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30 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Adoption of RBFSgreen2 sentences2018There, the court "note[d] that some courts have suggested that a best interests analysis may be constitutionally required before a child's familial relationships can be terminated." Id. (citing cases and authorities). 2018See supra ¶ 14 n.1 (citing In re R.B.F.S. , 2011 UT 46 , ¶ 7 n.6, 258 P.3d 583 , and noting that "some courts have suggested that a best interests analysis may be constitutionally required before a child's familial relationships can be terminated"). | 2 | 5 |
State in the Interest of STgreen2 sentences2013See id. at 399-400 (explaining that the bifurcated analysis involved in parental termination cases "does not require courts to separately hear and consider evidence pertaining to unfitness and best interests" nor does it require "two different sets of findings and conclusions") 4 Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the Children. 2013See id. at 399-400 (explaining that the bifurcated analysis involved in parental termination cases "does not require courts to separately hear and consider evidence pertaining to unfitness and best interests" nor does it require "two different sets of findings and conclusions") 4 Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interests of the Children. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Adoption of THgreen2 sentences2009Compare id. § 78B-6-120 (listing whose consent is required for adoption), id. § 78B-6-126 ("A consent or relinquishment is effective when it is signed and may not be revoked."), id. § 78B-6-133(1), (2)(b) (requiring best interests analysis either to terminate parental rights or to determine custody when parental rights are not terminated where there is no consent for adoption), and In re T.H., 2007 UT App 341, ¶¶ 14-15 , 171 P.3d 480 (interpreting reference to the Termination of Parental Rights Act in section 78B-6-133(1) to include a requirement that district court consider the children's bes 2009Compare id. § 78B-6-120 (listing whose consent is required for adoption), id. § 78B-6-126 ("A consent or relinquishment is effective when it is signed and may not be revoked."), id. § 78B-6-133(1), (2)(b) (requiring best interests analysis either to terminate parental rights or to determine custody when parental rights are not terminated where there is no consent for adoption), and In re T.H., 2007 UT App 341, ¶¶ 14-15 , 171 P.3d 480 (interpreting reference to the Termination of Parental Rights Act in section 78B-6-133(1) to include a requirement that district court consider the children's bes | 2 | 2 |
Elmer v. Elmergreen2 sentences2013Best Interests 121 Father next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that it was in Child's best interests for Mother to be awarded custody because its analysis of the best interests factors focused on *189 whether "Mother is an acceptable parent" rather than whether "Mother is more acceptable than Father, in light of all the facts and circumstances of the case." We agree. 122 "[The best interests of the child must be a primary focus when analyzing a request for a permanent change of custody in an unlitigated decree." Taylor v. Elison, 2011 UT App 272, ¶ 10 , 268 P 2013However, given that Father had no burden to show a material change of circumstances when petitioning to modify the custody provisions of an unajudicated divorce decree, see Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 603-04 (Utah 1989), the trial court's determination that a material change of circumstances had not occurred should not have had any impact on its ultimate ruling on the petition to modify, except to the extent that factual findings relevant to a material change of circumstances analysis were also relevant to the best interests analysis. 11 . | 1 | 2 |
In Re EHgreen2 sentences2012Father relies solely on the Utah Supreme Court’s decision In re E.H., 2006 UT 36 , 137 P.3d 809 , in support of that position. 2012Father relies solely on the Utah Supreme Court’s decision In re E.H., 2006 UT 36 , 137 P.3d 809 , in support of that position. | 1 | 2 |
