80 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1937–2023 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Di Orio v. City of Scottsdalegreen2 sentences1973Generally, there must be mutuality, not only of the parties, but of the issues to invoke the doctrine of res judicata." Di Orio v. City of Scottsdale, 2 Ariz. App. 329, 330 , 408 P.2d 849, 850 (1965). 1973Generally, there must be mutuality, not only of the parties, but of the issues to invoke the doctrine of res judicata." Di Orio v. City of Scottsdale, 2 Ariz. App. 329, 330 , 408 P.2d 849, 850 (1965). | 2 | 6 |
Gilbert v. Board of Medical Examinersgreen2 sentences2022Exam’rs, 155 Ariz. 169, 174 (App. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Goodman v. Samaritan Health Sys., 195 Ariz. 502 , 508 ¶ 25 n.7 (App. 1999). ¶9 Under the doctrine of res judicata (now referred to as “claim preclusion”), “a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” In re Gen. 1998Gilbert v. Board of Medical Examiners, 155 Ariz. 169 , 745 P.2d 617 (App.1987). | 2 | 3 |
Montana v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2006Simply put, the doctrine of res judicata provides that when a final judgment has been entered on the merits of a ease, ‘it is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them ... as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand____’ Nevada, 463 U.S. at 129-30 , 103 S.Ct. 2906 (quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 , 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876)) (internal alteration omitted); see also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 , 99 S.Ct. 970 , 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (“Under res judicata, a fina 2006Simply put, the doctrine of res judicata provides that when a final judgment has been entered on the merits of a ease, ‘it is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them ... as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand____’ Nevada, 463 U.S. at 129-30 , 103 S.Ct. 2906 (quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 , 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876)) (internal alteration omitted); see also Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 , 99 S.Ct. 970 , 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (“Under res judicata, a fina | 2 | 2 |
Lennar Corp. v. Transamerica Insurancegreen2 sentences2011Co., 227 Ariz. 238, ¶ 12 , 256 P.3d 635, 640 (App.2011), quoting Dancing Sunshines Lounge v. Indus. 2011Co., 227 Ariz. 238, ¶ 12 , 256 P.3d 635, 640 (App.2011), quoting Dancing Sunshines Lounge v. Indus. | 2 | 2 |
Lennar Corp. v. Auto-Owners Insurancegreen2 sentences2011Lennar I, 214 Ariz. at 270, ¶ 59 , 151 P.3d at 553 . 2011Lennar I, 214 Ariz. at 270, ¶ 59 , 151 P.3d at 553 . | 2 | 2 |
Clay v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'ngreen2 sentences2006See Pima County Bd. of Supervisors, 149 Ariz. at 43 , 716 P.2d at 412 ; see also Clay v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, Inc., 161 Ariz. 474, 476 , 779 P.2d 349, 351 (1989) (“[A]n [administrative] agency must follow its own rules and regulations; to do otherwise is unlawful.”); Modern Indus. 2006See Pima County Bd. of Supervisors, 149 Ariz. at 43 , 716 P.2d at 412 ; see also Clay v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass’n, Inc., 161 Ariz. 474, 476 , 779 P.2d 349, 351 (1989) (“[A]n [administrative] agency must follow its own rules and regulations; to do otherwise is unlawful.”); Modern Indus. | 2 | 2 |
Pima County Board of Supervisors v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2006See Pima County Bd. of Supervisors, 149 Ariz. at 43-44 , 716 P.2d at 412-13 (reopen and rearrangement statutes are exceptions to doctrine of res judicata). 2006See Pima County Bd. of Supervisors, 149 Ariz. at 43-44 , 716 P.2d at 412-13 (reopen and rearrangement statutes are exceptions to doctrine of res judicata). | 2 | 2 |
Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp.green2 sentences1992RES JUDICATA “[Ujnder the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment ‘on the merits’ in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars a second suit based on the same cause of action.” Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 , 75 S.Ct. 865, 867 , 99 L.Ed. 1122, 1126 (1955). 1992RES JUDICATA “[Ujnder the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment ‘on the merits’ in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars a second suit based on the same cause of action.” Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 , 75 S.Ct. 865, 867 , 99 L.Ed. 1122, 1126 (1955). | 1 | 7 |
Day v. Estate of Wiswallgreen2 sentences1971Cases of interest in relation to this applicability of the doctrine of res judicata are Hoff v. City of Mesa, 86 Ariz. 259 , 344 P.2d 1013 (1959); State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295 , 350 P.2d 756 (1960) ; and Day v. Estate of Wiswall, 93 Ariz. 400 , 381 P.2d 217 (1963). 1971Cases of interest in relation to this applicability of the doctrine of res judicata are Hoff v. City of Mesa, 86 Ariz. 259 , 344 P.2d 1013 (1959); State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295 , 350 P.2d 756 (1960) ; and Day v. Estate of Wiswall, 93 Ariz. 400 , 381 P.2d 217 (1963). | 1 | 5 |
