difficult standard in Michigan

2017However, a “ ‘facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’ ” IME v DBS, 306 Mich App 426, 439-440 ; 857 NW2d 667 (2014), quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 ; 107 S Ct 2095 ; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987).

2017However, a “ ‘facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’ ” IME v DBS, 306 Mich App 426, 439-440 ; 857 NW2d 667 (2014), quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 ; 107 S Ct 2095 ; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987).

2017However, a “ ‘facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’ ” IME v DBS, 306 Mich App 426, 439-440 ; 857 NW2d 667 (2014), quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 ; 107 S Ct 2095 ; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987).

2017However, a “ ‘facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’ ” IME v DBS, 306 Mich App 426, 439-440 ; 857 NW2d 667 (2014), quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 ; 107 S Ct 2095 ; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987).

2017However, a “ ‘facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’ ” IME v DBS, 306 Mich App 426, 439-440 ; 857 NW2d 667 (2014), quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 ; 107 S Ct 2095 ; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987).

2017However, a “ ‘facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.’ ” IME v DBS, 306 Mich App 426, 439-440 ; 857 NW2d 667 (2014), quoting United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 745 ; 107 S Ct 2095 ; 95 L Ed 2d 697 (1987).

2017This is a difficult standard to meet, and “defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s performance constituted sound trial strategy.” People v Riley, 468 Mich 135, 140 ; 659 NW2d 611 (2003).

2017This is a difficult standard to meet, and “defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s performance constituted sound trial strategy.” People v Riley, 468 Mich 135, 140 ; 659 NW2d 611 (2003).

2017In the absence of a Ginther hearing, “review of the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to mistakes that are apparent on the record.” People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 125 ; 695 NW2d 342 (2005).

2017In the absence of a Ginther hearing, “review of the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to mistakes that are apparent on the record.” People v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 125 ; 695 NW2d 342 (2005).

2008As will be discussed more thoroughly in part III(B), assuming that the error is unpreserved, non-constitutional error, defendant must satisfy the plain-error standard of review, which requires him to establish (1) that there was error, (2) that the error was plain, (3) that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceeding, and (4) that the error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or that the error “ * “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999) (ci

2008As will be discussed more thoroughly in part III(B), assuming that the error is unpreserved, non-constitutional error, defendant must satisfy the plain-error standard of review, which requires him to establish (1) that there was error, (2) that the error was plain, (3) that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceeding, and (4) that the error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or that the error “ * “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999) (ci

1981We prefer the more difficult test announced in People v Royal, 62 Mich App 756, 757-758 ; 233 NW2d 860 (1975): " 'In passing on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in a criminal case, the reviewing court must 1) consider only the evidence which had been introduced at the time the motion was made * * * 2) view that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution * * * and 3) determine whether that evidence, if credible and believed, would justify a reasonable man in concluding that all elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Citations omitted.) "See

1981We prefer the more difficult test announced in People v Royal, 62 Mich App 756, 757-758 ; 233 NW2d 860 (1975): " 'In passing on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in a criminal case, the reviewing court must 1) consider only the evidence which had been introduced at the time the motion was made * * * 2) view that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution * * * and 3) determine whether that evidence, if credible and believed, would justify a reasonable man in concluding that all elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Citations omitted.) "See

1981We prefer the more difficult test announced in People v Royal, 62 Mich App 756, 757-758 ; 233 NW2d 860 (1975): " 'In passing on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in a criminal case, the reviewing court must 1) consider only the evidence which had been introduced at the time the motion was made * * * 2) view that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution * * * and 3) determine whether that evidence, if credible and believed, would justify a reasonable man in concluding that all elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Citations omitted.) "See

1981We prefer the more difficult test announced in People v Royal, 62 Mich App 756, 757-758 ; 233 NW2d 860 (1975): " 'In passing on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in a criminal case, the reviewing court must 1) consider only the evidence which had been introduced at the time the motion was made * * * 2) view that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution * * * and 3) determine whether that evidence, if credible and believed, would justify a reasonable man in concluding that all elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Citations omitted.) "See

1981We prefer the more difficult test announced in People v Royal, 62 Mich App 756, 757-758 ; 233 NW2d 860 (1975): " 'In passing on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in a criminal case, the reviewing court must 1) consider only the evidence which had been introduced at the time the motion was made * * * 2) view that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution * * * and 3) determine whether that evidence, if credible and believed, would justify a reasonable man in concluding that all elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Citations omitted.) "See

1981We prefer the more difficult test announced in People v Royal, 62 Mich App 756, 757-758 ; 233 NW2d 860 (1975): " 'In passing on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in a criminal case, the reviewing court must 1) consider only the evidence which had been introduced at the time the motion was made * * * 2) view that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution * * * and 3) determine whether that evidence, if credible and believed, would justify a reasonable man in concluding that all elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Citations omitted.) "See

2026That said, the defendant does so “under a difficult standard,” as there is “a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant,” and the defendant bears “the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, inserted false material into the affidavit and that the false material was necessary to the finding of probable cause.” Id.

