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9 Tennessee opinions name it 4 courts 1996–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kinard v. Kinardgreen1 sentence2024“Courts frown upon the manipulation of the impartiality issue to gain procedural advantage and will not permit litigants to refrain from asserting known grounds for disqualification in order ‘to experiment with the court . . . and raise the objection later when the result of the trial is unfavorable.’” Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Holmes v. Eason, 76 Tenn. (8 Lea) 754, 757 (Tenn. 1882)). | 1 | 1 |
Dupuis v. Handgreen1 sentence2024This is a proper consideration for our Court, as we do not “hesitate[] to abolish obsolete common-law doctrines,” especially when “it is the Court, rather than the Legislature, which has recognized and nurtured the action.” Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tenn. 1991) (quoting Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tenn. 1991)). | 1 | 1 |
Hanover v. Ruchgreen1 sentence2024This is a proper consideration for our Court, as we do not “hesitate[] to abolish obsolete common-law doctrines,” especially when “it is the Court, rather than the Legislature, which has recognized and nurtured the action.” Dupuis v. Hand, 814 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tenn. 1991) (quoting Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tenn. 1991)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burnsgreen1 sentence2017A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. 3 At the beginning of the hearing, post-conviction counsel stated that the Petitioner had sought “several subpoenas,” that the subpoenas had been “issued by the clerk,” but that the people subpoenaed “couldn‟t be found to be served.” -6- See State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Lambdin Funeral Service, Inc. v. Griffithgreen1 sentence2010Inc. v. Griffith, 559 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tenn.1978). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2005To which the defense replied: “Your Honor, I’ve spoken with Mr. Livingston concerning this matter and he did want to raise those ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the motion for new trial knowing that he could not file later for Post-Conviction relief.” The Defendant then proceeded to argue only legal issues at the hearing, calling no witnesses nor putting on any proof pertaining to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. -13- S.W.3d at 462; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Goodman v. Oliver Springs Mining Co.
green
1 sentence2016Furthermore, in Goodman v. Oliver Springs Mining Co., 595 S.W.2d 805 (Tenn. 1980), an employer provided an employee a panel comprised of three physicians. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Jones v. Trice
green
1 sentence2010At the beginning of its analysis of the issue, the Supreme Court commented it was significant that the litigation privilege was based upon the “public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.” Id. at 24 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 cmt. a. (1977)). 6 The Court further noted that “access to the judicial process, freedom to institute an action, or defend, or participate therein without fear of the burden of being sued for defamation is so vital and necessary to the integrity of our judicial s | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. Stewart, Estes & Donnell
green
1 sentence2010At the beginning of its analysis of the issue, the Supreme Court commented it was significant that the litigation privilege was based upon the “public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.” Id. at 24 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 cmt. a. (1977)). 6 The Court further noted that “access to the judicial process, freedom to institute an action, or defend, or participate therein without fear of the burden of being sued for defamation is so vital and necessary to the integrity of our judicial s | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State Department of Children's Services v. A.M.H.
green
1 sentence2007Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Anderson
green
1 sentence2005Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Wade
green
1 sentence1996Wade, 863 S.W.2d at 409 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.