res judicata doctrine in West Virginia

2021Va. 762 , 277 S.E.2d 606 (1981), we held that an order denying a habeas petition generally precludes subsequent petitions, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, “where there has been an omnibus habeas corpus hearing at which the applicant for habeas corpus was represented by counsel or appeared pro se having knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.” 3 ISSUED: August 27, 2021 CONCURRED IN BY: Chief Justice Evan H.

2019Jenkins Justice John A. Hutchison 5 As respondent notes, a denial of a habeas petition without a hearing and appointment of counsel does not trigger the application doctrine of res judicata, pursuant to Syllabus Point 2 of Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W.

2025The third element of the res judicata test is most often the focal point, since “the central inquiry on a plea of res judicata is whether the cause of action in the second suit is the same as in the first suit.” Conley, 171 W.

2008We recognized in Conley v. Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584, 588 , 301 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1983), that "the underlying purpose of the doctrine of res judicata was initially to prevent a person from being twice vexed for one and the same cause." In Conley , we also observed the following additional rationale underlying the doctrine of res judicata: "To preclude parties from contesting matters that have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, claim preclusion serves to conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance

2015As we recognized in N.C. v. W.R.C., 173 W.Va. 434 , 317 S.E.2d 793 (1984): “ ‘The provisions of this rale [(60(b))] must be carefully interpreted to preserve the delicate balance between the sanctity of final judgments, expressed in the doctrine of res judicata, and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts,’ ” 173 W.Va. at 437 , 317 S.E.2d at 796 (quoting Bankers Mortgage Co. v. US., 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir.1970)).

2002As we recognized in N.C. v. W.R.C., 173 W.Va. 434 , 317 S.E.2d 793 (1984): “ ‘The provisions of this rule [60(b)] must be carefully interpreted to preserve the delicate balance between the sanctity of final judgments, expressed in the doctrine of res judicata, and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.’ ” 173 W.Va. at 437 , 317 S.E.2d at 796 (quoting Bankers Mortgage Co. v. U.S., 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir.1970)).

2013See Blake v. CAMC, Inc., 201 W.Va. 469, 476 , 498 S.E.2d 41, 48 (1997) (“under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action”) (quoting Porter v. McPherson, 198 W.Va. 158, 166 , 479 S.E.2d 668, 676 (1996)). [a]n entity knows, has notice or receives a notification of a fact for purposes of a particular transaction when the individual conducting the transaction for the entity knows, has notice, or receives a notification of the fact, or in any event when the fact would have b

2013See Blake v. CAMC, Inc., 201 W.Va. 469, 476 , 498 S.E.2d 41, 48 (1997) (“under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action”) (quoting Porter v. McPherson, 198 W.Va. 158, 166 , 479 S.E.2d 668, 676 (1996)). [a]n entity knows, has notice or receives a notification of a fact for purposes of a particular transaction when the individual conducting the transaction for the entity knows, has notice, or receives a notification of the fact, or in any event when the fact would have b

2001“It is now well-established that ‘the doctrine of res judicata may be applied to quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies.’ ” Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Rowing, 205 W.Va. 286, 296 , 517 S.E.2d 763, 773 (1999) (quoting Rowan v. McKnight, 184 W.Va. 763, 764 , 403 S.E.2d 780, 781 (1991) (per curiam)) (citation omitted).

2001“It is now well-established that ‘the doctrine of res judicata may be applied to quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies.’ ” Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Rowing, 205 W.Va. 286, 296 , 517 S.E.2d 763, 773 (1999) (quoting Rowan v. McKnight, 184 W.Va. 763, 764 , 403 S.E.2d 780, 781 (1991) (per curiam)) (citation omitted).

2020Va. 212 , 400 S.E.2d 220 (1990) (“a subsequent action in a state court on the state claim which would have been dismissed, without prejudice, in the prior federal action is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.”); Syl. pt. 5, in 1 The Petitioner believed that he was entitled to more money in this claim, but he was willing to limit his recover to the jurisdictional limit in magistrate court.

2007“The essence of the doctrine of res judicata (meaning, a matter adjudged) is that a judgment in a prior action *258 bars a subsequent action involving the same parties (or their privies) and the same cause of action which were involved in the prior action.” Sattler v. Bailey, 184 W.Va. 212, 217 , 400 S.E.2d 220, 225 (1990).

2000This Court has stated in Syllabus, Hannah v. Beasley, 132 W.Va. 814 , 53 S.E.2d 729 (1949), To justify the application of the doctrine of res judicata, * * * there must be a concurrence of four conditions, namely: (1) identity in the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of persons, and of parties to the action; (4) identity of the quality in the persons for or against whom the claim is made. .

