res judicata doctrine in Connecticut

2003"The doctrine of res judicata, therefore, applies not only to CT Page 2716 claims actually made and litigated . . . but also to claims that a party could have made in the initial action." (Citation omitted.) Id. , 293.

2000The Committee is thus absolutely immune from a suit for damages on this ground as well and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, "Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeMilo Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 233 Conn. 281 , 292 , 659 A.2d 162 (1995); New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals Health Care, 226 Conn. 105 , 128 , 627 A.2d 1257 (1993); see also 1 Restatement (S

2012“The doctrine of res judicata [applies] to the parties and their privies in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.” Wade’s Dairy, Inc. v. Fairfield, 181 Conn. 556, 559 , 436 A.2d 24 (1980); see also Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co., supra, 227 Conn. 188 (same); Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, 163 Conn. 309, 317 , 307 A.2d 155 (1972) (“[a] final judgment on the merits is conclusive on the parties in an action and their privies as to the cause of action involved”), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 , 93 S.

2012“The doctrine of res judicata [applies] to the parties and their privies in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.” Wade’s Dairy, Inc. v. Fairfield, 181 Conn. 556, 559 , 436 A.2d 24 (1980); see also Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. Connecticut Building Wrecking Co., supra, 227 Conn. 188 (same); Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, 163 Conn. 309, 317 , 307 A.2d 155 (1972) (“[a] final judgment on the merits is conclusive on the parties in an action and their privies as to the cause of action involved”), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 , 93 S.

2016Res judicata is ‘‘applicable only to later, independent proceedings . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) 50 C.J.S. 240, Judgments § 926 (2009). ‘‘The doctrine of res judicata provides that [a] valid, final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an abso- lute bar to a subsequent action between the same par- ties . . . upon the same claim or demand.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Weiss, supra, 459 . ‘‘The judicial [doctrine] of res judicata . . . [is] based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it

2016Res judicata is ‘‘applicable only to later, independent proceedings . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) 50 C.J.S. 240, Judgments § 926 (2009). ‘‘The doctrine of res judicata provides that [a] valid, final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an abso- lute bar to a subsequent action between the same par- ties . . . upon the same claim or demand.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Weiss, supra, 459 . ‘‘The judicial [doctrine] of res judicata . . . [is] based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it

1999Res Judicata "Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment, when rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties or those in privity with them, upon the same claim." Mazziotti v. Allstate Inc. Co., 240 Conn. 799 , 812 (1997).

1998Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment, when rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action, between the same parties or those in privity with them, upon the same claim." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazziotti v. Allstate Insurance Co. , 240 Conn. 799 , 812 , 695 A.2d 1010 (1997).

2010Co., 236 Conn. 582, 583-84 , 674 A.2d 1290 (1996), in which we determined that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the plaintiff in that case from bringing a postdissolution action, sounding in tort, against her former spouse for damages incurred as a result of conduct that occurred during the marriage.

2010Co., 236 Conn. 582, 583-84 , 674 A.2d 1290 (1996), in which we determined that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the plaintiff in that case from bringing a postdissolution action, sounding in tort, against her former spouse for damages incurred as a result of conduct that occurred during the marriage.

2002Linden Condominium Assn., Inc. v. McKenna, 247 Conn. 575, 594 , 726 A.2d 502 (1999). “[T]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, [provides that] a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim.

2002Linden Condominium Assn., Inc. v. McKenna, 247 Conn. 575, 594 , 726 A.2d 502 (1999). “[T]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, [provides that] a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim.

2016Byrd did not complete in any manner the portion of the will dedicated to the signatures, names and addresses of witnesses. 6 We note that ‘‘Probate Court decrees . . . are final judgments for the purpose of the doctrine of res judicata.’’ Gaynor v. Payne, 261 Conn. 585, 596 , 804 A.2d 170 (2002); Zanoni v. Lynch, 79 Conn. App. 325, 338 , 830 A.2d 314 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 928 , 837 A.2d 803 (2003).

