res judicata doctrine in Iowa

2026As a panel of our court noted when addressing issue preclusion in a juvenile court termination case, that doctrine “should be flexible and must give way when [its] mechanical application would frustrate other social policies based on values equally or more important than the convenience afforded by finality in legal controversies.” In re M.R.A., No. 04-1207, 2004 WL 2168643 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 29, 2004) (citation omitted); see also Spiker v. Spiker, 708 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Iowa 2006) (explaining that the res judicata standard, including issue preclusion, is relaxed in child custody matter

2019Moreover, the res judicata standard is relaxed in matters on the custody of children “because our goal in such cases is always to serve the best interests of the child.” Id. at 356 ; see also Iowa Code § 232.1 (“This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that each child under the jurisdiction of the court shall receive . . . the care, guidance and control that will best serve the child’s welfare and the best interest of the state.”).

2007See Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 401 (Iowa 1998) (noting the doctrine of res judicata does not apply if subject matter jurisdiction was lacking in the previous action).

2007See Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 401 (Iowa 1998) (noting the doctrine of res judicata does not apply if subject matter jurisdiction was lacking in the previous action).

2006See Heidemann v. Sweitzer, 375 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Iowa 1985) (“Issue preclusion, one application of the broader concept of res judicata, prevents a party to a prior action from relitigating in a subsequent action an issue raised and resolved in the prior action.”).

2006See Heidemann v. Sweitzer, 375 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Iowa 1985) (“Issue preclusion, one application of the broader concept of res judicata, prevents a party to a prior action from relitigating in a subsequent action an issue raised and resolved in the prior action.”).

2006See In re Marriage of Ford, 563 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1997) (primary consideration in child custody cases is the best interests of the children (citing In re Marriage of Kleist, 538 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Iowa 1995); In re Guardianship of Knell, 537 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa 1995))); accord Linder v. Linder, 348 Ark. 322 , 72 S.W.3d 841, 850 (2002) (“[CJustody orders are subject to modification in order to respond to changed circumstances and the best interest of the child.”).

2006See In re Marriage of Ford, 563 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1997) (primary consideration in child custody cases is the best interests of the children (citing In re Marriage of Kleist, 538 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Iowa 1995); In re Guardianship of Knell, 537 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa 1995))); accord Linder v. Linder, 72 S.W.3d 841, 850 (Ark. 2002) (“[C]ustody orders are subject to modification in order to respond to changed circumstances and the best interest of the child.”).

2006See In re Marriage of Ford, 563 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1997) (primary consideration in child custody cases is the best interests of the children (citing In re Marriage of Kleist, 538 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Iowa 1995); In re Guardianship of Knell, 537 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa 1995))); accord Linder v. Linder, 348 Ark. 322 , 72 S.W.3d 841, 850 (2002) (“[CJustody orders are subject to modification in order to respond to changed circumstances and the best interest of the child.”).

2006See In re Marriage of Ford, 563 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1997) (primary consideration in child custody cases is the best interests of the children (citing In re Marriage of Kleist, 538 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Iowa 1995); In re Guardianship of Knell, 537 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa 1995))); accord Linder v. Linder, 72 S.W.3d 841, 850 (Ark. 2002) (“[C]ustody orders are subject to modification in order to respond to changed circumstances and the best interest of the child.”).

2006See In re Marriage of Ford, 563 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1997) (primary consideration in child custody cases is the best interests of the children (citing In re Marriage of Kleist, 538 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Iowa 1995); In re Guardianship of Knell, 537 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa 1995))); accord Linder v. Linder, 348 Ark. 322 , 72 S.W.3d 841, 850 (2002) (“[CJustody orders are subject to modification in order to respond to changed circumstances and the best interest of the child.”).

2006See In re Marriage of Ford, 563 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1997) (primary consideration in child custody cases is the best interests of the children (citing In re Marriage of Kleist, 538 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Iowa 1995); In re Guardianship of Knell, 537 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa 1995))); accord Linder v. Linder, 348 Ark. 322 , 72 S.W.3d 841, 850 (2002) (“[CJustody orders are subject to modification in order to respond to changed circumstances and the best interest of the child.”).

2006See In re Marriage of Ford, 563 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1997) (primary consideration in child custody cases is the best interests of the children (citing In re Marriage of Kleist, 538 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Iowa 1995); In re Guardianship of Knell, 537 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa 1995))); accord Linder v. Linder, 348 Ark. 322 , 72 S.W.3d 841, 850 (2002) (“[CJustody orders are subject to modification in order to respond to changed circumstances and the best interest of the child.”).

