vehicle violation in California

2021(Jaramillo, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 759 ; People v. Briggs (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1036 .) As the court explained in Jaramillo, when “the record does not disclose or suggest what specific findings were made in convicting a defendant of a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 but it nevertheless appears that the fact finder may have found that the defendant intended to steal the vehicle, a second conviction based on a further finding that the defendant received that same stolen property is foreclosed.” (Jaramillo, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 759 .) In other words, where the jury concludes that t

2021(Jaramillo, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 759 ; People v. Briggs (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1036 .) As the court explained in Jaramillo, when “the record does not disclose or suggest what specific findings were made in convicting a defendant of a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 but it nevertheless appears that the fact finder may have found that the defendant intended to steal the vehicle, a second conviction based on a further finding that the defendant received that same stolen property is foreclosed.” (Jaramillo, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 759 .) In other words, where the jury concludes that t

2016(People v. Hochstraser (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 883, 891, 903-905 [police properly searched parked 5 car for evidence of missing person without warrant under automobile exception, even though officers had the car key and the defendant could not move the car]; People v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 89, 100-101 [police properly searched parked car for evidence of crime regardless of warrant under automobile exception]; see California v. Carney (1985) 471 U.S. 386, 392-393 [“[w]hen a vehicle is [readily capable of] being used on the highways . . and is found stationary . . . t

2009Rejecting the argument that the court should “distinguish his vehicle from other vehicles within the exception because it was capable of functioning as a home” (Carney, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 393 ) the court observed: “In our increasingly mobile society, many vehicles used for transportation can be and are being used not only for transportation but for shelter, i. e., as a ‘home’ or ‘residence.’ To distinguish between respondent’s motor home and an ordinary sedan for purposes of the vehicle exception would require that we apply the exception depending upon the size of the vehicle and the qualit

2012(Nyulassy, supra, at p. 1283 ; Martinez, supra, at p. 117 ; Wherry v. Award, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ] (Wherry).) As noted in Armendariz , “an arbitration agreement cannot be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of statutory rights created by the FEHA.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 101 .) In any event, the limitations period is just one of several one-sided provisions.

2012(Nyulassy, supra, at p. 1283 ; Martinez, supra, at p. 117 ; Wherry v. Award, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ] (Wherry).) As noted in Armendariz , “an arbitration agreement cannot be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of statutory rights created by the FEHA.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 101 .) In any event, the limitations period is just one of several one-sided provisions.

2025(See Ross, supra, 456 U.S. at pp. 800–801, 817 [corroborated information from informant about drug sales combined with officer’s observation of bullet on front seat of suspect’s vehicle provided probable cause to search under vehicle exception].) B.

2025Under the automobile exception, if police have probable cause to believe that a lawfully stopped vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity or contraband, they “ ‘ “may conduct a warrantless search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.” ’ ” (People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943 , 950; see United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798 , 800 15 [when police have probable cause, they “may conduct a probing search of compartments and containers within the vehicle whose contents are not in plain view”].) Probable cause “is a more demanding standard than mere reasonabl

2025(Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 168-169 [adoption of guidelines interpreting coastal access provisions constituted quasi-legislative agency action because guidelines governed future permit decisions rather than the application of the rules to a particular case . . . ]; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 273, 299-300 [traditional mandate [is] the proper vehicle to challenge constitutionality of city’s zoning ordinance][, disapproved on another ground in Hernandez v. City of Hanford (2007) 41 Cal.4th 279, 297 ].) A petition

2008Proc., § 1094.5]; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 273, 299-300 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 420 ] [traditional mandate the proper vehicle to challenge constitutionality of city’s zoning ordinance].) A petition for traditional mandamus is appropriate in other actions brought to attack, review, set aside, or void a quasi-legislative (where in general no evidentiary hearing is held) 19 or ministerial determination, or decision of a public agency.

2009The Berman Waiver Is Not Unenforceable Under Armendariz or Gentry (10) According to Armendariz , "arbitration agreements that encompass unwaivable statutory rights must be subject to particular scrutiny." ( Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 100 .) "[A]n arbitration agreement cannot be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of statutory rights ...." ( Id. at p. 101.) Armendariz enumerated several minimum requirements for arbitration that apply "to unwaivable claims that are `carefully tethered to statutory or constitutional provisions' ( Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London

2009The Berman Waiver Is Not Unenforceable Under Armendariz or Gentry (10) According to Armendariz , "arbitration agreements that encompass unwaivable statutory rights must be subject to particular scrutiny." ( Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 100 .) "[A]n arbitration agreement cannot be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of statutory rights ...." ( Id. at p. 101.) Armendariz enumerated several minimum requirements for arbitration that apply "to unwaivable claims that are `carefully tethered to statutory or constitutional provisions' ( Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London

2015(Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 90 .) The court determined that “ ‘an arbitration agreement cannot be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of statutory rights created by the FEHA’ [citation], because the enforcement of such rights was for the public benefit and was not waivable [citation]. [The court] concluded that a party to such an arbitration agreement must be able to fully vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum. [Citation.]” (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 677 [explaining Armendariz].) In order to ensure such vindication, the court determined that

