res judicata doctrine in Hawaii

2022Under the doctrine of res judicata, "'the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter.'" PennyMac Corp. v. Godinez, 148 Hawai‘i 323, 327, 474 P.3d 264, 268 (2020) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Kauhane v. Acutron Co., 71 Haw. 458, 463 , 795 P.2d 276, 278 (1990)).

2022Under the doctrine of res judicata, "'the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter.'" PennyMac Corp. v. Godinez, 148 Hawai‘i 323, 327, 474 P.3d 264, 268 (2020) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Kauhane v. Acutron Co., 71 Haw. 458, 463 , 795 P.2d 276, 278 (1990)).

1995Under the doctrine of res judicata, “ ‘[t]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter, and precludes the relitigation, not only of the [claims that] were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim [and defense that] might have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or decided.’” State v. Magoon, 75 Haw. 164, 190 , 858 P.2d 712, 725 , reconsideration denied, 75 Haw. 580 , 861 P.2d 735 (1993) (quoting Pele Defense Fund v

1995Under the doctrine of res judicata, “ ‘[t]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter, and precludes the relitigation, not only of the [claims that] were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim [and defense that] might have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or decided.’” State v. Magoon, 75 Haw. 164, 190 , 858 P.2d 712, 725 , reconsideration denied, 75 Haw. 580 , 861 P.2d 735 (1993) (quoting Pele Defense Fund v

2013Bremer v. Weeks, 104 Hawai'i 43, 54 , 85 P.3d 150, 161 (2004) (internal brackets, citations, emphases, and quotation marks omitted). *159 This court explained the purposes of the res judicata doctrine in Kauhane v. Acutron Co., Inc.: According to the doctrine of res judicata, the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter, and precludes the relitigation, not only of the claims which were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim ... which might ha

2013Bremer v. Weeks, 104 Hawai'i 43, 54 , 85 P.3d 150, 161 (2004) (internal brackets, citations, emphases, and quotation marks omitted). *159 This court explained the purposes of the res judicata doctrine in Kauhane v. Acutron Co., Inc.: According to the doctrine of res judicata, the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter, and precludes the relitigation, not only of the claims which were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim ... which might ha

1999Compare State v. Magoon, 75 Haw. 164, 189 , 858 P.2d 712, 724 , reconsideration denied, 75 Haw. 580 , 861 P.2d 735 (1993) (explaining purposes of the doctrine of res judicata) with Sentinel Ins.

1999Compare State v. Magoon, 75 Haw. 164, 189 , 858 P.2d 712, 724 , reconsideration denied, 75 Haw. 580 , 861 P.2d 735 (1993) (explaining purposes of the doctrine of res judicata) with Sentinel Ins.

1993Under the doctrine of res judicata, “ ‘[t]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter, and precludes the relitigation, not only of the [claims that] were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim [and defense that] might have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or decided.’” Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 599 , 837 P.2d 1247, 1261 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1277 (1993) (quoting Morneau v. Stark Enter

1993Under the doctrine of res judicata, “ ‘[t]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter, and precludes the relitigation, not only of the [claims that] were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim [and defense that] might have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or decided.’” Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 599 , 837 P.2d 1247, 1261 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1277 (1993) (quoting Morneau v. Stark Enter

2013Corp. v. Miller, 71 Haw. 65, 70 , 783 P.2d 855, 858 (1989), from which Petitioners appeal, and (2) Petitioners’ failure to appeal the foreclosure judgment barred challenges to Respondent’s standing under the doctrine of res judicata.

2013Corp. v. Miller, 71 Haw. 65, 70 , 783 P.2d 855, 858 (1989), from which Petitioners appeal, and (2) Petitioners’ failure to appeal the foreclosure judgment barred challenges to Respondent’s standing under the doctrine of res judicata.

1990Those doctrines or rules are denominated “res judicata” and “collateral estoppel.” 2 Under the doctrine of res judicata, “[t]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter, and precludes the relitigation, not only of the issues which were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim and defense which might have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or decided.” In re Bishop Estate, 36 Haw. 403, 416 (1943).

