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5 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Eckles v. State of Oregongreen2 sentences1992In Eckles v. State of Oregon, supra, 306 Or at 403 , the court held: “The state is not obliged by Article I, section 21, to return the funds to the IAF, but the circuit court erred in not awarding plaintiff a declaratory judgment that section four of the Transfer Act is unconstitutional insofar as it affects employers with SAIF insurance contracts that were in existence on or before the date of the enactment of the Transfer Act.” (Emphasis added.) The Eckles majority held that another section of the Transfer Act legislation in question in that case, section 2, merely directing the state treasu 1992In Eckles v. State of Oregon, supra, 306 Or. at 403 , 760 P.2d 846 , the court held: "The state is not obliged by Article I, section 21, to return the funds to the IAF, but the circuit court erred in not awarding plaintiff a declaratory judgment that section four of the Transfer Act is unconstitutional insofar as it affects employers with SAIF insurance contracts that were in existence on or before the date of the enactment of the Transfer Act." (Emphasis added.) The Eckles majority held that another section of the Transfer Act legislation in question in that case, section 2, merely directing | 1 | 1 |
United States Trust Co. of NY v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences1992See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 US 1, 18-19 , 97 S Ct 1505 , 52 L Ed 2d 92 (1977) (holding unconstitutional, under the federal constitution’s impairment clause, state legislative repeal in 1974 of a statutory covenant enacted in 1962 on the basis of which loans had been made to the state between 1962 and 1974); King v. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass 447, 454 (1819) (holding that once a contract is formed, a court “cannot give it a different construction in consequence of the statute which was after-wards passed”). 1992See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 US 1, 18-19 , 97 S Ct 1505 , 52 L Ed 2d 92 (1977) (holding unconstitutional, under the federal constitution’s impairment clause, state legislative repeal in 1974 of a statutory covenant enacted in 1962 on the basis of which loans had been made to the state between 1962 and 1974); King v. Dedham Bank, 15 Mass 447, 454 (1819) (holding that once a contract is formed, a court “cannot give it a different construction in consequence of the statute which was after-wards passed”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Tiner
green
2 sentences2008A defendant may establish the third factor — prejudice — in three ways: “(1) the damage arising from lengthy pretrial incarceration; (2) the anxiety and public suspicion resulting from public accusation of a crime; and (3) the impairment of the defense.” State v. Tiner, 340 Or 551, 557 , 135 P3d 305 (2006), cert den, 127 S Ct 1125 (2007) (citations omitted). 2008A defendant may establish the third factor — prejudice — in three ways: “(1) the damage arising from lengthy pretrial incarceration; (2) the anxiety and public suspicion resulting from public accusation of a crime; and (3) the impairment of the defense.” State v. Tiner, 340 Or 551, 557 , 135 P3d 305 (2006), cert den, 127 S Ct 1125 (2007) (citations omitted). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Harberts
green
1 sentence2006Harberts, 331 Or at 93 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Bryson v. Public Employes Retirement Board
green
2 sentences1996In Bryson v. PERB, 45 Or App 27, 30 , 607 P2d 768 (1979), rev den 289 Or 107 (1980), the Court of Appeals stated: “[I]t is without question that petitioner has a statutory and contractual right to receive retirement benefits computed at the most favorable rate applicable under laws in effect at any time during his judicial service.” (Citing Taylor.) Finally, in Hughes , the case on which the state primarily relies here, this court interpreted a state tax statute in the context of an impairment challenge under Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, to determine whether legislative a 1996In Bryson v. PERB, 45 Or App 27, 30 , 607 P2d 768 (1979), rev den 289 Or 107 (1980), the Court of Appeals stated: “[I]t is without question that petitioner has a statutory and contractual right to receive retirement benefits computed at the most favorable rate applicable under laws in effect at any time during his judicial service.” (Citing Taylor.) Finally, in Hughes , the case on which the state primarily relies here, this court interpreted a state tax statute in the context of an impairment challenge under Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, to determine whether legislative a | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Pacheco-Gonzalez v. SAIF Corp.
neutral
2 sentences1993In Pacheco-Gonzalez v. SAIF, 123 Or App 312 , 860 P2d 822 (1993), a medical arbiter’s report was ordered, but not completed until after the order on reconsideration. 1993In Pacheco-Gonzalez v. SAIF, 123 Or App 312 , 860 P2d 822 (1993), a medical arbiter’s report was ordered, but not completed until after the order on reconsideration. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.