recognized the general rule in Arkansas

1930In Sellers v. State, 91 Ark. 175 , the court recognized the general rule laid down by authorities on *Page 1018 criminal evidence that photographs are admissible in evidence when they are shown to have been accurately taken and to be correct representations of the subject in controversy, and are of such a nature as to throw light upon it.

1930In Sellers v. State, 91 Ark. 175 , the court recognized the general rule laid down by authorities on criminal evidence that photographs are admissible in evidence when they are shown to have been accurately taken and to be correct representations of the subject'in controversy, and are of such a nature as to throw light upon it.

1927Rep. 183 , 36 N. E. 909 , the court recognized the general rule, but said: ‘ There seems to be a well recognized distinction between this rule as applied to original surveys, whether in the making of such surveys or in allotting the deficiency or overplus, when the correctness of such surveys is not questioned, and that where such original surveys are found to have been erroneous or the original corners and lines are wholly lost. ’ “The following authorities which we have examined are cited as recognizing the distinction: Bailey v. Chamblin, 20 Ind. 33 ; Jones v. Kimble, 19 Wis. 452 (429); Mor

1927Rep. 183 , 36 N. E. 909 , the court recognized the general rule, but said: ‘ There seems to be a well recognized distinction between this rule as applied to original surveys, whether in the making of such surveys or in allotting the deficiency or overplus, when the correctness of such surveys is not questioned, and that where such original surveys are found to have been erroneous or the original corners and lines are wholly lost. ’ “The following authorities which we have examined are cited as recognizing the distinction: Bailey v. Chamblin, 20 Ind. 33 ; Jones v. Kimble, 19 Wis. 452 (429); Mor

1927Rep. 183 , 36 N. E. 909 , the court recognized the general rule, but said: ‘ There seems to be a well recognized distinction between this rule as applied to original surveys, whether in the making of such surveys or in allotting the deficiency or overplus, when the correctness of such surveys is not questioned, and that where such original surveys are found to have been erroneous or the original corners and lines are wholly lost. ’ “The following authorities which we have examined are cited as recognizing the distinction: Bailey v. Chamblin, 20 Ind. 33 ; Jones v. Kimble, 19 Wis. 452 (429); Mor

1911St. 183, 36 N. E. 909 , the court recognized the general rule, but said: “There seems to be a well-recognized distinction between this rule as applied to original surveys, whether in the making of such surveys or in alloting the deficiency or overplus, when the correctness of such surveys is not questioned, and that where such original surveys are found to have been erroneous or the original corners and lines are wholly lost.” The following authorities which we have examined are cited as recognizing the distinction: Bailey v. Chamblin, 20 Ind. 33 ; Jones v. Kimble, 19 Wis. 452 ; Moreland v. Pa

1927Rep. 183 , 36 N. E. 909 , the court recognized the general rule, but said: ‘ There seems to be a well recognized distinction between this rule as applied to original surveys, whether in the making of such surveys or in allotting the deficiency or overplus, when the correctness of such surveys is not questioned, and that where such original surveys are found to have been erroneous or the original corners and lines are wholly lost. ’ “The following authorities which we have examined are cited as recognizing the distinction: Bailey v. Chamblin, 20 Ind. 33 ; Jones v. Kimble, 19 Wis. 452 (429); Mor

1911St. 183, 36 N. E. 909 , the court recognized the general rule, but said: “There seems to be a well-recognized distinction between this rule as applied to original surveys, whether in the making of such surveys or in alloting the deficiency or overplus, when the correctness of such surveys is not questioned, and that where such original surveys are found to have been erroneous or the original corners and lines are wholly lost.” The following authorities which we have examined are cited as recognizing the distinction: Bailey v. Chamblin, 20 Ind. 33 ; Jones v. Kimble, 19 Wis. 452 ; Moreland v. Pa

1985In Young v. Barde, 194 Ark. 416 , 108 S.W.2d 495 (1937), the court recognized the general rule that where special trust and confidence exists between the parties to a deed, the gift to the party holding the dominent position is prima facie void.