2016Byrd did not complete in any manner the portion of the will dedicated to the signatures, names and addresses of witnesses. 6 We note that ‘‘Probate Court decrees . . . are final judgments for the purpose of the doctrine of res judicata.’’ Gaynor v. Payne, 261 Conn. 585, 596 , 804 A.2d 170 (2002); Zanoni v. Lynch, 79 Conn. App. 325, 338 , 830 A.2d 314 , cert. denied, 266 Conn. 928 , 837 A.2d 803 (2003).

2016See Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 44 Conn.App. at 751 -52 , 692 A.2d 1285 (rejecting petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as barred under doctrine of res judicata where petitioner, after having fully litigated effectiveness of counsel in petition for new trial, made additional ineffective assistance claim as to same attorney before habeas court but cited different factual grounds in support thereof); see also Asherman v. State, 202 Conn. 429 , 443, 521 A.2d 578 (1987) (concluding that defendant's claim of juror misconduct was barred by res judicata because clai

2016See Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 44 Conn.App. at 751 -52 , 692 A.2d 1285 (rejecting petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as barred under doctrine of res judicata where petitioner, after having fully litigated effectiveness of counsel in petition for new trial, made additional ineffective assistance claim as to same attorney before habeas court but cited different factual grounds in support thereof); see also Asherman v. State, 202 Conn. 429 , 443, 521 A.2d 578 (1987) (concluding that defendant's claim of juror misconduct was barred by res judicata because clai

2011The majority cites three opinions of the Appellate Court, namely, Somers v. Chan, 110 Conn. App. 511 , 540 and n.20, 955 A.2d 667 (2008), Honan v. Dimyan, 63 Conn. App. 702 , 706 and n.10, 778 A.2d 989 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 942 , 786 A.2d 430 (2001), and Legassey v. Shulansky, 28 Conn. App. 653, 654 , 611 A.2d 930 (1992), to support the proposition that courts occasionally have invoked the doctrine of res judicata, sua sponte, in order to promote the doctrine’s underlying policy of judicial economy and repose.

2011The majority cites three opinions of the Appellate Court, namely, Somers v. Chan, 110 Conn. App. 511 , 540 and n.20, 955 A.2d 667 (2008), Honan v. Dimyan, 63 Conn. App. 702 , 706 and n.10, 778 A.2d 989 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 942 , 786 A.2d 430 (2001), and Legassey v. Shulansky, 28 Conn. App. 653, 654 , 611 A.2d 930 (1992), to support the proposition that courts occasionally have invoked the doctrine of res judicata, sua sponte, in order to promote the doctrine’s underlying policy of judicial economy and repose.

2018Specifically, in the habeas context, in the interest of ensuring that no one is deprived of liberty in violation of his or her constitutional rights ... the application of the doctrine of res judicata ... [is limited] to claims that actually have been raised and litigated in an earlier proceeding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kearney v. Commissioner of Correction , 113 Conn. App. 223 , 233, 965 A.2d 608 (2009).

2018Specifically, in the habeas context, in the interest of ensuring that no one is deprived of liberty in violation of his or her constitutional rights ... the application of the doctrine of res judicata ... [is limited] to claims that actually have been raised and litigated in an earlier proceeding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kearney v. Commissioner of Correction , 113 Conn. App. 223 , 233, 965 A.2d 608 (2009).

2016See Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 44 Conn.App. at 751 -52 , 692 A.2d 1285 (rejecting petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as barred under doctrine of res judicata where petitioner, after having fully litigated effectiveness of counsel in petition for new trial, made additional ineffective assistance claim as to same attorney before habeas court but cited different factual grounds in support thereof); see also Asherman v. State, 202 Conn. 429 , 443, 521 A.2d 578 (1987) (concluding that defendant's claim of juror misconduct was barred by res judicata because clai

1985The fact that the final judgment in Aillon occurred after a trial and two subsequent mistrials was in no way crucial to its determination that “[ujnder the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim.” Id., 423 .