In re G.D...green1 sentence2024Outside of the factors enumerated by the relevant statutes, 64 the best interest __________________________________________________________ 59 See UTAH CODE § 80-4-104(12)(a) (formerly id. § 78A-6-503(12) (2020)); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Utah 1982) (“The best interest of the child has always been a paramount or ‘polar star’ principle in cases involving termination of parental rights . . . .”). 60 In re J.M., 2020 UT App 52, ¶ 35 , 463 P.3d 66 . 61 In re Z.C.W., 2021 UT App 98, ¶ 12 , 500 P.3d 94 . 62 In re C.L., 2007 UT 51 , ¶ 22, 166 P.3d 608 (“[A] juvenile court judge conducting a b | 1 | 1 |
In Re JPgreen1 sentence2024Outside of the factors enumerated by the relevant statutes, 64 the best interest __________________________________________________________ 59 See UTAH CODE § 80-4-104(12)(a) (formerly id. § 78A-6-503(12) (2020)); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Utah 1982) (“The best interest of the child has always been a paramount or ‘polar star’ principle in cases involving termination of parental rights . . . .”). 60 In re J.M., 2020 UT App 52, ¶ 35 , 463 P.3d 66 . 61 In re Z.C.W., 2021 UT App 98, ¶ 12 , 500 P.3d 94 . 62 In re C.L., 2007 UT 51 , ¶ 22, 166 P.3d 608 (“[A] juvenile court judge conducting a b | 1 | 1 |
A.W. v. State (In Re State Ex Rel. K.W.)green2 sentences2018See, e.g. , In re K.W. , 2018 UT App 44 , ¶¶ 29-31, 420 P.3d 82 ; In re B.A. , 2017 UT App 202 , ¶ 21, 407 P.3d 1053 ; In re P.B. , 2017 UT App 82 , ¶ 6, 397 P.3d 850 ; In re D.L. , 2014 UT App 297 , ¶¶ 3, 6, 342 P.3d 291 ; In re C.J. , 2013 UT App 284 , ¶ 8, 317 P.3d 475 . 2018See, e.g. , In re K.W. , 2018 UT App 44 , ¶¶ 29-31, 420 P.3d 82 ; In re B.A. , 2017 UT App 202 , ¶ 21, 407 P.3d 1053 ; In re P.B. , 2017 UT App 82 , ¶ 6, 397 P.3d 850 ; In re D.L. , 2014 UT App 297 , ¶¶ 3, 6, 342 P.3d 291 ; In re C.J. , 2013 UT App 284 , ¶ 8, 317 P.3d 475 . | 1 | 1 |
In re B.T.B.green2 sentences2018There, the court “note[d] that some courts have suggested that a best interests analysis may be constitutionally required before a child’s familial relationships can be terminated.” Id. (citing cases and authorities). 20170906-CA 8 2018 UT App 157 In re B.T.B. for termination by clear and convincing evidence, “the court shall then consider the welfare and best interest of the child of paramount importance in determining whether termination of parental rights shall be ordered”). ¶17 Moreover, in 2012 the legislature inserted new language into section 507, stating that a court may terminate pare 2018See supra ¶ 14 n.1 (citing In re R.B.F.S., 2011 UT 46 , ¶ 7 n.6, and noting that “some courts have suggested that a best interests analysis may be constitutionally required before a child’s familial relationships can be terminated”). 20170906-CA 12 2018 UT App 157 In re B.T.B. solutions for families and children that make the most sense in the particular situation. | 1 | 1 |
Harmon v. Harmongreen1 sentence2018See Harmon v. Harmon, 491 P.2d 231, 232 (Utah 1971) (stating that “[i]n order to carry out the important responsibility of safeguarding the interests and welfare of children, it has always been deemed that the courts have broad equitable powers”). | 1 | 1 |
| Woodward v. LaFrancagreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re A.K. and M.K. (H.K. v. State)green | 1 | 1 |
| D.B. v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| H.K. v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sigg v. Sigggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. U.S. Bank National Ass'ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Timmermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hudema v. Carpentergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Becker v. Beckergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hogge v. Hoggegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hirsch v. Hirschgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Jd
green
