58 California opinions name it 3 courts 1928–2026 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Easterby v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2015(See Easterby v. Clark, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 778 [court’s ruling excluding evidence for noncompliance with discovery rules reviewed for abuse of discretion]; Boston v. Penny Lane Centers, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 950 [same]; see generally Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 972 [trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling exceeds the bounds of reason].)7 3. 2015(See Easterby v. Clark, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 778 [court’s ruling excluding evidence for noncompliance with discovery rules reviewed for abuse of discretion]; Boston v. Penny Lane Centers, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 950 [same]; see generally Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 972 [trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling exceeds the bounds of reason].)7 3. | 2 | 2 |
Piscitelli v. Friedenberggreen2 sentences2015(See Easterby v. Clark, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 778 [court’s ruling excluding evidence for noncompliance with discovery rules reviewed for abuse of discretion]; Boston v. Penny Lane Centers, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 950 [same]; see generally Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 972 [trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling exceeds the bounds of reason].)7 3. 2015(See Easterby v. Clark, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 778 [court’s ruling excluding evidence for noncompliance with discovery rules reviewed for abuse of discretion]; Boston v. Penny Lane Centers, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 950 [same]; see generally Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 972 [trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling exceeds the bounds of reason].)7 3. | 2 | 2 |
Boston v. Penny Lane Centers, Inc.green2 sentences2015(See Easterby v. Clark, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 778 [court’s ruling excluding evidence for noncompliance with discovery rules reviewed for abuse of discretion]; Boston v. Penny Lane Centers, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 950 [same]; see generally Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 972 [trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling exceeds the bounds of reason].)7 3. 2015(See Easterby v. Clark, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 778 [court’s ruling excluding evidence for noncompliance with discovery rules reviewed for abuse of discretion]; Boston v. Penny Lane Centers, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 950 [same]; see generally Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 972 [trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling exceeds the bounds of reason].)7 3. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Fordgreen2 sentences1968At the beginning of an inquiry, both the police and a suspect have valid interests which are served by the maintenance of free communication with each other. ( People v. Ford, 234 Cal. App.2d 480, 488, 490-492 [ 44 Cal. Rptr. 556 ].) At the outset of the interrogation in the present case, for example, as conceivable as the result which in fact followed was the possibility that Merchant would convince the police that further investigation was unnecessary because their suspicions had been triggered by a discarded girl friend trying to make trouble for him, by his empty boasts of criminal prowess 1968At the beginning of an inquiry, both the police and a suspect have valid interests which are served by the maintenance of free communication with each other. ( People v. Ford, 234 Cal. App.2d 480, 488, 490-492 [ 44 Cal. Rptr. 556 ].) At the outset of the interrogation in the present case, for example, as conceivable as the result which in fact followed was the possibility that Merchant would convince the police that further investigation was unnecessary because their suspicions had been triggered by a discarded girl friend trying to make trouble for him, by his empty boasts of criminal prowess | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Insook Kim, AKA in Sook Kimgreen2 sentences2018However, even where a suspect voluntarily goes to a police station for an interview, if "once there, the circumstances become such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, the interrogation can become custodial." (United States v. Kim (9th Cir. 2002) 292 F.3d 969, 975 (Kim).) Thus, Saldana's voluntary contact with the police is only the beginning of the inquiry. 2. 2018However, even where a suspect voluntarily goes to a *456 police station for an interview, if "once there, the circumstances become such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, the interrogation can become custodial." ( United States v. Kim (9th Cir. 2002) 292 F.3d 969 , 975 ( Kim ).) Thus, Saldana's voluntary contact with the police is only the beginning of the inquiry. 2. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Garciagreen1 sentence2024(See People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356 [“complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”]; People v. Garcia (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1218 (Garcia) [“‘Claims of error relating to sentences “which, though otherwise permitted by law, were imposed in a procedurally or factually flawed manner” are waived on appeal if not first raised in the trial court’”].) Defendant could have objected to the trial court not giving a statement of reasons for its intended denial | 1 | 1 |
