ” (Id. at p. 35.) The appellate court held that this argument was misconduct because it “trivialize[d] the reasonable doubt standard.” (Nguyen, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 36 .) The court explained: “It is clear the almost reflexive decision to change lanes while driving is quite different from the reasonable doubt standard in a criminal case. 2021It’s the standard in every single criminal case.’ ” (Nguyen, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 35 .) The appellate court held that this was misconduct because it “trivialize[d] the reasonable doubt standard.” (Nguyen, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 36 .) The court explained: “It is clear the almost reflexive decision to change lanes while driving is quite different from the reasonable doubt standard in a criminal case. | 3 | 2015–2024 |
Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019"Defendants raising a claim of insufficiency of the evidence assume[] a 'daunting burden.' " (Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 678 .) "The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts." (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 .) Requiring an appellant to confront all the material evidence on a point, especially the "bad facts" before making a substantial evidence argument will lead to most substantia 2015(Ibid.) To be “outrageous,” the conduct must go “beyond all bounds of decency; ordinary rude or insulting behavior is not enough . . . .” (5 Witkin, supra, § 451 at p. 669.) 23 A party “raising a claim of insufficiency of the evidence assumes a daunting burden.” (Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 678 .) “The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 .) Acco | 3 | 2014–2019 |
In Re Zeth S.
green
2 sentences2016(See Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396 , 405–406 (Zeth S.) [no exceptional circumstances to justify deviating from general rule that appeal reviews the correctness of judgment as of the time of its rendition].) 12 (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631 .) The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts. 2014(See Zeth S., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 405 .) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), provides an exception to termination of parental rights when "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." The so-called "beneficial relationship exception" thus establishes a two-prong test requiring assessment of two criteria: (1) a parent's contact and visitation with the child, and (2) the benefit to the child of continuing the existing relationship. | 3 | 2012–2016 |
Jameson v. Desta
green
2 sentences2026(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 ; Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608–609 [judgment being challenged is presumed to be correct and error 26 We note that an even more difficult standard may apply to Voice. 2026(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 ; Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 , 608–609 [judgment being challenged is presumed to be correct and error 26 We note that an even more difficult standard may apply to Voice. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc.
green
2 sentences2026Where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof—here, Voice—did not carry its burden and that party appeals, “ ‘it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.’ ” (Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 465 .) “ ‘This follows because such a characterization is conceptually one that allows an attack on (1) the evidence supporting the party who had no burden of proof, and (2) the trier of fact’s unassailable conclusions that the party with the burden did not prove one or more ele 2026Where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof—here, Voice—did not carry its burden and that party appeals, “ ‘it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.’ ” (Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 465 .) “ ‘This follows because such a characterization is conceptually one that allows an attack on (1) the evidence supporting the party who had no burden of proof, and (2) the trier of fact’s unassailable conclusions that the party with the burden did not prove one or more ele | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Patricia A. Murray Dental Corp. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc.
green
2 sentences2026Where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof—here, Voice—did not carry its burden and that party appeals, “ ‘it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.’ ” (Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 465 .) “ ‘This follows because such a characterization is conceptually one that allows an attack on (1) the evidence supporting the party who had no burden of proof, and (2) the trier of fact’s unassailable conclusions that the party with the burden did not prove one or more ele 2026Where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof—here, Voice—did not carry its burden and that party appeals, “ ‘it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.’ ” (Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 465 .) “ ‘This follows because such a characterization is conceptually one that allows an attack on (1) the evidence supporting the party who had no burden of proof, and (2) the trier of fact’s unassailable conclusions that the party with the burden did not prove one or more ele | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Loeffler v. Medina
green
2 sentences2024(Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1505 .) This standard is “generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 .) Michael cannot meet this standard, because his failure to provide a complete record on appeal precludes a finding of error. 2023(Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 389, 396 (Perez).) An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling “ ‘exceeds the bounds of reason.’ ” (Ibid.) “To the extent that we are called upon to review the trial court’s factual findings, we apply a substantial evidence standard of review.” (Loeffler v. Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1505 .) This standard is “generally considered the most difficult standard of review to 8 meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 | 2 | 2023–2024 |
People v. Overstock.com, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 520 (Fremont).) “[W]hen ‘a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.] [A defendant] raising a claim of insufficiency of the evidence assumes a “daunting burden.” ’ ” (Overstock.com, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1079 .) “ ‘The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the m 2022Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 520 (Fremont).) “[W]hen ‘a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact.’ [Citations.]” [Citation.] [A defendant] raising a claim of insufficiency of the evidence assumes a “daunting burden.” ’ ” (Overstock.com, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1079 .) “ ‘The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the m | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education
green
2 sentences2018"A facial challenge is ' "the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid ." ' " ( T.H. v. San Diego Unified School Dist . (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1267 , 1281, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 .) "To resolve a facial challenge, we consider 'only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular circumstances' of this case." ( Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197 , 218, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 358 , 303 P.3d 1140 ( Today's Fresh Start 2018"A facial challenge is ' "the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid ." ' " ( T.H. v. San Diego Unified School Dist . (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1267 , 1281, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 .) "To resolve a facial challenge, we consider 'only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular circumstances' of this case." ( Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197 , 218, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 358 , 303 P.3d 1140 ( Today's Fresh Start | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. V.V.
