impairment defense (Texas) · Go Syfert
← Texas issues

impairment defense in Texas

23 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1941–2025 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Munozgreen
texcrimapp · 1999 · cited in 5 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2000–2025
2 sentences

2012See Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 829 (holding loss in memory was minimal and did not shift burden to State); Guerrero, 110 S.W.3d at 162 (holding that a bare assertion of dimming memories does not constitute some showing of an impairment to a defense); see also Hernandez v. State, No. 04-09-00199-CR, 2010 WL 454946 , at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio -8- 04-11-00405-CR Feb. 10, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (“State’s witnesses are subject to the same detriment with regard to fading memories based on the passage of time.”).

2006Munoz , 991 S.W.2d at 829 ("bare assertion of dimming memories does not constitute some showing of an impairment to the defense"); Meyer , 27 S.W.3d at 650-51 .

35
Barker v. Wingogreen
scotus · 1972 · cited in 8 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2005–2021
2 sentences

2021Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 .

2021Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 .

18
In Re Derzapfgreen
tex · 2007 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023See Scheller, 325 S.W.3d at 643-44; Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d at 330-34.

11
In Re Schellergreen
tex · 2010 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023See Scheller, 325 S.W.3d at 643-44; Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d at 330-34.

11
State v. Delanygreen
tex · 2006 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013In Delaney, landowners sued the State for inverse condemnation, claiming that the State‘s removal of a road abutting their property 28 See Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d at 183 (―Because Mrs. Sharboneau did not offer evidence of individual lot sales as comparable to her own undivided property, [her expert‘s] testimony is not precluded by Willey and Cannizzo.‖). 29 State v. Delaney, 197 S.W.3d 297, 300 (Tex. 2006) (citation omitted). 17 caused substantial and material impairment of access to their property. 30 The Delaney court reiterated its previous holding in Santikos that, with respect to unimproved

11
City of Harlingen v. Estate of Sharboneaugreen
tex · 2001 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013In Delaney, landowners sued the State for inverse condemnation, claiming that the State‘s removal of a road abutting their property 28 See Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d at 183 (―Because Mrs. Sharboneau did not offer evidence of individual lot sales as comparable to her own undivided property, [her expert‘s] testimony is not precluded by Willey and Cannizzo.‖). 29 State v. Delaney, 197 S.W.3d 297, 300 (Tex. 2006) (citation omitted). 17 caused substantial and material impairment of access to their property. 30 The Delaney court reiterated its previous holding in Santikos that, with respect to unimproved

11
State v. Guerrerogreen
texapp · 2003 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012See Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 829 (holding loss in memory was minimal and did not shift burden to State); Guerrero, 110 S.W.3d at 162 (holding that a bare assertion of dimming memories does not constitute some showing of an impairment to a defense); see also Hernandez v. State, No. 04-09-00199-CR, 2010 WL 454946 , at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio -8- 04-11-00405-CR Feb. 10, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (“State’s witnesses are subject to the same detriment with regard to fading memories based on the passage of time.”).

11
County of Bexar v. Santikosgreen
tex · 2004 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
1 sentence

2006A few months after the court of appeals affirmed, we held in County of Bexar v. Santikos that when a tract has “no businesses, homes, driveways, or other improvements of any kind,” an impairment claim cannot be sustained on the basis that “someday a developer might want to build a driveway at the single most difficult and expensive location on the entire property.” 144 S.W.3d 455, 460-61 (Tex.2004).

11
Swisher v. Texasgreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999Munoz, 960 S.W.2d at 200 ; see also Swisher v. State, 544 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 , 97 S.Ct. 734 , 50 L.Ed.2d 749 (1977).

1999Munoz, 960 S.W.2d at 200 ; see also Swisher v. State, 544 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 , 97 S.Ct. 734 , 50 L.Ed.2d 749 (1977).

11
Swisher v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1976 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
1 sentence

1999Munoz, 960 S.W.2d at 200 ; see also Swisher v. State, 544 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 , 97 S.Ct. 734 , 50 L.Ed.2d 749 (1977).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
Combs v. Health Care Services Corp. green
tex · 2013
2 sentences

2014We cannot ignore a statute’s unambiguous language unless its meaning is so unreasonable that it “would lead to absurd results.” Combs, 401 S.W.3d at 629 ; see, e.g., Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 234 (2012) (explaining that courts can ignore a statute’s 3 unambiguous meaning only if that meaning “would result in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve”).

2014We cannot ignore a statute’s unambiguous language unless its meaning is so unreasonable that it “would lead to absurd results.” Combs, 401 S.W.3d at 629 ; see, e.g., Anto-nin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 234 (2012) (explaining that courts can ignore a statute’s unambiguous meaning only if that meaning “would result in a disposition that no reasonable person could approve”).

22014–2014
In Re CS green
texapp · 2008
1 sentence

2021In re Serio, No. 03-14-00786-CV, 2014 WL 7458735 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 23, 2014, orig. proceeding) (citing In re C.S., 264 S.W.3d 864 , 874–75 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.)).

