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6 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bettis v. Potosi R-III School Districtgreen1 sentence2005In Potosi I , this court recognized the general rule that the statute of limitations "does not begin to run [in an action to calculate pension benefits] until the claimant has retired or otherwise qualified, and has submitted a formal claim." 51 S.W.3d at 188 ( citing 60A Am.Jur.2d Pensions and Retirement Funds § 1736 (1988)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hughes v. Davidson-Hues
green
2 sentences2024The western district of this Court recognized the general rule that when a claim on a contract is reduced to judgment, the contract between the parties is voluntarily surrendered, canceled by merger in the judgment and ceases to exist, but explained parties can “specifically agree that their contractual rights will survive incorporation into a judgment[.]” Id. at 117-18 . 2024Interpreting the clause there, the Court found that the parties “specifically agreed that their contractual rights … would survive if they were incorporated into the judgment and were then found to be unenforceable.” Id. at 121 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Gieselmann v. Stegeman
green
1 sentence2014Id. at 131-132 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Union Pacific Railroad v. Carrier Consultants, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Vogel v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006Id., 801 S.W.2d at 757 . 2006Id., 801 S.W.2d at 757 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Dillaplain v. Lite Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence1992Id. at 532 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Camper
green
1 sentence1974In affirming, this Court recognized the general principle that in some situations the testimony or occurrence may be such that its prejudicial effect cannot be removed by an instruction, but said that the granting of a mistrial is a drastic remedy to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances and “where the incident is so grievous that the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way,” citing State v. Camper, 391 S.W.2d 926 (Mo.1965). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.