vehicle challenge in Texas

2010Sheik, 248 S.W.3d at 394 (“The proper vehicle to challenge the master-in-chancery portion of the complained-of order is by mandamus.”).

2010Sheikh, 248 S.W.3d at 394 (“The proper vehicle to challenge the master-in-chancery portion of the complained-of order is by mandamus.”).

2015Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999) (correcting a number of The Terrell family also alleged, however, that Goble's trip to misunderstandings on that point). 4 The plaintiff has the the doctor was a part of her employment—and thus her use burden to show that jurisdiction exists by alleging facts that of her car was actionable under the vehicle exception to the affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court has subject Tort Claims Act.

2015Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999) (correcting a number of The Terrell family also alleged, however, that Goble's trip to misunderstandings on that point). 4 The plaintiff has the the doctor was a part of her employment—and thus her use burden to show that jurisdiction exists by alleging facts that of her car was actionable under the vehicle exception to the affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court has subject Tort Claims Act.

2025Code § 156.006 (governing temporary orders rendered in suit for modification of parent-child relationship); In re Coker, No. 03-17-00862-CV, 2018 WL 700033 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 23, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“Because a trial court’s temporary orders are not appealable, mandamus is an appropriate vehicle for a challenge to such an order. (citing In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 334-35 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam))); see also Tex. R.

2019See In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 334-35 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

2011When the order at issue was signed, mandamus was the appropriate vehicle to challenge an order denying arbitration under the FAA.4 In re Bank One, N.A., 216 S.W.3d 825, 826 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) 4 Section 51.016 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code was amended, effective September 1, 2009, to allow an interlocutory appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration under the FAA.

2010When the order at issue was signed, mandamus was the appropriate vehicle to challenge an order denying arbitration under the FAA. [7] In re Bank One, N.A. , 216 S.W.3d 825, 826 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias , 934 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).

2014Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954 , 956–57 (Tex. Crim.

2004See Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Crim.

2015App. 1984); Morrison v. State, 71 S.W.3d 821 , 828 n.5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (“We pause briefly to note that standing is not an issue because a passenger in a vehicle can challenge the search of a vehicle in which he is riding if the search resulted from an infringement, such as an illegal detention, of the passenger’s Fourth Amendments rights.”) (citing Carroll v. State, 56 S.W.3d 644, 650 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. ref’d)). 4 question of law and fact also subject to review de novo.

2002Carroll v. State, 56 S.W.3d 644, 650 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. ref'd) (citing Lewis v. State, 664 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex.Crim.App.1984)). 6 .

2010When the order at issue was signed, mandamus was the appropriate vehicle to challenge an order denying arbitration under the FAA. 7 In re Bank One, N.A., 216 S.W.3d 825, 826 (Tex.2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); *396 EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mandas, 934 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex.1996) (per curiam).

2010When the order at issue was signed, mandamus was the appropriate vehicle to challenge an order denying arbitration under the FAA. [7] In re Bank One, N.A. , 216 S.W.3d 825, 826 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); EZ Pawn Corp. v. Mancias , 934 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).

2007The proper vehicle to challenge the master-in-chancery portion of the complained-of order is by mandamus. 7 See Simpson, 806 S.W.2d at 812 ; In re Holt, 2006 WL 1549968 , at *2, 3.

2007The proper vehicle to challenge the master-in-chancery portion of the complained-of order is by mandamus. [7] See Simpson , 806 S.W.2d at 812 ; In re Holt , 2006 WL 1549968 , at * 2 , 3.

2025In re Janson, 614 S.W.3d at 727; In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re Mittelsted, 661 S.W.3d 639 , 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, orig. proceeding).

2020See In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding).

2023See, e.g., Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (“Even in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception.”); id. at 393 (“[T]he vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving.”); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 (“[T]he inherent mobility of automobiles creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.

2019App. 2009) (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93 (1985)) (“‘When a vehicle is being used on the highways, . . . the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play.’”).

2021Vernco Constr., –4– Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015).

2021Vernco Constr., Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam).

2019The prosecutor argued that, under Adkins v. State, 764 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim.

2017The prosecutor argued that, under Adkins v. State, 764 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim.

2015The opinion continued: 2 See Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 61 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) (holding that passengers in a vehicle may claim a violation of the Fourth Amendment based on an unlawful investigatory stop).

2014See Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 61 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (holding that passengers in a vehicle may claim a violation of the Fourth Amendment based on an unlawful investigatory stop).

2014Drug Corp., 391 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex.1965)) ("The taking of depositions to perpetuate testimony is ancillary to the anticipated suit.”); see also Cognata v. Down Hole Injection, Inc., 375 S.W.3d 370, 381-82 (Tex.App.-Houstbn [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (“•Mandamus■•is the proper vehicle to challenge a Rule 202 order when the order seeks discovery from a party against whom suit is anticipated.”).

