res judicata doctrine in District of Columbia

2019Under the doctrine of res judicata, "a prior judgment on the merits raises an absolute bar to the relitigation of the same cause of action between the original parties or those in privity with them." 7 *1138 Shin v. Portals Confederation Corp. , 728 A.2d 615 , 618 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Goldkind v. Snider Bros. , 467 A.2d 468 , 473 (D.C. 1983) ).

2014“Generally, [res judicata ] must be raised early in the life of a case[;] ... [otherwise the point of the doctrine — namely shielding parties from vexatious litigation and freeing judicial resources — is not fulfilled.” Mitchell v. Gales, 61 A.3d 678, 687 (D.C. 2013) (citations omitted). “[Njeither of these objectives is advanced where a party raises a res judicata defense ‘[ajfter a final judgment has been entered’; thus ‘it is most unlikely that a court could be persuaded to vacate the judgment so as to permit an assertion that could have been made earlier.’” Id. (citation omitted); see Gold

2021Compulsory Counterclaims, and the “Nullification Exception” “[T]he doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion)” dictates that “a final judgment on the merits of a claim bars relitigation in a subsequent proceeding of the same claim between the same parties or their privies.” Patton v. Klein, 746 A.2d 866, 869 (D.C. 1999).

2021After all, the doctrine of res judicata “operates to bar in the second action not only claims which were actually raised in the first, but also those arising out of the same transaction which could have been raised.” Id.

2022A. Res Judicata This court “reviews de novo the application of the doctrine of res judicata.” Calomiris v. Calomiris, 3 A.3d 1186, 1190 (D.C. 2010) (citation omitted).

2021A. The doctrine of res judicata, sometimes referred to as claim preclusion, prohibits “relitigation of the same claim between the same parties.” Calomiris v. Calomiris, 3 A.3d 1186, 1190 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Elwell v. Elwell, 947 A.2d 1136 , 1139–40 (D.C. 2008)).

2002“Under the doctrine of res judicata, ie., claim preclusion, ‘a final judgment on the merits ... precludes relitigation in a subsequent proceeding of all issues arising out of the same cause of action between the same parties or their privies, whether or not the issues were raised in the first proceeding.’ ” McManus v. MCI Communications Corp., 748 A.2d 949, 959 (D.C.2000) (quoting Carr v. Rose, 701 A.2d 1065, 1070 (D.C.1997)).

2002In Johnson v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 723 A.2d 852 (D.C.1999), we reiterated the principle that: “Under the doctrine of res judicata, ‘a final judgment on the merits ... precludes relitigation in a subsequent pr[o]ce[e]ding of all issues arising out of the same cause of action between the same parties or their privies, whether or not the issues were raised in the first proceeding.’ ” Id. at 856 (quoting Carr v. Rose, 701 A.2d 1065, 1070 (D.C.1997) (citations omitted)).

2026See Molovinsky v. Monterey Co-op., 689 A.2d 531, 533 (D.C. 1996) (“Under the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits embodies all of a party’s rights arising out of the transaction involved, and precludes relitigation in a subsequent proceeding of all issues arising out of the same cause of action between the same parties . . . whether or not the issues were raised in the first trial.” (citation modified)); see also Threatt, 907 A.2d at 782 n.3 (stating that Threatt “cannot succeed in his claim of wrongful eviction without nullifying the initial judgment or

2002We also emphasized that, “[s]uch a judgment ... ‘estops not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also as to every ground which might have been presented.’ ” Id. (quoting Carr, supra, 701 A.2d at 1070 (citing Molovinsky v. Monterey Coop., 689 A.2d 531, 533 (D.C.1997))).

2018“Under the doctrine of res judicata . . . a judgment estops not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also as to every ground which might have been presented[.]” Henderson v. Snider Bros., 439 A.2d 481, 485 (D.C. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted) (en banc).

2018"Under the doctrine of res judicata ... a judgment estops not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also as to every ground which might have been presented[.]" Henderson v. Snider Bros. , 439 A.2d 481 , 485 (D.C. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted) (en banc).

2006Co., 618 A.2d 181, 188 (D.C.1992)) (emphasis added).

2005Co., 618 A.2d 181, 183 (D.C.1992).

2012Moreover, as we explained in Oubre v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 630 A.2d 699 (D.C.1993), when the issue is whether an administrative proceeding gave rise to a res judicata bar, the “threshold inquiry is whether the earlier proceeding [was] the essential equivalent of a judicial proceeding.” Id. at 703 (quoting William J.

