interests test in Kansas

1995The court stated: “The best interests test was stated in Parish v. Parish, 220 Kan. 131, 132 , 551 P.2d 792 (1976), as follows: ‘In determining the right of custody of children between parents, the primary consideration is the best interest and welfare of the children, and all other issues are subordinate thereto.’ See Patton v. Patton, 215 Kan. 377 , 524 P.2d 709 (1974); Dalton v. Dalton, 214 Kan. 805 , 522 P.2d 378 (1974); Moran v. Moran, 196 Kan. 380 , 411 P.2d 677 (1966).

1995The court stated: “The best interests test was stated in Parish v. Parish, 220 Kan. 131, 132 , 551 P.2d 792 (1976), as follows: ‘In determining the right of custody of children between parents, the primary consideration is the best interest and welfare of the children, and all other issues are subordinate thereto.’ See Patton v. Patton, 215 Kan. 377 , 524 P.2d 709 (1974); Dalton v. Dalton, 214 Kan. 805 , 522 P.2d 378 (1974); Moran v. Moran, 196 Kan. 380 , 411 P.2d 677 (1966).

1995In Sheppard v. Sheppard, 230 Kan. 146 , 630 P.2d 1121 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 919 (1982), the court declared as unconstitutional a statutory provision which required the court to apply the best interests test instead of the parental preference doctrine in certain parent-nonparent custody disputes. . . .

1995In Sheppard v. Sheppard, 230 Kan. 146 , 630 P.2d 1121 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 919 (1982), the court declared as unconstitutional a statutory provision which required the court to apply the best interests test instead of the parental preference doctrine in certain parent-nonparent custody disputes. . . .

1995The court stated: “The best interests test was stated in Parish v. Parish, 220 Kan. 131, 132 , 551 P.2d 792 (1976), as follows: ‘In determining the right of custody of children between parents, the primary consideration is the best interest and welfare of the children, and all other issues are subordinate thereto.’ See Patton v. Patton, 215 Kan. 377 , 524 P.2d 709 (1974); Dalton v. Dalton, 214 Kan. 805 , 522 P.2d 378 (1974); Moran v. Moran, 196 Kan. 380 , 411 P.2d 677 (1966).

1995The court stated: “The best interests test was stated in Parish v. Parish, 220 Kan. 131, 132 , 551 P.2d 792 (1976), as follows: ‘In determining the right of custody of children between parents, the primary consideration is the best interest and welfare of the children, and all other issues are subordinate thereto.’ See Patton v. Patton, 215 Kan. 377 , 524 P.2d 709 (1974); Dalton v. Dalton, 214 Kan. 805 , 522 P.2d 378 (1974); Moran v. Moran, 196 Kan. 380 , 411 P.2d 677 (1966).

1995The court stated: “The best interests test was stated in Parish v. Parish, 220 Kan. 131, 132 , 551 P.2d 792 (1976), as follows: ‘In determining the right of custody of children between parents, the primary consideration is the best interest and welfare of the children, and all other issues are subordinate thereto.’ See Patton v. Patton, 215 Kan. 377 , 524 P.2d 709 (1974); Dalton v. Dalton, 214 Kan. 805 , 522 P.2d 378 (1974); Moran v. Moran, 196 Kan. 380 , 411 P.2d 677 (1966).

1995The court stated: “The best interests test was stated in Parish v. Parish, 220 Kan. 131, 132 , 551 P.2d 792 (1976), as follows: ‘In determining the right of custody of children between parents, the primary consideration is the best interest and welfare of the children, and all other issues are subordinate thereto.’ See Patton v. Patton, 215 Kan. 377 , 524 P.2d 709 (1974); Dalton v. Dalton, 214 Kan. 805 , 522 P.2d 378 (1974); Moran v. Moran, 196 Kan. 380 , 411 P.2d 677 (1966).

1995In Sheppard v. Sheppard, 230 Kan. 146 , 630 P.2d 1121 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 919 (1982), the court declared as unconstitutional a statutory provision which required the court to apply the best interests test instead of the parental preference doctrine in certain parent-nonparent custody disputes.... ....

1995In Sheppard v. Sheppard, 230 Kan. 146 , 630 P.2d 1121 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 919 (1982), the court declared as unconstitutional a statutory provision which required the court to apply the best interests test instead of the parental preference doctrine in certain parent-nonparent custody disputes. . . .