2013Drug Corp., 391 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex.1965)) (“The taking of depositions to perpetuate testimony is ancillary to the anticipated suit.”); see also Cognata v. Down Hole Injection, Inc., 375 S.W.3d 370, 381-82 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) ("Mandamus is the proper vehicle to challenge a Rule 202 order when the order seeks discovery from a party against whom suit is anticipated.”). 4 .

2014Drug Corp., 391 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex.1965)) ("The taking of depositions to perpetuate testimony is ancillary to the anticipated suit.”); see also Cognata v. Down Hole Injection, Inc., 375 S.W.3d 370, 381-82 (Tex.App.-Houstbn [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (“•Mandamus■•is the proper vehicle to challenge a Rule 202 order when the order seeks discovery from a party against whom suit is anticipated.”).

2013Drug Corp., 391 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex.1965)) (“The taking of depositions to perpetuate testimony is ancillary to the anticipated suit.”); see also Cognata v. Down Hole Injection, Inc., 375 S.W.3d 370, 381-82 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) ("Mandamus is the proper vehicle to challenge a Rule 202 order when the order seeks discovery from a party against whom suit is anticipated.”). 4 .

2011See Simpson v. Canales, 806 S.W.2d 802, 812 (Tex. 1991); Bahar, 330 S.W.3d at 388 (post-judgment order appointing master in chancery, even one that is embedded in a turnover and receivership order, is interlocutory and unappealable but may be challenged by mandamus); Sheikh v. Sheikh, 248 S.W.3d 381, 394 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (same).

2011See Simpson v. Canales , 806 S.W.2d 802, 812 (Tex. 1991); Bahar , 330 S.W.3d at 388 (post-judgment order appointing master in chancery, even one that is embedded in a turnover and receivership order, is interlocutory and unappealable but may be challenged by mandamus); Sheikh v. Sheikh , 248 S.W.3d 381, 394 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (same).

2008Sheihk v. Sheihk , 248 S.W.3d 381, 394 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no. pet.) (holding that post-judgment order appointing master-in-chancery, even one that is embedded into a turnover-and-receivership order, is interlocutory order over which there is no appeal, but which may be challenged by mandamus); Moyer v. Moyer, 183 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tex. App.--Austin 2005, no pet.) (holding that post-judgment appointment of master-in-chancery is not final and appealable order).

2008Sheikh v. Sheikh, 248 S.W.3d 381, 394 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no. pet.) (holding that post-judgment order appointing master-in-ehancery, even one that is embedded into a turnover-and-receivership order, is interlocutory order over which there is no appeal, but which may be challenged by mandamus); Moyer v. Moyer, 183 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.) (holding that post-judgment appointment of master-in-chaneery is not final and ap-pealable order).

2004See Russ Berrie and Co., Inc. v. Gantt , 998 S.W.2d 713, 714-15 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.) (holding that relief from arbitration order governed by FAA must be pursued by petition for writ of mandamus); see generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1999).

2004See Russ Berrie and Co., Inc. v. Gantt , 998 S.W.2d 713, 714-15 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.) (holding that relief from arbitration order governed by FAA must be pursued by petition for writ of mandamus); see generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1999).

2002Carroll v. State , 56 S.W.3d 644, 650 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet. ref'd) (citing Lewis v. State , 664 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex. Crim.

2002Carroll v. State, 56 S.W.3d 644, 650 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. ref'd) (citing Lewis v. State, 664 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex.Crim.App.1984)). 6 .

2023See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 445 (1971), holding modified on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 138–42 (1990). 6 only where entry on to private property is necessary to effectuate the search.”).

2017U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2304 , 110 L.

2006In re Lewin , 149 S.W.3d 727, 734 (Tex. App.–Austin 2004, orig. proceeding); see Tex. Fam.

2006Lewin, 149 S.W.3d at 734 ; see Tex. Fam.

2026Thus, special exceptions are appropriate not only when the plaintiff has alleged “no cause of action” but also when the plaintiff has “alleged no basis of a ground of recovery [that] is a part of his cause of action.” See Garrett v. City of Wichita Falls, 329 S.W.2d 491, 495 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1959, no writ); see also In re C.S., 264 S.W.3d 864 , 871– 82 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.) (“A special exception is the proper vehicle to challenge a pleading on the basis that ‘though there is a legal rule which might be applicable, the petition omits one or more allegations essential to bring plai

2026See Rosser, 902 S.W.2d at 962 ; see also Ex parte Casillas, 25 S.W.3d 296, 298 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.).