Ward v. Wardgreen2 sentences1973Ward v. Ward, 88 Ariz. 130 , 353 P.2d 895 (1960). 1973Ward v. Ward, 88 Ariz. 130 , 353 P.2d 895 (1960). | 1 | 2 |
Corcoran v. Department of Social Servicesgreen1 sentence2023Services, 859 A.2d 533, 540 (Conn. 2004) (“To invoke collateral estoppel the issues sought to be litigated in the new proceeding must be identical to those considered in the prior proceeding.”) (Citation omitted.). | 1 | 1 |
Weiss v. Weissgreen1 sentence2023See Weiss v. Weiss, 998 A.2d 766, 779 (Conn. 2010) (noting “the purposes of res judicata as promoting judicial economy, minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments and providing repose to parties”); Bruno, 46 A.3d at 986 (“[A] party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate.”); see also Underwriters Nat'l Assur. | 1 | 1 |
Cahaly v. Somersgreen1 sentence2023See, e.g., Cahaly v. Somers, 877 A.2d 837, 840 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (explaining that because defendants’ procedural due process claim was “fully and fairly litigated in the Massachusetts courts,” their claim “is barred by the doctrine of res judicata”); see also Lofts v. Superior Court In & For Maricopa Cnty., 140 Ariz. 407, 410 (1984) (“When the rendering court in a contested hearing determines it has jurisdiction, its determination is res judicata on the jurisdictional issue and cannot be relitigated in another state.”) ¶72 Finally, Trustee argues he was denied due process of law, the judgm | 1 | 1 |
Bruno v. Gellergreen1 sentence2023See Weiss v. Weiss, 998 A.2d 766, 779 (Conn. 2010) (noting “the purposes of res judicata as promoting judicial economy, minimizing repetitive litigation, preventing inconsistent judgments and providing repose to parties”); Bruno, 46 A.3d at 986 (“[A] party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate.”); see also Underwriters Nat'l Assur. | 1 | 1 |
Lyon v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2023Specially Concurring the jurisdictional issues is ‘bound on that issue by the doctrine of res judicata.’”).4 ¶71 Unlike res judicata, collateral estoppel requires a showing that the issues were “identical” and “actually decided.” See Lyon v. Jones, 968 A.2d 416, 429 (Conn. 2009) (explaining that for purposes of collateral estoppel, an “issue is actually litigated if it is properly raised in the pleadings or otherwise, submitted for determination, and in fact determined”) (citation omitted); Corcoran v. Dep't of Soc. | 1 | 1 |
Lofts v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2023See, e.g., Cahaly v. Somers, 877 A.2d 837, 840 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (explaining that because defendants’ procedural due process claim was “fully and fairly litigated in the Massachusetts courts,” their claim “is barred by the doctrine of res judicata”); see also Lofts v. Superior Court In & For Maricopa Cnty., 140 Ariz. 407, 410 (1984) (“When the rendering court in a contested hearing determines it has jurisdiction, its determination is res judicata on the jurisdictional issue and cannot be relitigated in another state.”) ¶72 Finally, Trustee argues he was denied due process of law, the judgm | 1 | 1 |
JOYNER v. LEAPHARTgreen1 sentence2023See Joyner v. Leaphart, 875 S.E.2d 729, 735 (Ga. 2022) (explaining that a showing of entitlement to relief under the two-dismissal rule means a “defendant has satisfied just one of the three criteria of a res judicata defense—a previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction”). ¶28 When addressing issues of claim preclusion that involve cases in different jurisdictions, courts look to the law of the jurisdiction where a previous judgment was entered to determine its legal effect. | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Lalligreen1 sentence2022Decision of the Court ¶18 The doctrine of res judicata precludes a claim “when a former judgment on the merits was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and the matter now in issue between the same parties or their privities was, or might have been, determined in the former action.” Hall v. Lalli, 194 Ariz. 54, 57, ¶ 7 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Matson v. Matsongreen1 sentence2021A defendant who appears in the proceedings and litigates the jurisdictional issues is “bound on that issue by the doctrine of res judicata.” Id. at 457 (quoting Matson v. Matson, 310 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 1981)). 1Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated. 5 COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al. | 1 | 1 |