2012Moreover, as we explained in Oubre v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 630 A.2d 699 (D.C.1993), when the issue is whether an administrative proceeding gave rise to a res judicata bar, the “threshold inquiry is whether the earlier proceeding [was] the essential equivalent of a judicial proceeding.” Id. at 703 (quoting William J.

1998Stutsman, supra, 546 A.2d at 369 .

1997The Consolidated Firm A. Under the settled doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits "embodies all of a party's rights arising out of the transaction involved," Stutsman v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 546 A.2d 367, 370 (D.C.1988), and precludes relitigation in a subsequent proceeding of all issues arising out of the same cause of action between the same parties or their privies, whether or not the issues were raised in the first proceeding.

2021Ctr., Inc. v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269, 1281 (D.C. 1990)). 18 Ms. Bell argues that her “affirmative claims stemming from [FISC’s] debt collection methods . . . are independent stand-alone tort claims giving rise to statutory damages.” She asserts that she does not dispute or challenge FISC’s right to the sum of money awarded in the 2018 consent judgment, which has been “paid and fully satisfied[.]” We conclude to the contrary that many of the factual allegations set out in Ms. Bell’s Amended Complaint do challenge FISC’s right to the sum awarded to it in the 2018 judgment.

1992Gilles v. Ware, 615 A.2d 533, 538 (D.C.1992); Washington Medical Center, Inc. v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269, 1280-81 (D.C.1990).

2018See Gilles v. Ware, 615 A.2d 533, 550-51 (D.C. 1992) (recognizing that an acquiescence to claim- (continued . . .) 21 (. . . continued) splitting can overcome a res judicata defense).

2018See Gilles v. Ware , 615 A.2d 533 , 550-51 (D.C. 1992) (recognizing that an acquiescence to claim-splitting can overcome a res judicata defense).

2016See Smith, supra, 562 A.2d at 613, and Henderson, supra, 439 A.2d at 485 ), articulating the res judicata or claim preclusion rule in terms of the effect of a judgment in a prior case. 8 .

2016See Smith, supra, 562 A.2d at 613, and Henderson, supra, 439 A.2d at 485 ), articulating the res judicata or claim preclusion rule in terms of the effect of a judgment in a prior case. 8 .

2009In Short , we considered whether a request for modification pursuant to this section was subject to the doctrine of res judicata. 723 A.2d at 847 .

2009Though his employer argued that any modification of the original compensation order was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we held that the doctrine did not apply to requests for modification pursuant to section 32-1524. 3 See id. at 848, 850 .

1987Thus all of these counts, including count IX, could be subject to claim preclusion, for the doctrine of res judicata bars “relitigation of not only those matters actually litigated but also those which might have been litigated in the first proceeding.” Goldkind v. Snider Brothers, Inc., 467 A.2d 468 , 473 n. 10 (D.C.1983) (citations omitted; emphasis in original); see Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 , 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2427-2428 , 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 , 101 S.Ct. 411, 414-415 , 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).

1987Thus all of these counts, including count IX, could be subject to claim preclusion, for the doctrine of res judicata bars “relitigation of not only those matters actually litigated but also those which might have been litigated in the first proceeding.” Goldkind v. Snider Brothers, Inc., 467 A.2d 468 , 473 n. 10 (D.C.1983) (citations omitted; emphasis in original); see Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 , 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2427-2428 , 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 , 101 S.Ct. 411, 414-415 , 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).

2026Upon learning about the prior default judgment, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the case, “explaining that it was barred under the doctrine of res judicata.” Id. at 782 .

2013Delaying beyond a final judgment and raising a defense of res judicata for the first time in a collateral proceeding is particularly untenable, and we have found no case in which we have endorsed the assertion of a res judicata defense at such a late stage. 20 Indeed, in a collateral proceeding, res judicata principles turn against the party seeking to raise it as a defense because the new judgment must now be afforded the same “[rjespect for finality of judgments [that] is deeply ingrained in our legal system.” Threatt, 907 A.2d at 784 (quoting Olivarius v. Stanley J.

2021A. The doctrine of res judicata, sometimes referred to as claim preclusion, prohibits “relitigation of the same claim between the same parties.” Calomiris v. Calomiris, 3 A.3d 1186, 1190 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Elwell v. Elwell, 947 A.2d 1136 , 1139–40 (D.C. 2008)).

2010The Res Judicata Issue The doctrine of res judicata — or claim preclusion — “ ‘precludes relitigation of the same claim between the same parties.’ ” Elwell, 947 A.2d at 1139 -40 (citing Borger Mgmt., Inc. v. Sindram, 886 A.2d 52, 59 (D.C.2005)).

