difficult challenge in Pennsylvania

2026Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269 . - 34 - J-A06038-26 Trial Court Reasoning The assessment of whether termination serves Child’s needs and welfare was undoubtedly the most challenging aspect of this case.

2026Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269 .

2025“They are also ‘the most difficult challenge to mount successfully[.]’” Id., quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).

2022As these standards plainly reflect, “facial challenges are generally disfavored,” Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1223 n.37, and they are “the most difficult challenge to mount successfully[.]” Commonwealth v. Pownall, 278 A.3d 885 , 905 (Pa. 2022) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).

2022In PEDF II, 161 A.3d 911 , the Foundation, the petitioner in this case, challenged the constitutionality of several provisions of The Fiscal Code that directed revenue generated by the lease of state forest and park lands for oil and gas extraction to be used to fund state government operations.

2016This is a difficult standard to meet, as Pennsylvania’s guilty plea procedures are designed to guarantee assurance that guilty pleas “are voluntarily and understandingly tendered.” Yeomans, 24 A.3d at 1046 .

2013Though, as noted above, all constitutional challenges to statutes are, by their nature, uphill battles, a facial challenge is “the most difficult challenge to mount successfully.” U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).

2013In Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991), 3 this Court was explicit in its recognition that we are not obliged to follow federal constitutional law in lockstep when construing similar provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

2013In Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374 , 586 A.2d 887 (1991), 3 this Court was explicit in its recognition that we are not obliged to follow federal constitutional law in lockstep when construing similar provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

2009Appellant took and passed the test in 1992, after which he drove an eighteen wheeler on a route between Pennsylvania and New Jersey. [7] The trial court incorporated into its May 27, 2007 Opinion in Support of Jury Verdict and Sentence its Opinion and Order dated January 24, 2007, in which the court analyzed the testimony presented at the four-day hearing on appellant's petition to bar the death penalty and concluded that appellant had failed to establish that he was mentally retarded prior to the age of eighteen. [8] The AAMR's Mental Retardation defines mental retardation as a "disability ch

2009Prior to United States v. Salerno, supra, the High Court required only that a party making a facial challenge establish that the invalid applications of a statute must be real and substantial, and are “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739-40 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments) (discussing cases). 35 In United States v. Salerno , the High Court seemed to suggest a stricter standard, stating t

2009Prior to United States v. Salerno, supra, the High Court required only that a party making a facial challenge establish that the invalid applications of a statute must be real and substantial, and are “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739-40 , 117 S.Ct. 2258 , 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments) (discussing cases). 35 In United States v. Salerno , the High Court seemed to suggest a stricter standard, stating t

1991I have opined on the viability of Praisner at some length in my dissenting opinion in Trackers Raceway, Inc. v. Comstock, 400 Pa.Super. 432 , 583 A.2d 1193 (1990) (en banc), which was argued as a companion to this case because it too presented a question of the appealability of an order dismissing fewer than all of the claims for relief against a particular defendant in a multi-count complaint.

1991I have opined on the viability of Praisner at some length in my dissenting opinion in Trackers Raceway, Inc. v. Comstock, 400 Pa.Super. 432 , 583 A.2d 1193 (1990) (en banc), which was argued as a companion to this case because it too presented a question of the appealability of an order dismissing fewer than all of the claims for relief against a particular defendant in a multi-count complaint.

1989Fruehauf Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Cornell), 31 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 341 , 376 A.2d 277 (1977).

1989Fruehauf Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Cornell), 31 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 341 , 376 A.2d 277 (1977).

1987A criminal case requires proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” whereas the burden of proof in a civil case is “by a fair preponderance of the evidence.” Shearer v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 156 A.2d 182 , 397 Pa. 566 (1960).

1987A criminal case requires proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” whereas the burden of proof in a civil case is “by a fair preponderance of the evidence.” Shearer v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 156 A.2d 182 , 397 Pa. 566 (1960).

1970Generally, this question is for the fact-finding tribunal (Bleman v. Gold, 431 Pa. 348 , 246 A. 2d 376 (1968)), *402 yet where the relevant facts are not in dispute and the remoteness of the casual connection between the first actor’s negligence (here Williams) and the injury to the plaintiff (Clevenstein) is so clear it becomes one of law.

1970Generally, this question is for the fact-finding tribunal (Bleman v. Gold, 431 Pa. 348 , 246 A. 2d 376 (1968)), *402 yet where the relevant facts are not in dispute and the remoteness of the casual connection between the first actor’s negligence (here Williams) and the injury to the plaintiff (Clevenstein) is so clear it becomes one of law.

1956In Gaydos v. Domabyl, supra, it is said: “It was early held that ‘parents’ and ‘children’ were words used to show an intention of indicating a family relation in point of fact as the foundation of the right of action. . . .

1944We are further supported in this view by the consideration that while, in the Brady case, the proceedings were in equity before a chancellor, actions to recover on the statutory liability must be brought at law (Gordon, Secretary of Banking, v. Biesinger, 335 Pa. 1 , 6 A. 2d 425 ), and it would be obviously impractical to have a multitude of different juries, in suits brought by the Receiver of a bank against its numerous stockholders, attempt to determine whether the Secretary of Banking acted with proper expedition in making the assessment, —a problem complicated, as it is, by the many diffi

1944We are further supported in this view by the consideration that while, in the Brady case, the proceedings were in equity before a chancellor, actions to recover on the statutory liability must be brought at law (Gordon, Secretary of Banking, v. Biesinger, 335 Pa. 1 , 6 A. 2d 425 ), and it would be obviously impractical to have a multitude of different juries, in suits brought by the Receiver of a bank against its numerous stockholders, attempt to determine whether the Secretary of Banking acted with proper expedition in making the assessment, —a problem complicated, as it is, by the many diffi