vehicle exception in Virginia

2017See also Rawls , 278 Va. at 218 , 683 S.E.2d at 547 (recognizing that a motion to vacate is the proper vehicle to challenge a void ab initio sentencing order); Singh , 261 Va. at 52 , 541 S.E.2d at 551 ("The lack of jurisdiction to enter an order ... renders the order a complete nullity [that] may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, or in any manner.").

2017See also Rawls, 278 Va. at 218, 683 S.E.2d at 547 (recognizing that a motion to vacate is the proper vehicle to challenge a void ab initio sentencing order); Singh, 261 Va. at 52 , 541 S.E.2d 551 (“The lack of jurisdiction to enter an order . . . renders the order a complete nullity [that] may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, or in any manner.”).

2017See also Rawls , 278 Va. at 218 , 683 S.E.2d at 547 (recognizing that a motion to vacate is the proper vehicle to challenge a void ab initio sentencing order); Singh , 261 Va. at 52 , 541 S.E.2d at 551 ("The lack of jurisdiction to enter an order ... renders the order a complete nullity [that] may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, or in any manner.").

2017See also Rawls , 278 Va. at 218 , 683 S.E.2d at 547 (recognizing that a motion to vacate is the proper vehicle to challenge a void ab initio sentencing order); Singh , 261 Va. at 52 , 541 S.E.2d at 551 ("The lack of jurisdiction to enter an order ... renders the order a complete nullity [that] may be impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, or in any manner.").

2016California v. Carney , 471 U.S. 386 , 390, 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 2068, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) ; see also Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 1565, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ("[P]eople are accorded less privacy in automobiles because of the compelling governmental need for regulation.") (citing Carney , 471 U.S. at 392 , 105 S.Ct. at 2069 ). [A]lthough ready mobility alone was perhaps the original justification for the vehicle exception, our later cases have made clear that ready mobility is not the only basis for the exception ...

2016California v. Carney , 471 U.S. 386 , 390, 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 2068, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) ; see also Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 1565, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ("[P]eople are accorded less privacy in automobiles because of the compelling governmental need for regulation.") (citing Carney , 471 U.S. at 392 , 105 S.Ct. at 2069 ). [A]lthough ready mobility alone was perhaps the original justification for the vehicle exception, our later cases have made clear that ready mobility is not the only basis for the exception ...

2012Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).

2012Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).

2016California v. Carney , 471 U.S. 386 , 390, 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 2068, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) ; see also Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 1565, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ("[P]eople are accorded less privacy in automobiles because of the compelling governmental need for regulation.") (citing Carney , 471 U.S. at 392 , 105 S.Ct. at 2069 ). [A]lthough ready mobility alone was perhaps the original justification for the vehicle exception, our later cases have made clear that ready mobility is not the only basis for the exception ...

2016California v. Carney , 471 U.S. 386 , 390, 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 2068, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) ; see also Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1552 , 1565, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ("[P]eople are accorded less privacy in automobiles because of the compelling governmental need for regulation.") (citing Carney , 471 U.S. at 392 , 105 S.Ct. at 2069 ). [A]lthough ready mobility alone was perhaps the original justification for the vehicle exception, our later cases have made clear that ready mobility is not the only basis for the exception ...

2016Carney, 471 U.S. at 391 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973) (recognizing the automobile exception even in cases where the “possibilities of the vehicle’s being removed or evidence in it destroyed were remote, if not nonexistent”)). of Appeals noted below, the fact that Collins had changed into motorcycle clothes and had the key in his pocket “further speak[s] to the reasonableness of Officer Rhodes’ belief that … [Collins] not only possessed an interest in, but also the ability and probable intention to move the motorcycle out of the reach of law enforcement.” Collins, 65 V

2013In other words, the Fitness Clubs, by using the declaratory judgment statute as a vehicle to challenge the Council's and Board's actions with regard to the Use Agreement, 27 are attempting to assert rights that they do not otherwise have. 2 Code § 8.01-184 "may not be used to attempt a third- party challenge to a governmental action when such a challenge is not otherwise authorized." Miller v. Highland Cnty., 274 Va. 355, 371 , 650 S.E.2d 532, 540 (2007).

2013In other words, the Fitness Clubs, by using the declaratory judgment statute as a vehicle to challenge the Council's and Board's actions with regard to the Use Agreement, 27 are attempting to assert rights that they do not otherwise have. 2 Code § 8.01-184 "may not be used to attempt a third- party challenge to a governmental action when such a challenge is not otherwise authorized." Miller v. Highland Cnty., 274 Va. 355, 371 , 650 S.E.2d 532, 540 (2007).

