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26 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Quirkgreen2 sentences2015Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (citations, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006) (“Where an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, a request for the driver’s license and vehicle registration, a license plate check, a request to search the driver’s vehicle and an inquiry regarding whether the driver has a weapon in the vehicle are within the scope of reasonable detention [under Article 1, Section 11].”). 2013However, the Supreme Court did state that “a request for the driver’s license and vehicle registration, a license plate check, a request to search the driver’s vehicle and an inquiry regarding whether the driver has a weapon in the vehicle are within the scope of reasonable detention.” Id. at 340 . | 2 | 4 |
Halsema v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Id. (citing Halsema v. State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 670-671 (Ind. 2005) (license plate check performed after traffic stop); Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 539, 543 (Ind. 2001) (an officer may as a matter of routine practice ask a driver stopped for a traffic violation if he has a weapon in the vehicle or on his person), reh’g denied; Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 52-53 (Ind. 1995) (after a traffic stop, officer requested driver’s license and registration, asked the driver if the car and its contents belonged to him, and whether the officers could search the driver’s car), reh’g denied). 2006See, e.g., Halsema v. State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 670-71 (Ind.2005) (license plate check performed after traffic stop); Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 539, 543 (Ind.2001) (an officer may as a matter of routine practice ask a driver stopped for a traffic violation if he has a weapon in the vehicle or on his person); Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 52-53 (Ind.1995) (after a traffic stop, officer requested driver's license and registration, asked the driver if the car and its contents belonged to him, and whether the officers could search the driver's car). | 2 | 2 |
Lockett v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Id. (citing Halsema v. State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 670-671 (Ind. 2005) (license plate check performed after traffic stop); Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 539, 543 (Ind. 2001) (an officer may as a matter of routine practice ask a driver stopped for a traffic violation if he has a weapon in the vehicle or on his person), reh’g denied; Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 52-53 (Ind. 1995) (after a traffic stop, officer requested driver’s license and registration, asked the driver if the car and its contents belonged to him, and whether the officers could search the driver’s car), reh’g denied). 2006See, e.g., Halsema v. State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 670-71 (Ind.2005) (license plate check performed after traffic stop); Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 539, 543 (Ind.2001) (an officer may as a matter of routine practice ask a driver stopped for a traffic violation if he has a weapon in the vehicle or on his person); Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 52-53 (Ind.1995) (after a traffic stop, officer requested driver's license and registration, asked the driver if the car and its contents belonged to him, and whether the officers could search the driver's car). | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Id. (citing Halsema v. State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 670-671 (Ind. 2005) (license plate check performed after traffic stop); Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 539, 543 (Ind. 2001) (an officer may as a matter of routine practice ask a driver stopped for a traffic violation if he has a weapon in the vehicle or on his person), reh’g denied; Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 52-53 (Ind. 1995) (after a traffic stop, officer requested driver’s license and registration, asked the driver if the car and its contents belonged to him, and whether the officers could search the driver’s car), reh’g denied). 2006See, e.g., Halsema v. State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 670-71 (Ind.2005) (license plate check performed after traffic stop); Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 539, 543 (Ind.2001) (an officer may as a matter of routine practice ask a driver stopped for a traffic violation if he has a weapon in the vehicle or on his person); Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 52-53 (Ind.1995) (after a traffic stop, officer requested driver's license and registration, asked the driver if the car and its contents belonged to him, and whether the officers could search the driver's car). | 2 | 2 |
