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19 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1971–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Salernogreen2 sentences2023Furthermore, the change in analytical framework between Nelson and NYSRPA is least likely to be outcome-determinative in a facial challenge. “‘A facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most difficult challenge to 39 mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exist under which the Act would be valid.’” DIRECTV, 215 So. 3d at 50 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). 2018In discussing the standards governing facial vagueness challenges, the Court has previously said that a law is facially unconstitutional only if it "is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." Hoffman Estates , 455 U.S. at 495 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 ; see also United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ("A facial challenge to a legislative Act is[-outside the limited context of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine-]the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under wh | 4 | 5 |
Harrington v. Richtergreen2 sentences2018This is "meant to be" a difficult standard to meet. *1244 Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86 , 102, 131 S.Ct. 770 , 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). 2018This is "meant to be" a difficult standard to meet. *1244 Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86 , 102, 131 S.Ct. 770 , 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Allied Oil Corp.green2 sentences2018In discussing the standards governing facial vagueness challenges, the Court has previously said that a law is facially unconstitutional only if it "is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." Hoffman Estates , 455 U.S. at 495 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 ; see also United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ("A facial challenge to a legislative Act is[-outside the limited context of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine-]the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under wh 2017“A facial challenge to a legislative Act is ... the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exist under which the Act would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). | 2 | 3 |
Florida Department of Revenue v. DirecTV, Inc., etc.green2 sentences2023Furthermore, the change in analytical framework between Nelson and NYSRPA is least likely to be outcome-determinative in a facial challenge. “‘A facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most difficult challenge to 39 mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exist under which the Act would be valid.’” DIRECTV, 215 So. 3d at 50 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). 2017The Companies and their Principals next argue that Rule 67-48.004(2) is facially unconstitutional because it “provides no procedural safeguards.” “A facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . . the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exist under which the Act would be valid.” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d 46, 50 (Fla. 2017) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). | 1 | 2 |
KEY CITIZENS FOR GOV., INC. v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Auth.green1 sentence2017In making their facial challenge, the Companies and their Principals fail to demonstrate that no set of circumstances exist under which the Rule would be valid. “[U]nlike some legal rules, due process is not a technical concept with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” Keys Citizens for Responsible Gov’t, Inc. v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 795 So. 2d 940, 948 (Fla. 2001) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
DirecTV, Inc. v. Stategreen1 sentence2015The challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [the tax] would be valid.” State, 632 S.E.2d at 547 (quotations and citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC v. Dupontgreen1 sentence2015The evidentiary requirement for summary judgment is “a difficult bar to reach for a moving party and is meant to be so.” Speedway Super-America, LLC v. Dupont, 933 So.2d 75, 78-79 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“Florida has a long-standing policy favoring jury trials and determinations on the merits.”). | 1 | 1 |
Eure v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See also Eure v. State, 764 So.2d 798, 800 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Mills v. Stategreen1 sentence2001Mills, 476 So.2d at 180 (McDonald, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part). | 1 | 1 |
Voce v. Stategreen1 sentence1997A legislative enactment is void on its face or facially invalid only "if it cannot be applied constitutionally to any factual situation." Voce v. State, 457 So.2d 541, 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), rev. den. 464 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1985); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2100 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)("A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."). | 1 | 1 |
Sanford v. Rubingreen1 sentence1996See also Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So.2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970) (cautioning courts to use this difficult doctrine "very guardedly"). | 1 | 1 |
Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Adamsgreen1 sentence1986See also Kidder v. Anderson, 354 So.2d 1306, 1310 (La. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978) (“. . . the burden placed upon a plaintiff in defeating a motion for summary judgment [in a freedom of expression case] is a most severe and difficult challenge to meet, though not impossible.”) Recent United States Supreme Court cases provide guidance as to the applicable standards regarding summary judgment, especially as related to libel cases. | 1 | 1 |
Kidder v. Andersongreen1 sentence1986See also Kidder v. Anderson, 354 So.2d 1306, 1310 (La. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978) (“. . . the burden placed upon a plaintiff in defeating a motion for summary judgment [in a freedom of expression case] is a most severe and difficult challenge to meet, though not impossible.”) Recent United States Supreme Court cases provide guidance as to the applicable standards regarding summary judgment, especially as related to libel cases. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Doe v. Marshall
green