2012Rule 3:20 provides that “[a]ny party may make a motion for summary judgment at any time after the parties are at issue, except in an action for divorce or for annulment of marriage.” To support his position, that the trial court erred in granting wife’s motion to strike, husband cites Costner v. Lackey, 223 Va. 377, 381 , 290 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1982) (per curiam), for the proposition that a “motion to strike is in effect a motion for summary judgment.” Husband takes this principle out of context. “[S]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy which is available only where there are no material facts ge

2012Rule 3:20 provides that “[a]ny party may make a motion for summary judgment at any time after the parties are at issue, except in an action for divorce or for annulment of marriage.” To support his position, that the trial court erred in granting wife’s motion to strike, husband cites Costner v. Lackey, 223 Va. 377, 381 , 290 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1982) (per curiam), for the proposition that a “motion to strike is in effect a motion for summary judgment.” Husband takes this principle out of context. “[S]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy which is available only where there are no material facts ge

2012Rule 3:20 provides that “[a]ny party may make a motion for summary judgment at any time after the parties are at issue, except in an action for divorce or for annulment of marriage.” To support his position, that the trial court erred in granting wife’s motion to strike, husband cites Costner v. Lackey, 223 Va. 377, 381 , 290 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1982) (per curiam), for the proposition that a “motion to strike is in effect a motion for summary judgment.” Husband takes this principle out of context. “[S]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy which is available only where there are no material facts ge

2012Rule 3:20 provides that “[a]ny party may make a motion for summary judgment at any time after the parties are at issue, except in an action for divorce or for annulment of marriage.” To support his position, that the trial court erred in granting wife’s motion to strike, husband cites Costner v. Lackey, 223 Va. 377, 381 , 290 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1982) (per curiam), for the proposition that a “motion to strike is in effect a motion for summary judgment.” Husband takes this principle out of context. “[S]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy which is available only where there are no material facts ge

1998Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); accord, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 23 Va. App. 598, 610 , 478 S.E.2d 715, 721 (1996) (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 ).

1998Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); accord, e.g., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 23 Va. App. 598, 610 , 478 S.E.2d 715, 721 (1996) (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 ).

1995While Combs' proximity to the marijuana and his occupancy of the vehicle are factors to be considered, Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 100 , 390 S.E.2d 491, 498 (1990), "no evidence or rule of law compels a finding that a person who shares an automobile with another necessarily knows that the other person has contraband or also shares possession of contraband that the other person has in the automobile." Scruggs v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 58, 62 , 448 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1994); see Jones v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 572, 574 , 439 S.E.2d 863, 864 (1994) (occupant of automobile not pres

1995While Combs' proximity to the marijuana and his occupancy of the vehicle are factors to be considered, Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 100 , 390 S.E.2d 491, 498 (1990), "no evidence or rule of law compels a finding that a person who shares an automobile with another necessarily knows that the other person has contraband or also shares possession of contraband that the other person has in the automobile." Scruggs v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 58, 62 , 448 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1994); see Jones v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 572, 574 , 439 S.E.2d 863, 864 (1994) (occupant of automobile not pres

1995While Combs' proximity to the marijuana and his occupancy of the vehicle are factors to be considered, Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 100 , 390 S.E.2d 491, 498 (1990), "no evidence or rule of law compels a finding that a person who shares an automobile with another necessarily knows that the other person has contraband or also shares possession of contraband that the other person has in the automobile." Scruggs v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 58, 62 , 448 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1994); see Jones v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 572, 574 , 439 S.E.2d 863, 864 (1994) (occupant of automobile not pres

1995While Combs' proximity to the marijuana and his occupancy of the vehicle are factors to be considered, Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 100 , 390 S.E.2d 491, 498 (1990), "no evidence or rule of law compels a finding that a person who shares an automobile with another necessarily knows that the other person has contraband or also shares possession of contraband that the other person has in the automobile." Scruggs v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 58, 62 , 448 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1994); see Jones v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 572, 574 , 439 S.E.2d 863, 864 (1994) (occupant of automobile not pres

1995While Combs' proximity to the marijuana and his occupancy of the vehicle are factors to be considered, Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 100 , 390 S.E.2d 491, 498 (1990), "no evidence or rule of law compels a finding that a person who shares an automobile with another necessarily knows that the other person has contraband or also shares possession of contraband that the other person has in the automobile." Scruggs v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 58, 62 , 448 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1994); see Jones v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 572, 574 , 439 S.E.2d 863, 864 (1994) (occupant of automobile not pres

1995While Combs' proximity to the marijuana and his occupancy of the vehicle are factors to be considered, Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 100 , 390 S.E.2d 491, 498 (1990), "no evidence or rule of law compels a finding that a person who shares an automobile with another necessarily knows that the other person has contraband or also shares possession of contraband that the other person has in the automobile." Scruggs v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 58, 62 , 448 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1994); see Jones v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 572, 574 , 439 S.E.2d 863, 864 (1994) (occupant of automobile not pres