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8 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Baltimore Cnty. v. Quinlangreen1 sentence2019And it is true that the Guides provide that, when a claimant has tinnitus, “an impairment percentage up to 5% may be added to the impairment for hearing loss.” The County also points to the experts’ reports in this case, and asserts that “both parties’ experts agree that tinnitus is part of hearing loss.” But whatever the Guides and the experts might say about the rating of tinnitus does not dictate or determine our interpretation of the statute.16 See Baltimore Cty. v. Quinlan, 466 Md. 1, 16 (2019) (“Indeed, ‘[t]he language of 16 And even if we were to consider the language of the Guides, its | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Stategreen2 sentences1987See Stewart v. State, 282 Md. 557, 563-64 , 386 A.2d 1206 (1978). 1987See Stewart v. State, 282 Md. 557, 563-64 , 386 A.2d 1206 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co.green2 sentences1986Under Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-13 , 103 S.Ct. 697, 704-05 , 74 L.Ed.2d 569, 580-81 (1983), an impairment analysis looks first to whether Ch. 6 in fact operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship. 1986Under Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-13 , 103 S.Ct. 697, 704-05 , 74 L.Ed.2d 569, 580-81 (1983), an impairment analysis looks first to whether Ch. 6 in fact operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship. | 1 | 1 |
Barker v. Wingogreen1 sentence1975It seems to us that the appellant has demonstrated not only “the possibility that [his] defense will be impaired,” Barker v. Wingo, supra, at 532, but has shown, to his prejudice, an actual impairment of his defense. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Yeatman v. Public Service Com.
neutral
2 sentences2003Finally, citing Yeatman v. Public Service Com., 126 Md. 513 , 95 A. 158 (1915), they assert that we have long recognized that the PSC is empowered to modify private contracts involving public utilities subject to PSC regulation on public policy grounds without running afoul of the impairment clause of the Constitution. 2003Finally, citing Yeatman v. Public Service Com., 126 Md. 513 , 95 A. 158 (1915), they assert that we have long recognized that the PSC is empowered to modify private contracts involving public utilities subject to PSC regulation on public policy grounds without running afoul of the impairment clause of the Constitution. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Brady v. State
green
2 sentences1987Brady, 291 Md. at 267 , 434 A.2d at 574 . 1987Brady, 291 Md. at 267 , 434 A.2d at 574 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Brady v. State
green
1 sentence1983Those were the precise factors upon which we were instructed by Brady I, i.e., 288 Md. at 67-70 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Strunk v. United States
green
2 sentences1976We do note, however, that factors of lesser importance are also to be considered in assessing prejudice: “The speedy trial guarantee recognizes that a prolonged delay may subject an accused to an emotional stress that can be presumed to result in the ordinary person from uncertainties in the prospect of facing public trial or of receiving a sentence longer than, or consecutive to, the one he is presently serving — uncertainties that a prompt trial removes.” Strunk v. United States, 412 U. S. 434, 439 , 93 S. Ct. 2260, 2263 , 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973). 1976We do note, however, that factors of lesser importance are also to be considered in assessing prejudice: “The speedy trial guarantee recognizes that a prolonged delay may subject an accused to an emotional stress that can be presumed to result in the ordinary person from uncertainties in the prospect of facing public trial or of receiving a sentence longer than, or consecutive to, the one he is presently serving — uncertainties that a prompt trial removes.” Strunk v. United States, 412 U. S. 434, 439 , 93 S. Ct. 2260, 2263 , 37 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.