2 sentences2014On appeal, Stepmother takes issue with the adequacy of the district court's findings to support its best interest determination. 117 "(Iln every case, the best interest of the child is of paramount importance in determining whether the child-parent relationship should be permanently severed." In re J.D., 2011 UT App 184, ¶ 26 , 257 P.3d 1062 . "[Wlhile evidence of unfitness may be probative of both factors of the termination analysis, the best interests analysis includes consideration of the impact of termination on the child, rather than simply on evaluating whether the statutory grounds for 2014On appeal, Stepmother takes issue with the adequacy of the district court's findings to support its best interest determination. 117 "(Iln every case, the best interest of the child is of paramount importance in determining whether the child-parent relationship should be permanently severed." In re J.D., 2011 UT App 184, ¶ 26 , 257 P.3d 1062 . "[Wlhile evidence of unfitness may be probative of both factors of the termination analysis, the best interests analysis includes consideration of the impact of termination on the child, rather than simply on evaluating whether the statutory grounds for | 5 | 2014–2015 |
State Ex Rel. Cl
green
2 sentences2024Outside of the factors enumerated by the relevant statutes, 64 the best interest __________________________________________________________ 59 See UTAH CODE § 80-4-104(12)(a) (formerly id. § 78A-6-503(12) (2020)); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Utah 1982) (“The best interest of the child has always been a paramount or ‘polar star’ principle in cases involving termination of parental rights . . . .”). 60 In re J.M., 2020 UT App 52, ¶ 35 , 463 P.3d 66 . 61 In re Z.C.W., 2021 UT App 98, ¶ 12 , 500 P.3d 94 . 62 In re C.L., 2007 UT 51 , ¶ 22, 166 P.3d 608 (“[A] juvenile court judge conducting a b 2024Outside of the factors enumerated by the relevant statutes, 64 the best interest __________________________________________________________ 59 See UTAH CODE § 80-4-104(12)(a) (formerly id. § 78A-6-503(12) (2020)); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Utah 1982) (“The best interest of the child has always been a paramount or ‘polar star’ principle in cases involving termination of parental rights . . . .”). 60 In re J.M., 2020 UT App 52, ¶ 35 , 463 P.3d 66 . 61 In re Z.C.W., 2021 UT App 98, ¶ 12 , 500 P.3d 94 . 62 In re C.L., 2007 UT 51 , ¶ 22, 166 P.3d 608 (“[A] juvenile court judge conducting a b | 2 | 2023–2024 |
In re M.J. and T.J. (J.J. v. State)
green
2 sentences2014On appeal, Stepmother takes issue with the adequacy of the district court's findings to support its best interest determination. 117 "(Iln every case, the best interest of the child is of paramount importance in determining whether the child-parent relationship should be permanently severed." In re J.D., 2011 UT App 184, ¶ 26 , 257 P.3d 1062 . "[Wlhile evidence of unfitness may be probative of both factors of the termination analysis, the best interests analysis includes consideration of the impact of termination on the child, rather than simply on evaluating whether the statutory grounds for 2014On appeal, Stepmother takes issue with the adequacy of the district court's findings to support its best interest determination. 117 "(Iln every case, the best interest of the child is of paramount importance in determining whether the child-parent relationship should be permanently severed." In re J.D., 2011 UT App 184, ¶ 26 , 257 P.3d 1062 . "[Wlhile evidence of unfitness may be probative of both factors of the termination analysis, the best interests analysis includes consideration of the impact of termination on the child, rather than simply on evaluating whether the statutory grounds for | 2 | 2014–2014 |
A.A. v. State
green
2 sentences2014"In determining whether termination of a parent's rights is in the best interest of a child, the ... court must, at a minimum, consider [the statutory factors]." See In re D.R.A., 2011 UT App 397, ¶ 10 , 266 P.3d 844 . 2014"In determining whether termination of a parent's rights is in the best interest of a child, the ... court must, at a minimum, consider [the statutory factors]." See In re D.R.A., 2011 UT App 397, ¶ 10 , 266 P.3d 844 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
J.J. v. State
green
