beginning analysis in North Carolina

2022The County, on the one hand, contends that the relevant payments are nothing more than the sort of “user fees” that we discussed in Homebuilders Association of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37 (1994), and that the United States Supreme Court discussed in decisions such as United States v. Sperry Corporation, 493 U.S. 52, 53 (1989).

2022The County, on the one hand, contends that the relevant payments are nothing more than the sort of “user fees” that we discussed in Homebuilders Association of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37 (1994), and that the United States Supreme Court discussed in decisions such as United States v. Sperry Corporation, 493 U.S. 52, 53 (1989).

2021At the beginning of its analysis, the Court of Appeals noted that “each new arrangement must be examined anew and in its own context” and that the “nature of the relationship between a corporate entity and the government is the dispositive factor in determining whether the corporate entity is governed by the Public Records Law.” Id. at 707–08 (quoting News & SELC V.

2021At the beginning of its analysis, the Court of Appeals noted that “each new arrangement must be examined anew and in its own context” and that the “nature of the relationship between a corporate entity and the government is the dispositive factor in determining whether the corporate entity is governed by the Public Records Law.” Id. at 707–08 (quoting News & SELC V.

2020(FACT Framework Doc.) Thus, as in Boyce, “the writing itself shows its incompleteness by emphasizing its preliminary character.” 285 N.C. at 734 , 208 S.E.2d at 695 .

2020(FACT Framework Doc.) Thus, as in Boyce, “the writing itself shows its incompleteness by emphasizing its preliminary character.” 285 N.C. at 734 , 208 S.E.2d at 695 .

2010Ed. 2d at 578 . 9 ' At the beginning of its analysis, the United States Supreme Court pointed out that “ [a]n attorney undoubtedly has a duty to consult with the client regarding ‘important decisions,’ including questions of overarching defense strategy;” Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187 , 160 L.

2010Ed. 2d at 578 . 9 ' At the beginning of its analysis, the United States Supreme Court pointed out that “ [a]n attorney undoubtedly has a duty to consult with the client regarding ‘important decisions,’ including questions of overarching defense strategy;” Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187 , 160 L.

2010Ed. 2d at 578 (quoting Strickland,, 466 U.S. at 688 , 80 L.

2009Respondent-father's argument ignores the fact that at the beginning of the hearing, the trial court agreed to consider the findings in the prior orders, which included the permanency planning order and the psychological evaluation, at the appropriate time, under the guidelines set out in In re J.W., 173 N.C.

2009App. 450 , 619 S.E.2d 534 (2005), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 361 , 625 S.E.2d 780 (2006).

2009Those who wished to speak at the hearing were sworn in at the beginning of the hearing “in [the] interest of time and getting more information at one time.” However, in Massey , we explained that a quasi-judicial hearing “involves all due process requirementsf.]” Massey, 145 N.C.

2009App. 450 , 619 S.E.2d 534 (2005), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 361 , 625 S.E.2d 780 (2006).

2009App. 450 , 619 S.E.2d 534 (2005), aff'd per curiam, 360 N.C. 361 , 625 S.E.2d 780 (2006).

1974However, “[a]t the beginning of the hearing, the Mayor read certain recommended amendments to the annexation reports.” Id. at 80, 169 S.E. 2d at 497 .

1972The disclosure statute, Chapter 1064, Session Laws of 1967, now G.S. § 15-155.4, was enacted after this Court’s decision in State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181 , 184 S.E. 2d 334 .

1972The disclosure statute, Chapter 1064, Session Laws of 1967, now G.S. § 15-155.4, was enacted after this Court’s decision in State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181 , 184 S.E. 2d 334 .

1928There is but a single disposing word, ‘bequeath,’ in the beginning of the clause, which extends to each thing given; and there is but one expression directing the quantity of estate, ‘during her lifetime,’ which is in the end of it, and necessarily controls the interest in each subject of the gift.” Concerning this interpretation Nash J., afterwards remarked in Williams v. McComb, 38 N. C., 450 , “No other construction could be placed on the words, with any regard to the ordinary rules of construction.” These cases bear directly upon the point in question, and the application of the principle