interests standard in Maryland

2021Similarly, in Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 444-45 , 921 A.2d 171, 195 (2007), a case involving a grandparent visitation statute, we held “that there must be a finding of either parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances demonstrating the current or future detriment to the child, absent visitation from his or her grandparents, as a prerequisite to application of the best interests analysis.” We held that the grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutionally applied to the petitioners in that case “in the absence of a threshold finding of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstanc

2021Similarly, in Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 444-45 , 921 A.2d 171, 195 (2007), a case involving a grandparent visitation statute, we held “that there must be a finding of either parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances demonstrating the current or future detriment to the child, absent visitation from his or her grandparents, as a prerequisite to application of the best interests analysis.” We held that the grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutionally applied to the petitioners in that case “in the absence of a threshold finding of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstanc

2008Compare McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 374-75 , 869 A.2d 751 (2005) (requiring proof that a parent is unfit or that extraordinary circumstances exist before a court may apply the best interests standard in third party/parent custody disputes), with Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 47-48 , 622 A.2d 121 (1993) (holding that a threshold showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances is not required in grandparent visitation cases), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404 , 921 A.2d 171 .

2008Compare McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 374-75 , 869 A.2d 751 (2005) (requiring proof that a parent is unfit or that extraordinary circumstances exist before a court may apply the best interests standard in third party/parent custody disputes), with Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 47-48 , 622 A.2d 121 (1993) (holding that a threshold showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances is not required in grandparent visitation cases), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404 , 921 A.2d 171 .

2009Captioned, "Blood or genetic tests," it provides: "(b) In general. — On the motion of the Administration, a party to the proceeding, or on its own motion, the court shall order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood or genetic tests to determine whether the alleged father can be excluded as being the father of the child." This Court has construed this section to mean that a trial judge has no discretion to deny a blood or genetic test request. [9] Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 429 , 754 A.2d 389, 407 (2000)("To now require a trial court to conduct a best interests analysis

2009Captioned, "Blood or genetic tests," it provides: "(b) In general. — On the motion of the Administration, a party to the proceeding, or on its own motion, the court shall order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood or genetic tests to determine whether the alleged father can be excluded as being the father of the child." This Court has construed this section to mean that a trial judge has no discretion to deny a blood or genetic test request. [9] Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 429 , 754 A.2d 389, 407 (2000)("To now require a trial court to conduct a best interests analysis

2000See Domingues, 323 Md. at 500-03 , 593 A.2d 1133 .

2000See Domingues, 323 Md. at 500-03 , 593 A.2d 1133 .

2008Compare McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 374-75 , 869 A.2d 751 (2005) (requiring proof that a parent is unfit or that extraordinary circumstances exist before a court may apply the best interests standard in third party/parent custody disputes), with Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 47-48 , 622 A.2d 121 (1993) (holding that a threshold showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances is not required in grandparent visitation cases), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404 , 921 A.2d 171 .

2008Compare McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 374-75 , 869 A.2d 751 (2005) (requiring proof that a parent is unfit or that extraordinary circumstances exist before a court may apply the best interests standard in third party/parent custody disputes), with Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. 39, 47-48 , 622 A.2d 121 (1993) (holding that a threshold showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances is not required in grandparent visitation cases), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404 , 921 A.2d 171 .

1998Maryland cases have referred to the required evidentiary showing as "harmful effect" and "adverse impact" ( Boswell v. Boswell, 118 Md.App. 1 , 701 A.2d 1153 (1997)); "adverse effect" and "damaging impact" ( Robinson v. Robinson, 328 Md. 507 , 615 A.2d 1190 (1992)); "harmful effect"( Queen v. Queen, 308 Md. 574 , 521 A.2d 320 (1987)); and "actual harmful effect" ( Swain v. Swain, 43 Md.App. 622 , 406 A.2d 680 , cert. denied, 286 Md. 754 (1979)). [4] Illinois uses a best interests standard to determine custody and the "endangerment standard" for visitation awards.

1998Maryland cases have referred to the required evidentiary showing as "harmful effect" and "adverse impact" ( Boswell v. Boswell, 118 Md.App. 1 , 701 A.2d 1153 (1997)); "adverse effect" and "damaging impact" ( Robinson v. Robinson, 328 Md. 507 , 615 A.2d 1190 (1992)); "harmful effect"( Queen v. Queen, 308 Md. 574 , 521 A.2d 320 (1987)); and "actual harmful effect" ( Swain v. Swain, 43 Md.App. 622 , 406 A.2d 680 , cert. denied, 286 Md. 754 (1979)). [4] Illinois uses a best interests standard to determine custody and the "endangerment standard" for visitation awards.

