impairment standard in California

2023Complaining he was “blindsided” by the exchange described above, Molina contends he had a right to withhold his custody status from the jury (a right he describes as a “necessary corollary” of his right to be tried in civilian clothing), that revealing his custody status subjected him to a weakened presumption of innocence, and his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by advising him to waive his right to withhold his custody status. 7 We are not persuaded. “[T]he mere fact that the jury is made aware of a defendant’s custodial status does not deprive the defendant of his constitutio

2022(See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams (1976) 425 U.S. 501, 504-505 [defendant wearing jail clothing can be “constant reminder” of custodial status and impact a juror’s judgment].) However, an “isolated comment that a defendant is in custody simply does not create the potential for the impairment of the presumption of innocence that might arise were such information repeatedly conveyed to the jury.” (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1336 .) 4 Throughout his briefs, Carey repeatedly argues the security guard was not to be trusted, at times even suggesting the robbery was an “inside job” in w

2024On these facts, we conclude that Colorado Plaintiffs have shown that disposition in this action “may” impair or impede their ability to protect their interest. (§ 387, subd. (d)(1)(B), italics added; see Technology Training, supra, 874 F.3d at pp. 696-697 [“the risk that the movants will be bound by an unsatisfactory class action settlement satisfies [the impairment requirement]”]; In re Community Bank of Northern Virginia, supra, 418 F.3d at p. 314 [absent class members’ interest may be impaired “by the very nature of [class action] representative litigation”].) 13 In finding otherwise, the t

2024On these facts, we conclude that Colorado Plaintiffs have shown that disposition in this action “may” impair or impede their ability to protect their interest. (§ 387, subd. (d)(1)(B), italics added; see Technology Training, supra, 874 F.3d at pp. 696-697 [“the risk that the movants will be bound by an unsatisfactory class action settlement satisfies [the impairment requirement]”]; In re Community Bank of Northern Virginia, supra, 418 F.3d at p. 314 [absent class members’ interest may be impaired “by the very nature of [class action] representative litigation”].) 13 In finding otherwise, the t

2023(People v. Cecil (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 769, 778 .) Absent any evidence to the contrary, we presume the jury understood and followed the court’s instruction to disregard Molina’s custodial status.

2023Complaining he was “blindsided” by the exchange described above, Molina contends he had a right to withhold his custody status from the jury (a right he describes as a “necessary corollary” of his right to be tried in civilian clothing), that revealing his custody status subjected him to a weakened presumption of innocence, and his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by advising him to waive his right to withhold his custody status. 7 We are not persuaded. “[T]he mere fact that the jury is made aware of a defendant’s custodial status does not deprive the defendant of his constitutio

2022(White v. Wheeler (2015) 577 U.S. 73, 77 [“ ‘a juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause’ ”]; Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9 .) Accordingly, Witt’s substantial impairment standard remains binding on this court, and we are not at liberty to consider defendant’s federal claim any further.

2022(White v. Wheeler (2015) 577 U.S. 73, 77 [“ ‘a juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause’ ”]; Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9 .) Accordingly, Witt’s substantial impairment standard remains binding on this court, and we are not at liberty to consider defendant’s federal claim any further.

2022(People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 865, fn. 7 [“Because, as defendant recognizes, this court cannot overrule a decision of the United States Supreme Court, we do not address his attack on Faretta [v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 ]”]; Stock v. Plunkett (1919) 181 Cal. 193 , 194–195 [decisions of the United States Supreme Court involving a federal question are binding on this court].) This is so even if we were to agree with defendant that subsequent decisions by that court have called into question whether the substantial impairment standard is consistent with the Sixth Amendment right

2022“In People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767 , we 31 PEOPLE v. MATAELE Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C.

2022(People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 865, fn. 7 [“Because, as defendant recognizes, this court cannot overrule a decision of the United States Supreme Court, we do not address his attack on Faretta [v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 ]”]; Stock v. Plunkett (1919) 181 Cal. 193 , 194–195 [decisions of the United States Supreme Court involving a federal question are binding on this court].) This is so even if we were to agree with defendant that subsequent decisions by that court have called into question whether the substantial impairment standard is consistent with the Sixth Amendment right

2016(See Estate of Mann, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d 593 [dementia sufferer placed under conservatorship nonetheless had periods of lucidity during which she was competent to make a will].) So even if it were true Perry had become incompetent to revoke the trust during some periods in 2010, that would not necessarily establish he had forever lost the capacity to do so by 2011.

2016Among other things, section 811 specifies “[t]he mere diagnosis of a mental or physical disorder shall not be sufficient in and of itself to support a determination that a person is of unsound mind or lacks the capacity to do a certain act.” (Id., subd. (d).) Instead, “[a] deficit in the mental functions listed above may be considered only if the deficit, by itself or in combination with one or more other mental function deficits, significantly impairs the person’s ability to understand and appreciate the consequences of his or her actions with regard to the type of act or decision in question

2016Among other things, section 811 specifies “[t]he mere diagnosis of a mental or physical disorder shall not be sufficient in and of itself to support a determination that a person is of unsound mind or lacks the capacity to do a certain act.” (Id., subd. (d).) Instead, “[a] deficit in the mental functions listed above may be considered only if the deficit, by itself or in combination with one or more other mental function deficits, significantly impairs the person’s ability to understand and appreciate the consequences of his or her actions with regard to the type of act or decision in question

2012(See 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(l)(B) [declaring state consumer financial laws preempted if “in accordance with the legal standard for preemption in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in [Barnett Bank] the State consumer financial law prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers”].) The high court affirmed and elaborated on these principles in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., supra, 550 U.S. 1 (Watters).