7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Osterkamp v. Browninggreen2 sentences2012We endeavor to “‘determine and give effect to our supreme court’s intent in promulgating the rule ... keeping in mind that the best reflection of that intent is the plain language of the rule.’ ” Id., quoting Osterkamp v. Browning, 226 Ariz. 485, ¶ 14 , 250 P.3d 551, 555 (App. 2011). ¶ 7 Under the Star’s interpretation, when a request is filed at least two days before the beginning of a hearing, there is no basis for a trial court to consider further whether the request was made “sufficiently in advance of the proceeding ... as not to delay or interfere with it.” Ariz. R. 2012We endeavor to “‘determine and give effect to our supreme court’s intent in promulgating the rule ... keeping in mind that the best reflection of that intent is the plain language of the rule.’ ” Id., quoting Osterkamp v. Browning, 226 Ariz. 485, ¶ 14 , 250 P.3d 551, 555 (App. 2011). ¶ 7 Under the Star’s interpretation, when a request is filed at least two days before the beginning of a hearing, there is no basis for a trial court to consider further whether the request was made “sufficiently in advance of the proceeding ... as not to delay or interfere with it.” Ariz. R. | 2 | 2 |
Capuano v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZONAgreen2 sentences2017Comm’n, 150 Ariz. 224, 226 , 722 P.2d 392, 394 (App. 1986) (citation omitted). 3 XANTERRA/SEDGWICK v. BROWN Decision of the Court and, as we discuss below, the ALJ’s finding was supported by reasonable evidence. ¶7 At the beginning of the hearing before the ALJ, the parties agreed that if Brown had experienced a “qualitatively-different change” in care from the November Award, a change in his supportive care award would be appropriate pursuant to Brown. 2017Comm’n, 150 Ariz. 224, 226 , 722 P.2d 392, 394 (App. 1986) (citation omitted). 3 XANTERRA/SEDGWICK v. BROWN Decision of the Court and, as we discuss below, the ALJ’s finding was supported by reasonable evidence. ¶7 At the beginning of the hearing before the ALJ, the parties agreed that if Brown had experienced a “qualitatively-different change” in care from the November Award, a change in his supportive care award would be appropriate pursuant to Brown. | 1 | 1 |
Smart v. State, Department of Health & Social Servicesgreen1 sentence2012Servs., 237 P.3d 1010, 1015-16 (Alaska 2010) (viewing all communications from the agency “in their totality” to determine whether Medicaid recipient received sufficient notice of an overpayment recoupment action). ¶ 16 It was only at the beginning of the hearing that the Department representative declared the statement regarding food stamps in the first notice to be a “misprint.” By that time, it was too late for Henricks to have a meaningful opportunity to prepare for the hearing. | 1 | 1 |
LaFaro v. Cahillgreen2 sentences2012Cf. LaFaro, 203 Ariz. at 485, ¶ 10 , 56 P.3d at 59 (appellate court reviews injunction against harassment for clear abuse of discretion). ¶ 17 At the beginning of the hearing, the superior court advised the parties the issue before it was whether there was “enough to support the order of protection” which Soldo had obtained based on his assertion of Cardoso’s “complete unrelentless harassment” through text and e-mail messages. 2012Cf. LaFaro, 203 Ariz. at 485, ¶ 10 , 56 P.3d at 59 (appellate court reviews injunction against harassment for clear abuse of discretion). ¶ 17 At the beginning of the hearing, the superior court advised the parties the issue before it was whether there was “enough to support the order of protection” which Soldo had obtained based on his assertion of Cardoso’s “complete unrelentless harassment” through text and e-mail messages. | 1 | 1 |
Gardner v. HKT Realty Corp.green2 sentences2003Perillo ed., rev. ed.1993), quoting Gardner v. HKT Realty Corp., 23 Ark.App. 148 , 744 S.W.2d 735, 738 (1988). ¶ 27 Thus, under the so-called “Corbin rule,” in certain cases, a court may intervene and equitably excuse an optionee’s untimely notice of intent to exercise an option when (1) the delay in giving notice is shoi’t or slight, (2) the delay does not prejudice the optionor by a change of position, and (3) because of the lessee’s valuable impi’ovements to the propei’ty, l’efusal to peivmit exex’cise of the option would result in such hardship as to make strict, literal enforcement of the 2003Perillo ed., rev. ed.1993), quoting Gardner v. HKT Realty Corp., 23 Ark.App. 148 , 744 S.W.2d 735, 738 (1988). ¶ 27 Thus, under the so-called “Corbin rule,” in certain cases, a court may intervene and equitably excuse an optionee’s untimely notice of intent to exercise an option when (1) the delay in giving notice is shoi’t or slight, (2) the delay does not prejudice the optionor by a change of position, and (3) because of the lessee’s valuable impi’ovements to the propei’ty, l’efusal to peivmit exex’cise of the option would result in such hardship as to make strict, literal enforcement of the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Petty
green
2 sentences2012We endeavor to “„determine and give effect to our supreme court‟s intent in promulgating the rule . . . keeping in mind that the best reflection of that intent is the plain language of the rule.‟” Id., quoting Osterkamp v. Browning, 226 Ariz. 485, ¶ 14 , 250 P.3d 551, 555 (App. 2011). ¶7 Under the Star‟s interpretation, when a request is filed at least two days before the beginning of a hearing, there is no basis for a trial court to consider further whether the request was made “sufficiently in advance of the proceeding . . . as not to delay or interfere with it.” Ariz. R. 2012We endeavor to “‘determine and give effect to our supreme court’s intent in promulgating the rule ... keeping in mind that the best reflection of that intent is the plain language of the rule.’ ” Id., quoting Osterkamp v. Browning, 226 Ariz. 485, ¶ 14 , 250 P.3d 551, 555 (App. 2011). ¶ 7 Under the Star’s interpretation, when a request is filed at least two days before the beginning of a hearing, there is no basis for a trial court to consider further whether the request was made “sufficiently in advance of the proceeding ... as not to delay or interfere with it.” Ariz. R. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Collins v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1971The case at bar is distinguishable from Collins v. Industrial Commission, 102 Ariz. 509 , 433 P.2d 801 (1967), in that the Collins case dealt with a situation where “the injured party has made no attempt to give the Commission jurisdiction within the period of limitations. * * * ” Here, there were “attempts” (successful under our holding) to confer jurisdiction on the commission, including a request for a hearing, a request to be notified if anything else was necessary to perfect claimant’s rights, and even the beginning of a hearing. 1971The case at bar is distinguishable from Collins v. Industrial Commission, 102 Ariz. 509 , 433 P.2d 801 (1967), in that the Collins case dealt with a situation where “the injured party has made no attempt to give the Commission jurisdiction within the period of limitations. * * * ” Here, there were “attempts” (successful under our holding) to confer jurisdiction on the commission, including a request for a hearing, a request to be notified if anything else was necessary to perfect claimant’s rights, and even the beginning of a hearing. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.