2006See In re Marriage of Ford, 563 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1997) (primary consideration in child custody cases is the best interests of the children (citing In re Marriage of Kleist, 538 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Iowa 1995); In re Guardianship of Knell, 537 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa 1995))); accord Linder v. Linder, 72 S.W.3d 841, 850 (Ark. 2002) (“[C]ustody orders are subject to modification in order to respond to changed circumstances and the best interest of the child.”).

1998Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 217 (1998) states: "All dismissals not governed by R.C.P. 215 or not for want of jurisdiction or improper venue, shall operate as adjudications on the merits unless they specify otherwise." On the basis of this rule, our supreme court has noted "dismissals without an actual trial can be the basis of a plea of res judicata." State ex rel. v. Mundie, 436 N.W.2d 60, 61 (Iowa 1989).

1998Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 217 (1998) states: “All dismissals not governed by R.C.P. 215 or not for want of jurisdiction or improper venue, shall operate as adjudications on the merits unless they specify otherwise.” On the basis of this rule, our supreme court has noted “dismissals without an actual trial can be the basis of a plea of res judicata.” State ex rel v. Mundie, 436 N.W.2d 60, 61 (Iowa 1989).

2025Under the doctrine of res judicata, a court’s final judgment “constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.” Bennett v. MC # 619, Inc., 586 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Iowa 1998) (citation omitted).

2023“Under Iowa law, ‘res judicata embraces two concepts: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.’” Dorsey v. State, 975 N.W.2d 356 , 361 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Braunschweig v. Fahrenkrog, 773 N.W.2d 888, 893 (Iowa 2009)).

2019Still, the issue before us is whether the court abused its discretion in dismissing Clester’s PCR application as a sanction for counsel’s noncompliance with a discovery order. 5 v. Kurtzhals, 792 N.W.2d 251, 258 (Iowa 2010).

2019See id. (“Having failed to plead and prove that claim, [the appellant] waived the right to relitigate the issue or claim and is barred or estopped under the doctrine of res judicata.”).

2019However, “the fact a judgment is rendered by default does not prevent it from operating as a basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata.” Lynch, 94 N.W.2d at 110 . 10 As to the third element, Butler claims he could not have fully and fairly adjudicated his claim that lot 2 was not included in the mortgage for several reasons.

2018See Mike Brooks, Inc. v. House, 843 N.W.2d 885, 888-89 (Iowa 2014).

2015Cir. 1999) (stating the two claims are sufficiently discrete and res judicata is inapplicable where the claims “call for a different legal analysis”); S.E.C. v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1464 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating a plaintiff can seek leave to file a supplemental pleading when the defendant engages in actionable conduct after the lawsuit is filed “but there is no requirement that plaintiffs do so” and an “election not to do so is not penalized by application of res judicata”).

2015See, e.g., Touris v. Flathead Cnty., 258 P.3d 1, 4 (Mont. 2011) (“The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars [relitigation] of a claim that a party has already had the opportunity to litigate.”); Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tenn. 2012) (same); In 12 1942); see also Black Law’s Dictionary 1425 (9th ed. 2009) (“[U]sage [of the term ‘res judicata’] is and doubtless will continue to be common, but it lumps under a single name two quite different effects of judgments.” (quoting Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 100A, at 722-23 (5th ed. 1994))).

2015Co., 228 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating under the federal and Kansas rules of civil procedure the trial court “may permit a plaintiff to supplement its complaint with a cause of action arising after the original complaint”—the rules are “permissive for the parties and discretionary for the court” so that the plaintiff’s failure to supplement its already-commenced action did not raise a res judicata bar precluding the second suit); Florida Power & Light Co. v. United States, 198 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed.

2015Co., 228 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating under the federal and Kansas rules of civil procedure the trial court “may permit a plaintiff to supplement its complaint with a cause of action arising after the original complaint”—the rules are “permissive for the parties and discretionary for the court” so that the plaintiff’s failure to supplement its already-commenced action did not raise a res judicata bar precluding the second suit); Florida Power & Light Co. v. United States, 198 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed.

2015See, e.g., Touris v. Flathead Cnty., 258 P.3d 1, 4 (Mont. 2011) (“The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars [relitigation] of a claim that a party has already had the opportunity to litigate.”); Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tenn. 2012) (same); In 12 1942); see also Black Law’s Dictionary 1425 (9th ed. 2009) (“[U]sage [of the term ‘res judicata’] is and doubtless will continue to be common, but it lumps under a single name two quite different effects of judgments.” (quoting Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 100A, at 722-23 (5th ed. 1994))).

