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9 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of St. Peters, Missouri v. Bonnie A. Roedergreen1 sentence2025Peters, 466 S.W.3d at 543 (“When the ordinance conflicts with a statute, the ordinance is void.”) MSD Waived its Procedural Arguments MSD alleges the only proper vehicle to challenge its lien for unpaid sewer charges is the procedure set out in MSD’s Plan. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen1 sentence2016The court acknowledged that, although “it would be simpler to apply section 571.015.4’s prohibitions if they applied to all forms of unlawful use of a weapon, that is a matter for the legislature, not for this Court.” Id.-, see also Prince, 311 S.W.3d at 327 (holding that unlawful use of a weapon for firing from a vehicle in violation of section 571.030.1(9) is not not one of the original ACA exceptions and can serve as a predicate offense for ACA without violating double jeopardy); Brown, 343 S.W.3d at 760 (accord); White, 458 S.W.3d at 337 (accord). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Princegreen1 sentence2016The court acknowledged that, although “it would be simpler to apply section 571.015.4’s prohibitions if they applied to all forms of unlawful use of a weapon, that is a matter for the legislature, not for this Court.” Id.-, see also Prince, 311 S.W.3d at 327 (holding that unlawful use of a weapon for firing from a vehicle in violation of section 571.030.1(9) is not not one of the original ACA exceptions and can serve as a predicate offense for ACA without violating double jeopardy); Brown, 343 S.W.3d at 760 (accord); White, 458 S.W.3d at 337 (accord). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2016Multiple charges do not violate double jeopardy if the defendant has “in law and in fact committed separate crimes.” State v. Jackson, 703 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Mo.App.E.D.1985) (affirming dual convictions “where two separate offenses arise out of the same set of facts”). *26 In this case, the two convictions Reynolds claims violate double jeopardy by imposing cumulative punishments are Count IV, armed criminal action (“ACA”) for committing an assault while armed with a deadly weapon in violation of 571.015, and Count V, unlawful use of a weapon (“UUW”) for discharging a firearm at a vehicle in viola | 1 | 1 |
Watson v. Claycorp, Inc.green1 sentence2016The court acknowledged that, although “it would be simpler to apply section 571.015.4’s prohibitions if they applied to all forms of unlawful use of a weapon, that is a matter for the legislature, not for this Court.” Id.-, see also Prince, 311 S.W.3d at 327 (holding that unlawful use of a weapon for firing from a vehicle in violation of section 571.030.1(9) is not not one of the original ACA exceptions and can serve as a predicate offense for ACA without violating double jeopardy); Brown, 343 S.W.3d at 760 (accord); White, 458 S.W.3d at 337 (accord). | 1 | 1 |
Love v. Board of Police Commissionersgreen1 sentence2011As we have long held, “Rule 74.06 is not intended as an alternative to a timely appeal.” Love v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 943 S.W.2d 862, 863 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
Oberkramer v. City of Ellisvillegreen1 sentence1988In those cases the courts have held that operating a motor vehicle encompasses “all acts necessary to be performed in the movement of a motor vehicle from one place to another or fairly incidental to the ordinary course of its op-eration_” Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286, 296 (Mo.App.1983); Johnson v. Carthell, supra. Thus, the question in this case becomes whether the act of operating the trash truck’s compactor is “fairly incidental to the ordinary course” of the operation of the instant vehicle, the trash truck. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson Ex Rel. Carter v. Carthellgreen2 sentences1988The fact that this particular vehicle was equipped with a trash compactor and that the compactor caused the injury in no way removes the vehicle from this exception. *163 In Johnson v. Carthell, 631 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Mo.App.1982), the court, in examining specific case authority, namely, Teters v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 300 S.W.2d 611 (Mo.1957), and Karnes v. Ace Cab Co., 287 S.W.2d 378 (Mo.App.1956), stated, “These cases demonstrate that the operation of a motor vehicle includes nearly any activity that deals specifically with the motor vehicle, i.e., the actual physical structure and 1988In those cases the courts have held that operating a motor vehicle encompasses “all acts necessary to be performed in the movement of a motor vehicle from one place to another or fairly incidental to the ordinary course of its op-eration_” Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286, 296 (Mo.App.1983); Johnson v. Carthell, supra. Thus, the question in this case becomes whether the act of operating the trash truck’s compactor is “fairly incidental to the ordinary course” of the operation of the instant vehicle, the trash truck. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Reid v. Kempgreen1 sentence1981See State ex rel Reid v. Kemp, 574 S.W.2d 695 (Mo.App.1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Klugesherz Ex Rel. Klugesherz v. American Honda Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2008Id. 2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. McNaughton
green
1 sentence1998McNaughton, 924 S.W.2d at 523 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Karnes v. Ace Cab Company
green
1 sentence1988The fact that this particular vehicle was equipped with a trash compactor and that the compactor caused the injury in no way removes the vehicle from this exception. *163 In Johnson v. Carthell, 631 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Mo.App.1982), the court, in examining specific case authority, namely, Teters v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 300 S.W.2d 611 (Mo.1957), and Karnes v. Ace Cab Co., 287 S.W.2d 378 (Mo.App.1956), stated, “These cases demonstrate that the operation of a motor vehicle includes nearly any activity that deals specifically with the motor vehicle, i.e., the actual physical structure and | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Mitchell
green
1 sentence1984In Mitchell, id. at 36 , we determined that “[sjection 137.073 is not a vehicle to test the propriety or legality of a taxing authority’s determination or procedure for determination of how much money it needs in order to operate.” We decline the invitation to do what Mitchell prohibits. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Wiglesworth v. Wyrick
green
1 sentence1980The term adequately describes the substantive right being protected and preserved.” Our Rule 27.26 does not, by its wording or interpretation thereof, suspend the common law writ of habeas corpus as contended by appellant, see Wiglesworth v. Wyrick, supra. Appellant’s further contention that dismissal of appellant’s motion “with prejudice” amounted to such suspension is without merit. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.