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8 New York opinions name it 3 courts 1901–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Greengreen1 sentence2026Accordingly, on remittal, County Court must address the admissibility of evidence related to the DRE (<i>see</i> <i>People v Green</i>, 141 AD3d 746, 747 [3d Dept 2016]).</p> <p>With respect to arguments about the proper jury instruction for a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (4), the Court of Appeals recently clarified that the impairment standard requires proof that a defendant's physical or mental abilities were actually impaired to any extent, not proof that the defendant was intoxicated or incapable of driving (<i>see</i> <i>People v Dondorfer</i>, ___ NY3d ___, ___, 2026 NY Sl | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dondorfergreen1 sentence2026Accordingly, on remittal, County Court must address the admissibility of evidence related to the DRE (<i>see</i> <i>People v Green</i>, 141 AD3d 746, 747 [3d Dept 2016]).</p> <p>With respect to arguments about the proper jury instruction for a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (4), the Court of Appeals recently clarified that the impairment standard requires proof that a defendant's physical or mental abilities were actually impaired to any extent, not proof that the defendant was intoxicated or incapable of driving (<i>see</i> <i>People v Dondorfer</i>, ___ NY3d ___, ___, 2026 NY Sl | 1 | 1 |
In re the Estate of Kiamiegreen1 sentence2005The standard is the same under the common law: “As to Bankers’ post-default actions, the touchstone of its obligations as a secured party was to dispose of the collateral in a ‘commercially reasonable’ manner.” (Bankers Trust Co. v Dowler & Co., 47 NY2d 128, 134 , 134 n 4 [1979] [observing that “this broadly stated standard of conduct evolved long before our adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1964”], citing Matter of Kiamie, 309 NY 325, 330 [1955] [which stated that, in the postdefault context, the secured party “must do nothing to impair the pledge’s value”].) | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bankers Trust Co. v. J. V. Dowler & Co.
green
1 sentence2005The standard is the same under the common law: “As to Bankers’ post-default actions, the touchstone of its obligations as a secured party was to dispose of the collateral in a ‘commercially reasonable’ manner.” (Bankers Trust Co. v Dowler & Co., 47 NY2d 128, 134 , 134 n 4 [1979] [observing that “this broadly stated standard of conduct evolved long before our adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1964”], citing Matter of Kiamie, 309 NY 325, 330 [1955] [which stated that, in the postdefault context, the secured party “must do nothing to impair the pledge’s value”].) | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Kleinfeldt v. New York City Employees' Retirement System
green
1 sentence1976Although the respondents contend that the wage freeze violates the prohibition of impairment of pension benefits in the State Constitution (NY Const, art V, § 7), it is sufficient to note that existing benefits are not impaired by the act; the only effect of the act is to prevent increased benefits that may be derived from a wage increase (cf. Kleinfeldt v New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 36 NY2d 95 ). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Flushing National Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp.
green
1 sentence1976Bank v Municipal Assistance Corp. for City of N. Y. ( 40 NY2d 731, 740 ) has no application here, since there the majority stated: "The Federal issues are not reached and therefore cases construing Federal constitutional provisions, especially the impairment clause, cast little light on the State constitutional issues in this case.” Here, there are no State constitutional provisions that in any sense are determinative. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
People v. Imbesi
green
1 sentence1976Upon this record and the findings of this court that no substantial delay is chargeable to the defendant by affirmative action or acquiescence and that no priority system reasonably prevented the holding of a speedy trial after April 4, 1974, the case of People v Imbesi (supra) would not appear to require that the defendant herein must additionally establish an impairment of his defense. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Matter of Slawinski v. J.H. Williams Co.
neutral
1 sentence1959A literal reading of the statute was suggested by Judge Foster in dissenting in Matter of Slawinski v. Williams & Co. ( 273 App. Div. 826 ); but although the majority decision here, decided without memorandum or opinion, was affirmed ( 298 N. Y. 546 ) without opinion, the case involved an impairment of hearing 'and .the reporter’s syllabus in the Court of Appeals notes (p. 547) that it was argued by the board that it might allow a schedule award in a case of impaired hearing and that it was not limited by the literal defimtions of section 37. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Wehr v. Arnstein
neutral
1 sentence1959A literal reading of the statute was suggested by Judge Foster in dissenting in Matter of Slawinski v. Williams & Co. ( 273 App. Div. 826 ); but although the majority decision here, decided without memorandum or opinion, was affirmed ( 298 N. Y. 546 ) without opinion, the case involved an impairment of hearing 'and .the reporter’s syllabus in the Court of Appeals notes (p. 547) that it was argued by the board that it might allow a schedule award in a case of impaired hearing and that it was not limited by the literal defimtions of section 37. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Chapin v. . Dobson
green
1 sentence1934Chapin v. Dobson ( 78 N. Y. 74 ), principally relied on by the respondent, appears also to have been relied on by the trial court. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Eighmie v. . Taylor
green
1 sentence1934(Eighmie v. Taylor, supra.) To allow it to be established by parol would result in the serious impairment of a rule which experience has shown to be useful and necessary. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Bronson v. Kinzie
green
2 sentences1933This doctrine beginning with Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 ; 11 L. 1933This doctrine beginning with Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 ; 11 L. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy
green
1 sentence1933That the distinction between rights and remedies is, to a great extent, arbitrary has long been recognized. “ If these doctrines were res integras the consistency and soundness of the reasoning which maintains a distinction between the contract and the remedy — or, to speak more accurately, between the remedy and the other parts of the contract — might perhaps well be doubted.” (Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U. S. 535, 554 .) One may find guidance in past decisions which suggest though they do not explain, the use which has been made of the distinction between “ right ” and “ remedy.” “ Ev | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Saumby v. . City of Rochester
neutral
1 sentence1901(Saumby v. City of Rochester, 145 N. Y. 81, 83 ; Shearm. & Redf. | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.