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8 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1935–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Koshko v. Haininggreen1 sentence2020Mr. Whittington failed to 4 The Court observed in Copes that “[u]nlike an application for a search warrant, the application to use a pen register or trap and trace device need not demonstrate probable cause that a crime has been committed or that the evidence relating to that crime will be acquired through use of the device.” Copes, 454 Md. at 591-92 . 16 mount a facial challenge to CP § 1-203.1 because he did not demonstrate that there is “no set of circumstances” under which the statute would be valid.5 Moreover, under the “canon of constitutional avoidance,” our review is guided by the “pri | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Salernogreen1 sentence2020“A facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallasgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2645 , 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013) ("A facial challenge to a [statute] ... is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 , 118 S.Ct. 2168 , 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) (“Facial invalidation is, manifestly, strong medicine that has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.” (Ci 2016See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2645 , 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013) ("A facial challenge to a [statute] ... is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 , 118 S.Ct. 2168 , 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) (“Facial invalidation is, manifestly, strong medicine that has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.” (Ci | 1 | 1 |
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finleygreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2645 , 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013) ("A facial challenge to a [statute] ... is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 , 118 S.Ct. 2168 , 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) (“Facial invalidation is, manifestly, strong medicine that has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.” (Ci 2016See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2645 , 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013) ("A facial challenge to a [statute] ... is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 , 118 S.Ct. 2168 , 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) (“Facial invalidation is, manifestly, strong medicine that has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.” (Ci | 1 | 1 |
Shelby County v. Holdergreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2645 , 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013) ("A facial challenge to a [statute] ... is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 , 118 S.Ct. 2168 , 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) (“Facial invalidation is, manifestly, strong medicine that has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.” (Ci 2016See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2645 , 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013) ("A facial challenge to a [statute] ... is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 , 118 S.Ct. 2168 , 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) (“Facial invalidation is, manifestly, strong medicine that has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.” (Ci | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Motor Vehicle Administrationgreen1 sentence2016See id. at 242 , 999 A.2d at 1025 (“[T]he continued possession of a driver’s license may become essential to earning a livelihood . . . . | 1 | 1 |
Bowers v. Stategreen2 sentences1999As we pointed out in Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. at 284 , 681 A.2d at 44 , citing Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 374-76 , 605 A.2d 103, 106-07 (1992), and Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 425-27 , 578 A.2d 734, 738-39 (1990), the petitioner must show "that there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," although that test "should not focus solely on an outcome determination, but should consider `whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.'" Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. a 1999As we pointed out in Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. at 284 , 681 A.2d at 44 , citing Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 374-76 , 605 A.2d 103, 106-07 (1992), and Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 425-27 , 578 A.2d 734, 738-39 (1990), the petitioner must show "that there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," although that test "should not focus solely on an outcome determination, but should consider `whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.'" Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. a | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences1999As we pointed out in Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. at 284 , 681 A.2d at 44 , citing Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 374-76 , 605 A.2d 103, 106-07 (1992), and Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 425-27 , 578 A.2d 734, 738-39 (1990), the petitioner must show "that there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," although that test "should not focus solely on an outcome determination, but should consider `whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.'" Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. a 1999As we pointed out in Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. at 284 , 681 A.2d at 44 , citing Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 374-76 , 605 A.2d 103, 106-07 (1992), and Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 425-27 , 578 A.2d 734, 738-39 (1990), the petitioner must show "that there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," although that test "should not focus solely on an outcome determination, but should consider `whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.'" Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bloodsworth v. State
green