2013(Pearson Dental, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 679–680.) Specifically addressing the issue of unwaivable statutory rights in the context of ―a mandatory employment arbitration agreement, i.e., an adhesive arbitration agreement that an employer imposes on the employee as a condition of employment,‖ the Supreme Court has recognized ―‗that an arbitration agreement cannot be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of statutory rights created by the FEHA‘ [citation], because the enforcement of such rights was for the public benefit and was not waivable.‖ (Pearson Dental, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 677 ;

2015Fair Employment and Housing Act Claims and Arbitration “It is indisputable that an employment contract that required employees to waive their rights under the [Fair Employment and Housing Act] to redress sexual harassment or discrimination would be contrary to public policy and unlawful. [para.] . . . “[A]n arbitration agreement cannot be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of statutory rights created by the [Fair Employment and Housing Act].” (Armendariz, supra, at pp. 100-101; accord, Ellis v. U.S. Security Associates (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1213 , 1220- 1221.) In the context of Fair Em

2015Fair Employment and Housing Act Claims and Arbitration “It is indisputable that an employment contract that required employees to waive their rights under the [Fair Employment and Housing Act] to redress sexual harassment or discrimination would be contrary to public policy and unlawful. [¶] [A]n arbitration agreement cannot be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of statutory rights created by the [Fair Employment and Housing Act].” ( Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 100- 101; accord, Ellis v. U.S. Security Associates (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1220-1221 .) In the context of Fair E

2013However, we have made clear that “[s]uch matters as whether objections should be made and the manner of cross-examination are within counsel’s discretion and rarely implicate ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 993 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 51 P.3d 874 ]; see People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 334 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 956 P.2d 374 ].) Defendant points to no exculpatory or impeachment evidence that further examination would have elicited. “ ‘We cannot evaluate alleged deficiencies in counsel’s representation solely on defendant’s unsubstantiated s

2013However, we have made clear that “[s]uch matters as whether objections should be made and the manner of cross-examination are within counsel’s discretion and rarely implicate ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 993 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 51 P.3d 874 ]; see People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 334 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 956 P.2d 374 ].) Defendant points to no exculpatory or impeachment evidence that further examination would have elicited. “ ‘We cannot evaluate alleged deficiencies in counsel’s representation solely on defendant’s unsubstantiated s

2023(OTO, at p. 125.) “In Armendariz [v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000)] 24 Cal.4th 83 , the court held that a mandatory ‘arbitration agreement cannot be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of statutory rights created by the FEHA.’ [Citations.] To be valid, at minimum the arbitration agreement must require a neutral arbitrator, sufficient discovery, and a written decision adequate enough to allow judicial review.

2021An employee may not be required to waive the asymmetric FEHA attorney fee standard The Supreme Court in Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 83 held employees may be compelled to arbitrate FEHA claims “if the arbitration permits an employee to vindicate his or her statutory rights.” (Id. at p. 90.) “[A]n arbitration agreement cannot be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of statutory rights created by the FEHA.” (Id. at p. 101.) To be valid and enforceable, the Court ruled, a predispute arbitration agreement involving FEHA claims, among other requirements, “may not limit statutorily imposed rem

2021Under this statute, the acts of driving and taking “‘are separate and distinct.’” (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 876 (Garza); see People v. Barrick (1982) 33 Cal.3d 115, 135 ; People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 759, fn. 6 .) The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 1820 as follows: “The defendant is charged in Count 1 with unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code Section 10851(a).

2017The instruction should have informed the jurors that only a conviction for taking a vehicle would bar a conviction for receiving it as stolen property ( Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 871 , 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 335 , 111 P.3d 310 ).

2013Cir. 2000) 222 F.3d 1092, 1095 [passenger has no standing to challenge a search of a vehicle per se, but “may challenge a stop of a vehicle on Fourth Amendment grounds even if she has no possessory or ownership interest in the vehicle”].) Here the installation of the GPS device, and its use to monitor and track the Acura‟s movements, were the means essential to the locating and detaining of the Acura, the Chrysler, and the occupants―both drivers and passengers―of both vehicles.

2003(U.S. v. Twilley, supra, 222 F.3d at p. 1094 .) The officer mistakenly believed that Michigan, like California, issued two plates and that the vehicle was in violation of Vehicle Code section 5202.

2026Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728 [same].) Our Supreme Court only recently decided that an excessive fines analysis, “which considers ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines.” (Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 23.) Because Kopp was decided after Alemi was sentenced and he previously relied solely on Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 , we agree that Alemi, like the defendant in the high court’s case, should be given the opportunity to develop an excessive fines argument in the first instance on remand.