1990According to the doctrine of res judicata, “‘|t]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter, and precludes the rclitigalion, not only of the [claims] which were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim ... which might have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or decided.’” Morneau v. Stark Enters., Ltd., 56 Haw. 420, 422-23 , 539 P.2d 472, 474-75 (1975) (quoting In re Bishop Estate, 36 Haw. 403, 416 (1943)).

2001A more generic rendition of the doctrine of res judicata proves more limpid in the context of this case: Under the doctrine of res judicata, “[t]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a .new action in any court between the same parties or them privies concerning the same subject matter, and *137 precludes the relitigation, not only of the issues which were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim and defense which might have been properly litigated in the first action but ivere not litigated or decided.” In re Dowsett Trust, 7 Haw.App. 640,

2001A more generic rendition of the doctrine of res judicata proves more limpid in the context of this case: Under the doctrine of res judicata, “[t]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a .new action in any court between the same parties or them privies concerning the same subject matter, and *137 precludes the relitigation, not only of the issues which were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim and defense which might have been properly litigated in the first action but ivere not litigated or decided.” In re Dowsett Trust, 7 Haw.App. 640,

1995Under the doctrine of res judicata, “ ‘[t]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter, and precludes the relitigation, not only of the [claims that] were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim [and defense that] might have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or decided.’” State v. Magoon, 75 Haw. 164, 190 , 858 P.2d 712, 725 , reconsideration denied, 75 Haw. 580 , 861 P.2d 735 (1993) (quoting Pele Defense Fund v

1995Under the doctrine of res judicata, “ ‘[t]he judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter, and precludes the relitigation, not only of the [claims that] were actually litigated in the first action, but also of all grounds of claim [and defense that] might have been properly litigated in the first action but were not litigated or decided.’” State v. Magoon, 75 Haw. 164, 190 , 858 P.2d 712, 725 , reconsideration denied, 75 Haw. 580 , 861 P.2d 735 (1993) (quoting Pele Defense Fund v

1990The doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, “precludes the relitigation of a fact or issue which was previously determined in a prior suit in a different claim between the same parties or their privies[, or]. . . [the] relitigation of facts or issues previously determined when it is raised defensively by one not a party in a prior suit against one who was a party in that suit *645 and who himself raised and litigated the fact or issue.” 3 Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 55-56 , 451 P.2d 814, 822 (1969) (citations omitted).

1990The doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, “precludes the relitigation of a fact or issue which was previously determined in a prior suit in a different claim between the same parties or their privies[, or]. . . [the] relitigation of facts or issues previously determined when it is raised defensively by one not a party in a prior suit against one who was a party in that suit *645 and who himself raised and litigated the fact or issue.” 3 Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 55-56 , 451 P.2d 814, 822 (1969) (citations omitted).

2013See Eastern Savings Bank, FSB v. Esteban, 129 Hawai'i 154, 159 , 296 P.3d 1062, 1067 (2013) (“According to the doctrine of res judicata, the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter[.]”).

2013See Eastern Savings Bank, FSB v. Esteban, 129 Hawai'i 154, 159 , 296 P.3d 1062, 1067 (2013) (“According to the doctrine of res judicata, the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter[.]”).

1994The “law of the case” doctrine does not present as formidable an obstacle to reconsideration as the doetime of stare decisis or the related doctrine of res judicata. 4 This court has explicitly recognized that the “law of the case” doctrine “is akin to res judicata ... but is not subject to the inflexibility of res judicata.” Robinson, 65 Haw. at 652 n. 9, 658 P.2d at 297 n. 9 (quoting Glover, 42 Haw. at 578 ).

1973Under the doctrine of res judicata “an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights, questions, and facts in issue, as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.” Glover v. Fong, 42 Haw. 560, 573 (1958).

2022Under the doctrine of res judicata, "'the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the same parties or their privies concerning the same subject matter.'" PennyMac Corp. v. Godinez, 148 Hawai‘i 323, 327, 474 P.3d 264, 268 (2020) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Kauhane v. Acutron Co., 71 Haw. 458, 463 , 795 P.2d 276, 278 (1990)).