2 sentences2008To counter that testimony, Bloodsworth sought to introduce an expert who would testify “that eyewitnesses are ... confronted with ... a very difficult challenge to the memory system” and would provide the jury with a methodological “checklist ... so that they [could] essentially assess” the eyewitnesses’ testimony through “the filter of the scientist.” Id. at 177-78 , 512 A.2d 1056 . 2008To counter that testimony, Bloodsworth sought to introduce an expert who would testify “that eyewitnesses are ... confronted with ... a very difficult challenge to the memory system” and would provide the jury with a methodological “checklist ... so that they [could] essentially assess” the eyewitnesses’ testimony through “the filter of the scientist.” Id. at 177-78 , 512 A.2d 1056 . | 2 | 2008–2010 |
State v. Copes
green
1 sentence2020Mr. Whittington failed to 4 The Court observed in Copes that “[u]nlike an application for a search warrant, the application to use a pen register or trap and trace device need not demonstrate probable cause that a crime has been committed or that the evidence relating to that crime will be acquired through use of the device.” Copes, 454 Md. at 591-92 . 16 mount a facial challenge to CP § 1-203.1 because he did not demonstrate that there is “no set of circumstances” under which the statute would be valid.5 Moreover, under the “canon of constitutional avoidance,” our review is guided by the “pri | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Rochin v. California
green
2 sentences2010The origin of “shock the conscience” traces back to Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). 2010The origin of “shock the conscience” traces back to Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Board of County Commissioners v. Stephans
green
2 sentences2006As previously discussed, the Stephans II Court viewed this term in its “legal sense” as indicative of an adversarial proceeding wherein opposing parties settle a controversy in some form of tribunal. 286 Md. at 390 , 408 A.2d at 1019 . 2006As previously discussed, the Stephans II Court viewed this term in its “legal sense” as indicative of an adversarial proceeding wherein opposing parties settle a controversy in some form of tribunal. 286 Md. at 390 , 408 A.2d at 1019 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Lockhart v. Fretwell
green
2 sentences1999As we pointed out in Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. at 284 , 681 A.2d at 44 , citing Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 374-76 , 605 A.2d 103, 106-07 (1992), and Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 425-27 , 578 A.2d 734, 738-39 (1990), the petitioner must show "that there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," although that test "should not focus solely on an outcome determination, but should consider `whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.'" Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. a 1999As we pointed out in Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. at 284 , 681 A.2d at 44 , citing Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 374-76 , 605 A.2d 103, 106-07 (1992), and Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 425-27 , 578 A.2d 734, 738-39 (1990), the petitioner must show "that there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," although that test "should not focus solely on an outcome determination, but should consider `whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.'" Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. a | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Oken v. State
green
2 sentences1999As we pointed out in Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. at 284 , 681 A.2d at 44 , citing Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 374-76 , 605 A.2d 103, 106-07 (1992), and Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 425-27 , 578 A.2d 734, 738-39 (1990), the petitioner must show "that there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," although that test "should not focus solely on an outcome determination, but should consider `whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.'" Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. a 1999As we pointed out in Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. at 284 , 681 A.2d at 44 , citing Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 374-76 , 605 A.2d 103, 106-07 (1992), and Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 425-27 , 578 A.2d 734, 738-39 (1990), the petitioner must show "that there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different," although that test "should not focus solely on an outcome determination, but should consider `whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.'" Oken v. State, supra, 343 Md. a | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Bradford v. Calhoun
green
1 sentence1935In Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53 , 109 S. W. 502 , 504, it is said: “It is optional with the devisee to accept the devise, however beneficial it may be to him; and when he elects to renounce, before any act on his part indicating an acceptance, his renunciation shall relate back, and will be held to have been made at the time of the gift, and will displace any levy of creditors that may in the meantime have been made.” Some early English and some American cases, reviewed in Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243 , announced the difficult doctrine that property may be granted or otherwise trans *6 f | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Welch v. Sackett
green
1 sentence1935In Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53 , 109 S. W. 502 , 504, it is said: “It is optional with the devisee to accept the devise, however beneficial it may be to him; and when he elects to renounce, before any act on his part indicating an acceptance, his renunciation shall relate back, and will be held to have been made at the time of the gift, and will displace any levy of creditors that may in the meantime have been made.” Some early English and some American cases, reviewed in Welch v. Sackett, 12 Wis. 243 , announced the difficult doctrine that property may be granted or otherwise trans *6 f | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.