2019Under the doctrine of res judicata, "a prior judgment on the merits raises an absolute bar to the relitigation of the same cause of action between the original parties or those in privity with them." 7 *1138 Shin v. Portals Confederation Corp. , 728 A.2d 615 , 618 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Goldkind v. Snider Bros. , 467 A.2d 468 , 473 (D.C. 1983) ).

2003Id. at 619.

1999The doctrine bars relitigation "not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also as to every ground which might have been presented ...." Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 , 24 L.Ed. 195 (1877) (emphasis added); accord, e.g., Molovinsky v. Monterey Cooperative, Inc., 689 A.2d 531, 533 (D.C.1996); Faulkner v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 618 A.2d 181, 183 (D.C.1992); Goldkind, supra, 467 A.2d at 473 n. 10.

1999The doctrine bars relitigation "not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also as to every ground which might have been presented ...." Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 , 24 L.Ed. 195 (1877) (emphasis added); accord, e.g., Molovinsky v. Monterey Cooperative, Inc., 689 A.2d 531, 533 (D.C.1996); Faulkner v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 618 A.2d 181, 183 (D.C.1992); Goldkind, supra, 467 A.2d at 473 n. 10.

2023App. R. 15(a)(3)(B), (d); see Francis v. Recycling Sols., Inc., 695 A.2d 63, 86 (D.C. 1997).

2022See id. at 139 (“When evaluating whether claim preclusion operates to bar a subsequent lawsuit, courts look to whether the prior litigation ‘(1) involv[ed] the same claims or cause of action, (2) between the same parties or their privies, and (3) there has been a final, valid judgment on the merits, (4) by a court of competent jurisdiction.’. . .

2020As “res judicata[] [is itself] the embodiment of a public policy[,]” Crain v. Crain, 209 A.2d 257, 260 (D.C. 1965) (internal quotation marks omitted), it weighs against Ms. Whiting’s contrary-to-public-policy argument.

2018As this court explained in EDCare , EDCare and GSCEP were in privity, as were CMC and DeLisi, 50 A.3d at 451 -52 , with the result that the arbitrator's decision posed a res judicata bar with respect to "not only claims that actually were litigated in the [arbitration] but all issues arising out of the same cause of action that could have been litigated" in that proceeding.

2018XIII (a)-(b) (providing that "[a]n attorney subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this [c]ourt shall be deemed to have agreed to arbitrate disputes over fees for legal services and disbursements related thereto" "pursuant to such reasonable rules and regulations ... as may be promulgated from time to time by the [ACAB]."). 8 "Civil conspiracy is not an independent tort but only a means for establishing vicarious liability for an underlying tort." Grimes v. District of Columbia , 89 A.3d 107 , 115 (D.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 As we repeated in EDCare , "[u]nder the do

2016Given our disposition, we do not address the parties’ specific arguments regarding unrepresented tenants in the L & T Branch, except to remind trial judges of the "latitude” "afford[ed] to pro se litigants in matters of pleading.” Pajic v. Foote Props., LLC, 72 A.3d 140, 148 (D.C. 2013) (citing cases).

2014See Calomiris v. Calomiris, 3 A.3d 1186, 1190 (D.C.2010) (explaining that in determining whether res judicata applies, this court considers: “(1) whether the claim was adjudicated *74 finally in the first action; (2) whether the present claim is the same as the claim which was raised or which might have been raised in the prior proceeding; and (3) whether the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case”); see also In re Stanton, 589 A.2d 425, 426 (D.C.1991) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (explaining that the doctrine of res judicata applies t

2014“Generally, [res judicata ] must be raised early in the life of a case[;] ... [otherwise the point of the doctrine — namely shielding parties from vexatious litigation and freeing judicial resources — is not fulfilled.” Mitchell v. Gales, 61 A.3d 678, 687 (D.C. 2013) (citations omitted). “[Njeither of these objectives is advanced where a party raises a res judicata defense ‘[ajfter a final judgment has been entered’; thus ‘it is most unlikely that a court could be persuaded to vacate the judgment so as to permit an assertion that could have been made earlier.’” Id. (citation omitted); see Gold

2014“Generally, [res judicata ] must be raised early in the life of a case[;] ... [otherwise the point of the doctrine — namely shielding parties from vexatious litigation and freeing judicial resources — is not fulfilled.” Mitchell v. Gales, 61 A.3d 678, 687 (D.C. 2013) (citations omitted). “[Njeither of these objectives is advanced where a party raises a res judicata defense ‘[ajfter a final judgment has been entered’; thus ‘it is most unlikely that a court could be persuaded to vacate the judgment so as to permit an assertion that could have been made earlier.’” Id. (citation omitted); see Gold