recognized the general rule in Oklahoma

1982Also see, Thigpen v. State, 96 Okl.Cr. 309 , 253 P.2d 1083 (1953); Gaines v. State, 568 P.2d 1290 (Okl.Cr.1977).

1982Also see, Thigpen v. State, 96 Okl.Cr. 309 , 253 P.2d 1083 (1953); Gaines v. State, 568 P.2d 1290 (Okl.Cr.1977).

1982Although the appellant contends that he had a continuous objection to this type of testimony, the record does not support this contention. 2 In Davis v. State, 514 P.2d 1195 (Okl.Cr.1973), this Court recognized the general rule that objections must be made in order to preserve the error for appeal.

1977In Davis v. State, Okl.Cr., 514 P.2d 1195 (1973), this Court recognized the general rule that objections must be made in order to preserve the error for appeal.

1991The Court recognized the general rule that double jeopardy is not usually impli cated where “the defendant himself has elected to terminate the proceedings against him_” Id. at 672 , 102 S.Ct. at 2089 , 72 L.Ed.2d at 422 .

1991The Court recognized the general rule that double jeopardy is not usually impli cated where “the defendant himself has elected to terminate the proceedings against him_” Id. at 672 , 102 S.Ct. at 2089 , 72 L.Ed.2d at 422 .

1982Also see, Thigpen v. State, 96 Okl.Cr. 309 , 253 P.2d 1083 (1953); Gaines v. State, 568 P.2d 1290 (Okl.Cr.1977).

1973In Love v. State, Okl.Cr., 360 P.2d 954 , this Court recognized the general rule that objections must be made in order to preserve the error for appeal.

1973In Love v. State, Okl.Cr., 360 P.2d 954 , this Court recognized the general rule that objections must be made in order to preserve the error for appeal.

1967As early as Jamar v. Brightwell, 162 Okl. 124 , 19 P.2d 366 , this Court recognized the general rule of common law nonliability, except for instances of negligence in entrusting a potentially dangerous machine to a person incompetent to handle same.

1967As early as Jamar v. Brightwell, 162 Okl. 124 , 19 P.2d 366 , this Court recognized the general rule of common law nonliability, except for instances of negligence in entrusting a potentially dangerous machine to a person incompetent to handle same.

1967In Anderson v. Eaton, 180 Okl. 243 , 68 P.2d 858 , a trial court’s action sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence was affirmed, upon the ground that an owner’s knowledge the party to whom an automobile was entrusted was a fast driver was not alone sufficient to fasten liability for damages to third persons upon the owner.

1967In Anderson v. Eaton, 180 Okl. 243 , 68 P.2d 858 , a trial court’s action sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence was affirmed, upon the ground that an owner’s knowledge the party to whom an automobile was entrusted was a fast driver was not alone sufficient to fasten liability for damages to third persons upon the owner.

1965As early as Carter State Bank v. Ross, 52 Okl. 642 , 152 P. 1113 , this Court recognized the general rule relative to impeaching a jury verdict but held same subject to qualification.

1965As early as Carter State Bank v. Ross, 52 Okl. 642 , 152 P. 1113 , this Court recognized the general rule relative to impeaching a jury verdict but held same subject to qualification.

1935However, in Johnston v. Byers State Bank, 141 Okla. 277 , 284 P. 862 , where it was conceded by the parties that funds held by an administrator were not subject to garnishment prior to decree of distribution, the court recognized the general rule to be as conceded, and, there being an absence of such legal remedy, allowed a creditor of an heir to proceed against such funds by proper bill in equity.

1935However, in Johnston v. Byers State Bank, 141 Okla. 277 , 284 P. 862 , where it was conceded by the parties that funds held by an administrator were not subject to garnishment prior to decree of distribution, the court recognized the general rule to be as conceded, and, there being an absence of such legal remedy, allowed a creditor of an heir to proceed against such funds by proper bill in equity.

1913The court. recognized the general doctrine that the plaintiff could have made application in the same cause and secured a modification of the decree, but held that an original action could be maintained for the same purpose, citing Olney v. Watts, 43 Ohio St. 499 , 3 N. E. 354 , and further stating: “The natural obligation resting upon him in the forum of the divorce would not become lifeless because its enforcement was not sought in the jurisdiction in which the divorce was granted.” *172 In Graham v. Graham, 38 Colo. 453 , 88 Pac. 852 , 8 L.