2 sentences2025See, e.g., Hill, 341 So. 3d at 545; Doe 1, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 1326 .2 2 An anomaly identified in Hill is that polar opposite tests apply depending on how a “branded-identification card” is characterized, i.e., whether it “amounts to government speech or compelled speech.” Hill, 341 So. 3d at 545. 2025See, e.g., Hill, 341 So. 3d at 545; Doe 1, 367 F. Supp. 3d at 1326 .4 They do so in part based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Wooley, which held that New Hampshire could not punish Mr. Wooley for covering up the state motto, “Live Free or Die,” on his state-issued license plate. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018In discussing the standards governing facial vagueness challenges, the Court has previously said that a law is facially unconstitutional only if it "is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." Hoffman Estates , 455 U.S. at 495 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 ; see also United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ("A facial challenge to a legislative Act is[-outside the limited context of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine-]the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under wh 2018In discussing the standards governing facial vagueness challenges, the Court has previously said that a law is facially unconstitutional only if it "is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." Hoffman Estates , 455 U.S. at 495 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 ; see also United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739 , 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095 , 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ("A facial challenge to a legislative Act is[-outside the limited context of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine-]the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under wh | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sessions v. Dimaya
green
2 sentences2018But the Court more recently explained in Johnson v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2551 , 2560-61, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), that "although statements in some of [the Court's] opinions could be read to suggest otherwise, [the Court's] holdings squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp." The Court this year reinforced the point in Sessions v. Dimaya , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1204 , 1214 n.3, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018) (" Johnson made clear that our decisions 'squarely contradi 2018But the Court more recently explained in Johnson v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2551 , 2560-61, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), that "although statements in some of [the Court's] opinions could be read to suggest otherwise, [the Court's] holdings squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp." The Court this year reinforced the point in Sessions v. Dimaya , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1204 , 1214 n.3, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018) (" Johnson made clear that our decisions 'squarely contradi | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences2018But the Court more recently explained in Johnson v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2551 , 2560-61, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), that "although statements in some of [the Court's] opinions could be read to suggest otherwise, [the Court's] holdings squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp." The Court this year reinforced the point in Sessions v. Dimaya , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1204 , 1214 n.3, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018) (" Johnson made clear that our decisions 'squarely contradi 2018But the Court more recently explained in Johnson v. United States , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2551 , 2560-61, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), that "although statements in some of [the Court's] opinions could be read to suggest otherwise, [the Court's] holdings squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision's grasp." The Court this year reinforced the point in Sessions v. Dimaya , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1204 , 1214 n.3, 200 L.Ed.2d 549 (2018) (" Johnson made clear that our decisions 'squarely contradi | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Meyer v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n
green
1 sentence2013It allows for jurisdiction over a defendant who has “[b]reaeh[ed] a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.” Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
green
2 sentences1986Two months ago in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2505 , 91 L. 1986Two months ago in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 2505 , 91 L. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
City of Homestead, Dade County v. Watkins
green
1 sentence1980City of Homestead, Dade County v. Watkins, 285 So.2d 394 (Fla. 1973). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Fogarty Bros. Transfer, Inc. v. Boyd
green
1 sentence1971This Court stated that “[T]he degree of proof necessary to establish the requisite public convenience and necessity for a new domicile point will be less exacting than that required of a carrier upon application for an original certificate or an extension of existing service.” (Page 890) Examination of the record, and of the examiner’s recommendation and the Commission’s order, persuades that sufficient competent evidence was presented to justify use of the proof standard announced in Fogarty Brothers Transfer, Inc. v. Boyd, supra, rather than the more difficult standard announced in Wells Far | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Wells Fargo Armored Service Corp. of Florida v. Mason
neutral
1 sentence1971This Court stated that “[T]he degree of proof necessary to establish the requisite public convenience and necessity for a new domicile point will be less exacting than that required of a carrier upon application for an original certificate or an extension of existing service.” (Page 890) Examination of the record, and of the examiner’s recommendation and the Commission’s order, persuades that sufficient competent evidence was presented to justify use of the proof standard announced in Fogarty Brothers Transfer, Inc. v. Boyd, supra, rather than the more difficult standard announced in Wells Far | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.