beginning hearing in Oregon

2024On April 26, 2023, mother filed a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to ORS 419B.923(1)(b), which autho- rizes a juvenile court to set aside its orders and judgments on the grounds of “excusable neglect.” Mother did not appear at the beginning of the hearing on her motion, and her counsel Cite as 331 Or App 122 (2024) 109 argued that, because of mother’s modest means, she often relies on public transportation, which causes her lateness.

2023B., 309 Or App 455, 458 , 482 P3d 134 (2021), a case in which the citation was not served until the beginning of the hearing, we did not exercise our dis- cretion to correct the error, if any, because there was no indication that “the delay in service of the citation caused appellant or counsel not to be informed of the bases for the commitment or not to have adequate time or information to prepare for the hearing.” Id.

2023B., 309 Or App 455, 458 , 482 P3d 134 (2021), a case in which the citation was not served until the beginning of the hearing, we did not exercise our dis- cretion to correct the error, if any, because there was no indication that “the delay in service of the citation caused appellant or counsel not to be informed of the bases for the commitment or not to have adequate time or information to prepare for the hearing.” Id.

2021At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered appellant committed to the cus- tody of DHS for a period of time not to exceed one year after making the determination that appellant had an intellec- tual or other developmental disability and because of that “(3) If * * * voluntary treatment and training or conditional release is not in the best interest of the person, the court may order the commitment of the person * * * for a period not to exceed one year * * *. “(4) If * * * the person may be incapacitated, the court may appoint a legal guardian or conservator * * *.” Cite as 310 Or App

2004Id. *365 At the time that Koskela first sought reconsideration, ORS 656.283(7) (1993) provided, in part, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent or limit the right of a worker, insurer or self-insured employer to present evidence at hearing and to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the standards * * * for evaluation of the worker’s permanent disability were incorrectly applied in the reconsideration order pursuant to ORS 656.268.” As this court observed, that statute previously had been interpreted to permit a party “to introduce evidence at hearing [before the AL

2004Id. *365 At the time that Koskela first sought reconsideration, ORS 656.283(7) (1993) provided, in part, “Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent or limit the right of a worker, insurer or self-insured employer to present evidence at hearing and to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the standards * * * for evaluation of the worker’s permanent disability were incorrectly applied in the reconsideration order pursuant to ORS 656.268.” As this court observed, that statute previously had been interpreted to permit a party “to introduce evidence at hearing [before the AL

1997As a beginning principle, the American Indians’ exemption from state tax is not automatic or inferred. “[The Supreme Court] has repeatedly said that tax exemptions are not granted by implication. * * * It has applied that rule to taxing acts affecting Indians as to all others.” Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 US 145 , 93 S Ct 1267 , 36 L Ed 2d 114, 124 (1973) (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 US 598, 606-07 , 63 S Ct 1284 , 87 L Ed 1612 (1943)).

1997As a beginning principle, the American Indians’ exemption from state tax is not automatic or inferred. “[The Supreme Court] has repeatedly said that tax exemptions are not granted by implication. * * * It has applied that rule to taxing acts affecting Indians as to all others.” Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 US 145 , 93 S Ct 1267 , 36 L Ed 2d 114, 124 (1973) (quoting Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. United States, 319 US 598, 606-07 , 63 S Ct 1284 , 87 L Ed 1612 (1943)).

1995At the beginning of the hearing, petitioner’s attorney said: “I’d like to put [the hearings officer] and Deputy Radar on notice that I’ll be challenging the reasonableness of this stop and the probable cause for the arrest, pursuant to [Bish] and Pooler v. Motor Vehicles Division[, 306 Or 47 , 755 P2d 701 (1988)].” That necessarily placed the validity of the stop at issue.

1995At the beginning of the hearing, petitioner’s attorney said: “I’d like to put [the hearings officer] and Deputy Radar on notice that I’ll be challenging the reasonableness of this stop and the probable cause for the arrest, pursuant to [Bish] and Pooler v. Motor Vehicles Division[, 306 Or 47 , 755 P2d 701 (1988)].” That necessarily placed the validity of the stop at issue.

1995Fischer v. MVD, 101 Or App 580 , 582 n 1, 792 P2d 445 (1990).

1995Fischer v. MVD, 101 Or App 580 , 582 n 1, 792 P2d 445 (1990).

1991THE ROLE OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF At the beginning of its analysis of the substantiality of the evidence in this case, the majority discusses the burden of proof in the TSPC hearing. 312 Or. at 417-419 , 822 P.2d at 1180-1181 .

1991THE ROLE OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF At the beginning of its analysis of the substantiality of the evidence in this case, the majority discusses the burden of proof in the TSPC hearing. 312 Or. at 417-419 , 822 P.2d at 1180-1181 .

1985The court said at the very beginning of its analysis: “The petitioner in this case presents the same problem as the occupational disease claimant who at different times held jobs with several employers, each of which involved exposure to conditions which might cause the disease.” 288 Or at 341 .

1976Plaintiff says that: "The defendant’s Answer did not put in issue or deny any material averment of the Complaint.” and that: «* * * Once plaintiff moved for a judgment on the pleadings, the Court is required to review the pleadings since '[a]n issue of law arises * * * upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings, under Section 79, L.O.L. [ORS 16.130]’ State v. Pacific Live Stock Co., 93 Or 196, 222 , 182 Pac 828 (1919).

1976Plaintiff says that: "The defendant’s Answer did not put in issue or deny any material averment of the Complaint.” and that: «* * * Once plaintiff moved for a judgment on the pleadings, the Court is required to review the pleadings since '[a]n issue of law arises * * * upon a motion for judgment on the pleadings, under Section 79, L.O.L. [ORS 16.130]’ State v. Pacific Live Stock Co., 93 Or 196, 222 , 182 Pac 828 (1919).

1935Where, as in this case, the chancery tribunal has before it all the parties interested, it may correct the error and establish the individuals involved in their rights as they would have been but for the mistake, without going back through all its ramifications and making corrections as of the beginning of the error.” Mays v. Morrell, 65 Or. 558 ( 132 P. 714 ).

1935Where, as in this case, the chancery tribunal has before it all the parties interested, it may correct the error and establish the individuals involved in their rights as they would have been but for the mistake, without going back through all its ramifications and making corrections as of the beginning of the error.” Mays v. Morrell, 65 Or. 558 ( 132 P. 714 ).

1935Brown v. Briggs, 134 Or. 184 ( 292 P. 1034 ), was a case in which a description in a deed covered more property than was intended to be conveyed, and this court, after citing many authorities said: ‘ ‘ The record clearly shows that defendants received possession of every square foot of land intended to be conveyed under their agreement with the plaintiffs. ’ ’ The same is true in the instant case.

1935Brown v. Briggs, 134 Or. 184 ( 292 P. 1034 ), was a case in which a description in a deed covered more property than was intended to be conveyed, and this court, after citing many authorities said: ‘ ‘ The record clearly shows that defendants received possession of every square foot of land intended to be conveyed under their agreement with the plaintiffs. ’ ’ The same is true in the instant case.