res judicata doctrine in Texas

2025The doctrine of res judicata "prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit." Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992); Res judicata bars a party from attempting to relitigate a claim or cause of action that a competent tribunal has finally adjudicated." Valverde v. Biela's Glass & Aluminum Prods., 293 S.W.3d 751, 755 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, pet. denied).

2024As described by the Supreme Court: The doctrine of res judicata in Texas holds that a final judgment in an action bars the parties and their privies from bringing a second suit “not only on matters actually litigated, but also on causes of action or defenses which arise out of the same subject matter and which might have been litigated in the first suit.” Compania Financiara Libano, S.A. v. Simmons, 53 S.W.3d 365, 367 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 630 ).

2024As described by the Supreme Court: The doctrine of res judicata in Texas holds that a final judgment in an action bars the parties and their privies from bringing a second suit “not only on matters actually litigated, but also on causes of action or defenses which arise out of the same subject matter and which might have been litigated in the first suit.” Compania Financiara Libano, S.A. v. Simmons, 53 S.W.3d 365, 367 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 630 ).

2008The doctrine of res judicata in Texas holds that a final judgment in an action bars the parties and their privies from bringing a second suit “not only on matters actually litigated, but also on causes of action or defenses which arise out of the same subject matter and which might have been litigated in the first suit.” Compania Financiara Libano, S.A. v. Simmons, 53 S.W.3d 365, 367 (Tex.2001); Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex.1992).

2023In other words, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata . . . bars a second action by parties and their privies on matters actually litigated in a previous suit, as well as claims ‘“which, through the exercise of diligence, could have been litigated in a prior suit.”’” Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cnty., 221 S.W.3d 50, 58 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Getty Oil Co. v. Ins.

2022The doctrine of res judicata “bars a second action by parties and their privies on matters actually litigated in a previous suit, as well as claims which, through the exercise of diligence, could have been litigated in a prior suit.” Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cnty., 221 S.W.3d 50, 58 (Tex. 2006)[Internal quotation and citation omitted].

2023Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. 1992)).

2017Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. 1992)).

2025Rosetta Resources Operating, LP, 645 S.W.3d at 225 (citing Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at 652 ).

2025Molbert, Administrator . . . ,’ nevertheless said judgment was binding upon him as such by virtue of his active participation[.] Since the judgment was binding on him as Administrator, it was not void and not subject to collateral attack.”) (emphasis added). 6 See Cervantes v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 645 S.W.3d 843 , 847 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“Under federal law, the doctrine of res judicata will apply if: (1) the parties are identical in both suits; (2) the prior judgment is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a final judgment on the merits; and (4)

2019Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). 59 Discussion Appellees, in their motion for summary judgment, argued that they were entitled to judgment against Star on its claim for breach of the parties’ Settlement Agreement because Star’s claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

2019To prevail on their motion for summary judgment on their affirmative defense, appellees were first required to conclusively establish “a prior final determination on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.” See id.

1991The doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars retrial of claims asserted in a prior suit where there is "identity of parties, issues and subject matter." Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. 1984).

1991The doctrine of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars retrial of claims asserted in a prior suit where there is “identity of parties, issues and subject matter.” Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex.1984).

2008See Weiman v. Addicks-Fairbanks Road Sand Co., 846 S.W.2d at 421 .

2008Weiman v. Addicks-Fairbanks Road Sand Co. , 846 S.W.2d 414, 418 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).

2025Molbert, Administrator . . . ,’ nevertheless said judgment was binding upon him as such by virtue of his active participation[.] Since the judgment was binding on him as Administrator, it was not void and not subject to collateral attack.”) (emphasis added). 6 See Cervantes v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 645 S.W.3d 843 , 847 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“Under federal law, the doctrine of res judicata will apply if: (1) the parties are identical in both suits; (2) the prior judgment is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a final judgment on the merits; and (4)

2013“Under federal law, the doctrine of res judicata will apply if: (1) the parties are identical in both suits; (2) the prior judgment is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a final judgment on the merits; and (4) *541 the same cause of action is involved in both' cases.” Id.