2019The court cited with approval 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child § 26, p. 253, which states that, when there is no intent permanently to relinquish custody, but a parent surrenders a child temporarily because of illness or financial difficulties, the parent has the right to reclaim custody when the situation changes for the better. 254 Kan. at 827 , 869 P.2d 661 .

2019The court cited with approval 67A C.J.S., Parent and Child § 26, p. 253, which states that, when there is no intent permanently to relinquish custody, but a parent surrenders a child temporarily because of illness or financial difficulties, the parent has the right to reclaim custody when the situation changes for the better. 254 Kan. at 827 , 869 P.2d 661 .

2019The court also referred to In re Eden , 216 Kan. 784 , 786-87, 533 P.2d 1222 (1975), which rejected the best interests test in disputes between strangers and natural parents who are not unfit and who are able and willing to care for the children.

2019The court also referred to In re Eden , 216 Kan. 784 , 786-87, 533 P.2d 1222 (1975), which rejected the best interests test in disputes between strangers and natural parents who are not unfit and who are able and willing to care for the children.

2014In N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d at 363 , the Colorado Supreme Court observed that “the whole paternity proceeding [is intended] to be about the best interests of the child.” This focus is in part because “[t]he outcome of a paternity action irrevocably alters a child’s current family situation and her future.” 9 P.3d at 364 .

2014In N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d at 363 , the Colorado Supreme Court observed that “the whole paternity proceeding [is intended] to be about the best interests of the child.” This focus is in part because “[t]he outcome of a paternity action irrevocably alters a child’s current family situation and her future.” 9 P.3d at 364 .

2006The court then suggested that application of the best interests test may include considerations such as: “(1) the child’s preference in light of the child’s age and experience; (2) the effect of a name change on the development and preservation of the child’s relationship with each parent; (3) the length of time the child has used a name; (4) the difficulties, harassment, or embarrassment a child may experience from bearing the present or proposed name; (5) the possibility that a different name may cause insecurity and lack of identity; and (6) the motive or interests of tire custodial parent.

2001The highest bidder rather than the ‘best home’ gets the child.” The Kansas Court of Appeals interpreted K.S.A. 59-2121 in State v. Clark, 16 Kan.

1997Instead, it recognized that the legislature in drafting a specific statute had already exercised its judgment as to what the public is entitled to know and what information could be closed to protect privacy interests. 927 S.W.2d at 483 .

1997Rel Public Employees Retirees, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio 1979), the court's decision to disclose home addresses of public employees was based on a balancing of the interests test using the state's privacy act, Ohio Rev.

1981See Parish v. Parish, 220 Kan. 131, 132 , 551 P.2d 792 (1976), where we said: “In determining the right of custody of children between parents, the primary consideration is the best interest and welfare of the children, and all other issues are subordinate thereto.” And see also Hardenburger v. Hardenburger, 216 Kan. 322 , 532 P.2d 1106 (1975).

1981See Parish v. Parish, 220 Kan. 131, 132 , 551 P.2d 792 (1976), where we said: “In determining the right of custody of children between parents, the primary consideration is the best interest and welfare of the children, and all other issues are subordinate thereto.” And see also Hardenburger v. Hardenburger, 216 Kan. 322 , 532 P.2d 1106 (1975).

1917This statute, as we have held, covers information acquired by observation while the physician is in attendance upon his patient, as well as communications made by the patient to him, Briggs v. Briggs, 20 Mich. 34 ; but the rule it establishes is one of privilege for the protection of the patient; and he may waive it if he sees fit, Scripps v. Foster, 41 Mich. 742 ; and what he may do in his lifetime, those who represent him after his death may also do for the protection of the interests they claim under him.” (p. 224.) Here the plaintiffs were the heirs at law of the deceased, and they were wi

1917This statute, as we have held, covers information acquired by observation while the physician is in attendance upon his patient, as well as communications made by the patient to him, Briggs v. Briggs, 20 Mich. 34 ; but the rule it establishes is one of privilege for the protection of the patient; and he may waive it if he sees fit, Scripps v. Foster, 41 Mich. 742 ; and what he may do in his lifetime, those who represent him after his death may also do for the protection of the interests they claim under him.” (p. 224.) Here the plaintiffs were the heirs at law of the deceased, and they were wi