Harper v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Likewise, under the Indiana Constitution, “[w]here an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, a request for the driver’s license and vehicle registration, a license plate check, a request to search the driver’s vehicle and an inquiry regarding whether the driver has a weapon in the vehicle are within the scope of reasonable detention.” Harper v. State, 922 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. [14] Here, the traffic stop was permissible under both the United States and Indiana Constitutions because Captain Pyatt had reasonable suspicion that Tellez- Salinas had committed | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ramon Rubio-Riveragreen1 sentence2020Based on its determination that “federal precedent addressing standing of a passenger asserting an interest in a searched vehicle is equally applicable under the Indiana Constitution[,]” 1 the court agreed with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that “[w]here the defendant offers sufficient evidence indicating that he has permission of the owner to use the vehicle, the defendant plainly has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and standing to challenge the search of the vehicle.” Id. at 598 , 599 (quoting United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 1990)). | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (citations, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006) (“Where an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation, a request for the driver’s license and vehicle registration, a license plate check, a request to search the driver’s vehicle and an inquiry regarding whether the driver has a weapon in the vehicle are within the scope of reasonable detention [under Article 1, Section 11].”). | 1 | 1 |
Rutledge v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Id. [26] Article 1, Section 11 provides, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated . . . .” In Rutledge v. State, 426 N.E.2d 638, 641 (Ind. 1981), the Indiana Supreme Court addressed an argument that a stop of a vehicle was in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and held that “[i]n order to determine the reasonableness of such a warrantless intrusion, the court must examine the facts known to the officer | 1 | 1 |
Harp v. Indiana Department of Highwaysgreen1 sentence2010Harp v. Indiana Department of Highways, 585 N.E.2d 652, 660 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Chambers v. Maroneygreen2 sentences2003Thus, in Chambers a warrantless automobile search was valid when there was probable cause that it contained evidence of a crime, even though the search did not take place until after the automobile's occupants were arrested and the automobile was taken to a police station. 399 U.S. at 44, 52 , 90 S.Ct. at 1977, 1981 . 2003Thus, in Chambers a warrantless automobile search was valid when there was probable cause that it contained evidence of a crime, even though the search did not take place until after the automobile's occupants were arrested and the automobile was taken to a police station. 399 U.S. at 44, 52 , 90 S.Ct. at 1977, 1981 . | 1 | 1 |
Protective Insurance v. Steubergreen2 sentences1980See Protective Insurance Co. v. Steuber (1977), Ind. App., 370 N.E.2d 406 ; Roberts v. Watson (1977), Ind. App., 359 N.E.2d 615 ; Robbins v. Robbins (1976), Ind. App., 358 N.E.2d 153 ; Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds (1976), Ind. App., 358 N.E.2d 146 ; Covalt v. Covalt (1976), Ind. App., 354 N.E.2d 766 . [2] Martin's brief is devoid of any argument on his fourth issue, excessive interest, therefore, pursuant to Ind.Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7), this issue is deemed waived. [3] We note for the sake of clarity that we are addressing here the rules governing transfer of venue to a count 1980See Protective Insurance Co. v. Steuber (1977), Ind.App., 370 N.E.2d 406 ; Roberts v. Watson (1977), Ind.App., 359 N.E.2d 615 ; Robbins v. Robbins (1976), Ind.App., 358 N.E.2d 153 ; Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds (1976), Ind.App., 358 N.E.2d 146 ; Covalt v. Covalt (1976), Ind.App., 354 N.E.2d 766 . . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
California v. Carney
green
2 sentences2025But “[w]ith few exceptions, the courts have not hesitated to apply the vehicle exception to vehicles other than automobiles.” Carney, 471 U.S. at 393 n.2. 11 To determine whether the automobile exception applies under these circumstances, we revisit its justifications, both of which “come into play” here. 2004"When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes-temporary or otherwise ... the vehicle exception Carney, 471 U.S. at comes into play." 392-93, 105 S.Ct. at 2070 . | 5 | 2001–2025 |
Klopfenstein v. State
green