2025Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707 that, because due process principles also proscribe excessive fines, in assessing the constitutionality of a fine, it ordinarily “makes no 17 We disapprove the following cases to the extent they are inconsistent with our opinion: People v. Cowan (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 32 ; People v. Belloso (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 647 ; People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485 ; People v. Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 . 23 PEOPLE v. KOPP Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. difference whether we examine the issue as an excessive fine or a violation of due proc

2021Under this statute, the acts of driving and taking “‘are separate and distinct.’” (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 876 (Garza); see People v. Barrick (1982) 33 Cal.3d 115, 135 ; People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 759, fn. 6 .) The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 1820 as follows: “The defendant is charged in Count 1 with unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code Section 10851(a).

1994In People v. Barrick, supra, 33 Cal.3d 115 , the Supreme Court first agreed *1089 with Thomas that joyriding is not a necessarily included offense within Vehicle Code section 10851 under the elements of the offense because one could violate section 10851 without violating section 499b: “[Ojne could conceivably ‘take’ a vehicle in violation of section 10851 without the purpose of using or operating it in violation of section 499b, . . . [F]or example, a vehicle could be towed with the specific intent to deprive the owner of possession without being towed for the purpose of using or operating th

2020(See Aguilar, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017 [carrying concealed firearm in a vehicle in violation of § 25400, subd. (a)(1)]; People v. Robinson (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 707, 715 (Robinson) [unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)]; People v. Feaster (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1093 [discharge of firearm in grossly negligent manner in violation of § 246.3]; People v. Garrett (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 795, 800 [possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861 , subd. (d)].) Second, the statute proscribes possession of a firear

2018Garrett (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 795 , 798, 241 Cal.Rptr. 10 ( Garrett ) )." ( Aguilar , supra , at p. 1017, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 202 .) Aguilar addressed the admissibility of impeachment evidence based on a prior felony conviction for carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle in violation of section 25400, subdivision (a). ( Aguilar , supra , 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011 , 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 202 .) The court rejected the defendant's argument that the offense did not involve moral turpitude because it required no affirmative act signifying " ' "a readiness to do evil." ' " ( Id . at p. 1017, 200 Cal.Rptr.3

2020(See Aguilar, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1017 [carrying concealed firearm in a vehicle in violation of § 25400, subd. (a)(1)]; People v. Robinson (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 707, 715 (Robinson) [unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)]; People v. Feaster (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1093 [discharge of firearm in grossly negligent manner in violation of § 246.3]; People v. Garrett (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 795, 800 [possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861 , subd. (d)].) Second, the statute proscribes possession of a firear

2018Garrett (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 795 , 798, 241 Cal.Rptr. 10 ( Garrett ) )." ( Aguilar , supra , at p. 1017, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 202 .) Aguilar addressed the admissibility of impeachment evidence based on a prior felony conviction for carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle in violation of section 25400, subdivision (a). ( Aguilar , supra , 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011 , 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 202 .) The court rejected the defendant's argument that the offense did not involve moral turpitude because it required no affirmative act signifying " ' "a readiness to do evil." ' " ( Id . at p. 1017, 200 Cal.Rptr.3

2015(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) Because Delta permits a motion to quash the service of a summons to be used as a vehicle to challenge the validity of the three-day notice, then, like any other motion to quash, the parties must be permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence relevant to that issue.

2015(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) Because Delta permits a motion to quash the service of a summons to be used as a vehicle to challenge the validity of the three-day notice, then, like any other motion to quash, the parties must be permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence relevant to that issue.

2013(Pearson Dental, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 679–680.) Specifically addressing the issue of unwaivable statutory rights in the context of ―a mandatory employment arbitration agreement, i.e., an adhesive arbitration agreement that an employer imposes on the employee as a condition of employment,‖ the Supreme Court has recognized ―‗that an arbitration agreement cannot be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of statutory rights created by the FEHA‘ [citation], because the enforcement of such rights was for the public benefit and was not waivable.‖ (Pearson Dental, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 677 ;

2009Code, § 12900 et seq.) or wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (i.e., claims under Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 ])." ( Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1280 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 5 ] ( Giuliano ).) The Supreme Court explained in Gentry, supra, 42 Cal.4th 443 , that it imposed the Armendariz requirements because they are "`necessary to enable an employee to vindicate ... unwaivable rights in an arbitration forum.' ( Little [ v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003)] 29 Cal.4th [1064,] 1077 [ 130 Cal.R

2013However, we have made clear that “[s]uch matters as whether objections should be made and the manner of cross-examination are within counsel’s discretion and rarely implicate ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 993 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 51 P.3d 874 ]; see People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 334 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 956 P.2d 374 ].) Defendant points to no exculpatory or impeachment evidence that further examination would have elicited. “ ‘We cannot evaluate alleged deficiencies in counsel’s representation solely on defendant’s unsubstantiated s

2013However, we have made clear that “[s]uch matters as whether objections should be made and the manner of cross-examination are within counsel’s discretion and rarely implicate ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 993 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 51 P.3d 874 ]; see People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 334 [ 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 , 956 P.2d 374 ].) Defendant points to no exculpatory or impeachment evidence that further examination would have elicited. “ ‘We cannot evaluate alleged deficiencies in counsel’s representation solely on defendant’s unsubstantiated s