2021Corp. v. Richardson, the court held that “[o]nly where there is urgent reason . . . for the invocation of this court’s supervisory jurisdiction over the lower courts, under both HRS §§ 602-4 and 602-5, will this court 15 consider departing from [the doctrine of res judicata].” 59 Haw. 224, 226-27 , 580 P.2d 49, 53 (1978).

2021Corp. v. Richardson, the court held that “[o]nly where there is urgent reason . . . for the invocation of this court’s supervisory jurisdiction over the lower courts, under both HRS §§ 602-4 and 602-5, will this court 15 consider departing from [the doctrine of res judicata].” 59 Haw. 224, 226-27 , 580 P.2d 49, 53 (1978).

2020(Emphasis added.) However, recognizing that res judicata could not be applied to void judgments, the ICA also observed, “[l]ack of standing does not render a court’s judgment void under HRCP Rule 60(b),” and quoted from this court’s decision in Tax Foundation of Hawaiʻi v. State, 144 Hawaiʻi 175, 188, 439 P.3d 127, 140 (2019): “[i]n Hawaiʻi state courts, standing is a prudential consideration . . . and is not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.” Accordingly, the ICA concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its direction in denying Godinez’s HRCP Rule 60(b) motion.

2020An HRCP Rule 60(b) motion is a continuation of the action Although we have not addressed whether an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion is a continuation of the original action, we have acknowledged that the primary purpose of the motion “is to authorize the reopening of a closed case or a final order.” Cho v. State, 115 Hawaiʻi 373, 383, 168 P.3d 17, 27 (2007) (emphasis doctrines,” “[c]laim preclusion and issue preclusion are . . . separate doctrines that involve distinct questions of law.” Esteban, 129 Hawaiʻi at 158, 158 n.8, 296 P.3d at 1066 , 1066 n.8.

2009See 111 Hawai'i at 479-81 , 143 P.3d at 18-20 .

2009See 111 Hawai'i at 479-81 , 143 P.3d at 18-20 .

2008Gamino v. Greenwell, 2 Haw.App. 59, 62-63 , 625 P.2d 1055, 1058 (1981). 10 The seminal Hawai'i Supreme Court case describing what constitutes a collateral attack held: A collateral attack is an attempt to impeach a judgment or decree in a proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting or modifying such judgment or decree.

2008Gamino v. Greenwell, 2 Haw.App. 59, 62-63 , 625 P.2d 1055, 1058 (1981). 10 The seminal Hawai'i Supreme Court case describing what constitutes a collateral attack held: A collateral attack is an attempt to impeach a judgment or decree in a proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting or modifying such judgment or decree.

2007Waiver Wife maintains that this court’s decision in Solarana v. Industrial Electronics, Inc., 50 Haw. 22 , 428 P.2d 411 (1967), “compels a conclusion that [Husband] had waived the res judicata defense.” In Solarana , this court held that: The defense of res judicata will be deemed to have been waived when based on a judgment of dismissal in a prior suit in which, on defendant’s insistence, the subject matter of the second suit was excluded from consideration as being outside the scope of the pleadings and plaintiff ivas precluded from amending to include it, the implication being that another

2007Waiver Wife maintains that this court’s decision in Solarana v. Industrial Electronics, Inc., 50 Haw. 22 , 428 P.2d 411 (1967), “compels a conclusion that [Husband] had waived the res judicata defense.” In Solarana , this court held that: The defense of res judicata will be deemed to have been waived when based on a judgment of dismissal in a prior suit in which, on defendant’s insistence, the subject matter of the second suit was excluded from consideration as being outside the scope of the pleadings and plaintiff ivas precluded from amending to include it, the implication being that another

2006HRCP Rule 8(c) (2003) provides that, “[i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... res judicata ... and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” As such, “[r]es judicata is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded [at the circuit court level].” In re Keamo, 3 Haw.App. 360, 363 , 650 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1982) (citation omitted).

2006HRCP Rule 8(c) (2003) provides that, “[i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... res judicata ... and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.” As such, “[r]es judicata is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded [at the circuit court level].” In re Keamo, 3 Haw.App. 360, 363 , 650 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1982) (citation omitted).