2 sentences2017Klopfenstein, 439 N.E.2d at 1185 . 2013Id. | 3 | 2003–2017 |
Collins v. Virginia
green
1 sentence2025Collins, 584 U.S. at 592 . [23] To refresh, the automobile exception is based on a vehicle’s ready mobility and its occupants’ lesser expectations of privacy. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Campos v. State
green
2 sentences2020Based on its determination that “federal precedent addressing standing of a passenger asserting an interest in a searched vehicle is equally applicable under the Indiana Constitution[,]” 1 the court agreed with the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that “[w]here the defendant offers sufficient evidence indicating that he has permission of the owner to use the vehicle, the defendant plainly has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and standing to challenge the search of the vehicle.” Id. at 598 , 599 (quoting United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 1990)). 2020In Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590 (Ind. 2008), the Indiana Supreme Court considered whether the passenger of a vehicle may challenge a search of the vehicle under Article 1, Section 11. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Kirby v. State
green
2 sentences2019Id. at 521 . 2019Id. at 521 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Pease
green
1 sentence2015Id. [26] Article 1, Section 11 provides, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated . . . .” In Rutledge v. State, 426 N.E.2d 638, 641 (Ind. 1981), the Indiana Supreme Court addressed an argument that a stop of a vehicle was in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution and held that “[i]n order to determine the reasonableness of such a warrantless intrusion, the court must examine the facts known to the officer | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Mitchell v. State
green
1 sentence2014Id. (citing Halsema v. State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 670-671 (Ind. 2005) (license plate check performed after traffic stop); Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 539, 543 (Ind. 2001) (an officer may as a matter of routine practice ask a driver stopped for a traffic violation if he has a weapon in the vehicle or on his person), reh’g denied; Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 52-53 (Ind. 1995) (after a traffic stop, officer requested driver’s license and registration, asked the driver if the car and its contents belonged to him, and whether the officers could search the driver’s car), reh’g denied). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Sims v. State
red
2 sentences2009Under Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution, "a person who is asked to give consent to search while in police custody is entitled to the presence and advice of counsel prior to making the decision whether to give such consent." Pirtle, 263 Ind. at 29 , 323 N.E.2d at 640 ; Sims, 274 Ind. at 499-500 , 413 N.E.2d at 558 . 2009Under Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution, "a person who is asked to give consent to search while in police custody is entitled to the presence and advice of counsel prior to making the decision whether to give such consent." Pirtle, 263 Ind. at 29 , 323 N.E.2d at 640 ; Sims, 274 Ind. at 499-500 , 413 N.E.2d at 558 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Pirtle v. State
green
2 sentences2009Under Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution, "a person who is asked to give consent to search while in police custody is entitled to the presence and advice of counsel prior to making the decision whether to give such consent." Pirtle, 263 Ind. at 29 , 323 N.E.2d at 640 ; Sims, 274 Ind. at 499-500 , 413 N.E.2d at 558 . 2009Under Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution, "a person who is asked to give consent to search while in police custody is entitled to the presence and advice of counsel prior to making the decision whether to give such consent." Pirtle, 263 Ind. at 29 , 323 N.E.2d at 640 ; Sims, 274 Ind. at 499-500 , 413 N.E.2d at 558 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Beets v. State
neutral
1 sentence2008Jackson also cites Beets v. State, 872 N.E.2d 222 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (Table), trans. denied, in support of his argument. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Reffett v. State
green
1 sentence1998Reffett, 571 N.E.2d at 1229 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Craven v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1994Id. at (b). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Crain v. State
green
1 sentence1986Crain v. State (1978), 261 Ind. 272 , 801 N.E.2d 751 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Eilinger v. Department of Motor Vehicles
neutral
