res judicata doctrine in Vermont

2013See Berlin Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Stoneman, 159 Vt. 53, 56 , 615 A.2d 141, 143 (1992) (explaining that doctrine of res judicata “bars the litigation of a claim or defense if there exists a final judgment in former litigation in which the ‘parties, subject matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical’ ” (citation omitted)). ¶ 31.

2013See Berlin Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Stoneman, 159 Vt. 53, 56 , 615 A.2d 141, 143 (1992) (explaining that doctrine of res judicata “bars the litigation of a claim or defense if there exists a final judgment in former litigation in which the ‘parties, subject matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical’ ” (citation omitted)). ¶ 31.

2012The doctrine of res judicata “bars the litigation of a claim or defense if there exists a final judgment in former litigation in which the ‘parties, subject matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical.’ ” Berlin Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Stoneman, 159 Vt. 53, 56 (1992) (quoting Berisha v. Hardy, 144 Vt. 136, 138 (1984)). (citations omitted).

2006The doctrine of res judicata “bars the litigation of a claim or defense if there exists a final judgment in former litigation in which the ‘parties, subject matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical.’” Berlin Convalescent Ctr. v. Stoneman, 159 Vt. 53, 56 (1992) (quoting Berisha v. Hardy, 144 Vt. 136, 138 (1984)).

2025The doctrine of res judicata, also called claim preclusion, “bars the litigation of a claim or defense if there exists a final judgment in former litigation in which the parties, subject matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical.” Lamb v. Geovjian, 165 Vt. 375, 379 , 683 A.2d 731, 734 (1996) (quotations omitted).

2025The doctrine of res judicata, also called claim preclusion, “bars the litigation of a claim or defense if there exists a final judgment in former litigation in which the parties, subject matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical.” Lamb v. Geovjian, 165 Vt. 375, 379 , 683 A.2d 731, 734 (1996) (quotations omitted).

1996“It bars not only issues actually litigated but also those which ‘should have been raised in previous litigation.’” Id. at 56, 615 A.2d at 143 -44 (quoting American Trucking Ass’ns v. Conway, 152 Vt. 363, 370 , 566 A.2d 1323, 1328 (1989)).

1996“It bars not only issues actually litigated but also those which ‘should have been raised in previous litigation.’” Id. at 56, 615 A.2d at 143 -44 (quoting American Trucking Ass’ns v. Conway, 152 Vt. 363, 370 , 566 A.2d 1323, 1328 (1989)).

2015Fair Ass’n, 2004 VT 123, ¶ 8 , 178 Vt. 51 , 869 A.2d 103 .

2015Fair Ass’n, 2004 VT 123, ¶ 8 , 178 Vt. 51 , 869 A.2d 103 .

2023Ala. 2006) (holding res judicata barred successive lawsuits by different plaintiffs challenging legislative redistricting plans: “[t]he remedy for any individual voter’s claim of unequal weighting necessarily affects the rights of all other voters”; and “[a] state should not face an endless stream of lawsuits after each redistricting.”); Matter of Pearsall-Stipek, 961 P.2d 343, 346 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (“Mr. Bennett’s interests in judicial resolution of the sufficiency of a recall petition are no different from that of any other citizen: proceeding to the signature gathering stage of the rec

2023Id. at 50–51 (quotations omitted) (citing Richards, 517 U.S. at 803 and other cases); see also Nolles v. State Comm. for the Reorganization of School Dists., 524 F.3d 892, 904 (8th Cir. 2008) (applying Nebraska law, court found res judicata barred second set of voters from raising same claim that another unrelated group of voters had raised in earlier action because “due process concerns that limit the application of the res judicata doctrine to nonparties are lessened when the rights asserted involve issues of public concern rather than private rights”)8; Gustafson v. Johns, 434 F.Supp.2d 124

2020Partn. v. Pomfret Associates, 174 Vt. 280, 284 (2002).

2018Indus., Inc. , 920 F.Supp. 1008 , 1013 (D.

2013Corp., 172 Vt. 14, 20 , 769 A.2d 668, 673 (2001) (“The doctrine of res judicata . . . bars the litigation of a claim or defense if there exists a final judgment in former litigation in *331 which the parties, subject matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical!’ (emphasis added) (quotation omitted)).

2013Corp., 172 Vt. 14, 20 , 769 A.2d 668, 673 (2001) (“The doctrine of res judicata . . . bars the litigation of a claim or defense if there exists a final judgment in former litigation in *331 which the parties, subject matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical!’ (emphasis added) (quotation omitted)).

2012Trust v. Wyman’s, Inc., 139 Vt. 350, 358-59 , 428 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1981) (for purposes of applying doctrine of res judicata, the “test for privity ... is whether the parties have really and substantially the same interest in the property in issue”).

2012Trust v. Wyman’s, Inc., 139 Vt. 350, 358-59 , 428 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1981) (for purposes of applying doctrine of res judicata, the “test for privity ... is whether the parties have really and substantially the same interest in the property in issue”).

