recognized the general rule in California

2016There, the court recognized the general rule that courts should not interfere with arbitration awards, but noted that in Loving "the Supreme Court recognized a narrow exception to the general rule" when a party challenged the legality of the entire contract. ( Lindenstadt, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 889 , 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 484 .) In that *607 case, plaintiff Lindenstadt assisted defendant Staff Builders in locating home health care businesses to acquire.

2016There, the court recognized the general rule that courts should not interfere with arbitration awards, but noted that in Loving "the Supreme Court recognized a narrow exception to the general rule" when a party challenged the legality of the entire contract. ( Lindenstadt, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 889 , 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 484 .) In that *607 case, plaintiff Lindenstadt assisted defendant Staff Builders in locating home health care businesses to acquire.

2015In contrast, a California legal encyclopedia has addressed how the commencement of the statute of limitations in a quiet title action is affected when the owner’s property has been leased to a tenant: “[N]o statute of limitations runs against a plaintiff seeking to quiet title while he or she is in possession of the property, as where the plaintiff has been and is in possession through his or her tenant for a long period of time.” (43 Cal.Jur.3d (2011) Limitations of Actions, § 108, p. 186, fn. omitted.) Similarly, in Ankoanda v. Walker-Smith (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 610 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 39 ], th

2015In contrast, a California legal encyclopedia has addressed how the commencement of the statute of limitations in a quiet title action is affected when the owner’s property has been leased to a tenant: “[N]o statute of limitations runs against a plaintiff seeking to quiet title while he or she is in possession of the property, as where the plaintiff has been and is in possession through his or her tenant for a long period of time.” (43 Cal.Jur.3d (2011) Limitations of Actions, § 108, p. 186, fn. omitted.) Similarly, in Ankoanda v. Walker-Smith (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 610 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 39 ], th

2016Lindenstadt brought an action against Staff Builders seeking finder's fees for locating several businesses; Staff Builders asserted that Lindenstadt was statutorily barred from seeking fees because he acted as an unlicensed real estate broker. ( Id. at pp. 885-886, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 484 .) The case went to arbitration based on the parties' contract, and the arbitrator concluded Lindenstadt was entitled to fees. ( Id. p. 887, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 484 .) In its opposition to Lindenstadt's motion to confirm the arbitration award, Staff Builders argued that the trial court was obligated to undertake a de n

2016Lindenstadt brought an action against Staff Builders seeking finder's fees for locating several businesses; Staff Builders asserted that Lindenstadt was statutorily barred from seeking fees because he acted as an unlicensed real estate broker. ( Id. at pp. 885-886, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 484 .) The case went to arbitration based on the parties' contract, and the arbitrator concluded Lindenstadt was entitled to fees. ( Id. p. 887, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 484 .) In its opposition to Lindenstadt's motion to confirm the arbitration award, Staff Builders argued that the trial court was obligated to undertake a de n

2016Lindenstadt brought an action against Staff Builders seeking finder's fees for locating several businesses; Staff Builders asserted that Lindenstadt was statutorily barred from seeking fees because he acted as an unlicensed real estate broker. ( Id. at pp. 885-886, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 484 .) The case went to arbitration based on the parties' contract, and the arbitrator concluded Lindenstadt was entitled to fees. ( Id. p. 887, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 484 .) In its opposition to Lindenstadt's motion to confirm the arbitration award, Staff Builders argued that the trial court was obligated to undertake a de n

2006But case law suggests that, even though the payment of money may be involved, an action to compel the return of a specific sum of money belonging to a party under applicable law is not a claim “for money or damages.” In Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 102 , 520 P.2d 726 ], which involved the demurrer to “an action by an arrestee for the return of property taken by local police officers at the time of arrest and wrongfully withheld following the disposition of criminal charges,” the Supreme Court considered whether an action to recover $7,720 allegedly taken b

2006But case law suggests that, even though the payment of money may be involved, an action to compel the return of a specific sum of money belonging to a party under applicable law is not a claim “for money or damages.” In Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 102 , 520 P.2d 726 ], which involved the demurrer to “an action by an arrestee for the return of property taken by local police officers at the time of arrest and wrongfully withheld following the disposition of criminal charges,” the Supreme Court considered whether an action to recover $7,720 allegedly taken b

2006(Id. at p. 121.) It also noted: “No court has intimated or held that the claims statute applies to the arrestee directly seeking mandamus in a criminal proceeding to compel the return of property wrongfully in the possession of custodial officers.” (Id. at p. 123.) *930 The court in Minsky reasoned: “[T]he government in effect occupies the position of a bailee when it seizes from an arrestee property that is not shown to be contraband. [Citation.] The arrestee retains his right to eventual specific recovery, whether he seeks to regain tangible property like an automobile, ring, wallet or camer