2 sentences1985It is noteworthy that the California statute, unlike the Indiana act, creates an exception to voluntarily submitting to the test of the driver "is unconscious or otherwise in a condition rendering him or her incapable of refusal ..." Eilinger v. Director of California State Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1983), 143 Cal.App.3d 748 , 192 Cal.Rptr. 187, 188 . 1985It is noteworthy that the California statute, unlike the Indiana act, creates an exception to voluntarily submitting to the test of the driver "is unconscious or otherwise in a condition rendering him or her incapable of refusal ..." Eilinger v. Director of California State Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1983), 143 Cal.App.3d 748 , 192 Cal.Rptr. 187, 188 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Roberts v. Watson
green
2 sentences1980See Protective Insurance Co. v. Steuber (1977), Ind. App., 370 N.E.2d 406 ; Roberts v. Watson (1977), Ind. App., 359 N.E.2d 615 ; Robbins v. Robbins (1976), Ind. App., 358 N.E.2d 153 ; Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds (1976), Ind. App., 358 N.E.2d 146 ; Covalt v. Covalt (1976), Ind. App., 354 N.E.2d 766 . [2] Martin's brief is devoid of any argument on his fourth issue, excessive interest, therefore, pursuant to Ind.Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7), this issue is deemed waived. [3] We note for the sake of clarity that we are addressing here the rules governing transfer of venue to a count 1980See Protective Insurance Co. v. Steuber (1977), Ind.App., 370 N.E.2d 406 ; Roberts v. Watson (1977), Ind.App., 359 N.E.2d 615 ; Robbins v. Robbins (1976), Ind.App., 358 N.E.2d 153 ; Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds (1976), Ind.App., 358 N.E.2d 146 ; Covalt v. Covalt (1976), Ind.App., 354 N.E.2d 766 . . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Covalt v. Covalt
green
2 sentences1980See Protective Insurance Co. v. Steuber (1977), Ind. App., 370 N.E.2d 406 ; Roberts v. Watson (1977), Ind. App., 359 N.E.2d 615 ; Robbins v. Robbins (1976), Ind. App., 358 N.E.2d 153 ; Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds (1976), Ind. App., 358 N.E.2d 146 ; Covalt v. Covalt (1976), Ind. App., 354 N.E.2d 766 . [2] Martin's brief is devoid of any argument on his fourth issue, excessive interest, therefore, pursuant to Ind.Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7), this issue is deemed waived. [3] We note for the sake of clarity that we are addressing here the rules governing transfer of venue to a count 1980See Protective Insurance Co. v. Steuber (1977), Ind.App., 370 N.E.2d 406 ; Roberts v. Watson (1977), Ind.App., 359 N.E.2d 615 ; Robbins v. Robbins (1976), Ind.App., 358 N.E.2d 153 ; Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds (1976), Ind.App., 358 N.E.2d 146 ; Covalt v. Covalt (1976), Ind.App., 354 N.E.2d 766 . . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
In Re Marriage of Robbins
green
2 sentences1980See Protective Insurance Co. v. Steuber (1977), Ind. App., 370 N.E.2d 406 ; Roberts v. Watson (1977), Ind. App., 359 N.E.2d 615 ; Robbins v. Robbins (1976), Ind. App., 358 N.E.2d 153 ; Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds (1976), Ind. App., 358 N.E.2d 146 ; Covalt v. Covalt (1976), Ind. App., 354 N.E.2d 766 . [2] Martin's brief is devoid of any argument on his fourth issue, excessive interest, therefore, pursuant to Ind.Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7), this issue is deemed waived. [3] We note for the sake of clarity that we are addressing here the rules governing transfer of venue to a count 1980See Protective Insurance Co. v. Steuber (1977), Ind.App., 370 N.E.2d 406 ; Roberts v. Watson (1977), Ind.App., 359 N.E.2d 615 ; Robbins v. Robbins (1976), Ind.App., 358 N.E.2d 153 ; Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds (1976), Ind.App., 358 N.E.2d 146 ; Covalt v. Covalt (1976), Ind.App., 354 N.E.2d 766 . . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds
green
2 sentences1980See Protective Insurance Co. v. Steuber (1977), Ind. App., 370 N.E.2d 406 ; Roberts v. Watson (1977), Ind. App., 359 N.E.2d 615 ; Robbins v. Robbins (1976), Ind. App., 358 N.E.2d 153 ; Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds (1976), Ind. App., 358 N.E.2d 146 ; Covalt v. Covalt (1976), Ind. App., 354 N.E.2d 766 . [2] Martin's brief is devoid of any argument on his fourth issue, excessive interest, therefore, pursuant to Ind.Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7), this issue is deemed waived. [3] We note for the sake of clarity that we are addressing here the rules governing transfer of venue to a count 1980See Protective Insurance Co. v. Steuber (1977), Ind.App., 370 N.E.2d 406 ; Roberts v. Watson (1977), Ind.App., 359 N.E.2d 615 ; Robbins v. Robbins (1976), Ind.App., 358 N.E.2d 153 ; Kelly v. Bank of Reynolds (1976), Ind.App., 358 N.E.2d 146 ; Covalt v. Covalt (1976), Ind.App., 354 N.E.2d 766 . . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.