res judicata doctrine in Kentucky

2021Citing Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Board, 983 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1998), the circuit court held that both the claim preclusion and issue preclusion prongs of the res judicata doctrine were fatal to Leonhardt’s second -5- action.

2019To have any operative effect, the doctrine of res judicata requires "an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits[.]" See Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Bd. , 983 S.W.2d 459 , 464 (Ky. 1998) (quoting 46 AM.

2022ANALYSIS “The doctrine of res judicata (also known as the doctrine of the finality of judgments) is basic to our legal system and stands for the principle that once the rights of the parties have been finally determined, litigation should end.” Slone v. R & S Mining, Inc., 74 S.W.3d 259, 261 (Ky. 2002).

2015Thus, where there is an identity of parties and an identity of causes of action, the doctrine precludes further litigation of issues that were decided on the merits in a final judgment." Slone v. R & S Mining, Inc., 74 S.W.3d 259, 261 (Ky. 2002).

2010In an effort to avoid the res judicata bar, Appellants note a recent formulation of the rule wherein this Court stated that when a plaintiff "sue[s] a defendant in regard to a single transaction or event, [that plaintiff] must raise all claims arising from that transaction or event." Watts, supra, 957 S.W.2d at 236 .

2010In an effort to avoid the res judicata bar, Appellants note a recent formulation of the rule wherein this Court stated that when a plaintiff "sue[s] a defendant in regard to a single transaction or event, [that plaintiff] must raise all claims arising from that transaction or event." Watts, supra, 957 S.W.2d at 236 .

2008When determining that the 1994 injury was not independent from the 1990 injury, the court relied on Young v.. Young , 460 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Ky. 1970), which explained that Special Fund liability did not arise unless the worker's present condition resulted from the combined effects of a prior and subsequent injury .

2008When determining that the 1994 injury was not independent from the 1990 injury, the court relied on Young v.. Young , 460 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Ky. 1970), which explained that Special Fund liability did not arise unless the worker's present condition resulted from the combined effects of a prior and subsequent injury .

1939“In Hopkins v. Jones, 193 Ky. 281 , 235 S. W. 754 , the Court of Appeals laid down the doctrine of res judicata and it is the settled rule in Kentucky that the doctrine of res judicata means that where a question or a fact is once litigated and determined by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, no question or fact that was litigated or could have been litigated therein can thereafter be relitigated by the same parties o.r their privies.

1939“In Hopkins v. Jones, 193 Ky. 281 , 235 S. W. 754 , the Court of Appeals laid down the doctrine of res judicata and it is the settled rule in Kentucky that the doctrine of res judicata means that where a question or a fact is once litigated and determined by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, no question or fact that was litigated or could have been litigated therein can thereafter be relitigated by the same parties o.r their privies.

2024Issue preclusion is “a close cousin to the doctrine of res judicata[.]” Moore v. Commonwealth, 954 S.W.2d 317, 318 (Ky. 1997).

2022He also argues that this rule is “exactly the same as it relates to the related doctrine of res judicata.” He cites Moore v. Commonwealth, 954 S.W.2d 317 (Ky. 1997), for this proposition.

2012The Supreme Court of Kentucky defined this doctrine in City of Louisville v. Louisville Professional Firefighters Ass’n, Local Union No. 345, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 813 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Ky.1991), as follows: “Under the doctrine of res judicata or ‘claim preclusion,’ a judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars a subsequent suit based upon the same cause of action.” The City of Louisville Court then cited to Newman v. Newman, 451 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Ky.1970), in which the former Court of Appeals addressed the elements of res judicata: The general rule for deter

2002“Under the doctrine of res judicata or ‘claim preclusion,’ a judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars a subsequent suit based upon the same cause of action.” City of Louisville v. Louisville Professional Firefighters Ass’n, Local Union No. 345, IAFF, AFL-CIO By and Through Gnagie, Ky., 813 S.W.2d 804, 806 (1991).

2012The Supreme Court of Kentucky defined this doctrine in City of Louisville v. Louisville Professional Firefighters Ass’n, Local Union No. 345, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 813 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Ky.1991), as follows: “Under the doctrine of res judicata or ‘claim preclusion,’ a judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars a subsequent suit based upon the same cause of action.” The City of Louisville Court then cited to Newman v. Newman, 451 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Ky.1970), in which the former Court of Appeals addressed the elements of res judicata: The general rule for deter

1991Id.

2023Thus, where there is an identity of parties and an identity of causes of action, the doctrine precludes further litigation of issues that were decided on the merits in a final judgment.” Whittaker v. Cecil, 69 S.W.3d 69, 71-72 (Ky. 2002) (citations omitted).

2021It is being considered by a separate panel of this Court in Appeal No. 2019-CA- 1283-MR, also rendered this day. -2- We begin by enunciating our standard of review: “[W]hether a particular defendant is protected by official immunity is a question of law, Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Peerce, 132 S.W.3d 824, 825 (Ky. 2004), which we review de novo.

2017In denying summary judgment, the circuit court explained its ruling as follows: Safely driving a police vehicle in' a pursuit is a ministerial act. [Mattingly v. Mitchell, 425 S.W.3d 85, 90 (Ky. App. 2013)] citing Jones v. Lathram, 150 S.W.3d 50 (Ky. 2004).

2011Stearns Land & Lumber Co., 241 Ky. 292, 296 , 43 S.W.2d 1012, 1014 (Ky.1931), in which Kentucky’s highest court recognized that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply “where the court in rendering the judgment expressly or by necessary implication reserved the determination of the issues to be later litigated, but against the determination of which the judgment was then interposed as a bar[.]” However, the facts in Asher are distinguishable from the case at bar.

2011Stearns Land & Lumber Co., 241 Ky. 292, 296 , 43 S.W.2d 1012, 1014 (Ky.1931), in which Kentucky’s highest court recognized that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply “where the court in rendering the judgment expressly or by necessary implication reserved the determination of the issues to be later litigated, but against the determination of which the judgment was then interposed as a bar[.]” However, the facts in Asher are distinguishable from the case at bar.

2010Hays v. Sturgill, 302 Ky. 31 , 193 S.W.2d 648, 650 (1946).

2010Hays v. Sturgill, 302 Ky. 31 , 193 S.W.2d 648, 650 (1946).

2005The fact that this matter was settled rather than tried does not abrogate the effect of the doctrine: "[i]n general, a judgment by agreement, consent or compromise bars a subsequent action on the same cause of action." Blevins v. Johnson, 344 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Ky.1961).

2005The fact that this matter was settled rather than tried does not abrogate the effect of the doctrine: “[i]n general, a judgment by agreement, consent or compromise bars a subsequent action on the same cause of action.” Blevins v. Johnson, 344 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Ky.1961).

1995Dennis v. Fiscal Court of Bullitt County, Ky.App., 784 S.W.2d 608, 609 (1990); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 394 (1969).

1992Revenue Cabinet v. Samani, Ky.App., 757 S.W.2d 199, 201 (1988).