11 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1941–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18 , 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (“ ‘[Wjhere relief may be granted by extraordinary writ (special action), [an appellate court] may grant the appropriate relief even though the writ applied for ... is not aptly titled.’ ”), quoting Brown v. State, 117 Ariz. 476, 477 , 573 P.2d 876, 877 (1978) (alteration in Meza). 2004See Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18 , 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (“ ‘[Wjhere relief may be granted by extraordinary writ (special action), [an appellate court] may grant the appropriate relief even though the writ applied for ... is not aptly titled.’ ”), quoting Brown v. State, 117 Ariz. 476, 477 , 573 P.2d 876, 877 (1978) (alteration in Meza). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Mezagreen2 sentences2004See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130 , 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18 , 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281 , 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. 2004See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130 , 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18 , 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281 , 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. | 2 | 2 |
Hovey v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2004See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130 , 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18 , 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281 , 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. 2004See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130 , 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18 , 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281 , 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. | 2 | 2 |
Nalbandian v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2004See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130 , 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18 , 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281 , 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. 2004See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130 , 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18 , 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281 , 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Slaytongreen1 sentence2025To do so, we look first at the statute’s language, then its context and history, and finally at “whether the type of crime is one for which strict liability has been historically imposed.” State v. Slayton, 214 Ariz. 511, 515-16, ¶ 13 (App. 2007). ¶12 For the State to prove aggravated DUI under A.R.S. § 28-1383(A)(5), its burden is to establish two elements: (1) driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of A.R.S. §§ 28-1381, -1382, or -1383; and (2) driving the wrong way on a highway. | 1 | 1 |
Foggy v. Arizona Board of Pardons and Parolesgreen1 sentence2021See Foggy v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 108 Ariz. 470, 471 (1972) (holding the superior court “has the power to review proceedings of the Board to determine the absence of due process in the conduct of a parole hearing” but the court lacks authority to review the Board’s actual “decisions”); see also Cooper v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 149 Ariz. 182, 184 (1986) (“Due process requires that judicial review be available to insure that the requirements of due process have been met and that the parole board has acted within the scope of its powers.”). ¶13 Although a petition for writ of | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Parolesgreen1 sentence2021See Foggy v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 108 Ariz. 470, 471 (1972) (holding the superior court “has the power to review proceedings of the Board to determine the absence of due process in the conduct of a parole hearing” but the court lacks authority to review the Board’s actual “decisions”); see also Cooper v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 149 Ariz. 182, 184 (1986) (“Due process requires that judicial review be available to insure that the requirements of due process have been met and that the parole board has acted within the scope of its powers.”). ¶13 Although a petition for writ of | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mitchellgreen1 sentence2018See State v. Mitchell, 234 Ariz. 410 , 415 ¶ 19 (App. 2014) (finding lawful possession “sufficient to confer standing under Jones” when defendant driver “had the rights of a bailee”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217 (Am. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Millergreen2 sentences2013See State v. Miller, 226 Ariz. 190, ¶ 10 , 245 P.3d 454, 456 (App. 2011) (impaired judgment from alcohol consumption could violate statute; evidence of bad driving unnecessary to establish DUI). 2013See State v. Miller, 226 Ariz. 190, ¶ 10 , 245 P.3d 454, 456 (App. 2011) (impaired judgment from alcohol consumption could violate statute; evidence of bad driving unnecessary to establish DUI). | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. Roylstongreen2 sentences2002See Nelson v. Roylston, 137 Ariz. 272, 273 , 669 P.2d 1349, 1350 (App.1983). 