1985In Young v. Barde, 194 Ark. 416 , 108 S.W.2d 495 (1937), the court recognized the general rule that where special trust and confidence exists between the parties to a deed, the gift to the party holding the dominent position is prima facie void.

1969In its opinion the court recognized the general rule stated in American Insurance Union v. Wilson, 172 Ark. 841 , 291 S. W. 417 , where there is' a bona fide dispute as to'the amount due under an insurance contract, that the payment of a smaller sunrin satisfaction of the entire claim-is a sufficient consideration for the rfelease-of'the balance -of the amount claimed..

1969In its opinion the court recognized the general rule stated in American Insurance Union v. Wilson, 172 Ark. 841 , 291 S. W. 417 , where there is' a bona fide dispute as to'the amount due under an insurance contract, that the payment of a smaller sunrin satisfaction of the entire claim-is a sufficient consideration for the rfelease-of'the balance -of the amount claimed..

1954In Kahn v. Cherry, supra [ 131 Ark. 49 , 198 S.W. 268 ], this court recognized the general rule relating to implied easements in approving the following statement of the Indiana Court in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Patterson, 103 Ind. 582, 586 , 2 N.E. 188 : "`Where, during the unity of title, an apparently permanent and obvious servitude is imposed on one part of an estate in favor of another, which at the time of the severance is in use, and is reasonably necessary for the fair enjoyment of the other, then, upon a severance of such ownership, whether by voluntary alienation or

1954In such case, the law implies that with the grant of the one an easement is also granted or reserved, as the case may be, in the other, subjecting it to the burden of all such visible uses and incidents as are reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant heritage, in substantially the same condition in which it appeared and was used when the grant was made.'" This same principle was approved in the Brizzolara case [ 89 Ark. 309 , 116 S.W. 671 ], where the court also approved the holding in Crosland v. Rogers, 32 S.C. 130 , 10 S.E. 874 , to the effect, "* * * that in order to establish

1954In such case, the law implies that with the grant of the one an easement is also granted or reserved, as the case may be, in the other, subjecting it to the burden of all such visible uses and incidents as are reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant heritage, in substantially the same condition in which it appeared and was used when the grant was made.'" This same principle was approved in the Brizzolara case [ 89 Ark. 309 , 116 S.W. 671 ], where the court also approved the holding in Crosland v. Rogers, 32 S.C. 130 , 10 S.E. 874 , to the effect, "* * * that in order to establish

1954In such case, the law implies that with the grant of the one an easement is also granted or reserved, as the case may be, in the other, subjecting it to the burden of all such visible uses and incidents as are reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant heritage, in substantially the same condition in which it appeared and was used when the grant was made.'" This same principle was approved in the Brizzolara case [ 89 Ark. 309 , 116 S.W. 671 ], where the court also approved the holding in Crosland v. Rogers, 32 S.C. 130 , 10 S.E. 874 , to the effect, "* * * that in order to establish

1954In Kahn v. Cherry, supra [ 131 Ark. 49 , 198 S.W. 268 ], this court recognized the general rule relating to implied easements in approving the following statement of the Indiana Court in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Patterson, 103 Ind. 582, 586 , 2 N.E. 188 : "`Where, during the unity of title, an apparently permanent and obvious servitude is imposed on one part of an estate in favor of another, which at the time of the severance is in use, and is reasonably necessary for the fair enjoyment of the other, then, upon a severance of such ownership, whether by voluntary alienation or

1954In Kahn v. Cherry, supra [ 131 Ark. 49 , 198 S.W. 268 ], this court recognized the general rule relating to implied easements in approving the following statement of the Indiana Court in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Patterson, 103 Ind. 582, 586 , 2 N.E. 188 : "`Where, during the unity of title, an apparently permanent and obvious servitude is imposed on one part of an estate in favor of another, which at the time of the severance is in use, and is reasonably necessary for the fair enjoyment of the other, then, upon a severance of such ownership, whether by voluntary alienation or

1937This decision was handed' down in 1929, and the rule as to voluntary entrance of appearance in Anheuser-Busch v. Manion, 193 Ark. 405 , 100 S. W. 2d 672 , was not promulgated until January, 1937.