2 sentences2014On appeal, Stepmother takes issue with the adequacy of the district court's findings to support its best interest determination. 117 "(Iln every case, the best interest of the child is of paramount importance in determining whether the child-parent relationship should be permanently severed." In re J.D., 2011 UT App 184, ¶ 26 , 257 P.3d 1062 . "[Wlhile evidence of unfitness may be probative of both factors of the termination analysis, the best interests analysis includes consideration of the impact of termination on the child, rather than simply on evaluating whether the statutory grounds for 2014On appeal, Stepmother takes issue with the adequacy of the district court's findings to support its best interest determination. 117 "(Iln every case, the best interest of the child is of paramount importance in determining whether the child-parent relationship should be permanently severed." In re J.D., 2011 UT App 184, ¶ 26 , 257 P.3d 1062 . "[Wlhile evidence of unfitness may be probative of both factors of the termination analysis, the best interests analysis includes consideration of the impact of termination on the child, rather than simply on evaluating whether the statutory grounds for | 2 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Rbfs
neutral
2 sentences2011(In re R.B.F.S.), 2009 UT App 223, ¶ 10 , 218 P.3d 908 . 2011(In re R.B.F.S.), 2009 UT App 223, ¶ 10 , 218 P.3d 908 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
In re Z.C.W...
green
1 sentence2024Outside of the factors enumerated by the relevant statutes, 64 the best interest __________________________________________________________ 59 See UTAH CODE § 80-4-104(12)(a) (formerly id. § 78A-6-503(12) (2020)); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Utah 1982) (“The best interest of the child has always been a paramount or ‘polar star’ principle in cases involving termination of parental rights . . . .”). 60 In re J.M., 2020 UT App 52, ¶ 35 , 463 P.3d 66 . 61 In re Z.C.W., 2021 UT App 98, ¶ 12 , 500 P.3d 94 . 62 In re C.L., 2007 UT 51 , ¶ 22, 166 P.3d 608 (“[A] juvenile court judge conducting a b | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re J.M...
green
1 sentence2024Outside of the factors enumerated by the relevant statutes, 64 the best interest __________________________________________________________ 59 See UTAH CODE § 80-4-104(12)(a) (formerly id. § 78A-6-503(12) (2020)); In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Utah 1982) (“The best interest of the child has always been a paramount or ‘polar star’ principle in cases involving termination of parental rights . . . .”). 60 In re J.M., 2020 UT App 52, ¶ 35 , 463 P.3d 66 . 61 In re Z.C.W., 2021 UT App 98, ¶ 12 , 500 P.3d 94 . 62 In re C.L., 2007 UT 51 , ¶ 22, 166 P.3d 608 (“[A] juvenile court judge conducting a b | 1 | 2024–2024 |
A.T. v. State (In Re C.T.)
green
1 sentence2020In conducting the best interests inquiry, the court must also “explore whether other feasible options exist that could address the specific problems or issues facing the family.” Id. ¶ 55. ¶24 Father claims the court failed to consider “any alternatives to termination of [his] parental rights.” But a court need only “consider or explore alternatives to termination”; if it finds “no such alternatives are available or articulates supported reasons for rejecting alternatives that do exist, such findings are entitled to deference on appeal,” In re C.T., 2018 UT App 233, ¶ 16 , and the court did th | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort
green
1 sentence2019Both prongs of the Clover framework are thus incompatible with the statute because they override the clear terms and structure of the Act. ¶107 The majority offers a series of defenses of the merits of the Clover framework-arguing that it: (1) is consistent with the "structure" of the statute and certain canons of construction, supra ¶¶ 33-38; (2) better advances the stated legislative goal of " 'clarify[ing] the law,' " supra ¶ 44 (quoting Clover , 808 P.2d at 1045 ); (3) avoids absurd or arbitrary consequences, supra ¶ 41; and (4) furthers the interests of the doctrine of constitutional avoi | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In re D.L. (M.L. v. State)
green
1 sentence2018See, e.g. , In re K.W. , 2018 UT App 44 , ¶¶ 29-31, 420 P.3d 82 ; In re B.A. , 2017 UT App 202 , ¶ 21, 407 P.3d 1053 ; In re P.B. , 2017 UT App 82 , ¶ 6, 397 P.3d 850 ; In re D.L. , 2014 UT App 297 , ¶¶ 3, 6, 342 P.3d 291 ; In re C.J. , 2013 UT App 284 , ¶ 8, 317 P.3d 475 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In re P.B.