People v. Scottgreen1 sentence2024(See People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356 [“complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”]; People v. Garcia (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1218 (Garcia) [“‘Claims of error relating to sentences “which, though otherwise permitted by law, were imposed in a procedurally or factually flawed manner” are waived on appeal if not first raised in the trial court’”].) Defendant could have objected to the trial court not giving a statement of reasons for its intended denial | 1 | 1 |
People v. Butchergreen1 sentence2023Garcia criticizes the trial court for not making the “factual determination whether [S.E.] was moved from outside the garage to inside the garage or was instead simply prevented from leaving the garage.” We disagree with Garcia “the trial court made a legal determination, based on the prosecutor’s argument, that it was irrelevant whether [S.E.] was moved from outside to inside because movement within the garage coupled with the door shutting was enough to establish kidnapping.” (See People v. Butcher (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 929, 936 [appellate court may consider trial court’s statement when they | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Sturgellgreen1 sentence2021“A federal judgment ‘has the same effect in the courts of this state as it would have in a federal court.’ [Citation.]” (Younger v. Jensen (1980) 26 Cal.3d 397, 411 ; see also Rest.2d of Judgments § 87 [“Federal law determines the effects under the rules of res judicata of a judgment of a federal court.”].) “For judgments in diversity cases, federal law incorporates the rules of preclusion applied by the State in which the rendering court sits. [Citation.]” (Taylor v. Sturgell 17 (2008) 553 U.S. 880, 891, fn. 4 ; see also Semtek Intern. | 1 | 1 |
Las Canoas Co. v. Kramergreen1 sentence2021The trial court said: “[T]he court is going to make a disclosure . . . that prior to being appointed to the bench I did work for County Counsel’s office, and in that line of work I did have occasion to provide counsel to the healthcare system, but I have . . . nothing that disqualifies me from hearing this matter.” This court considered a similar situation in Las Canoas Co., Inc. v. Kramer (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 96, 101 (Las Canoas). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Merrimangreen1 sentence2021Although a trial court is authorized to consolidate where appropriate under section 954, “it is not required to do so.” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 37 (Merriman).) “In exercising its discretion in this regard, the court must weigh ‘the potential prejudice of joinder against the state’s strong interest in the efficiency of a joint trial.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, the trial court did so, concluding there was no prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Ebony W.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hyatt v. Eckel Valve Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Carrier v. Robbinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gatton v. T-MOBILE USA, INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| ARLENA M. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Industrial Accident Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rodriguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bradley v. Lacygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Addington v. Texasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Armstrong v. Manzogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilder v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Giddens v. State Bargreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ramirezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Civil Service Assn. v. City & County of San Franciscogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mathews v. Eldridgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Meltongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morrissey v. Brewergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barry v. Barchigreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Richard W.green | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Alvagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Eppsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fare v. John G.green | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Reynaldo R.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Marsden
green
2 sentences2024At the beginning of the hearing, stand-in counsel noted that Robles made a request under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute new counsel to represent him for purposes of his resentencing petition. 2024At the beginning of a hearing held on September 7, 2022, defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant “would like to Marsden2 me.” The court ordered a closed hearing, excluding everyone except defense counsel, defendant, and court staff. 2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 . 3. | 3 | 1982–2024 |
In Re Heather P.