2001Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment, when rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action, between the same parties or those in privity with them, upon the same claim. . . ." In contrast, collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues and facts actually and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim (Citations omitted.) Dowling, Sr. v. Finley Associates, Inc ., 248 Conn. 364 , 373-374 , 727 A.2d 1245 (1999); Weiss v. Statewide Grievance Committee , 227 Conn. 802

2001Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment, when rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action, between the same parties or those in privity with them, upon the same claim. . . ." In contrast, collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues and facts actually and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim (Citations omitted.) Dowling, Sr. v. Finley Associates, Inc ., 248 Conn. 364 , 373-374 , 727 A.2d 1245 (1999); Weiss v. Statewide Grievance Committee , 227 Conn. 802

2020Specifically, in the habeas context, in the interest of ensuring that no one is deprived of liberty in violation of his or her constitutional rights . . . the application of the doctrine of res judicata . . . [is lim- ited] to claims that actually have been raised and liti- gated in an earlier proceeding.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63–64, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011). ‘‘Thus, a habeas petition may be vulnerable to dis- missal by reason of claim preclusion only if it is prem- ised on the sa

2020Specifically, in the habeas context, in the interest of ensuring that no one is deprived of liberty in violation of his or her constitutional rights . . . the application of the doctrine of res judicata . . . [is lim- ited] to claims that actually have been raised and liti- gated in an earlier proceeding.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63–64, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011). ‘‘Thus, a habeas petition may be vulnerable to dis- missal by reason of claim preclusion only if it is prem- ised on the sa

2020Specifically, in the habeas context, in the interest of ensuring that no one is deprived of liberty in violation of his or her constitutional rights . . . the application of the doctrine of res judicata . . . [is lim- ited] to claims that actually have been raised and liti- gated in an earlier proceeding.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63–64, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011). ‘‘Thus, a habeas petition may be vulnerable to dis- missal by reason of claim preclusion only if it is prem- ised on the sa

2020Specifically, in the habeas context, in the interest of ensuring that no one is deprived of liberty in violation of his or her constitutional rights . . . the application of the doctrine of res judicata . . . [is lim- ited] to claims that actually have been raised and liti- gated in an earlier proceeding.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63–64, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011). ‘‘Thus, a habeas petition may be vulnerable to dis- missal by reason of claim preclusion only if it is prem- ised on the sa

2016See Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 44 Conn.App. at 751 -52 , 692 A.2d 1285 (rejecting petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as barred under doctrine of res judicata where petitioner, after having fully litigated effectiveness of counsel in petition for new trial, made additional ineffective assistance claim as to same attorney before habeas court but cited different factual grounds in support thereof); see also Asherman v. State, 202 Conn. 429 , 443, 521 A.2d 578 (1987) (concluding that defendant's claim of juror misconduct was barred by res judicata because clai

2012A judgment is final not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain the claim, but also as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.” State v. Aillon, 189 Conn. 416, 423-24 , 456 A.2d 279 , cert. denied, 464 U.S. 837 , 104 S. Ct. 124 , 78 L.

2005Our courts have long recognized that the doctrine of res judicata “must be raised as a special defense and may not be raised by a motion to dismiss, which is the appropriate vehicle to assert a lack of jurisdiction.” Id., citing Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 686-87 , 490 A.2d 509 (1985).

2005Our courts have long recognized that the doctrine of res judicata “must be raised as a special defense and may not be raised by a motion to dismiss, which is the appropriate vehicle to assert a lack of jurisdiction.” Id., citing Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 686-87 , 490 A.2d 509 (1985).

2010“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment... is an absolute bar to a subsequent action, between the same parties . . . upon the same claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Finley Associates, Inc., 248 Conn. 364, 373 , 727 A.2d 1245 (1999).

2010“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment... is an absolute bar to a subsequent action, between the same parties . . . upon the same claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Finley Associates, Inc., 248 Conn. 364, 373 , 727 A.2d 1245 (1999).