12021–2021
Oliver v. State green
texapp · 1999
1 sentence

2013Id.

12013–2013
Meyer v. State green
texapp · 2000
1 sentence

2006Munoz , 991 S.W.2d at 829 ("bare assertion of dimming memories does not constitute some showing of an impairment to the defense"); Meyer , 27 S.W.3d at 650-51 .

12006–2006
State v. Munoz green
texapp · 1997
1 sentence

1999Munoz, 960 S.W.2d at 200 ; see also Swisher v. State, 544 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 , 97 S.Ct. 734 , 50 L.Ed.2d 749 (1977).

11999–1999
Henwood v. Moore green
texapp · 1947
2 sentences

1957Also in Henwood v. Moore, Tex.Civ.App., 203 S.W.2d 973 , an action by a 24 year old brakeman with a life expectancy of 39½ years, earning a gross monthly wage of $270, who received injuries to his head and right shoulder, necessitating several blood tranfusions and causing an unconscious condition for a week coupled with atrophy of the muscles in his right shoulder, the impairment of his hearing, the inability to lift his arm for several months higher than on a level parallel with the floor, and at the time of trial he still suffered pain in his head, it was held that $35,000 was excessive by

1957App., 203 S.W.2d 973 , an action by a 24 year old brakeman with a life expectancy of 39½ years, earning a gross monthly wage of $270, who received injuries to his head and right shoulder, necessitating several blood tranfusions and causing an unconscious condition for a week coupled with atrophy of the muscles in his right shoulder, the impairment of his hearing, the inability to lift his arm for several months higher than on a level parallel with the floor, and at the time of trial he still suffered pain in his head, it was held that $35,000 was excessive by $15,000, requiring a remittitur of

11957–1957
Gillette Motor Transport Co. v. Whitfield green
tex · 1947
2 sentences

1957In Gillette Motor Transport Co. v. Whitfield, Tex.Civ.App., 197 S.W.2d 157 , affirmed 145 Tex. 571 , 200 S.W.2d 624 , an award of $44,000 to a brakeman on a railroad for very serious injuries was held to be so clearly excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice, or corruption or. that it was clear that the jury disregarded the evidence, necessitating the requiring of a remittitur of $12,-500.

1957In Gillette Motor Transport Co. v. Whitfield, Tex.Civ.App., 197 S.W.2d 157 , affirmed 145 Tex. 571 , 200 S.W.2d 624 , an award of $44,000 to a brakeman on a railroad for very serious injuries was held to be so clearly excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice, or corruption or. that it was clear that the jury disregarded the evidence, necessitating the requiring of a remittitur of $12,-500.

11957–1957
Gillette Motor Transp. Co. v. Whitfield neutral
texapp · 1946
2 sentences

1957In Gillette Motor Transport Co. v. Whitfield, Tex.Civ.App., 197 S.W.2d 157 , affirmed 145 Tex. 571 , 200 S.W.2d 624 , an award of $44,000 to a brakeman on a railroad for very serious injuries was held to be so clearly excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice, or corruption or. that it was clear that the jury disregarded the evidence, necessitating the requiring of a remittitur of $12,-500.

1957In Gillette Motor Transport Co. v. Whitfield, Tex.Civ.App., 197 S.W.2d 157 , affirmed 145 Tex. 571 , 200 S.W.2d 624 , an award of $44,000 to a brakeman on a railroad for very serious injuries was held to be so clearly excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice, or *283 corruption or that it was clear that the jury disregarded the evidence, necessitating the requiring of a remittitur of $12,500.

11957–1957
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dicken green
texapp · 1935
1 sentence

1941Appellants rely upon Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dicken, Tex.Civ.App., 80 S.W.2d 800, which held that it was reversible error for a trial court to refuse to submit to the jury as defensive issues the question of whether or not a partial impairment of hearing was the only injury sustained as a result of an accident.

11941–1941

Where else courts name it

TX 23 (1941–2025) MI 20 (1936–2026) NM 13 (1989–2022) GA 12 (1986–2024) MO 10 (2015–2024) CA 10 (1973–2024) WA 9 (1991–2025) NY 9 (1901–2026) MT 9 (1984–2026) MD 8 (1975–2019) IN 7 (1937–2019) WY 6 (2014–2022) PA 6 (1964–1999) OR 5 (1992–2008) FL 5 (1986–2013) KS 4 (2010–2025) LA 4 (1959–2004) UT 4 (2011–2022) TN 4 (1981–1999) RI 3 (1975–2005) WI 3 (1957–2010) IL 3 (1978–2020) SC 3 (2006–2007) CT 3 (2019–2020) MN 2 (1981–2011) AL 2 (1934–1995) OH 2 (1969–2004) MS 2 (2011–2015) CO 2 (2001–2004)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check