recognized the general rule in Minnesota

1937Here the devisees under the will did not receive the property which was inventoried, but received, in lieu of that, cash which was the balance remaining after the real property of the estate had been sold to meet the debts and expenses of the estate and the expense of administration." So we held in In re Estate of Bowlin, 189 Minn. 196 , 248 N.W. 741 , that the tax is to be computed after deducting the expenses of administration from the value at which the estate was appraised for the purpose of determining the tax.

1937Here the devisees under the will did not receive the property which was inventoried, but received, in lieu of that, cash which was the balance remaining after the real property of the estate had been sold to meet the debts and expenses of the estate and the expense of administration." So we held in In re Estate of Bowlin, 189 Minn. 196 , 248 N.W. 741 , that the tax is to be computed after deducting the expenses of administration from the value at which the estate was appraised for the purpose of determining the tax.

1915The same claim was made in Dimond v. Manheim, 61 Minn. 178 , 63 N. W. 495 , where the court recognized the general rule that, when the title of a party sufficiently appears of record, mere silence on his part is no violation of duty, and does not estop him from asserting his title as against others dealing with the property as another’s, but stated that this rule was subject to certain limitations and qualifications.

1915The same claim was made in Dimond v. Manheim, 61 Minn. 178 , 63 N. W. 495 , where the court recognized the general rule that, when the title of a party sufficiently appears of record, mere silence on his part is no violation of duty, and does not estop him from asserting his title as against others dealing with the property as another’s, but stated that this rule was subject to certain limitations and qualifications.

1914The doctrine of that case was approved in Nelson v. City of Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 16, 18 , 127 N. W. 445 , 29 L.R.A.(N.S.) 260, where it was held that the purpose of the latter action was not to restrain a criminal prosecution, but to enjoin continued seizure and destruction of milk, sought to be justified under an ordinance alleged void.

1914The doctrine of that case was approved in Nelson v. City of Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 16, 18 , 127 N. W. 445 , 29 L.R.A.(N.S.) 260, where it was held that the purpose of the latter action was not to restrain a criminal prosecution, but to enjoin continued seizure and destruction of milk, sought to be justified under an ordinance alleged void.

1907In State v. Town of Westport, 116 Mo. 582 , 22 S. W. 888 , it was held that quo warranto proceedings will not lie on the part of the state to deprive a city and its officers of their franchise because of irregularities in its organization after the lapse of twelve years, and after repeated recognition of its corporate existence by the courts and legislatures during that time.

1907In State v. Town of Westport, 116 Mo. 582 , 22 S. W. 888 , it was held that quo warranto proceedings will not lie on the part of the state to deprive a city and its officers of their franchise because of irregularities in its organization after the lapse of twelve years, and after repeated recognition of its corporate existence by the courts and legislatures during that time.