10 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1974–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clark v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025Id. at 909-10 ; see also id. at 908 (explaining that the purposes of the attorney-client privilege “do not include concealing abuses of the attorney-client relationship to further the commission of a crime or fraud”); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (explaining that “[t]here is a privilege 5 See also Wigmore, supra § 2298 (“It has been agreed from the beginning that the privilege cannot avail to protect the client in concerting with the attorney a crime or other evil enterprise. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Public Defender Servicegreen2 sentences2025Id. at 909-10 ; see also id. at 908 (explaining that the purposes of the attorney-client privilege “do not include concealing abuses of the attorney-client relationship to further the commission of a crime or fraud”); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (explaining that “[t]here is a privilege 5 See also Wigmore, supra § 2298 (“It has been agreed from the beginning that the privilege cannot avail to protect the client in concerting with the attorney a crime or other evil enterprise. 2025Id. at 909-10 ; see also id. at 908 (explaining that the purposes of the attorney-client privilege “do not include concealing abuses of the attorney-client relationship to further the commission of a crime or fraud”); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (explaining that “[t]here is a privilege 5 See also Wigmore, supra § 2298 (“It has been agreed from the beginning that the privilege cannot avail to protect the client in concerting with the attorney a crime or other evil enterprise. | 1 | 1 |
McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co.green1 sentence1999At the beginning of its analysis, the probate court states the proper 12(b)(6) standard, indicating that a complaint must be dismissed “if it fails to set forth facts which, if credited, would entitle the plaintiff to the relief demanded.” See Fraser, supra, 636 A.2d at 432 (explaining that a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted “only if ‘it appears beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief ”) (quoting McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co., 404 A.2d 200, 202 (D.C.1979)) (alteration in original). | 1 | 1 |
Fraser v. Gottfriedgreen2 sentences1999At the beginning of its analysis, the probate court states the proper 12(b)(6) standard, indicating that a complaint must be dismissed “if it fails to set forth facts which, if credited, would entitle the plaintiff to the relief demanded.” See Fraser, supra, 636 A.2d at 432 (explaining that a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted “only if ‘it appears beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief ”) (quoting McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co., 404 A.2d 200, 202 (D.C.1979)) (alteration in original). 1999At the beginning of its analysis, the probate court states the proper 12(b)(6) standard, indicating that a complaint must be dismissed “if it fails to set forth facts which, if credited, would entitle the plaintiff to the relief demanded.” See Fraser, supra, 636 A.2d at 432 (explaining that a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be granted “only if ‘it appears beyond a doubt that [the plaintiff] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief ”) (quoting McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co., 404 A.2d 200, 202 (D.C.1979)) (alteration in original). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Akindulurenigreen1 sentence1987Harris v. Akindulureni, 342 A.2d 684, 686 (D.C.1975) (motion for continuance committed to sound discretion of trial court). | 1 | 1 |
Snyder v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences1974NOTES [1] D.C.Code 1973, § 22-3204. [2] Super.Ct.Crim.R. 43 provides in pertinent part: The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impanelling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence. . . . [3] Even the motion to suppress asserted that the woman "stated [to the officer] that defendant was carrying a gun." The hearing judge observed this fact at the beginning of the hearing when he also stated: "The facts set out in your pleading demonstrate it's without merit." [4] See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 1974NOTES [1] D.C.Code 1973, § 22-3204. [2] Super.Ct.Crim.R. 43 provides in pertinent part: The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impanelling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence. . . . [3] Even the motion to suppress asserted that the woman "stated [to the officer] that defendant was carrying a gun." The hearing judge observed this fact at the beginning of the hearing when he also stated: "The facts set out in your pleading demonstrate it's without merit." [4] See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Addington v. Texas
green
2 sentences1991As the Supreme Court stated in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1811 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), [t]here may be factual issues to resolve in a commitment proceeding, but the factual aspects represent only the beginning of the inquiry. 1991As the Supreme Court stated in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1811 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), [t]here may be factual issues to resolve in a commitment proceeding, but the factual aspects represent only the beginning of the inquiry. | 3 | 1981–1991 |
Roe v. Flores-Ortega
green
2 sentences2007Ultimately, "[t]he relevant question is not whether counsel's choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 , 120 S.Ct. 1029 , 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (citation omitted). 2007Ultimately, "[t]he relevant question is not whether counsel's choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 , 120 S.Ct. 1029 , 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Wingate v. United States
green
2 sentences1996At the beginning of the inquiry, defense counsel, asked by the trial court to explain the conflict between counsel and client, explained: "I guess it’s a strategic basic question whether or not it's in the client’s best interest to plead guilty." Id. at 1281 . 1996At the beginning of the inquiry, defense counsel, asked by the trial court to explain the conflict between counsel and client, explained: "I guess it's a strategic basic question whether or not it's in the client's best interest to plead guilty." Id. at 1281 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
MATTER OF DeLOATCH
green
1 sentence1993Mr. Barlow’s counsel immediately made a motion to dismiss, alleging that the hearing had not been timely provided, citing In re DeLoatch, 532 A.2d 1343 (D.C.1987). 2 Judge Dorsey denied the motion, noting that the calling of the case constituted the beginning of the hearing. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Neild v. District of Columbia
green
2 sentences1974NOTES [1] D.C.Code 1973, § 22-3204. [2] Super.Ct.Crim.R. 43 provides in pertinent part: The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impanelling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence. . . . [3] Even the motion to suppress asserted that the woman "stated [to the officer] that defendant was carrying a gun." The hearing judge observed this fact at the beginning of the hearing when he also stated: "The facts set out in your pleading demonstrate it's without merit." [4] See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 1974NOTES [1] D.C.Code 1973, § 22-3204. [2] Super.Ct.Crim.R. 43 provides in pertinent part: The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impanelling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence. . . . [3] Even the motion to suppress asserted that the woman "stated [to the officer] that defendant was carrying a gun." The hearing judge observed this fact at the beginning of the hearing when he also stated: "The facts set out in your pleading demonstrate it's without merit." [4] See also Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.