2006(Id. at p. 121.) It also noted: “No court has intimated or held that the claims statute applies to the arrestee directly seeking mandamus in a criminal proceeding to compel the return of property wrongfully in the possession of custodial officers.” (Id. at p. 123.) *930 The court in Minsky reasoned: “[T]he government in effect occupies the position of a bailee when it seizes from an arrestee property that is not shown to be contraband. [Citation.] The arrestee retains his right to eventual specific recovery, whether he seeks to regain tangible property like an automobile, ring, wallet or camer

2002All such exposure to substantially the same general conditions existing at or emanating from one premises location shall be deemed one occurrence. '" ( 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1149 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 .) The court recognized the general rule that, "for the purpose of determining the number of occurrences under a liability insurance policy (usually as a means of calculating policy limits) `occurrence has generally been held to mean the underlying cause of the injury, rather than the injury or claim itself .... [Citation.]" ( FMC, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1161 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , italics add

2002All such exposure to substantially the same general conditions existing at or emanating from one premises location shall be deemed one occurrence. '" ( 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1149 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 .) The court recognized the general rule that, "for the purpose of determining the number of occurrences under a liability insurance policy (usually as a means of calculating policy limits) `occurrence has generally been held to mean the underlying cause of the injury, rather than the injury or claim itself .... [Citation.]" ( FMC, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 1161 , 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , italics add

1989(Campbell v. Superior Court, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 152 .) In Campbell , the court recognized the general rule that the amount of damages sought in the prayer controls the determination of jurisdiction for a civil action, unless the prayer is fraudulent or fictitious on its face. (2 Witkin, op. cit. supra, § 19, p.385; Depretto v. Superior Court (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 36, 39 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 810 ]; Davis v. Superior Court (1972) 25 *385 Cal.App.3d 596, 599-600 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 238 ].) On this point, the court cited Davis v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 599, quoting Sellery v. Ward (1942) 21

1989(Cf. Stratton v. Superior Court (1935) 2 Cal.2d 693 , 698 . . . [‘even though lack of jurisdiction of [a] cause may not appear from the pleading itself, evidence may be offered at the trial [or other hearing] which discloses the lack of jurisdiction over the cause of action so pleaded . . .’ ].)” (Campbell v. Superior Court, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 147, 151-152 .) Williams urges Davis (supra, 25 Cal.App.3d 596 ) and Depretto (supra, 116 Cal.App.3d 36 ) bind the trial court in its management of the case to make jurisdictional determinations solely from the amount claimed in the prayer.

1989(Campbell v. Superior Court, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 152 .) In Campbell , the court recognized the general rule that the amount of damages sought in the prayer controls the determination of jurisdiction for a civil action, unless the prayer is fraudulent or fictitious on its face. (2 Witkin, op. cit. supra, § 19, p.385; Depretto v. Superior Court (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 36, 39 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 810 ]; Davis v. Superior Court (1972) 25 *385 Cal.App.3d 596, 599-600 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 238 ].) On this point, the court cited Davis v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 599, quoting Sellery v. Ward (1942) 21

1989(Cf. Stratton v. Superior Court (1935) 2 Cal.2d 693 , 698 . . . [‘even though lack of jurisdiction of [a] cause may not appear from the pleading itself, evidence may be offered at the trial [or other hearing] which discloses the lack of jurisdiction over the cause of action so pleaded . . .’ ].)” (Campbell v. Superior Court, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 147, 151-152 .) Williams urges Davis (supra, 25 Cal.App.3d 596 ) and Depretto (supra, 116 Cal.App.3d 36 ) bind the trial court in its management of the case to make jurisdictional determinations solely from the amount claimed in the prayer.

1989(Cf. Stratton v. Superior Court (1935) 2 Cal.2d 693 , 698 . . . [‘even though lack of jurisdiction of [a] cause may not appear from the pleading itself, evidence may be offered at the trial [or other hearing] which discloses the lack of jurisdiction over the cause of action so pleaded . . .’ ].)” (Campbell v. Superior Court, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 147, 151-152 .) Williams urges Davis (supra, 25 Cal.App.3d 596 ) and Depretto (supra, 116 Cal.App.3d 36 ) bind the trial court in its management of the case to make jurisdictional determinations solely from the amount claimed in the prayer.