2004In Langston v. Riffe the Court of Appeals reviewed Turner and two other cases in which a best interests analysis had been applied, Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758 , 621 A.2d 898 (1993), and Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512 , 639 A.2d 1076 (1994). 2 The Court said that “[g]iven the ‘unique’ circumstances of Sider , as well as Turner and Monroe , we chose not to apply or extend their holdings further than the unique facts of those cases.” Langston, 359 Md. at 432-33 , 754 A.2d at 408-09 (footnote omitted).

2004In Langston v. Riffe the Court of Appeals reviewed Turner and two other cases in which a best interests analysis had been applied, Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758 , 621 A.2d 898 (1993), and Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512 , 639 A.2d 1076 (1994). 2 The Court said that “[g]iven the ‘unique’ circumstances of Sider , as well as Turner and Monroe , we chose not to apply or extend their holdings further than the unique facts of those cases.” Langston, 359 Md. at 432-33 , 754 A.2d at 408-09 (footnote omitted).

2007The Shurupoff Court identified seemingly contradictory verbiage from Ross that described the best interests standard as "always determinative," but later qualified that it is only upon a determination by an equity court that the parent is unfit or that there are exceptional circumstances which make custody in the parent detrimental to the best interest of the child, that the court need inquire into the best interest of the child in order to make a proper custodial disposition. 372 Md. at 661 , 814 A.2d at 556 -57 (quoting Ross, 280 Md. at 178-79 , 372 A.2d at 587 ).

2007The Shurupoff Court identified seemingly contradictory verbiage from Ross that described the best interests standard as "always determinative," but later qualified that it is only upon a determination by an equity court that the parent is unfit or that there are exceptional circumstances which make custody in the parent detrimental to the best interest of the child, that the court need inquire into the best interest of the child in order to make a proper custodial disposition. 372 Md. at 661 , 814 A.2d at 556 -57 (quoting Ross, 280 Md. at 178-79 , 372 A.2d at 587 ).

2005So critical is the best interests standard that it has garnered superlative language in the many cases in which the concept appears: This Court labeled it “of transcendent importance” in Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116 , 43 A.2d 186, 191 (1945), as the “ultimate test” in Fanning v. Warfield, 252 Md. 18, 24 , 248 A.2d 890, 894 (1969), and as the “controlling factor” in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113 , 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994).

2005So critical is the best interests standard that it has garnered superlative language in the many cases in which the concept appears: This Court labeled it “of transcendent importance” in Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 116 , 43 A.2d 186, 191 (1945), as the “ultimate test” in Fanning v. Warfield, 252 Md. 18, 24 , 248 A.2d 890, 894 (1969), and as the “controlling factor” in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113 , 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994).

2021We have explained that, in custody cases, “unfitness means an unfitness to have custody of the child, not an unfitness to remain the child’s parents; exceptional circumstances are those that would make parental custody detrimental to the best interest of the child.” In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., 460 Md. 201, 217 , 189 A.3d 284, 293 (2018) (cleaned up).

2021We have explained that, in custody cases, “unfitness means an unfitness to have custody of the child, not an unfitness to remain the child’s parents; exceptional circumstances are those that would make parental custody detrimental to the best interest of the child.” In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., 460 Md. 201, 217 , 189 A.3d 284, 293 (2018) (cleaned up).

2014See Turner, 327 Md. at 116 , 607 A.2d 935 (citing Matter of Marriage of Ross, 245 Kan. 591 , 783 P.2d 331, 338 (1989)) (stating a court must consider the best interests of a child prior to ordering a blood test to determine whether the presumed parent is the biological parent); see also Miles v. Stovall, 132 Md.App. 71, 82-83 , 750 A.2d 729 (2000) (holding, in a child support case, that former husband was entitled to blood tests to rebut presumption of paternity).

2014See Turner, 327 Md. at 116 , 607 A.2d 935 (citing Matter of Marriage of Ross, 245 Kan. 591 , 783 P.2d 331, 338 (1989)) (stating a court must consider the best interests of a child prior to ordering a blood test to determine whether the presumed parent is the biological parent); see also Miles v. Stovall, 132 Md.App. 71, 82-83 , 750 A.2d 729 (2000) (holding, in a child support case, that former husband was entitled to blood tests to rebut presumption of paternity).