| Norriega v. MacHadogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Read v. City of Scottsdalegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Summers v. Gloorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dressler v. Morrisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Foote v. Gerbergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pettit v. Pettitgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Minjares v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Yeo v. Yeogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tarien v. Katzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Heinig v. Hudmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bill by and Through Bill v. Gossettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. North Carolinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coe v. Coegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sherrer v. Sherrergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Focal Point, Inc. v. Court of Appealsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Aldrich and Steinberger v. Martingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barassi v. Matisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boardsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. Bramblettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bramblett v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Colpo v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local 107green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hoff v. City of Mesa
green
2 sentences1971Cases of interest in relation to this applicability of the doctrine of res judicata are Hoff v. City of Mesa, 86 Ariz. 259 , 344 P.2d 1013 (1959); State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295 , 350 P.2d 756 (1960) ; and Day v. Estate of Wiswall, 93 Ariz. 400 , 381 P.2d 217 (1963). 1971Cases of interest in relation to this applicability of the doctrine of res judicata are Hoff v. City of Mesa, 86 Ariz. 259 , 344 P.2d 1013 (1959); State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295 , 350 P.2d 756 (1960) ; and Day v. Estate of Wiswall, 93 Ariz. 400 , 381 P.2d 217 (1963). | 3 | 1971–1979 |
Dorothy Elfenbein v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., and Stelux Manufacturing Co., and Bulova Watch Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1982Rather, as stated by the court in Elfenbein, supra: “The action is terminated; however, a subsequent suit will not be barred by the doctrine of res judicata.” 590 F.2d at 449 . 1982Rather, as stated by the court in Elfenbein, supra: “The action is terminated; however, a subsequent suit will not be barred by the doctrine of res judicata.” 590 F.2d at 449 . | 2 | 1982–2012 |
Kadish v. Arizona State Land Department
green
2 sentences2011The doctrine is not absolute; it "does not have the same conclusive effect as the doctrine of res judicata. " Id. "[I]t should not be strictly applied when it would result in a manifestly unjust decision." Dancing Sunshines Lounge, 149 Ariz. at 482 , 720 P.2d at 83 . [3] ¶ 13 In Lennar I we reversed summary judgment on Lennar's bad-faith claim because we presumed the superior court had ruled based solely on its conclusion that the insurers had no duty to indemnify or defend Lennar. 2011The doctrine is not absolute; it “does not have the same conclusive effect as the doctrine of res judicata.” Id. “[I]t should not be strictly applied when it would result in a manifestly unjust decision.” Dancing Sunshines Lounge, 149 Ariz. at 482 , 720 P.2d at 83 . 2 ¶ 13 In Lennar I we reversed summary judgment on Lennar’s bad-faith claim because we presumed the superior court had ruled based solely on its conclusion that the insurers had no duty to indemnify or defend Lennar. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Dancing Sunshines Lounge v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences2011The doctrine is not absolute; it “does not have the same conclusive effect as the doctrine of res judicata.” Id. “[I]t should not be strictly applied when it would result in a manifestly unjust decision.” Dancing Sunshines Lounge, 149 Ariz. at 482 , 720 P.2d at 83 . 2 ¶ 13 In Lennar I we reversed summary judgment on Lennar’s bad-faith claim because we presumed the superior court had ruled based solely on its conclusion that the insurers had no duty to indemnify or defend Lennar. 2011The doctrine is not absolute; it “does not have the same conclusive effect as the doctrine of res judicata.” Id. “[I]t should not be strictly applied when it would result in a manifestly unjust decision.” Dancing Sunshines Lounge, 149 Ariz. at 482 , 720 P.2d at 83 . 2 ¶ 13 In Lennar I we reversed summary judgment on Lennar’s bad-faith claim because we presumed the superior court had ruled based solely on its conclusion that the insurers had no duty to indemnify or defend Lennar. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Little
green
2 sentences1981This doctrine, as applied in criminal cases, has been defined by State v. Little as: . . . the judgment in an action has the following effect in a subsequent action between the same parties: where the causes of action are the same, the prior judgment is conclusive, under the doctrine of res judicata, as to all issues which were or might have been litigated in the first action; where the causes of action are different, the judgment in the first action is conclusive under the doctrine of ... collateral estoppel, only as to such issues as were actually litigated and adjudicated in the first actio 1981This doctrine, as applied in criminal cases, has been defined by State v. Little as: . . . the judgment in an action has the following effect in a subsequent action between the same parties: where the causes of action are the same, the prior judgment is conclusive, under the doctrine of res judicata, as to all issues which were or might have been litigated in the first action; where the causes of action are different, the judgment in the first action is conclusive under the doctrine of ... collateral estoppel, only as to such issues as were actually litigated and adjudicated in the first actio | 2 | 1971–1981 |