neutral
1 sentence2018See, e.g. , In re K.W. , 2018 UT App 44 , ¶¶ 29-31, 420 P.3d 82 ; In re B.A. , 2017 UT App 202 , ¶ 21, 407 P.3d 1053 ; In re P.B. , 2017 UT App 82 , ¶ 6, 397 P.3d 850 ; In re D.L. , 2014 UT App 297 , ¶¶ 3, 6, 342 P.3d 291 ; In re C.J. , 2013 UT App 284 , ¶ 8, 317 P.3d 475 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In re B.A..
green
1 sentence2018See, e.g. , In re K.W. , 2018 UT App 44 , ¶¶ 29-31, 420 P.3d 82 ; In re B.A. , 2017 UT App 202 , ¶ 21, 407 P.3d 1053 ; In re P.B. , 2017 UT App 82 , ¶ 6, 397 P.3d 850 ; In re D.L. , 2014 UT App 297 , ¶¶ 3, 6, 342 P.3d 291 ; In re C.J. , 2013 UT App 284 , ¶ 8, 317 P.3d 475 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
S.H. v. State
neutral
2 sentences2018See, e.g. , In re K.W. , 2018 UT App 44 , ¶¶ 29-31, 420 P.3d 82 ; In re B.A. , 2017 UT App 202 , ¶ 21, 407 P.3d 1053 ; In re P.B. , 2017 UT App 82 , ¶ 6, 397 P.3d 850 ; In re D.L. , 2014 UT App 297 , ¶¶ 3, 6, 342 P.3d 291 ; In re C.J. , 2013 UT App 284 , ¶ 8, 317 P.3d 475 . 2018See, e.g. , In re K.W. , 2018 UT App 44 , ¶¶ 29-31, 420 P.3d 82 ; In re B.A. , 2017 UT App 202 , ¶ 21, 407 P.3d 1053 ; In re P.B. , 2017 UT App 82 , ¶ 6, 397 P.3d 850 ; In re D.L. , 2014 UT App 297 , ¶¶ 3, 6, 342 P.3d 291 ; In re C.J. , 2013 UT App 284 , ¶ 8, 317 P.3d 475 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
M.L. v. State
neutral
1 sentence2018See, e.g. , In re K.W. , 2018 UT App 44 , ¶¶ 29-31, 420 P.3d 82 ; In re B.A. , 2017 UT App 202 , ¶ 21, 407 P.3d 1053 ; In re P.B. , 2017 UT App 82 , ¶ 6, 397 P.3d 850 ; In re D.L. , 2014 UT App 297 , ¶¶ 3, 6, 342 P.3d 291 ; In re C.J. , 2013 UT App 284 , ¶ 8, 317 P.3d 475 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
L.B. v. State
neutral
1 sentence2018See, e.g. , In re K.W. , 2018 UT App 44 , ¶¶ 29-31, 420 P.3d 82 ; In re B.A. , 2017 UT App 202 , ¶ 21, 407 P.3d 1053 ; In re P.B. , 2017 UT App 82 , ¶ 6, 397 P.3d 850 ; In re D.L. , 2014 UT App 297 , ¶¶ 3, 6, 342 P.3d 291 ; In re C.J. , 2013 UT App 284 , ¶ 8, 317 P.3d 475 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
M.T. v. State
green
1 sentence2018See, e.g. , In re K.W. , 2018 UT App 44 , ¶¶ 29-31, 420 P.3d 82 ; In re B.A. , 2017 UT App 202 , ¶ 21, 407 P.3d 1053 ; In re P.B. , 2017 UT App 82 , ¶ 6, 397 P.3d 850 ; In re D.L. , 2014 UT App 297 , ¶¶ 3, 6, 342 P.3d 291 ; In re C.J. , 2013 UT App 284 , ¶ 8, 317 P.3d 475 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Brown v. Babbitt
neutral
2 sentences2016ANALYSIS ¶8 A remand with specific instructions to the trial court necessarily precludes the trial court from considering issues outside the scope of remand, just as it constrains the appellate court, on further appeal following remand, from reconsidering the trial court’s decision except as to the resolution of the issues previously identified. 5 See Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 291 , ¶ 6 n. 5, 364 P.3d 60 (“[Ujnder the law of the case doctrine, ‘a decision made on an issue during one stage of a ease is binding in successive stages of the same litigation.’ Thus, the doctrine allows a court t 2016ANALYSIS ¶8 A remand with specific instructions to the trial court necessarily precludes the trial court from considering issues outside the scope of remand, just as it constrains the appellate court, on further appeal following remand, from reconsidering the trial court’s decision except as to the resolution of the issues previously identified. 5 See Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 291 , ¶ 6 n. 5, 364 P.3d 60 (“[Ujnder the law of the case doctrine, ‘a decision made on an issue during one stage of a ease is binding in successive stages of the same litigation.’ Thus, the doctrine allows a court t | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Wasatch County v. Okelberry