2000This Court has stated in Syllabus, Hannah v. Beasley, 132 W.Va. 814 , 53 S.E.2d 729 (1949), To justify the application of the doctrine of res judicata, * * * there must be a concurrence of four conditions, namely: (1) identity in the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of persons, and of parties to the action; (4) identity of the quality in the persons for or against whom the claim is made. .

2015As we recognized in N.C. v. W.R.C., 173 W.Va. 434 , 317 S.E.2d 793 (1984): “ ‘The provisions of this rale [(60(b))] must be carefully interpreted to preserve the delicate balance between the sanctity of final judgments, expressed in the doctrine of res judicata, and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts,’ ” 173 W.Va. at 437 , 317 S.E.2d at 796 (quoting Bankers Mortgage Co. v. US., 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir.1970)).

2015As we recognized in N.C. v. W.R.C., 173 W.Va. 434 , 317 S.E.2d 793 (1984): “ ‘The provisions of this rale [(60(b))] must be carefully interpreted to preserve the delicate balance between the sanctity of final judgments, expressed in the doctrine of res judicata, and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts,’ ” 173 W.Va. at 437 , 317 S.E.2d at 796 (quoting Bankers Mortgage Co. v. US., 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir.1970)).

2020See White v. Haines, 215 W.Va. 698 , 705 n.9, 601 S.E.2d 18 , 25 n.9 (2004) (affirming denial of the petitioner’s second habeas petition, finding that “it is difficult to muster any sound reasoning for giving [him] another bite at the apple”); Call v. McKenzie, 159 W.Va. 191, 194 , 220 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1975) (finding that post-conviction litigation must end at some point because, “[w]hile a defendant is entitled to due process of law, he is not entitled to appeal upon appeal, attack upon attack, and habeas corpus upon habeas corpus”).

2020See White v. Haines, 215 W.Va. 698 , 705 n.9, 601 S.E.2d 18 , 25 n.9 (2004) (affirming denial of the petitioner’s second habeas petition, finding that “it is difficult to muster any sound reasoning for giving [him] another bite at the apple”); Call v. McKenzie, 159 W.Va. 191, 194 , 220 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1975) (finding that post-conviction litigation must end at some point because, “[w]hile a defendant is entitled to due process of law, he is not entitled to appeal upon appeal, attack upon attack, and habeas corpus upon habeas corpus”).

2009Massey Coal Co., Inc., 270 B.R. 654, 655 (S.D.W.Va.2001). [43] Mr. Caperton also contends that the doctrine of res judicata applies.

2008Massey Coal Co., Inc., 270 B.R. 654, 655 (S.D.W.Va.2001). [36] Mr. Caperton also contends that the doctrine of res judicata applies.

2008We recognized in Conley v. Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584, 588 , 301 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1983), that "the underlying purpose of the doctrine of res judicata was initially to prevent a person from being twice vexed for one and the same cause." In Conley , we also observed the following additional rationale underlying the doctrine of res judicata: "To preclude parties from contesting matters that have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, claim preclusion serves to conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance

2008We recognized in Conley v. Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584, 588 , 301 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1983), that "the underlying purpose of the doctrine of res judicata was initially to prevent a person from being twice vexed for one and the same cause." In Conley , we also observed the following additional rationale underlying the doctrine of res judicata: "To preclude parties from contesting matters that have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, claim preclusion serves to conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance

2001“It is now well-established that ‘the doctrine of res judicata may be applied to quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies.’ ” Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Rowing, 205 W.Va. 286, 296 , 517 S.E.2d 763, 773 (1999) (quoting Rowan v. McKnight, 184 W.Va. 763, 764 , 403 S.E.2d 780, 781 (1991) (per curiam)) (citation omitted).

2001“It is now well-established that ‘the doctrine of res judicata may be applied to quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies.’ ” Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Rowing, 205 W.Va. 286, 296 , 517 S.E.2d 763, 773 (1999) (quoting Rowan v. McKnight, 184 W.Va. 763, 764 , 403 S.E.2d 780, 781 (1991) (per curiam)) (citation omitted).

2017As we explained in Marguerite Coal Co. v. Meadow River Lumber Co., 98 W.Va. 698 , 127 S.E. 644 (1925), the doctrine of res judicata “is founded upon two maxims of the law, one of which is that ‘a man should not be twice vexed for the same cause,’ the other that ‘it is for the public good that there be an end of litigation.’” Id. at 702 , 127 S.E. at 646 (citation omitted).

2017As we explained in Marguerite Coal Co. v. Meadow River Lumber Co., 98 W.Va. 698 , 127 S.E. 644 (1925), the doctrine of res judicata “is founded upon two maxims of the law, one of which is that ‘a man should not be twice vexed for the same cause,’ the other that ‘it is for the public good that there be an end of litigation.’” Id. at 702 , 127 S.E. at 646 (citation omitted).