2002See Nelson v. Roylston, 137 Ariz. 272, 273 , 669 P.2d 1349, 1350 (App.1983). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Choategreen2 sentences2004See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130 , 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18 , 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281 , 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. 2004See Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130 , 786 P.2d 977, 981 (App.1989) (“[A] petition for special action is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim.”); see also State v. Meza, 203 Ariz. 50, ¶ 18 , 50 P.3d 407, ¶ 18 (App.2002) (“The proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appeal but a petition for special action.”); Hovey v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 278, 281 , 798 P.2d 416, 419 (App. 1990) (“The denial of a motion to dismiss is not an appealable order.”); but cf. State v. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Love
green
2 sentences2009It requires a fact finder, in determining if a person actually *55 physically controlled a vehicle in violation of the statute, not only to consider all the circumstances, but also to decide if a defendant “actually posed a threat to the public by the exercise of present or imminent control over [the vehicle] while impaired.” Id. at 326-27 , 897 P.2d at 628-29 . 2009It requires a fact finder, in determining if a person actually *55 physically controlled a vehicle in violation of the statute, not only to consider all the circumstances, but also to decide if a defendant “actually posed a threat to the public by the exercise of present or imminent control over [the vehicle] while impaired.” Id. at 326-27 , 897 P.2d at 628-29 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Coombs v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company
green
2 sentences1977Appellants rely on Travelers Indemnity Company v. Hudson, 15 Ariz.App. 371 , 488 P.2d 1008 (1971), and Coombs v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, 23 Ariz.App. 207 , 531 P.2d 1145 (1975), for the *390 proposition that “regular use” denotes continuous, uninterrupted possession of the vehicle with the privilege and opportunity of its use at such times and for such purposes as Roof wished. 1977Appellants rely on Travelers Indemnity Company v. Hudson, 15 Ariz.App. 371 , 488 P.2d 1008 (1971), and Coombs v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, 23 Ariz.App. 207 , 531 P.2d 1145 (1975), for the *390 proposition that “regular use” denotes continuous, uninterrupted possession of the vehicle with the privilege and opportunity of its use at such times and for such purposes as Roof wished. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Travelers Indemnity Company v. Hudson
green
2 sentences1977Appellants rely on Travelers Indemnity Company v. Hudson, 15 Ariz.App. 371 , 488 P.2d 1008 (1971), and Coombs v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, 23 Ariz.App. 207 , 531 P.2d 1145 (1975), for the *390 proposition that “regular use” denotes continuous, uninterrupted possession of the vehicle with the privilege and opportunity of its use at such times and for such purposes as Roof wished. 1977Appellants rely on Travelers Indemnity Company v. Hudson, 15 Ariz.App. 371 , 488 P.2d 1008 (1971), and Coombs v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, 23 Ariz.App. 207 , 531 P.2d 1145 (1975), for the *390 proposition that “regular use” denotes continuous, uninterrupted possession of the vehicle with the privilege and opportunity of its use at such times and for such purposes as Roof wished. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Brown v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1972Brown v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz.App. 434 , 409 P.2d 593 (1966). 1972Brown v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz.App. 434 , 409 P.2d 593 (1966). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Miners & Merchants Bank v. Board of Supervisors
neutral
2 sentences1941We held, in the case of Miners & Merchants Bank v. Board of Supervisors, 55 Ariz. 357 , 101 Pac. (2d) 461 , that the tax thereby imposed was an excise and not an ad valorem tax, and might be imposed by the legislature if it so desired, in addition to the regular ad valorem tax, but that it could not be made a substitute for the ad valorem tax under section 2, article IX, supra, and that the part exempting certain automobiles from the ad valorem tax was so interwoven with the balance of the law that the whole chapter fell as unconstitutional. 1941We held, in the case of Miners & Merchants Bank v. Board of Supervisors, 55 Ariz. 357 , 101 Pac. (2d) 461 , that the tax thereby imposed was an excise and not an ad valorem tax, and might be imposed by the legislature if it so desired, in addition to the regular ad valorem tax, but that it could not be made a substitute for the ad valorem tax under section 2, article IX, supra, and that the part exempting certain automobiles from the ad valorem tax was so interwoven with the balance of the law that the whole chapter fell as unconstitutional. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.