beginning hearing in Texas

2013Thus, Rivas has preserved this complaint for appeal.3 See Black v. State, 358 S.W.3d 823, 829 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d) (holding that a motion to suppress heard by the trial court preserves the issue for appellate review); see also Sargent v. State, No. 02-09- 00346-CR, 2011 WL 1331856 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 7, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that error is preserved 3 The State further argues that if we find that Rivas preserved his complaint for review, we must abate the case to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of

2013Thus, Rivas has preserved this complaint for appeal.3 See Black v. State, 358 S.W.3d 823, 829 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d) (holding that a motion to suppress heard by the trial court preserves the issue for appellate review); see also Sargent v. State, No. 02-09- 00346-CR, 2011 WL 1331856 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 7, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that error is preserved 3 The State further argues that if we find that Rivas preserved his complaint for review, we must abate the case to the trial court for findings of fact and conclusions of

2021Whereas under (a)(2), the dismissal or plea bargain is only the beginning of the analysis.” 55 But because “[t]he expunction scheme under subsection (a)(2) [was] not at issue[,] we express[ed] no opinion about it.” 56 We concluded our analysis in T.S.N. by rejecting an argument raised in an amicus brief and adopted by today’s dissenting justices: that arrest records are not severable for expunction purposes and are not amenable to selective redaction and expunction. 57 While acknowledging the “practical difficulties” of partial redaction of arrest records to facilitate expunction as to individ

2021Whereas under (a)(2), the dismissal or plea bargain is only the beginning of the analysis.” 55 But because “[t]he expunction scheme under subsection (a)(2) [was] not at issue[,] we express[ed] no opinion about it.” 56 We concluded our analysis in T.S.N. by rejecting an argument raised in an amicus brief and adopted by today’s dissenting justices: that arrest records are not severable for expunction purposes and are not amenable to selective redaction and expunction. 57 While acknowledging the “practical difficulties” of partial redaction of arrest records to facilitate expunction as to individ

2024See Elite Framing v. BBL Builders, L.P., No. 05-15-01430-CV, 2016 WL 3346041 , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 15, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding no grounds for vacatur under TAA when arbitrator, “in accordance with his rule established at the beginning of the hearing,” excluded exhibits that had not been produced during discovery); Sanders v. Newton, 124 S.W. 482, 483 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1909, writ ref’d) (noting that “[t]he arbitrators adopted as a rule of procedure that neither party to the controversy should be present while any other witness was testifying, [and] the evidence con

2016See Sanders v. Newton, 124 S.W. 482 , 482–83 (Tex. Civ.

2014See Garcia v. State, No. PD-0646-13, 2014 WL 1375457, at *2 (Tex.Crim.App.

2014See Garcia v. State , No. PD-0646-13, 2014 WL 1375457, at *2 (Tex. Crim.

2013See Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 165 ; In re D.C.C., 359 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2011 , pet. denied).

2010App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A) (requiring the trial court to have “ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly” to present a complaint for appellate review); see also In re Z.L.T. , 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003) (recognizing an implicit ruling on a request for a bench warrant where the trial court proceeded to trial without issuing a bench warrant or issuing a ruling on the request); In re A.D.A. , 287 S.W.3d 382, 387 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (acknowledging an implicit ruling on an oral motion for continuance made at the beginning of a hearing by simply proce

2012See In re A.D.A., 287 S.W.3d 382, 387 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (acknowledging an implicit ruling on an oral motion for continuance made at the beginning of a hearing by simply proceeding with the hearing). -6- 04-11-00240-CV pursuant to the March 29, 2010 order, the motion does not limit the time period at issue.

2010App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A) (requiring the trial court to have “ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly” to present a complaint for appellate review); see also In re Z.L.T. , 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003) (recognizing an implicit ruling on a request for a bench warrant where the trial court proceeded to trial without issuing a bench warrant or issuing a ruling on the request); In re A.D.A. , 287 S.W.3d 382, 387 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, no pet.) (acknowledging an implicit ruling on an oral motion for continuance made at the beginning of a hearing by simply proce

2007App. 2005), cert. denied , 546 U.S. 1150 (2006); State v. Sailo , 910 S.W.2d 184 , 188–89 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref’d) (citing Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 242 , 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2334 (1983)). 13: Brother , 166 S.W.3d at 259 n.5; Sailo , 910 S.W.2d at 189 . 14: Pipkin v. State , 114 S.W.3d 649, 654 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); State v. Stolte , 991 S.W.2d 336, 341 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.). 15: Pipkin , 114 S.W.3d at 655 ; Stolte , 991 S.W.2d at 341 . 16: At the beginning of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties agreed that the scope of the hear

2007App. 2005), cert. denied , 546 U.S. 1150 (2006); State v. Sailo , 910 S.W.2d 184 , 188–89 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref’d) (citing Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 242 , 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2334 (1983)). 13: Brother , 166 S.W.3d at 259 n.5; Sailo , 910 S.W.2d at 189 . 14: Pipkin v. State , 114 S.W.3d 649, 654 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); State v. Stolte , 991 S.W.2d 336, 341 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.). 15: Pipkin , 114 S.W.3d at 655 ; Stolte , 991 S.W.2d at 341 . 16: At the beginning of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties agreed that the scope of the hear

2006See Hill v. State , 90 S.W.3d 308, 312-13 (Tex. Crim.

2006See Hill v. State, 90 S.W.3d 308, 312-13 (Tex. Crim.

1996See In re R.W., 884 S.W.2d 502, 502 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); In re T.F., 877 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); In re F.M., 792 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ.); I.G. v. State, 727 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ.); In re Cooper, 623 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ.); and W.J.M.A v. State, 602 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1980, no writ).