1991We cited syllabus point 1 of Pearson v. Dodd, 159 W.Va. 254 , 221 S.E.2d 171 (1975), appeal dismissed, 426 U.S. 946 , 96 S.Ct. 3164 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1182 (1977), overruled in part on other grounds in Lilly v. Duke, 180 W.Va. 228 , 376 S.E.2d 122 (1980) with favor as follows: “ ‘To justify the application of the doctrine of res judicata,’ ... there must be a concurrence of four conditions, namely: “(1) identity in the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of persons, and of parties to the action; (4) identity of the quality in the person for or against whom the claim is

1991We cited syllabus point 1 of Pearson v. Dodd, 159 W.Va. 254 , 221 S.E.2d 171 (1975), appeal dismissed, 426 U.S. 946 , 96 S.Ct. 3164 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1182 (1977), overruled in part on other grounds in Lilly v. Duke, 180 W.Va. 228 , 376 S.E.2d 122 (1980) with favor as follows: “ ‘To justify the application of the doctrine of res judicata,’ ... there must be a concurrence of four conditions, namely: “(1) identity in the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of persons, and of parties to the action; (4) identity of the quality in the person for or against whom the claim is

2025I. 4 Petitioner was represented by counsel below. 5 Although this provision was not substantively affected by the recent amendments to West Virginia Code § 16-5-10 (2024), we refer to the former version of the statute because it was in effect at the time the events giving rise to this case arose, and it was the law in effect when the present case was filed below. 4 In evaluating petitioner’s petition under the res judicata doctrine, the circuit court noted the seminal case of Blake v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 201 W.

2013See Blake v. CAMC, Inc., 201 W.Va. 469, 476 , 498 S.E.2d 41, 48 (1997) (“under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action”) (quoting Porter v. McPherson, 198 W.Va. 158, 166 , 479 S.E.2d 668, 676 (1996)). [a]n entity knows, has notice or receives a notification of a fact for purposes of a particular transaction when the individual conducting the transaction for the entity knows, has notice, or receives a notification of the fact, or in any event when the fact would have b

2002As we have noted on numerous occasions, once a court has adjudicated a matter, the doctrine of res judicata applies: “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” Porter v. McPherson, 198 W.Va. 158, 166 , 479 S.E.2d 668, 676 (1996), quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 , 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645 , 649 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 , 559 n. 5 (1979) (footnote omitted).

2002As we have noted on numerous occasions, once a court has adjudicated a matter, the doctrine of res judicata applies: “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” Porter v. McPherson, 198 W.Va. 158, 166 , 479 S.E.2d 668, 676 (1996), quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 , 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645 , 649 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 , 559 n. 5 (1979) (footnote omitted).

1999It is now well established that “the doctrine of res judicata may be applied to quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies.” Rowan v. McKnight, 184 W.Va. 763, 764 , 403 S.E.2d 780, 781 (1991) (per curiam) (citing Liller v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm’n, 180 W.Va. 433 , 376 S.E.2d 639 (1988)).

1999It is now well established that “the doctrine of res judicata may be applied to quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies.” Rowan v. McKnight, 184 W.Va. 763, 764 , 403 S.E.2d 780, 781 (1991) (per curiam) (citing Liller v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm’n, 180 W.Va. 433 , 376 S.E.2d 639 (1988)).

2017Id. at 809 , 591 S.E.2d at 735 . 7 Finally, we have defined the doctrine of res judicata as “a doctrine which bars the subsequent litigation of any cause of action which has been previously tried on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, and includes within its bar issues which might have been tried.” Mellon-Stuart Co. v. Hall, 178 W.

2017Va. 291, 298 , 359 S.E.2d 124, 131 (1987).

2020See White v. Haines, 215 W.Va. 698 , 705 n.9, 601 S.E.2d 18 , 25 n.9 (2004) (affirming denial of the petitioner’s second habeas petition, finding that “it is difficult to muster any sound reasoning for giving [him] another bite at the apple”); Call v. McKenzie, 159 W.Va. 191, 194 , 220 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1975) (finding that post-conviction litigation must end at some point because, “[w]hile a defendant is entitled to due process of law, he is not entitled to appeal upon appeal, attack upon attack, and habeas corpus upon habeas corpus”).

2020See White v. Haines, 215 W.Va. 698 , 705 n.9, 601 S.E.2d 18 , 25 n.9 (2004) (affirming denial of the petitioner’s second habeas petition, finding that “it is difficult to muster any sound reasoning for giving [him] another bite at the apple”); Call v. McKenzie, 159 W.Va. 191, 194 , 220 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1975) (finding that post-conviction litigation must end at some point because, “[w]hile a defendant is entitled to due process of law, he is not entitled to appeal upon appeal, attack upon attack, and habeas corpus upon habeas corpus”).