2022Grp., Inc., 250 S.W.3d 78 , 87–88 (Tex. 2008) (certain final orders of Workforce Commission are res judicata), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Engelman Irrigation Dist. v. Shields Bros., 514 S.W.3d 746 , 750 n.28 (Tex. 2017); Tricon Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Thumann, 226 S.W.3d 494, 511 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (“The doctrine of res judicata also applies to the relitigation of claims previously determined by an administrative agency.”).

2022Grp., Inc., 250 S.W.3d 78 , 87–88 (Tex. 2008) (certain final orders of Workforce Commission are res judicata), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Engelman Irrigation Dist. v. Shields Bros., 514 S.W.3d 746 , 750 n.28 (Tex. 2017); Tricon Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Thumann, 226 S.W.3d 494, 511 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (“The doctrine of res judicata also applies to the relitigation of claims previously determined by an administrative agency.”).

2023The doctrine of res judicata “applies to the property division in a final divorce decree, just as it does to any other final judgment, barring subsequent collateral attack even if the divorce decree improperly divided the property.” DeAcetis v. Whitley, No 14-08-00429-CV, 2010 WL 1077904 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 25, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Baxter v. Ruddle, 794 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Tex. 1990)). 7 For res judicata to apply, there must be: (1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with

2007The Texas Supreme Court has rejected collateral attacks on divorce decrees that violated the USFSPA by awarding more than "disposable retired pay." See, e.g. , Baxter v. Ruddle , 794 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Tex. 1990) (decree awarded portion of gross military retirement pay); Berry , 786 S.W.2d at 673 (decree awarded portion of gross military disability retirement pay); Cook , 733 S.W.2d at 140 (decree awarded portion of gross military retirement pay).

2007Discussion The doctrine of res judicata "does not bar a former defendant who asserted no affirmative claim for relief in an earlier action from stating a claim in a later action that could have been filed as a . . . counterclaim in the earlier action, unless the claim was compulsory in the earlier action." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp. , 997 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex. 1999).

2007Discussion The doctrine of res judicata “does not bar a former defendant who asserted no affirmative claim for relief in an earlier action from stating a claim in a later action that could have been filed as a ... counterclaim in the earlier action, unless the claim was compulsory in the earlier action.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 997 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex.1999).

2014Under common law, the doctrine of res judicata (or claim preclusion) “prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit.” Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992); Wren v. Gusnowski, 919 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no pet.).

2007Under common law, the doctrine of res judicata (or claim preclusion) “prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the prior suit.” Wren v. Gusnowski, 919 S.W.2d 847, 848 (TexApp.-Austin 1996, no writ) (quoting Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex.1992)).

2001The doctrine of res judicata in Texas holds that a final judgment in an action bars the parties and their privies from bringing a second suit “ ‘not only on matters actually litigated, but also on causes of action or defenses which arise out of the same subject matter and which might have been litigated in the first suit.’” Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex.1992) (quoting Texas Water Rights Comm. v. Crow Iron Works, 582 S.W.2d 768, 771-772 (Tex.1979) (emphasis omitted)).

1980Superficially, it might appear that the broader view of the scope of the doctrine of res judicata, as expressed in Ogletree , was reaffirmed by the supreme court in Texas Water Rights Commission v. Crow Iron Works, 582 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.1979), in which the court, relying on Griffin, Gravis and Ogletree , stated: The scope of res judicata is not limited to matters actually litigated; the judgment in the first suit precludes a second action by the parties and their privies not only on matters actually litigated, but also on causes of action or defenses which arise out of the same subject matter an

1986This is “technical” res judicata or “claim preclusion.” Gilbert v. Fireside Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1980, no writ).

1986Segrest v. Segrest, 649 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tex. *820 1983); Gilbert v. Fireside Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 869, 872 (Tex.Civ.App.- Dallas 1980, no writ).