neutral
2 sentences2016ANALYSIS ¶8 A remand with specific instructions to the trial court necessarily precludes the trial court from considering issues outside the scope of remand, just as it constrains the appellate court, on further appeal following remand, from reconsidering the trial court’s decision except as to the resolution of the issues previously identified. 5 See Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 291 , ¶ 6 n. 5, 364 P.3d 60 (“[Ujnder the law of the case doctrine, ‘a decision made on an issue during one stage of a ease is binding in successive stages of the same litigation.’ Thus, the doctrine allows a court t 2016ANALYSIS ¶8 A remand with specific instructions to the trial court necessarily precludes the trial court from considering issues outside the scope of remand, just as it constrains the appellate court, on further appeal following remand, from reconsidering the trial court’s decision except as to the resolution of the issues previously identified. 5 See Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 291 , ¶ 6 n. 5, 364 P.3d 60 (“[Ujnder the law of the case doctrine, ‘a decision made on an issue during one stage of a ease is binding in successive stages of the same litigation.’ Thus, the doctrine allows a court t | 1 | 2016–2016 |
IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D & K MANAGEMENT, INC.
green
2 sentences2016ANALYSIS ¶8 A remand with specific instructions to the trial court necessarily precludes the trial court from considering issues outside the scope of remand, just as it constrains the appellate court, on further appeal following remand, from reconsidering the trial court’s decision except as to the resolution of the issues previously identified. 5 See Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 291 , ¶ 6 n. 5, 364 P.3d 60 (“[Ujnder the law of the case doctrine, ‘a decision made on an issue during one stage of a ease is binding in successive stages of the same litigation.’ Thus, the doctrine allows a court t 2016ANALYSIS ¶8 A remand with specific instructions to the trial court necessarily precludes the trial court from considering issues outside the scope of remand, just as it constrains the appellate court, on further appeal following remand, from reconsidering the trial court’s decision except as to the resolution of the issues previously identified. 5 See Brown v. Babbitt, 2015 UT App 291 , ¶ 6 n. 5, 364 P.3d 60 (“[Ujnder the law of the case doctrine, ‘a decision made on an issue during one stage of a ease is binding in successive stages of the same litigation.’ Thus, the doctrine allows a court t | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Taylor v. Elison green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Bake v. Bake green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Burak green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Scripps v. Foster neutral | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Briggs v. Briggs green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.