recognized the general rule in Maryland

1994The issue of retroactivity of a statute was addressed by the Court of Appeals in Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. Riverdale Fire Co., 308 Md. 556 , 520 A.2d 1319 (1987), in which the Court recognized the general rule that “statutes are presumed to operate prospectively and are to be construed accordingly” and that “the presumption against retrospectivity is rebutted only where there are clear expressions in the statute to the contrary.” WSSC, 308 Md. at 560-561 , 520 A.2d 1319 .

1994The issue of retroactivity of a statute was addressed by the Court of Appeals in Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. Riverdale Fire Co., 308 Md. 556 , 520 A.2d 1319 (1987), in which the Court recognized the general rule that “statutes are presumed to operate prospectively and are to be construed accordingly” and that “the presumption against retrospectivity is rebutted only where there are clear expressions in the statute to the contrary.” WSSC, 308 Md. at 560-561 , 520 A.2d 1319 .

1994The Court also discussed its decision in Janda v. General Motors Corp., 237 Md. 161 , 205 A.2d 228 (1964), which involved a statute with terms clearly reflecting a retroactive intent.

1994The Court also discussed its decision in Janda v. General Motors Corp., 237 Md. 161 , 205 A.2d 228 (1964), which involved a statute with terms clearly reflecting a retroactive intent.

1991In reversing the award of punitive damages, this Court recognized the general rule that punitive damages are unavailable in pure breach of contract actions. 262 Md. at 236 , 278 A.2d at 33 .

1991In reversing the award of punitive damages, this Court recognized the general rule that punitive damages are unavailable in pure breach of contract actions. 262 Md. at 236 , 278 A.2d at 33 .

1986Relying on the law as indicated in Great United Realty Co. v. Lewis, 203 Md. 442 , 101 A.2d 881 (1954) and as stated in Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., § 928 at pp. 639-641, Chief Judge Bruñe quoted: “If there is nothing but mere inadequacy of price, the case must be extreme, in order to call for the interposition of equity.

1986Relying on the law as indicated in Great United Realty Co. v. Lewis, 203 Md. 442 , 101 A.2d 881 (1954) and as stated in Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., § 928 at pp. 639-641, Chief Judge Bruñe quoted: “If there is nothing but mere inadequacy of price, the case must be extreme, in order to call for the interposition of equity.

1986Though this Court recognized the general rule that “mere inadequacy of price will not of itself be sufficient to warrant the rescission of a contract or the refusal of the remedy of specific performance [and that o]ne cannot be relieved of a contract merely because he may have made a bad bargain”, Id. at 542 , 150 A.2d at 235 , Straus nevertheless pointed out that the general rule is not absolute.

1986Though this Court recognized the general rule that “mere inadequacy of price will not of itself be sufficient to warrant the rescission of a contract or the refusal of the remedy of specific performance [and that o]ne cannot be relieved of a contract merely because he may have made a bad bargain”, Id. at 542 , 150 A.2d at 235 , Straus nevertheless pointed out that the general rule is not absolute.

1980Nevertheless, it affirmed a judgment in favor of the lessor, as defendant in an action to foreclose the mortgage, and said: While, under general principles of mortgage subordination law outlined above, a construction lender taking the benefit of a subordination is not a guarantor to the subordinator or liable to him for mere negligence in seeing to the appropriation of the moneys to the construction, we think plain principles of equity at least call for such a construction lender to make and administer the loan in the conventional manner of a construction lender rather than mask what is essent

1980Nevertheless, it affirmed a judgment in favor of the lessor, as defendant in an action to foreclose the mortgage, and said: While, under general principles of mortgage subordination law outlined above, a construction lender taking the benefit of a subordination is not a guarantor to the subordinator or liable to him for mere negligence in seeing to the appropriation of the moneys to the construction, we think plain principles of equity at least call for such a construction lender to make and administer the loan in the conventional manner of a construction lender rather than mask what is essent

1960In Childs v. Childs, 49 Md. 509, 513, 514 , Clatterbuck v. Clatterbuck, *426 150 Md. 648 , 133 A. 316 , and Collier v. Collier, 182 Md. 82, 94, 95 , 32 A. 2d 469 , this Court recognized the general rule to be that a divorce will not be granted on the grounds of cruelty when the cruelty is provoked by the misconduct of the complainant. 1 But, under the facts of the present case, we see no reason to invoke this principle of law.

1960In Childs v. Childs, 49 Md. 509, 513, 514 , Clatterbuck v. Clatterbuck, *426 150 Md. 648 , 133 A. 316 , and Collier v. Collier, 182 Md. 82, 94, 95 , 32 A. 2d 469 , this Court recognized the general rule to be that a divorce will not be granted on the grounds of cruelty when the cruelty is provoked by the misconduct of the complainant. 1 But, under the facts of the present case, we see no reason to invoke this principle of law.

1960In Childs v. Childs, 49 Md. 509, 513, 514 , Clatterbuck v. Clatterbuck, *426 150 Md. 648 , 133 A. 316 , and Collier v. Collier, 182 Md. 82, 94, 95 , 32 A. 2d 469 , this Court recognized the general rule to be that a divorce will not be granted on the grounds of cruelty when the cruelty is provoked by the misconduct of the complainant. 1 But, under the facts of the present case, we see no reason to invoke this principle of law.

1960In Childs v. Childs, 49 Md. 509, 513, 514 , Clatterbuck v. Clatterbuck, *426 150 Md. 648 , 133 A. 316 , and Collier v. Collier, 182 Md. 82, 94, 95 , 32 A. 2d 469 , this Court recognized the general rule to be that a divorce will not be granted on the grounds of cruelty when the cruelty is provoked by the misconduct of the complainant. 1 But, under the facts of the present case, we see no reason to invoke this principle of law.