2011The court, quoting Larter & Sons v. Dinkler Hotels Co., 199 F.2d 854, 855 (5th Cir. 1952), observed preliminarily that dismissal on the basis of an affirmative defense such as res judicata may be proper where “the facts are admitted or are not controverted or are conclusively established so that nothing further can be developed by a trial of the issue.” The court went on to correctly state that the doctrine of res judicata “bars the litigation of a claim or defense if there exists a final judgment in former litigation in which the parties, subject matter and causes of action are identical or s

2011See Boivin v. Town of Addison, 2010 VT 67, ¶ 18 ; In re Chittenden Solid Waste Dist., 2007 VT 28, ¶ 29 . 7 than one project application to a single permitting body (the ZBA) or multiple permitting bodies (the ZBA and District Commission).

2010See LaFarr v. Scribner, 150 Vt. 159, 161 (1988) (a foreclosure decree bars litigation on the amount of indebtedness due on the mortgage in another action by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata).

2010See LaFarr v. Scribner, 150 Vt. 159, 161 (1988) (a foreclosure decree bars litigation on the amount of indebtedness due on the mortgage in another action by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata).

2010Plaintiff counters that the Defendants explicitly waived the res judicata defense in their guaranties. “[A] guarantor can waive its right to raise the legal defenses of the principal.” O’Brien v. Ravenswood Apartments, Ltd., 862 N.E.2d 549 , 555 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); see also HSH Nordbank Ag New York Branch v. Swerdlow, 672 F. Supp. 2d 409, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“a guarantor cannot assert defenses that it expressly waived in the guaranty agreement”).

2009Nor are we dealing with a situation where Aqua Terra Corporation was bound to raise a compulsory counterclaim involving easement by necessity; that is, a claim that arose “out of the transaction or occurrence that [was] the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.” V.R.C.P. 13(a); see Stratton v. Steele, 144 Vt. 31, 34 , 472 A.2d 1237, 1239 (1984) (“[F]ailure to raise a compulsory counterclaim will result in a bar to future litigation of the claim under the doctrine of res judicata.”).

2009Nor are we dealing with a situation where Aqua Terra Corporation was bound to raise a compulsory counterclaim involving easement by necessity; that is, a claim that arose “out of the transaction or occurrence that [was] the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim.” V.R.C.P. 13(a); see Stratton v. Steele, 144 Vt. 31, 34 , 472 A.2d 1237, 1239 (1984) (“[F]ailure to raise a compulsory counterclaim will result in a bar to future litigation of the claim under the doctrine of res judicata.”).

2009In discussing the doctrine of res judicata, our case law refers interchangeably to issues that “could have been raised” and issues that “should have been raised.” See, e.g., Merrilees, 159 Vt. at 624 , 618 A.2d at 1316 (using both terms).

2009In discussing the doctrine of res judicata, our case law refers interchangeably to issues that “could have been raised” and issues that “should have been raised.” See, e.g., Merrilees, 159 Vt. at 624 , 618 A.2d at 1316 (using both terms).

2007Unified Buddhist argues that Appellants should be precluded from litigating any issues that were, or could have been, litigated in any of the prior proceedings, based on the doctrine of res judicata.3 Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is “founded upon the judicial economy and fairness of litigating and disposing of all issues involved in a legal dispute where the parties, subject matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical.” Cupola Golf Course, Inc. v. Dooley, 2006 VT 25, ¶10 , 179 Vt. 427, 430 (citing Lamb v. Geovjian, 165 Vt. 375, 379-80 (1996)).

2007Unified Buddhist argues that Appellants should be precluded from litigating any issues that were, or could have been, litigated in any of the prior proceedings, based on the doctrine of res judicata.3 Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is “founded upon the judicial economy and fairness of litigating and disposing of all issues involved in a legal dispute where the parties, subject matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical.” Cupola Golf Course, Inc. v. Dooley, 2006 VT 25, ¶10 , 179 Vt. 427, 430 (citing Lamb v. Geovjian, 165 Vt. 375, 379-80 (1996)).

2006The City relies on In re Application of Carrier, 155 Vt. 152, 158 (1990), for the proposition that a second application for development of the same property cannot be reviewed “’after a previous application has been denied . . . .’” Id., quoting Silsby v. Allen’s Blueberry Freezer, Inc., 501 A.2d 1290, 1295 (Me. 1985).

2006The City relies on In re Application of Carrier, 155 Vt. 152, 158 (1990), for the proposition that a second application for development of the same property cannot be reviewed “’after a previous application has been denied . . . .’” Id., quoting Silsby v. Allen’s Blueberry Freezer, Inc., 501 A.2d 1290, 1295 (Me. 1985).

2006The City relies on In re Application of Carrier, 155 Vt. 152, 158 (1990), for the proposition that a second application for development of the same property cannot be reviewed “’after a previous application has been denied . . . .’” Id., quoting Silsby v. Allen’s Blueberry Freezer, Inc., 501 A.2d 1290, 1295 (Me. 1985).