2023Appraisal Dist., No. 03-21-00069-CV, 2022 WL 2836807 , at *3 (Tex. App.–Austin July 21, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (citing Tricon Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Thumann, 226 S.W.3d 494, 511 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (“The doctrine of res judicata also applies to the relitigation of claims previously determined by an administrative agency”)); see also Willacy Cty.

2022Grp., Inc., 250 S.W.3d 78 , 87–88 (Tex. 2008) (certain final orders of Workforce Commission are res judicata), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Engelman Irrigation Dist. v. Shields Bros., 514 S.W.3d 746 , 750 n.28 (Tex. 2017); Tricon Tool & Supply, Inc. v. Thumann, 226 S.W.3d 494, 511 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (“The doctrine of res judicata also applies to the relitigation of claims previously determined by an administrative agency.”).

2015See id.

1999See Pierce v. Reynolds, 160 Tex. 198 , 329 S.W.2d 76, 78 (1959); Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).

2015Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 559 (5th Cir.1983).

2014In re Paige, 610 F.3d 865, 870 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, Miss., 701 F.2d 556, 559 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc)).

2007The Texas Supreme Court has rejected collateral attacks on divorce decrees that violated the USFSPA by awarding more than "disposable retired pay." See, e.g. , Baxter v. Ruddle , 794 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Tex. 1990) (decree awarded portion of gross military retirement pay); Berry , 786 S.W.2d at 673 (decree awarded portion of gross military disability retirement pay); Cook , 733 S.W.2d at 140 (decree awarded portion of gross military retirement pay).

2007The Texas Supreme Court has rejected collateral attacks on divorce decrees that violated the USFSPA by awarding more than “disposable retired pay.” See, e.g., Baxter v. Ruddle, 794 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Tex. 1990) (decree awarded portion of gross military retirement pay); Berry, 786 S.W.2d at 673 (decree awarded portion of gross military disability retirement pay); Cook, 733 S.W.2d at 140 (decree awarded portion of gross military retirement pay).

2007The Texas Supreme Court has rejected collateral attacks on divorce decrees that violated the USFSPA by awarding more than "disposable retired pay." See, e.g. , Baxter v. Ruddle , 794 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Tex. 1990) (decree awarded portion of gross military retirement pay); Berry , 786 S.W.2d at 673 (decree awarded portion of gross military disability retirement pay); Cook , 733 S.W.2d at 140 (decree awarded portion of gross military retirement pay).

2007The Texas Supreme Court has rejected collateral attacks on divorce decrees that violated the USFSPA by awarding more than “disposable retired pay.” See, e.g., Baxter v. Ruddle, 794 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Tex. 1990) (decree awarded portion of gross military retirement pay); Berry, 786 S.W.2d at 673 (decree awarded portion of gross military disability retirement pay); Cook, 733 S.W.2d at 140 (decree awarded portion of gross military retirement pay).

2007Trahan v. Trahan , 894 S.W.2d 113, 117 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, writ denied), cert. denied , 517 U.S. 1155 (1996).

2007Trahan v. Trahan, 894 S.W.2d 113, 117 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1155 (1996).

2006See Brown v. Henderson , 941 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1996, no writ) (discussing Tex. Civ.

2006See Brown v. Henderson, 941 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, no writ) (discussing Tex. Civ.

1991Griffin v. Holiday Inns of America, 496 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1973); Abbott Laboratories v. Gravis, 470 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex.1971).

1988Abbott Laboratories v. Gravis, 470 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.1971).

1980Again citing Moore , the court in Griffin noted conversely that: “[A] judgment on the merits in a suit on one cause of action is not [under the doctrine of res judicata] conclusive of [any issue in] a subsequent suit on a different cause of action except [under the principle of collateral estoppel] as to issues of fact actually litigated and determined in the first suit.” 496 S.W.2d at 538 .

1980Again citing Moore , the court in Griffin noted conversely that: "[A] judgment on the merits in a suit on one cause of action is not [under the doctrine of res judicata] conclusive of [any issue in] a subsequent suit on a different cause of action except [under the principle of collateral estoppel] as to issues of fact actually litigated and determined in the first suit." 496 S.W.2d at 538 .