2006Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 18, at 151-52; see In re Estate of Boyd, 634 N.W.2d 630, 637-38 (Iowa 2001) (when party did not raise defense to claim, final judgment was issued, and party did not appeal, party could not collaterally attack the judgment); Robbins v. Daniel, 226 Iowa 678, 690 , 284 N.W. 793, 798 (1939) (when party did not assert affirmative defense, res judicata barred raising the issue in later suit); see also Shin v. Portals Confederation Corp., 728 A.2d 615, 619 (D.C. 1999) (where party could have raised fraudulent misrepresentation as defense in first action, he could n

2006Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 18, at 151-52; see In re Estate of Boyd, 634 N.W.2d 630, 637-38 (Iowa 2001) (when party did not raise defense to claim, final judgment was issued, and party did not appeal, party could not collaterally attack the judgment); Robbins v. Daniel, 226 Iowa 678, 690 , 284 N.W. 793, 798 (1939) (when party did not assert affirmative defense, res judicata barred raising the issue in later suit); see also Shin v. Portals Confederation Corp., 728 A.2d 615, 619 (D.C. 1999) (where party could have raised fraudulent misrepresentation as defense in first action, he could n

2006Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 18, at 151-52; see In re Estate of Boyd, 634 N.W.2d 630, 637-38 (Iowa 2001) (when party did not raise defense to claim, final judgment was issued, and party did not appeal, party could not collaterally attack the judgment); Robbins v. Daniel, 226 Iowa 678, 690 , 284 N.W. 793, 798 (1939) (when party did not assert affirmative defense, res judicata barred raising the issue in later suit); see also Shin v. Portals Confederation Corp., 728 A.2d 615, 619 (D.C. 1999) (where party could have raised fraudulent misrepresentation as defense in first action, he could n

2006Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 18, at 151-52; see In re Estate of Boyd, 634 N.W.2d 630, 637-38 (Iowa 2001) (when party did not raise defense to claim, final judgment was issued, and party did not appeal, party could not collaterally attack the judgment); Robbins v. Daniel, 226 Iowa 678, 690 , 284 N.W. 793, 798 (1939) (when party did not assert affirmative defense, res judicata barred raising the issue in later suit); see also Shin v. Portals Confederation Corp., 728 A.2d 615, 619 (D.C. 1999) (where party could have raised fraudulent misrepresentation as defense in first action, he could n

2006Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 18, at 151-52; see In re Estate of Boyd, 634 N.W.2d 630, 637-38 (Iowa 2001) (when party did not raise defense to claim, final judgment was issued, and party did not appeal, party could not collaterally attack the judgment); Robbins v. Daniel, 226 Iowa 678, 690 , 284 N.W. 793, 798 (1939) (when party did not assert affirmative defense, res judicata barred raising the issue in later suit); see also Shin v. Portals Confederation Corp., 728 A.2d 615, 619 (D.C. 1999) (where party could have raised fraudulent misrepresentation as defense in first action, he could n

2006Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 18, at 151-52; see In re Estate of Boyd, 634 N.W.2d 630, 637-38 (Iowa 2001) (when party did not raise defense to claim, final judgment was issued, and party did not appeal, party could not collaterally attack the judgment); Robbins v. Daniel, 226 Iowa 678, 690 , 284 N.W. 793, 798 (1939) (when party did not assert affirmative defense, res judicata barred raising the issue in later suit); see also Shin v. Portals Confederation Corp., 728 A.2d 615, 619 (D.C. 1999) (where party could have raised fraudulent misrepresentation as defense in first action, he could n

2006Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 18, at 151-52; see In re Estate of Boyd, 634 N.W.2d 630, 637-38 (Iowa 2001) (when party did not raise defense to claim, final judgment was issued, and party did not appeal, party could not collaterally attack the judgment); Robbins v. Daniel, 226 Iowa 678, 690 , 284 N.W. 793, 798 (1939) (when party did not assert affirmative defense, res judicata barred raising the issue in later suit); see also Shin v. Portals Confederation Corp., 728 A.2d 615, 619 (D.C. 1999) (where party could have raised fraudulent misrepresentation as defense in first action, he could n

1998Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Lewis, 777 F.2d 587, 590-92 (10th Cir.1985). 7 .