State v. Forteson
green
2 sentences1981State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295 , 350 P.2d 756 (1960); State v. Forteson, 8 Ariz.App. 468 , 447 P.2d 560 (1968). 1981State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295 , 350 P.2d 756 (1960); State v. Forteson, 8 Ariz.App. 468 , 447 P.2d 560 (1968). | 2 | 1971–1981 |
Taylor v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1973We recently, in the case of Taylor v. Industrial Commission, 20 Ariz.App. 46 , 509 P.2d 1083 (filed May 15, 1973), held that Parsons merely created an additional exception to the doctrine of res judicata, this exception being “that when at the time of the issuance of an award or a Notice of Claim Status, the claimant does not have knowledge of facts or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could not obtain knowledge of facts which would entitle him to properly protest the award, the Commission may waive failure to protest, provided that the delay occasioned thereby is neither excessive nor u 1973We recently, in the case of Taylor v. Industrial Commission, 20 Ariz.App. 46 , 509 P.2d 1083 (filed May 15, 1973), held that Parsons merely created an additional exception to the doctrine of res judicata, this exception being “that when at the time of the issuance of an award or a Notice of Claim Status, the claimant does not have knowledge of facts or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could not obtain knowledge of facts which would entitle him to properly protest the award, the Commission may waive failure to protest, provided that the delay occasioned thereby is neither excessive nor u | 2 | 1973–1973 |
Wright v. Schick
green
2 sentences1945In Wright v. Schick, 134 Ohio St. 193 , 16 N. E. (2d) 321, 121 A. L. 1945In Wright v. Schick , 134 Ohio St. 193 , 16 N.E.2d 321 , 121 A.L.R. 882 , it appeared that Schick and his insurance carrier had been sued in an independent action to recover for a judgment against the former. | 2 | 1945–1945 |
In Re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System & Source
green
1 sentence2022Adjud. of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 212 Ariz. 64 , 69 ¶ 14 (2006) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Goodman v. Samaritan Health System
green
1 sentence2022Exam’rs, 155 Ariz. 169, 174 (App. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Goodman v. Samaritan Health Sys., 195 Ariz. 502 , 508 ¶ 25 n.7 (App. 1999). ¶9 Under the doctrine of res judicata (now referred to as “claim preclusion”), “a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” In re Gen. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Giehrl v. Royal Aloha Vacation Club, Inc. green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Grynberg v. Shaffer
green
1 sentence2021Decision of the Court ¶18 “Because the judgment of a sister state must be final before full faith and credit attaches, [this court looks to Connecticut] law to determine when the judgment in this case became final.” See Grynberg v. Shaffer, 216 Ariz. 256 , 258 ¶ 8 (App. 2007). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Callanan v. Sun Lakes Homeowners' Ass'n 1, Inc. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Cromwell v. County of Sac green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Nevada v. United States green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Ohlmaier v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| C & J TRAVEL, INC. v. Shumway green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Jordan v. Jordan green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Helvering v. Mitchell green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Associated Hosts of Georgia, Inc. v. Marley green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| In Re Marshall neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Nienstedt v. Wetzel green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Stainless Specialty Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| In Re Marriage of Fellers green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Riggins green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Krasse v. Del E. Webb Development Corporation green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Chavez v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Janis v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Waller v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Franklin v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Parsons v. Bekins Freight green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Martin v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.