1988Nonetheless, the majority argues that the concerns which troubled the Mc-Nabb Court in 1943 have been addressed and remedied for the most part by subsequent changes in constitutional doctrine, beginning with Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

1988Nonetheless, the majority argues that the concerns which troubled the Mc-Nabb Court in 1943 have been addressed and remedied for the most part by subsequent changes in constitutional doctrine, beginning with Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ; 86 S Ct 1602 ; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

1981We prefer the more difficult test announced in People v Royal, 62 Mich App 756, 757-758 ; 233 NW2d 860 (1975): " 'In passing on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in a criminal case, the reviewing court must 1) consider only the evidence which had been introduced at the time the motion was made * * * 2) view that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution * * * and 3) determine whether that evidence, if credible and believed, would justify a reasonable man in concluding that all elements of the crime were established beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Citations omitted.) "See

1980People v Collins, 388 Mich 680 ; 202 NW2d 769 (1972).

1980People v Collins, 388 Mich 680 ; 202 NW2d 769 (1972).

1978Certainly there are cases in which courts have used these terms as descriptive of the odor involved: the odor of "unburned" marijuana, see, e.g., People v Cook, 13 Cal 3d 663; 119 Cal Rptr 500; 532 P2d 148 (1975); People v Wolf, 15 Ill App 3d 374; 304 NE2d 512 (1973); State v Zamora, 114 Ariz 75; 559 P2d 195 (Ct App, 1976) (very faint odor of marijuana sufficient probable cause for search even though the other officer present was unable to verify the existence of that odor); the odor of "burning" marijuana, People v Parisi, 46 Mich App 322 ; 208 NW2d 70 (1973), reversed on grounds not relevant

1978The evidence of their existence before the search was adequate and the testimony of the officers to that effect would not perish from the delay of getting a warrant." (Emphasis added.) Johnson, supra, 15 . *335 Therefore, the United States Supreme Court both acknowledged that odor can be sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, [6] a more difficult standard to meet than the standard of reasonableness required in automobile cases generally, and further acknowledged that such odor in a movable vehicle could obviate the necessity of a warrant. [7] We need only decide, there

1978Certainly there are cases in which courts have used these terms as descriptive of the odor involved: the odor of "unburned" marijuana, see, e.g., People v Cook, 13 Cal 3d 663; 119 Cal Rptr 500; 532 P2d 148 (1975); People v Wolf, 15 Ill App 3d 374; 304 NE2d 512 (1973); State v Zamora, 114 Ariz 75; 559 P2d 195 (Ct App, 1976) (very faint odor of marijuana sufficient probable cause for search even though the other officer present was unable to verify the existence of that odor); the odor of "burning" marijuana, People v Parisi, 46 Mich App 322 ; 208 NW2d 70 (1973), reversed on grounds not relevant

1978Certainly there are cases in which courts have used these terms as descriptive of the odor involved: the odor of "unburned" marijuana, see, e.g., People v Cook, 13 Cal 3d 663; 119 Cal Rptr 500; 532 P2d 148 (1975); People v Wolf, 15 Ill App 3d 374; 304 NE2d 512 (1973); State v Zamora, 114 Ariz 75; 559 P2d 195 (Ct App, 1976) (very faint odor of marijuana sufficient probable cause for search even though the other officer present was unable to verify the existence of that odor); the odor of "burning" marijuana, People v Parisi, 46 Mich App 322 ; 208 NW2d 70 (1973), reversed on grounds not relevant

1978Certainly there are cases in which courts have used these terms as descriptive of the odor involved: the odor of "unburned" marijuana, see, e.g., People v Cook, 13 Cal 3d 663; 119 Cal Rptr 500; 532 P2d 148 (1975); People v Wolf, 15 Ill App 3d 374; 304 NE2d 512 (1973); State v Zamora, 114 Ariz 75; 559 P2d 195 (Ct App, 1976) (very faint odor of marijuana sufficient probable cause for search even though the other officer present was unable to verify the existence of that odor); the odor of "burning" marijuana, People v Parisi, 46 Mich App 322 ; 208 NW2d 70 (1973), reversed on grounds not relevant