1937This decision was handed' down in 1929, and the rule as to voluntary entrance of appearance in Anheuser-Busch v. Manion, 193 Ark. 405 , 100 S. W. 2d 672 , was not promulgated until January, 1937.

1931In Stotts v. State, 170 Ark. 188 , 279 S. W. 364 , it was said (quoting syllabus) : “All evidence is admissible which tends to prove the issue, and no facts are forbidden to he shown, except such as are incapable of affording any reasonable presumption or inference in elucidation of the matters involved in the issue. ’ ’ In Stone v. State, 162 Ark. 154 , 258 S. W. 116 , the court recognized the general rule that evidence of a distinct offense is inadmissible to prove another offense, and the exceptions thereto are stated that such testimony was admissible when necessary to fix the intent of th

1931In Stotts v. State, 170 Ark. 188 , 279 S. W. 364 , it was said (quoting syllabus) : “All evidence is admissible which tends to prove the issue, and no facts are forbidden to he shown, except such as are incapable of affording any reasonable presumption or inference in elucidation of the matters involved in the issue. ’ ’ In Stone v. State, 162 Ark. 154 , 258 S. W. 116 , the court recognized the general rule that evidence of a distinct offense is inadmissible to prove another offense, and the exceptions thereto are stated that such testimony was admissible when necessary to fix the intent of th

1931In Stotts v. State, 170 Ark. 188 , 279 S. W. 364 , it was said (quoting syllabus) : “All evidence is admissible which tends to prove the issue, and no facts are forbidden to he shown, except such as are incapable of affording any reasonable presumption or inference in elucidation of the matters involved in the issue. ’ ’ In Stone v. State, 162 Ark. 154 , 258 S. W. 116 , the court recognized the general rule that evidence of a distinct offense is inadmissible to prove another offense, and the exceptions thereto are stated that such testimony was admissible when necessary to fix the intent of th

1931In Stotts v. State, 170 Ark. 188 , 279 S. W. 364 , it was said (quoting syllabus) : “All evidence is admissible which tends to prove the issue, and no facts are forbidden to he shown, except such as are incapable of affording any reasonable presumption or inference in elucidation of the matters involved in the issue. ’ ’ In Stone v. State, 162 Ark. 154 , 258 S. W. 116 , the court recognized the general rule that evidence of a distinct offense is inadmissible to prove another offense, and the exceptions thereto are stated that such testimony was admissible when necessary to fix the intent of th

1927Rep. 183 , 36 N. E. 909 , the court recognized the general rule, but said: ‘ There seems to be a well recognized distinction between this rule as applied to original surveys, whether in the making of such surveys or in allotting the deficiency or overplus, when the correctness of such surveys is not questioned, and that where such original surveys are found to have been erroneous or the original corners and lines are wholly lost. ’ “The following authorities which we have examined are cited as recognizing the distinction: Bailey v. Chamblin, 20 Ind. 33 ; Jones v. Kimble, 19 Wis. 452 (429); Mor

1874In McKane v. The State, 11 Ind., 195 , the accused was-charged with stealing “ sixty dollars of the current gold coin of the United States,” etc. The court recognized the general rule as to the description of coin when the subject of larceny, but said: “We have a piece of money of the gold coin called a dollar; and is it not just as intelligible to say ‘ sixty dollars of the gold coin,’ as to say ‘ sixty pieces of gold coin called sixty dollars ? ’ In our opinion the indictment is unobjectionable.” Mi’.