difficult challenge (Oregon) · Go Syfert
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difficult challenge in Oregon

13 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2025 8 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Bruton v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1968 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 US 123 , 88 S Ct 1620 , 20 L Ed 2d 476 (1968) (admission of codefendant’s confession implicating both codefendant and defendant violated defendant’s federal constitutional rights to confrontation and cross-examination, despite jury instruction to consider confession only as to codefendant). 12 *385 In combination, then, the text and context of ORS 136.060(1) suggest that “clearly inappropriate” was designed to be a difficult standard to meet.

2016See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 US 123 , 88 S Ct 1620 , 20 L Ed 2d 476 (1968) (admission of codefendant’s confession implicating both codefendant and defendant violated defendant’s federal constitutional rights to confrontation and cross-examination, despite jury instruction to consider confession only as to codefendant). 12 *385 In combination, then, the text and context of ORS 136.060(1) suggest that “clearly inappropriate” was designed to be a difficult standard to meet.

11
MacPherson v. Department of Administrative Servicesgreen
or · 2006 · cited in 1 Oregon opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007See MacPherson v. DAS, 340 Or 117, 138-39 , 130 P3d 308 (2006) (in a facial challenge, petitioner must show that the challenged provision cannot be lawfully applied under any circumstance); cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 , 107 S Ct 2095 , 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987) (under federal law, “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid”). *569 Of course, to determine whether the revised management plan cannot be applied c

2007See MacPherson v. DAS, 340 Or 117, 138-39 , 130 P3d 308 (2006) (in a facial challenge, petitioner must show that the challenged provision cannot be lawfully applied under any circumstance); cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 , 107 S Ct 2095 , 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987) (under federal law, “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid”). *569 Of course, to determine whether the revised management plan cannot be applied c

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
United States v. Rahimi green
scotus · 2024
2 sentences

2025“A facial challenge is ‘the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,’ because it ‘requires a defendant to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which’ the law would be valid.” Sottile, 336 Or App at 744 (quoting United States v. Rahimi, 602 US 680, 693 , 144 S Ct 1889 , 1898, 219 L Ed 2d 351 (2024)).

2025That is, “[f]or a statute to be facially uncon- stitutional, it must be unconstitutional in all circumstances, i.e., there can be no reasonably likely circumstances in which application of the statute would pass constitutional muster.” State v. Sutherland, 329 Or 359, 365 , 987 P2d 501 (1999); cf. City of Portland v. Sottile, 336 Or App 741, 744 , 561 P3d 1159 (2024) (stating with respect to a facial challenge under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution that “[a] facial challenge is ‘the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,’ because it ‘requires a defendant to estab

42024–2025
City of Portland v. Sottile green
orctapp · 2024
2 sentences

2025“A facial challenge is ‘the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,’ because it ‘requires a defendant to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which’ the law would be valid.” Sottile, 336 Or App at 744 (quoting United States v. Rahimi, 602 US 680, 693 , 144 S Ct 1889 , 1898, 219 L Ed 2d 351 (2024)).

2025That is, “[f]or a statute to be facially uncon- stitutional, it must be unconstitutional in all circumstances, i.e., there can be no reasonably likely circumstances in which application of the statute would pass constitutional muster.” State v. Sutherland, 329 Or 359, 365 , 987 P2d 501 (1999); cf. City of Portland v. Sottile, 336 Or App 741, 744 , 561 P3d 1159 (2024) (stating with respect to a facial challenge under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution that “[a] facial challenge is ‘the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,’ because it ‘requires a defendant to estab

22025–2025
State v. Stone green
orctapp · 2023
2 sentences

2023In other words, “the issue is not whether a jury could have found defendant to have the requisite mental state on this record; rather, it is whether there is some likelihood that the jury might not have been persuaded that he had the requisite mental state, had it considered that issue.” State v. Stone, 324 Or App 688, 695 , 527 P3d 800 (2023) (emphases in original).

2023In other words, “the issue is not whether a jury could have found defendant to have the requisite mental state on this record; rather, it is whether there is some likelihood that the jury might not have been persuaded that he had the requisite mental state, had it considered that issue.” State v. Stone, 324 Or App 688, 695 , 527 P3d 800 (2023) (emphases in original).

22023–2023
State v. Perkins green
orctapp · 2023
2 sentences

2023We should therefore be appropriately cautious about concluding that the failure to instruct a jury on a required element of an offense was legally “harmless.” Here, as to each of defendant’s criminal-mischief convictions, we conclude that the error does not meet the legal standard for harmlessness.3 There is at least some 3 Recently, in State v. Perkins, 325 Or App 624, 630-31 , 529 P3d 999 (2023), which involved a preserved error, we called attention to the fact that “the failure 264 State v. Horton possibility that the jury might not have been persuaded that defendant had the requisite menta

2023We should therefore be appropriately cautious about concluding that the failure to instruct a jury on a required element of an offense was legally “harmless.” Here, as to each of defendant’s criminal-mischief convictions, we conclude that the error does not meet the legal standard for harmlessness.3 There is at least some 3 Recently, in State v. Perkins, 325 Or App 624, 630-31 , 529 P3d 999 (2023), which involved a preserved error, we called attention to the fact that “the failure 264 State v. Horton possibility that the jury might not have been persuaded that defendant had the requisite menta

22023–2023
State v. Horton green
orctapp · 2023
2 sentences

2023Although harm- lessness is often a difficult analysis, it is especially difficult when considering instructional errors regarding the mental state associated with elements of a crime because we must “assess whether the jury might have found that element to be unproved, had it been instructed on it.” Id. at 263 .