green
2 sentences1990Rather, the court in Damian merely concluded that because the drafters used the term "shall," they must have intended the rule to have mandatory rather than directory effect. ( In re Damian V., supra, 197 Cal. App.3d at p. 938 .) In reaching its conclusion that proceedings before an attorney are void in the absence of a written stipulation, the court in Heather simply relied on its earlier holding in Damian. ( In re Heather P., supra, 203 Cal. App.3d at p. 1225 .) As the court in People v. McGee, supra, 19 Cal.3d 948 , made plain, use of "shall" in rule 244 should be the beginning of our analy 1990(In re Heather P., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1225 .) As the court in People v. McGee, supra, 19 Cal.3d 948 , made plain, use of “shall” in rule 244 should be the beginning of our analysis rather than the end. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
People v. McGee
green
2 sentences1990Rather, the court in Damian merely concluded that because the drafters used the term "shall," they must have intended the rule to have mandatory rather than directory effect. ( In re Damian V., supra, 197 Cal. App.3d at p. 938 .) In reaching its conclusion that proceedings before an attorney are void in the absence of a written stipulation, the court in Heather simply relied on its earlier holding in Damian. ( In re Heather P., supra, 203 Cal. App.3d at p. 1225 .) As the court in People v. McGee, supra, 19 Cal.3d 948 , made plain, use of "shall" in rule 244 should be the beginning of our analy 1990(In re Heather P., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1225 .) As the court in People v. McGee, supra, 19 Cal.3d 948 , made plain, use of “shall” in rule 244 should be the beginning of our analysis rather than the end. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
People v. French
green
1 sentence2026(People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36 , 46–48.) 7 interpretation of a statute . . . [citation], they should do so rarely, and only in ‘extreme cases’—those in which, as a matter of law, the Legislature did not intend the statute to have its literal effect . . . .” (Gorham Co., Inc. v. First Financial Ins. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Verio Healthcare, Inc. v. Superior Court of Orange County
green
1 sentence2024(Verio Healthcare, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1327 .) Third, Husband submits no authority to support his claim that the court erred in its treatment of the audiovisual evidence. (d) Husband contends the trial court denied him due process by proceeding with the hearing despite the failure to serve him with the DVRO request. 6 At the beginning of the hearing, Husband told the court: “I wanted to advise the Court that I was never served with the Respondent’s DV 100 or with the temporary restraining order. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Superior Court (Zamudio)
green
1 sentence2023(People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183 , 194 . . . .) . . . [¶] ‘Substantial compliance’ means actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute, as distinguished from mere technical imperfections of form. [Citations.] The essential inquiry is whether under the circumstances the policies underlying the statute were served. [Citation.] ‘“Where there is compliance as to all matters of substance[,] technical deviations are not to be given the stature of noncompliance.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Carroll (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 140 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Lewis
green
2 sentences2023(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708 , fn. omitted; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959 .) The initial version of former section 1170.95 permitted “a person with an existing conviction for felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the sentencing court to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she 3 In the July 5, 2022, reporter’s transcript, the court stated at the beginning of the hearing that appellant was not present but represented by counsel. 2023(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708 , fn. omitted; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959 .) The initial version of former section 1170.95 permitted “a person with an existing conviction for felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the sentencing court to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she 3 In the July 5, 2022, reporter’s transcript, the court stated at the beginning of the hearing that appellant was not present but represented by counsel. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Strong
green
1 sentence2023(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708 , fn. omitted; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959 .) The initial version of former section 1170.95 permitted “a person with an existing conviction for felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the sentencing court to have the murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she 3 In the July 5, 2022, reporter’s transcript, the court stated at the beginning of the hearing that appellant was not present but represented by counsel. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Perkins
green
2 sentences2023After citing to Perkins, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th 454 , which concerned the second element, “the issue that’s really being focused upon here,” the court provided its reasoning. 2023After citing to Perkins, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th 454 , which concerned the second element, “the issue that’s really being focused upon here,” the court provided its reasoning. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Carroll
green