1996See In re R.W., 884 S.W.2d 502, 502 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); In re T.F., 877 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); In re F.M., 792 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ.); I.G. v. State, 727 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ.); In re Cooper, 623 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ.); and W.J.M.A. v. State, 602 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1980, no writ).

1996See In re R.W., 884 S.W.2d 502, 502 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); In re T.F., 877 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); In re F.M., 792 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ.); I.G. v. State, 727 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ.); In re Cooper, 623 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ.); and W.J.M.A v. State, 602 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1980, no writ).

1996See In re R.W., 884 S.W.2d 502, 502 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); In re T.F., 877 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); In re F.M., 792 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ.); I.G. v. State, 727 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ.); In re Cooper, 623 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ.); and W.J.M.A. v. State, 602 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1980, no writ).

1996See In re R.W., 884 S.W.2d 502, 502 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); In re T.F., 877 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); In re F.M., 792 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ.); I.G. v. State, 727 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ.); In re Cooper, 623 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ.); and W.J.M.A v. State, 602 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1980, no writ).

1996See In re R.W., 884 S.W.2d 502, 502 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); In re T.F., 877 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); In re F.M., 792 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ.); I.G. v. State, 727 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ.); In re Cooper, 623 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ.); and W.J.M.A. v. State, 602 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1980, no writ).

1996See In re R.W., 884 S.W.2d 502, 502 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); In re T.F., 877 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); In re F.M., 792 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ.); I.G. v. State, 727 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ.); In re Cooper, 623 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ.); and W.J.M.A v. State, 602 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1980, no writ).

1996See In re R.W., 884 S.W.2d 502, 502 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); In re T.F., 877 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); In re F.M., 792 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ.); I.G. v. State, 727 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ.); In re Cooper, 623 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ.); and W.J.M.A. v. State, 602 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1980, no writ).

1996See In re R.W., 884 S.W.2d 502, 502 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); In re T.F., 877 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); In re F.M., 792 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ.); I.G. v. State, 727 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ.); In re Cooper, 623 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ.); and W.J.M.A v. State, 602 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1980, no writ).

1996See In re R.W., 884 S.W.2d 502, 502 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); In re T.F., 877 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); In re F.M., 792 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1990, no writ.); I.G. v. State, 727 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ.); In re Cooper, 623 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ.); and W.J.M.A. v. State, 602 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1980, no writ).

2019Ford v. State , 158 S.W.3d 488 , 492 (Tex. Crim.

2009REASONABLE SUSPICION In his third point of error, Kuhn asserts “the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop [Kuhn’s] vehicle for two weaves onto the shoulder of the roadway.” The State responds, “If 1 … Although we address the merits of Kuhn’s contentions, we do note that Kuhn’s attorney stated the following at the beginning of the hearing on the motion to suppress, “Just for expediency purposes, we’re just contesting the reasonable suspicion to stop.” -2- 04-08-00927-CR weaving were the only factors [sic] considered by the Trooper, Appellant’s contention might have some merit; h

2026See Walser, 648 S.W.3d at 445. 5 that the trial court “could have reached only one conclusion and that a contrary finding is thus arbitrary and unreasonable.” In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 604 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding). “[A]n appellate court may not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s determination of factual or other matters committed to the trial court’s discretion, even if the mandamus court would have decided the issue differently.” Id.

2026See Walser, 648 S.W.3d at 445. 5 that the trial court “could have reached only one conclusion and that a contrary finding is thus arbitrary and unreasonable.” In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 604 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding). “[A]n appellate court may not substitute its judgment for the trial court’s determination of factual or other matters committed to the trial court’s discretion, even if the mandamus court would have decided the issue differently.” Id.

2024See Elite Framing v. BBL Builders, L.P., No. 05-15-01430-CV, 2016 WL 3346041 , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 15, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding no grounds for vacatur under TAA when arbitrator, “in accordance with his rule established at the beginning of the hearing,” excluded exhibits that had not been produced during discovery); Sanders v. Newton, 124 S.W. 482, 483 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1909, writ ref’d) (noting that “[t]he arbitrators adopted as a rule of procedure that neither party to the controversy should be present while any other witness was testifying, [and] the evidence con

2019Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim.

2019See Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 675 (Tex. Crim.

2015Yet, it is distinct from the greatest-degree-of-finality rule, which is a first principle of appellate practice.11 Whether the court addresses the arguments that would provide the greatest relief at the beginning of its analysis or at the end, the court must consider and reject all such arguments before issuing an appellate judgment that provides lesser relief.12 This case presents no exception to the rule.13 9 See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 124 S.W.3d at 201–02 (holding that, although dissenting justice asserted that court should sustain remand issue, court could not do so because it wa

2015Co., 995 S.W.2d 675 , 676–77 (Tex. 1999) (holding that the court of appeals erred, not in using the wrong sequence in its analysis, but in sustaining a remand issue without determining whether a rendition issue had merit); Ortega, 396 S.W.3d at 627 (stating that “[w]hen an appellant asserts multiple grounds for reversal of the trial court’s judgment, this court should first address all issues that would require rendition and then, if necessary, consider issues that would result in remand” and considering and rejecting all rendition issues before sustaining a remand issue); Monsanto Co., 25 S.W

2015Kunstoplast of Am., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 937 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1996); Serrano v. Pellicano Park, L.L.C., 441 S.W.3d 517, 521 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet. dism’d w.o.j.); Custom-Crete, Inc. v. K-Bar Servs., Inc., 82 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2002, no pet.). -2- 04-15-00041-CV Accordingly, the court ruled, “[S]ince [Templeton] ha[s]n’t gotten an attorney as of this date, then I’ll strike [its] answer, which lets . . . you go forward with a default.” Thereafter, the trial court permitted Poenisch to proceed with his motion for a no-answer default judgment.