res judicata doctrine in Utah

1997Because we determine that the claims made in the second termination proceeding were not barred under a traditional res judicata analysis, we need not reach the issue of whether different notions of res judi-cata should be applied in termination of parental rights proceedings. 2 “The doctrine of res judicata ‘is based on the premise that the proper administration of justice is best served by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or cause.’ ” In re 877 P.2d 161 , 162 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (quoting Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah Ct.App.1988)).

1997Because we determine that the claims made in the second termination proceeding were not barred under a traditional res judicata analysis, we need not reach the issue of whether different notions of res judi-cata should be applied in termination of parental rights proceedings. 2 “The doctrine of res judicata ‘is based on the premise that the proper administration of justice is best served by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or cause.’ ” In re 877 P.2d 161 , 162 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (quoting Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah Ct.App.1988)).

1997This court in In re J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 164 (Utah Ct.App.1994), although leaving unanswered the precise question of how res judicata applies in parental termination cases, stated that "to effectively determine the best interests of a child, a court must be free from the imposition of artificial constraints that serve merely to advance the cause of judicial economy.” Further, "determining whether the circumstances of child abuse or abandonment justify terminating parental rights is not the type of 'needless litigation’ contemplated by the doctrine of res judicata.” Id.

1997This court in In re J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 164 (Utah Ct.App.1994), although leaving unanswered the precise question of how res judicata applies in parental termination cases, stated that "to effectively determine the best interests of a child, a court must be free from the imposition of artificial constraints that serve merely to advance the cause of judicial economy.” Further, "determining whether the circumstances of child abuse or abandonment justify terminating parental rights is not the type of 'needless litigation’ contemplated by the doctrine of res judicata.” Id.

2022What matters is not that the UPUAA Claims were never adjudicated on the merits but that they “could and should have been raised in the [Georgia] action.” See id. (cleaned up).

2022What matters is not that the UPUAA Claims were never adjudicated on the merits but that they “could and should have been raised in the [Georgia] action.” See id. (cleaned up).

2017See generally Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 410 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (explaining that the doctrine of res judicata “bars domestic modification proceedings only where the moving party cannot establish either a substantial ehange of circumstances or mistake of fact”).

2017See generally Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 410 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (explaining that the doctrine of res judicata “bars domestic modification proceedings only where the moving party cannot establish either a substantial change of circumstances or mistake of fact”).

2010Co., 846 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Utah 1992) (“[T]he doctrine of res judicata has been applied to administrative agency decisions in Utah since at least 1950.”).

1997Res judicata, which "subsumes the doctrine of collateral estoppel," Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996), applies to administrative adjudications in Utah. [2] We noted recently in Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States, 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992), that "the doctrine of res judicata has been applied to administrative agency decisions in Utah since at least 1950." Id. at 1251 (citing North Salt Lake v. St.

1999Under the doctrine of res judicata, [appellee] and his privies are therefore precluded from having or claiming any right or title adverse to [appellant] for any period prior to November 1951.”); Bagley v. Moxley, 407 Mass. 633 , 555 N.E.2d 229, 232 (1990) (“[Plaintiffs were not entitled to pursue their claim of ownership through piecemeal litigation, offering one legal theory to the court while holding others in reserve for future litigation should the first prove unsuccessful.”). 3 B.

1999Under the doctrine of res judicata, [appellee] and his privies are therefore precluded from having or claiming any right or title adverse to [appellant] for any period prior to November 1951.”); Bagley v. Moxley, 407 Mass. 633 , 555 N.E.2d 229, 232 (1990) (“[Plaintiffs were not entitled to pursue their claim of ownership through piecemeal litigation, offering one legal theory to the court while holding others in reserve for future litigation should the first prove unsuccessful.”). 3 B.

1999All matters which could have been litigated in the earlier proceedings are barred by the doctrine of res judicata."); Hyman, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 745 ("At the time the first action for reformation was commenced, the cause of action for adverse possession was also viable and could also have been pleaded in the prior complaint and determined in the prior action."). [4] It is inarguable that a final judgment was entered in the prior action.

1999All matters which could have been litigated in the earlier proceedings are barred by the doctrine of res judicata."); Hyman, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 745 ("At the time the first action for reformation was commenced, the cause of action for adverse possession was also viable and could also have been pleaded in the prior complaint and determined in the prior action.”). .

1998See Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985) (“ ‘In the absence of [a showing of substantial change of circumstances], the [divorce] decree shall not be modified and the matters previously litigated and incorporated therein cannot be collaterally attacked in face of the doctrine of res judicata.’” (citation omitted)).

1994Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., 846 P.2d 1245, 1251-52 (Utah 1992); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985); Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983).

1997Res judicata, which "subsumes the doctrine of collateral estoppel," Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996), applies to administrative adjudications in Utah. [2] We noted recently in Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States, 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992), that "the doctrine of res judicata has been applied to administrative agency decisions in Utah since at least 1950." Id. at 1251 (citing North Salt Lake v. St.

1997Res judicata, which “subsumes the doctrine of collateral estoppel,” Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996), applies to administrative adjudications in Utah. 2 We noted recently in Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States, 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992), that “the doctrine of res judicata has been applied to administrative agency decisions in Utah since at least 1950.” Id. at 1251 (citing North Salt Lake v. St.

