beginning hearing in Arkansas

2017The court mentioned two recent appellate cases, Wright v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2014 Ark.

2014At the beginning of the hearing, appellant’s attorney requested that appellant, who was not present, be permitted to 3 Cite as 2014 Ark.

2005Upon the defendant’s admitting that he understood the suspended sentence was based upon this condition, the judge told the defendant’s attorney: “[Y]ou can call what witnesses you want, but I cannot sanction this type of conduct. . . .” This court reversed, stating that the trial judge’s comments showed “a [mindset] which cannot be reconciled with the proposition that the trial court is committed to hear all relevant, credible evidence weighing it and arriving at a judicious result.” 267 Ark. at 1032-33 , 593 S.W.2d at 478 .

2005Upon the defendant’s admitting that he understood the suspended sentence was based upon this condition, the judge told the defendant’s attorney: “[Y]ou can call what witnesses you want, but I cannot sanction this type of conduct. . . .” This court reversed, stating that the trial judge’s comments showed “a [mindset] which cannot be reconciled with the proposition that the trial court is committed to hear all relevant, credible evidence weighing it and arriving at a judicious result.” 267 Ark. at 1032-33 , 593 S.W.2d at 478 .

2005In response, DHS cited Hathcock v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 347 Ark. 819 , 69 S.W.3d 6 (2002), in which our supreme court held that the purpose of the time limit on continuances for adjudication hearings was clear, 1 and that the limited continuance provision of the juvenile code controlled rather than Rule 40(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure because it served the specific purpose of expediting hearings involving children in out-of-home placements.

2005In response, DHS cited Hathcock v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 347 Ark. 819 , 69 S.W.3d 6 (2002), in which our supreme court held that the purpose of the time limit on continuances for adjudication hearings was clear, 1 and that the limited continuance provision of the juvenile code controlled rather than Rule 40(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure because it served the specific purpose of expediting hearings involving children in out-of-home placements.

2004Rather, its arguments are couched in terms of no substantial evidence of irreparable harm or likelihood of success on the merits. [4] See Weiss v. Johnson, 331 Ark. 409 , 961 S.W.2d 28 (1998).

2004Rather, its arguments are couched in terms of no substantial evidence of irreparable harm or likelihood of success on the merits. [4] See Weiss v. Johnson, 331 Ark. 409 , 961 S.W.2d 28 (1998).

1996See City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239 (1983); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).

1988Southwestern Insurance Company v. Camp, 253 Ark. 886 , 489 S.W.2d 498 (1973).

1988Southwestern Insurance Company v. Camp, 253 Ark. 886 , 489 S.W.2d 498 (1973).

1956The Trial Court recognized that, as a legal proposition, a voter must vote in the ward or precinct in which he resides (see Wilson v. Luck, 203 Ark. 377 , 156 S. W. 2d 795 ; and Logan v. Moody, 219 Ark. 697 , 244 S. W. 2d 499 ); but the Court said at the beginning of the hearing: “. . . unless the definite precincts were laid off for the purpose of the election, anybody in the School District could vote in any box in the District.” Under the facts — or lack of facts — shown in the record in this case, we find the Trial Court’s ruling to have been correct as regards the election here involved.

1956The Trial Court recognized that, as a legal proposition, a voter must vote in the ward or precinct in which he resides (see Wilson v. Luck, 203 Ark. 377 , 156 S. W. 2d 795 ; and Logan v. Moody, 219 Ark. 697 , 244 S. W. 2d 499 ); but the Court said at the beginning of the hearing: “. . . unless the definite precincts were laid off for the purpose of the election, anybody in the School District could vote in any box in the District.” Under the facts — or lack of facts — shown in the record in this case, we find the Trial Court’s ruling to have been correct as regards the election here involved.

1956The Trial Court recognized that, as a legal proposition, a voter must vote in the ward or precinct in which he resides (see Wilson v. Luck, 203 Ark. 377 , 156 S. W. 2d 795 ; and Logan v. Moody, 219 Ark. 697 , 244 S. W. 2d 499 ); but the Court said at the beginning of the hearing: “. . . unless the definite precincts were laid off for the purpose of the election, anybody in the School District could vote in any box in the District.” Under the facts — or lack of facts — shown in the record in this case, we find the Trial Court’s ruling to have been correct as regards the election here involved.

1956The Trial Court recognized that, as a legal proposition, a voter must vote in the ward or precinct in which he resides (see Wilson v. Luck, 203 Ark. 377 , 156 S. W. 2d 795 ; and Logan v. Moody, 219 Ark. 697 , 244 S. W. 2d 499 ); but the Court said at the beginning of the hearing: “. . . unless the definite precincts were laid off for the purpose of the election, anybody in the School District could vote in any box in the District.” Under the facts — or lack of facts — shown in the record in this case, we find the Trial Court’s ruling to have been correct as regards the election here involved.

1922The case of Turner v. Burke, 81 Ark. 352 , which is cited by the opinion of the majority, is only the beginning of the doctrine in this court.