green
2 sentences2016(Luis B., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1121-1123.) Those cases are clearly inapposite, because unlike the case before us, the minors were never given the statutorily required notice of their DEJ eligibility. 23 reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] Thus, if the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact‟s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]‟ [Citation.]” (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026 .) “The substantial evidence 2016(Luis B., supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1121-1123.) Those cases are clearly inapposite, because unlike the case before us, the minors were never given the statutorily required notice of their DEJ eligibility. 23 reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] Thus, if the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026 .) “The substantial evidence | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Bowers v. Bernards
green
2 sentences2015(Ibid.) To be “outrageous,” the conduct must go “beyond all bounds of decency; ordinary rude or insulting behavior is not enough . . . .” (5 Witkin, supra, § 451 at p. 669.) 23 A party “raising a claim of insufficiency of the evidence assumes a daunting burden.” (Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 678 .) “The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts.” (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589 .) Acco 2014Standard of review The bulk of Frey’s appeal involves his assertion that there is not substantial evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings.9 In such cases, we determine whether, “on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination, and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, [we are] without power to substitute [our] deductions for those of the trial court.” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870 , 873–874, italics omitted.) This is a difficult standard of review to meet, an | 2 | 2014–2015 |
People v. Watson
green
1 sentence2026(See In re A.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 372 [Courts of Appeal are split regarding the standard for prejudice]; In re Christopher L., at p. 1083 [declining to decide which standard of prejudice applies].) Even under the more difficult standard for an appellant, which requires proof of a reasonable probability of a more favorable result (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ), the errors were prejudicial. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Jameson v. Five Feet Restaurant, Inc. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Robert v. Greenberg
green
1 sentence2025This is the nature of 8 factfinding. ‘The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Greenberg (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1099 .) “In that role, the judge may reject any evidence as unworthy of credence, even uncontradicted testimony. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 979 (Falcone).) In reviewing for substantial evidence, we do “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or indulge in inferences contrary to the findings of the trial court. [Citations.] The | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Tison v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2025As our state Supreme Court explained in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 , 799–802 (Banks), two United States Supreme Court cases are useful in understanding the opposing ends of this spectrum: Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison), and Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Enmund v. Florida green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Banks
green
1 sentence2025As our state Supreme Court explained in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 , 799–802 (Banks), two United States Supreme Court cases are useful in understanding the opposing ends of this spectrum: Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison), and Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Kyles v. Whitley green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Foust v. San Jose Construction Co. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Conagra Grocery Prods. Co. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Skinner v. Vacaville Unified School District green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Smith v. County of Los Angeles green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. SANGHERA green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Sanchez v. City of Modesto green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Home Builders Assn. v. City of Napa green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| HUONG QUE, INC. v. Luu green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Sabbah v. Sabbah green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| In Re Marriage of Drake green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Kraft green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Ritchie v. Konrad green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| American Civil Rights Foundation v. Berkeley Unified School District green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Costa Mesa City Employees' Ass'n v. City of Costa Mesa green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Rental Housing Owners Ass'n v. City of Hayward green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Bolin green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Stevens green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Integrated Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. VitaVet Labs, Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Gurule green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.