1996See Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995) (stating that there must be final judgment on merits before doctrine of res judicata is applicable).

1996See Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995) (stating that there must be final judgment on merits before doctrine of res judicata is applicable).

1994See, e.g., In re J.R., 711 P.2d 701, 703 (Colo. App.1985) (policy of limiting litigation should not be applied so as to disadvantage state in its role of parens patriae); In re Juvenile Appeal, 190 Conn. 310 , 460 A.2d 1277, 1282 (1983) (doctrines of preclusion should be flexible and "must give way when their mechanical application would frustrate other social policies based on values equally or more important than the convenience afforded by finality in legal controversies”); In re A.S., 12 Kan.App.2d 594 , 752 P.2d 705, 711 (1988) (court must be free to examine all circumstances, evidence, p

1994See, e.g., In re J.R., 711 P.2d 701, 703 (Colo. App.1985) (policy of limiting litigation should not be applied so as to disadvantage state in its role of parens patriae); In re Juvenile Appeal, 190 Conn. 310 , 460 A.2d 1277, 1282 (1983) (doctrines of preclusion should be flexible and "must give way when their mechanical application would frustrate other social policies based on values equally or more important than the convenience afforded by finality in legal controversies”); In re A.S., 12 Kan.App.2d 594 , 752 P.2d 705, 711 (1988) (court must be free to examine all circumstances, evidence, p

1994Consequently, the doctrine has evolved from common law jurisprudence to serve such public interests as "fostering reliance on prior adjudication," "preventing inconsistent decisions," "relieving parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits," and "conserving judicial resources." Office of Recovery Servs. v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah App.1992) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 , 101 S.Ct. 411, 415 , 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980)). *163 Res judicata has two related but distinct branches, both of which are intended to promote judicial economy and the convenience afforded by finality

1994Consequently, the doctrine has evolved from common law jurisprudence to serve such public interests as “fostering reliance on prior adjudication,” “preventing inconsistent decisions,” “relieving parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits,” and “conserving judicial resources.” Office of Recovery Servs. v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah App.1992) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 , 101 S.Ct. 411, 415 , 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980)).

1988Consequently, [the] attempt to challenge the equity of the original decree cannot be tolerated.” Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978) (footnote omitted).

1985Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, Utah, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (1978) (footnotes omitted).

1998As we noted in Stevenson, unless “‘the record of the prior action was ... before the trial court, there is no basis to sustain the determination that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.’ ” Id. (quoting Parrish v. Layton City Corp., 542 P.2d 1086, 1087 (Utah 1975)).

1996“Since the record of the prior action was not before the trial court, there is no basis to sustain the determination that plaintiffs claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.” Id.

2005In contrast, the doctrine of res judicata, " 'precludes the relit-igation of all issues [and claims] that could have been litigated as well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action.'" Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ¶ 12 , 99 P.3d 842 (quoting Macris & Assoc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ¶ 19 , 16 P.3d 1214 (citation omitted)). 19 Claim preclusion, 3 has three requirements: *732 First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies.

2005In contrast, the doctrine of res judicata, " 'precludes the relit-igation of all issues [and claims] that could have been litigated as well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action.'" Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, ¶ 12 , 99 P.3d 842 (quoting Macris & Assoc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ¶ 19 , 16 P.3d 1214 (citation omitted)). 19 Claim preclusion, 3 has three requirements: *732 First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies.

2011See id. 15 Accordingly, the district court's April 18, 2011 order is affirmed.

2002ANALYSIS $12 Respondents argue we are without jurisdiction to hear this appeal because we dismissed the appeal and the October 18, 2000 remittitur divested us of jurisdiction and returned jurisdiction to the Commission. - Respondents cite State v. Clark, 913 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct.App.1996), for the proposition that once a party has failed to file a brief as required, the appeal has been dismissed, and the time for a motion for reinstatement under Rule 23A of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure has passed, then the court loses jurisdiction and the dismissal is an adjudication on the merits barrin

2002However, we "cannot be expected, for [their] sole relief, to upset the general and well established doctrine of res judicata, conceived in the light of the maxim that the interest of the state requires that there be an end to litigation-a maxim which comports with common sense as well as public policy" 3 Id. at 401-02 (quoting Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 198-99 , 52 S.Ct. 582 , 76 L.Ed. 1054 (1932) (italics omitted)).

2000See id. at 395 , 101 S.Ct. at 2427 . 123 After removal of the state claims to federal court, the federal district court concluded that the claims were essentially the same as those decided in the original federal action and dismissed them under the doctrine of res judicata.

2020Although U.S. Bank correctly points out that courts may take judicial notice of public records, see BMBT, 2014 UT App 64, ¶ 7 (holding that courts can take judicial notice of public records when considering a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss even if those documents are not referenced in the pleadings or central to a plaintiff’s claim), there is nothing in the record to suggest that U.S. Bank asked the district court to take judicial notice of any public records or that the court did 20190276-CA 7 2020 UT App 55 Lewis v. U.S. Bank so. 6 It is therefore unclear how the district court (or this cou