1978Therefore, the United States Supreme Court both acknowledged that odor can be sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, 6 a more difficult standard to meet than the standard of reasonableness required in automobile cases generally, and further acknowledged that such odor in a movable vehicle could obviate the necessity of a warrant. 7 We need only decide, therefore, under the standards of reasonableness applicable to searches of automobiles, Whalen, supra, whether the odor emanating from defendant Hilber’s car created a sufficient basis for the officers to believe that ma

1978The evidence of their existence before the search was adequate and the testimony of the officers to that effect would not perish from the delay of getting a warrant." (Emphasis added.) Johnson, supra, 15 . *335 Therefore, the United States Supreme Court both acknowledged that odor can be sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, [6] a more difficult standard to meet than the standard of reasonableness required in automobile cases generally, and further acknowledged that such odor in a movable vehicle could obviate the necessity of a warrant. [7] We need only decide, there

1978Certainly there are cases in which courts have used these terms as descriptive of the odor involved: the odor of "unburned" marijuana, see, e.g., People v Cook, 13 Cal 3d 663; 119 Cal Rptr 500; 532 P2d 148 (1975); People v Wolf, 15 Ill App 3d 374; 304 NE2d 512 (1973); State v Zamora, 114 Ariz 75; 559 P2d 195 (Ct App, 1976) (very faint odor of marijuana sufficient probable cause for search even though the other officer present was unable to verify the existence of that odor); the odor of "burning" marijuana, People v Parisi, 46 Mich App 322 ; 208 NW2d 70 (1973), reversed on grounds not relevant

1978Certainly there are cases in which courts have used these terms as descriptive of the odor involved: the odor of "unburned" marijuana, see, e.g., People v Cook, 13 Cal 3d 663; 119 Cal Rptr 500; 532 P2d 148 (1975); People v Wolf, 15 Ill App 3d 374; 304 NE2d 512 (1973); State v Zamora, 114 Ariz 75; 559 P2d 195 (Ct App, 1976) (very faint odor of marijuana sufficient probable cause for search even though the other officer present was unable to verify the existence of that odor); the odor of "burning" marijuana, People v Parisi, 46 Mich App 322 ; 208 NW2d 70 (1973), reversed on grounds not relevant

1978Certainly there are cases in which courts have used these terms as descriptive of the odor involved: the odor of "unburned" marijuana, see, e.g., People v Cook, 13 Cal 3d 663; 119 Cal Rptr 500; 532 P2d 148 (1975); People v Wolf, 15 Ill App 3d 374; 304 NE2d 512 (1973); State v Zamora, 114 Ariz 75; 559 P2d 195 (Ct App, 1976) (very faint odor of marijuana sufficient probable cause for search even though the other officer present was unable to verify the existence of that odor); the odor of "burning" marijuana, People v Parisi, 46 Mich App 322 ; 208 NW2d 70 (1973), reversed on grounds not relevant

1978Certainly there are cases in which courts have used these terms as descriptive of the odor involved: the odor of "unburned" marijuana, see, e.g., People v Cook, 13 Cal 3d 663; 119 Cal Rptr 500; 532 P2d 148 (1975); People v Wolf, 15 Ill App 3d 374; 304 NE2d 512 (1973); State v Zamora, 114 Ariz 75; 559 P2d 195 (Ct App, 1976) (very faint odor of marijuana sufficient probable cause for search even though the other officer present was unable to verify the existence of that odor); the odor of "burning" marijuana, People v Parisi, 46 Mich App 322 ; 208 NW2d 70 (1973), reversed on grounds not relevant

1978Certainly there are cases in which courts have used these terms as descriptive of the odor involved: the odor of "unburned" marijuana, see, e.g., People v Cook, 13 Cal 3d 663; 119 Cal Rptr 500; 532 P2d 148 (1975); People v Wolf, 15 Ill App 3d 374; 304 NE2d 512 (1973); State v Zamora, 114 Ariz 75; 559 P2d 195 (Ct App, 1976) (very faint odor of marijuana sufficient probable cause for search even though the other officer present was unable to verify the existence of that odor); the odor of "burning" marijuana, People v Parisi, 46 Mich App 322 ; 208 NW2d 70 (1973), reversed on grounds not relevant

1905The legislature derives its authority to determine the situs for the taxation of personal property — and it certainly has that authority (see Common Council of Detroit v. Board of Assessors of Detroit, 91 Mich. 78 [16 L.