2023Although harm- lessness is often a difficult analysis, it is especially difficult when considering instructional errors regarding the mental state associated with elements of a crime because we must “assess whether the jury might have found that element to be unproved, had it been instructed on it.” Id. at 263 .

22023–2023
State v. Sutherland green
or · 1999
2 sentences

2025That is, “[f]or a statute to be facially uncon- stitutional, it must be unconstitutional in all circumstances, i.e., there can be no reasonably likely circumstances in which application of the statute would pass constitutional muster.” State v. Sutherland, 329 Or 359, 365 , 987 P2d 501 (1999); cf. City of Portland v. Sottile, 336 Or App 741, 744 , 561 P3d 1159 (2024) (stating with respect to a facial challenge under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution that “[a] facial challenge is ‘the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,’ because it ‘requires a defendant to estab

2025That is, “[f]or a statute to be facially uncon- stitutional, it must be unconstitutional in all circumstances, i.e., there can be no reasonably likely circumstances in which application of the statute would pass constitutional muster.” State v. Sutherland, 329 Or 359, 365 , 987 P2d 501 (1999); cf. City of Portland v. Sottile, 336 Or App 741, 744 , 561 P3d 1159 (2024) (stating with respect to a facial challenge under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution that “[a] facial challenge is ‘the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,’ because it ‘requires a defendant to estab

12025–2025
Regina J. Lafayette Burke, by Mitchell T. Lafayette v. Douglas R. Spear green
ca2 · 1960
1 sentence

2019The rule also forecloses an avenue for tax manipulation by preventing the taxpayer from converting a business expense of his company into one of his own simply by failing to seek reimbursement.” Id. at 1408 (citing Coplon, 277 F2d at 535).

12019–2019
State v. N. R. L. neutral
or · 2013
1 sentence

2013Cite as 354 Or 222 (2013) 229 law, is different in purpose and function from the adult resti- tution statute that this court analyzed in Hart.

12013–2013
United States v. Allied Oil Corp. green
scotus · 1951
1 sentence

2007See MacPherson v. DAS, 340 Or 117, 138-39 , 130 P3d 308 (2006) (in a facial challenge, petitioner must show that the challenged provision cannot be lawfully applied under any circumstance); cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 , 107 S Ct 2095 , 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987) (under federal law, “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid”). *569 Of course, to determine whether the revised management plan cannot be applied c

12007–2007
United States v. Salerno green
scotus · 1987
2 sentences

2007See MacPherson v. DAS, 340 Or 117, 138-39 , 130 P3d 308 (2006) (in a facial challenge, petitioner must show that the challenged provision cannot be lawfully applied under any circumstance); cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 , 107 S Ct 2095 , 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987) (under federal law, “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid”). *569 Of course, to determine whether the revised management plan cannot be applied c

2007See MacPherson v. DAS, 340 Or 117, 138-39 , 130 P3d 308 (2006) (in a facial challenge, petitioner must show that the challenged provision cannot be lawfully applied under any circumstance); cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 , 107 S Ct 2095 , 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987) (under federal law, “[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid”). *569 Of course, to determine whether the revised management plan cannot be applied c

12007–2007
Signal Thread Company v. King neutral
tenn · 1968
1 sentence

1975It is not a self-serving “volunteer” in the category of the plaintiff in Signal Thread Co. v. King, 222 Tenn 241, 435 SW2d 468 , 6 CCH STC ¶ 250-149 (1968), but that decision is instructive on the effect of voluntary tax payments to a foreign state by a corporation seeking the right to apportion. ⑫ Lynn, The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 19 Ohio St LJ 41 (1958), at 50-51, comments interestingly *101 on the most difficult of the factors, sales, apropos of the Uniform Act’s §§ 16 and 17 (ORS 314.665).

11975–1975

Statutes the citing opinions construe

OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.085 (5) OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.365 (3) OR § Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.291 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 525 (1990–2026) IL 151 (1994–2026) CA 87 (1975–2026) OH 50 (1990–2023) NC 45 (1982–2026) WY 29 (2003–2026) KY 27 (2006–2025) PA 25 (1944–2026) GA 24 (2017–2026) FL 19 (1971–2025) IN 19 (1994–2023) MI 16 (1905–2026) NJ 15 (1973–2020) IA 15 (1985–2025) TN 14 (1993–2026) LA 13 (1984–2023) WA 13 (1976–2025) OR 13 (1975–2025) NY 12 (1989–2026) MO 11 (1948–2025) MA 11 (1980–2025) DE 10 (1985–2026) MN 9 (1971–2025) WV 9 (1992–2025) ID 9 (1986–2024) WI 8 (1993–2023) MD 8 (1935–2020) DC 7 (1989–2026) UT 7 (1997–2025) HI 7 (1973–2025) CO 6 (1977–2018) AZ 6 (1989–2018) AL 6 (2007–2018) SC 5 (2012–2024) CT 5 (1983–2000) KS 5 (2014–2025) MT 4 (1994–2020) ME 4 (2000–2016) NH 3 (2009–2011) NE 3 (2006–2025) OK 3 (1996–2001) RI 2 (2005–2008) NM 2 (1997–2024) VI 2 (2009–2026)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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