1971(See Sanchez v. Sanchez, supra, 55 Cal.2d 118, 121-124 ; Munson v. Munson, supra, 27 Cal.2d 659, 661-663 ; Taber v. Taber, supra, 209 Cal. 755, 757-758; Dahl v. Dahl, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d 407, 409-411 ; Mathewson v. Mathewson, supra, 207 Cal.App.2d 532, 534-535 ; and Grubaugh v. Grubaugh (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 151, 152-154 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 141 ].) In Ashwell v. Ashwell, supra, the court recognized the general rule of review as follows: “In the resolution of the issue as to which of two parents shall have custody much is committed to the sound legal discretion of the trial court and the decision

1971(See Sanchez v. Sanchez, supra, 55 Cal.2d 118, 121-124 ; Munson v. Munson, supra, 27 Cal.2d 659, 661-663 ; Taber v. Taber, supra, 209 Cal. 755, 757-758; Dahl v. Dahl, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d 407, 409-411 ; Mathewson v. Mathewson, supra, 207 Cal.App.2d 532, 534-535 ; and Grubaugh v. Grubaugh (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 151, 152-154 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 141 ].) In Ashwell v. Ashwell, supra, the court recognized the general rule of review as follows: “In the resolution of the issue as to which of two parents shall have custody much is committed to the sound legal discretion of the trial court and the decision

1971(See Sanchez v. Sanchez, supra, 55 Cal.2d 118, 121-124 ; Munson v. Munson, supra, 27 Cal.2d 659, 661-663 ; Taber v. Taber, supra, 209 Cal. 755, 757-758; Dahl v. Dahl, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d 407, 409-411 ; Mathewson v. Mathewson, supra, 207 Cal.App.2d 532, 534-535 ; and Grubaugh v. Grubaugh (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 151, 152-154 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 141 ].) In Ashwell v. Ashwell, supra, the court recognized the general rule of review as follows: “In the resolution of the issue as to which of two parents shall have custody much is committed to the sound legal discretion of the trial court and the decision

1971(See Sanchez v. Sanchez, supra, 55 Cal.2d 118, 121-124 ; Munson v. Munson, supra, 27 Cal.2d 659, 661-663 ; Taber v. Taber, supra, 209 Cal. 755, 757-758; Dahl v. Dahl, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d 407, 409-411 ; Mathewson v. Mathewson, supra, 207 Cal.App.2d 532, 534-535 ; and Grubaugh v. Grubaugh (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 151, 152-154 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 141 ].) In Ashwell v. Ashwell, supra, the court recognized the general rule of review as follows: “In the resolution of the issue as to which of two parents shall have custody much is committed to the sound legal discretion of the trial court and the decision

1971(See Sanchez v. Sanchez, supra, 55 Cal.2d 118, 121-124 ; Munson v. Munson, supra, 27 Cal.2d 659, 661-663 ; Taber v. Taber, supra, 209 Cal. 755, 757-758; Dahl v. Dahl, supra, 237 Cal.App.2d 407, 409-411 ; Mathewson v. Mathewson, supra, 207 Cal.App.2d 532, 534-535 ; and Grubaugh v. Grubaugh (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 151, 152-154 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 141 ].) In Ashwell v. Ashwell, supra, the court recognized the general rule of review as follows: “In the resolution of the issue as to which of two parents shall have custody much is committed to the sound legal discretion of the trial court and the decision

1970See also, Rowland School Dist. v. State Board of Education (1968) 264 Cal. App.2d 589, 593-595 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 504 ]; Burke v. City etc. of San Francisco, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d 32, 34 ; Travers v. Louden (1967) 254 Cal. App.2d 926, 932 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 654 ]; Hagan v. Fairfield (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 197, 202 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 600 ]; Auberry Union School Dist. v. Rafferty (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 599, 603 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 223 ]; Wilson v. Transit Authority, supra, 199 Cal.App.2d 716, 722-726 ; and Pittenger v. Home Sav. & Loan Assn. (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 32, 36 [ 332 P.2d 399 ].) The railroad states that

1970In Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 432 P.2d 717 ], the court recognized the general rule governing exercise of judicial review as quoted in Consolidated Vultee etc. Corp. v. United Auto. etc. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859, 863 [ 167 P.2d 725 ], from Mills v. Green (1895) 159 U.S. 651, 653 [ 40 L.Ed. 293, 294 , 16 S.Ct. 132 ], as follows: “[T]he duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions

1970In Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 432 P.2d 717 ], the court recognized the general rule governing exercise of judicial review as quoted in Consolidated Vultee etc. Corp. v. United Auto. etc. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859, 863 [ 167 P.2d 725 ], from Mills v. Green (1895) 159 U.S. 651, 653 [ 40 L.Ed. 293, 294 , 16 S.Ct. 132 ], as follows: “[T]he duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions

1970See also, Rowland School Dist. v. State Board of Education (1968) 264 Cal. App.2d 589, 593-595 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 504 ]; Burke v. City etc. of San Francisco, supra, 258 Cal.App.2d 32, 34 ; Travers v. Louden (1967) 254 Cal. App.2d 926, 932 [ 62 Cal.Rptr. 654 ]; Hagan v. Fairfield (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 197, 202 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 600 ]; Auberry Union School Dist. v. Rafferty (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 599, 603 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 223 ]; Wilson v. Transit Authority, supra, 199 Cal.App.2d 716, 722-726 ; and Pittenger v. Home Sav. & Loan Assn. (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 32, 36 [ 332 P.2d 399 ].) The railroad states that