1 sentence2023(People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183 , 194 . . . .) . . . [¶] ‘Substantial compliance’ means actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute, as distinguished from mere technical imperfections of form. [Citations.] The essential inquiry is whether under the circumstances the policies underlying the statute were served. [Citation.] ‘“Where there is compliance as to all matters of substance[,] technical deviations are not to be given the stature of noncompliance.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Carroll (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 140 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Marshall
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1 , 20–23.) Analysis At the beginning of a hearing on July 30, 2021, the court told defendant it had seen his request for a Marsden hearing, “but because right now you are – criminal proceedings 6. have been suspended and you’ve been found incompetent, you can’t act as your own attorney.” The court made a similar statement later in the hearing, “I mean, if he’s incompetent they can’t really represent themselves, first of all, and they can’t have a Marsden.” These statements by the court do suggest a conflation of the issues of substituting counsel under Ma | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Zelig v. County of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2022Furthermore, plaintiff’s alleged motion to disqualify the judge based on a “permanent or temporary physical impairment” under section 170.1, subdivision (a)(7) lacks merit because the tentative ruling does not provide any evidence the judge was suffering from such an impairment as plaintiff argues in his appellate brief. 6 demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.” [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Younger v. Jensen
green
1 sentence2021“A federal judgment ‘has the same effect in the courts of this state as it would have in a federal court.’ [Citation.]” (Younger v. Jensen (1980) 26 Cal.3d 397, 411 ; see also Rest.2d of Judgments § 87 [“Federal law determines the effects under the rules of res judicata of a judgment of a federal court.”].) “For judgments in diversity cases, federal law incorporates the rules of preclusion applied by the State in which the rendering court sits. [Citation.]” (Taylor v. Sturgell 17 (2008) 553 U.S. 880, 891, fn. 4 ; see also Semtek Intern. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Covarrubias
green
1 sentence2021We presume jurors are intelligent persons, capable of understanding and correlating all the instructions they are given. 28 (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 95 ; People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 915 .) We are not persuaded by Pena’s argument that, based on the instructional errors, the jury could have found him guilty even if it concluded he did not intend to commit any crime when he entered the duplex. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Landry
green
1 sentence2021We presume jurors are intelligent persons, capable of understanding and correlating all the instructions they are given. 28 (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 95 ; People v. Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 915 .) We are not persuaded by Pena’s argument that, based on the instructional errors, the jury could have found him guilty even if it concluded he did not intend to commit any crime when he entered the duplex. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Estate of Bennett green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ray v. Silverado Constructors
green
1 sentence2020(Ray, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134 ; Thirion, supra, 193 Cal.App.2d at pp. 304-305; Breslin, supra, 152 Cal.App.2d at p. 786 .) No additional or different insurance would appear necessary by the imposition of the duty we have described here. 6 4. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Breslin v. Fredrickson
green
2 sentences2020(Ray, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134 ; Thirion, supra, 193 Cal.App.2d at pp. 304-305; Breslin, supra, 152 Cal.App.2d at p. 786 .) No additional or different insurance would appear necessary by the imposition of the duty we have described here. 6 4. 2020(Ray, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134 ; Thirion, supra, 193 Cal.App.2d at pp. 304-305; Breslin, supra, 152 Cal.App.2d at p. 786 .) No additional or different insurance would appear necessary by the imposition of the duty we have described here. 6 4. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Thirion v. Fredrickson & Watson Construction Co.
green
1 sentence2020(Ray, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134 ; Thirion, supra, 193 Cal.App.2d at pp. 304-305; Breslin, supra, 152 Cal.App.2d at p. 786 .) No additional or different insurance would appear necessary by the imposition of the duty we have described here. 6 4. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In Re Jesusa
green
1 sentence2020(In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588 , 621–624.) Thus, an incarcerated parent may waive his or her appearance, but the juvenile court may only adjudicate the petition if that parent has representation at the hearing. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Walker green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC red | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Jespersen v. Zubiate-Beauchamp green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| The People v. Super. Ct. green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Ayala green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Parada v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Ritchie v. Konrad green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Wallace green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| In Re Marriage of Fuller green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Margaret W. v. Kelley R. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Murphy v. Check 'N Go of California, Inc. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Romero v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People v. Goss green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Rummel v. Estelle green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.