2014See Turner, 327 Md. at 116 , 607 A.2d 935 (citing Matter of Marriage of Ross, 245 Kan. 591 , 783 P.2d 331, 338 (1989)) (stating a court must consider the best interests of a child prior to ordering a blood test to determine whether the presumed parent is the biological parent); see also Miles v. Stovall, 132 Md.App. 71, 82-83 , 750 A.2d 729 (2000) (holding, in a child support case, that former husband was entitled to blood tests to rebut presumption of paternity).

2014See Turner, 327 Md. at 116 , 607 A.2d 935 (citing Matter of Marriage of Ross, 245 Kan. 591 , 783 P.2d 331, 338 (1989)) (stating a court must consider the best interests of a child prior to ordering a blood test to determine whether the presumed parent is the biological parent); see also Miles v. Stovall, 132 Md.App. 71, 82-83 , 750 A.2d 729 (2000) (holding, in a child support case, that former husband was entitled to blood tests to rebut presumption of paternity).

2014See Turner, 327 Md. at 116 , 607 A.2d 935 (citing Matter of Marriage of Ross, 245 Kan. 591 , 783 P.2d 331, 338 (1989)) (stating a court must consider the best interests of a child prior to ordering a blood test to determine whether the presumed parent is the biological parent); see also Miles v. Stovall, 132 Md.App. 71, 82-83 , 750 A.2d 729 (2000) (holding, in a child support case, that former husband was entitled to blood tests to rebut presumption of paternity).

2014See Turner, 327 Md. at 116 , 607 A.2d 935 (citing Matter of Marriage of Ross, 245 Kan. 591 , 783 P.2d 331, 338 (1989)) (stating a court must consider the best interests of a child prior to ordering a blood test to determine whether the presumed parent is the biological parent); see also Miles v. Stovall, 132 Md.App. 71, 82-83 , 750 A.2d 729 (2000) (holding, in a child support case, that former husband was entitled to blood tests to rebut presumption of paternity).

2012Corbett v. Mulligan, 198 Md.App. 38, 41 , 16 A.3d 233, 234 (2011).

2012Corbett v. Mulligan, 198 Md.App. 38, 41 , 16 A.3d 233, 234 (2011).

2011Kamp, 410 Md. at 665-66 , 980 A.2d 448 ; Ashley, 176 Md.App. at 39-40, 55 , 932 A.2d 757 . 8 The present case is distinguishable from the above cases because here the child was not born during a marriage. 9 Gracelyn was conceived while Mr. and Ms. Mulligan were *59 married, albeit separated, but she was born after they were divorced.

2011Kamp, 410 Md. at 665-66 , 980 A.2d 448 ; Ashley, 176 Md.App. at 39-40, 55 , 932 A.2d 757 . 8 The present case is distinguishable from the above cases because here the child was not born during a marriage. 9 Gracelyn was conceived while Mr. and Ms. Mulligan were *59 married, albeit separated, but she was born after they were divorced.

2009Captioned, "Blood or genetic tests," it provides: "(b) In general. — On the motion of the Administration, a party to the proceeding, or on its own motion, the court shall order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood or genetic tests to determine whether the alleged father can be excluded as being the father of the child." This Court has construed this section to mean that a trial judge has no discretion to deny a blood or genetic test request. [9] Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 429 , 754 A.2d 389, 407 (2000)("To now require a trial court to conduct a best interests analysis

2009Captioned, "Blood or genetic tests," it provides: "(b) In general. — On the motion of the Administration, a party to the proceeding, or on its own motion, the court shall order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood or genetic tests to determine whether the alleged father can be excluded as being the father of the child." This Court has construed this section to mean that a trial judge has no discretion to deny a blood or genetic test request. [9] Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 429 , 754 A.2d 389, 407 (2000)("To now require a trial court to conduct a best interests analysis

2008Id. at 445; see also Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 677-80 , 948 A.2d 73 (2008).

2008Id. at 445; see also Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 677-80 , 948 A.2d 73 (2008).

2008The rationale for this distinction, as outlined in Fairbanks, was twofold: first, the plain text of the GVS did not require a threshold showing; and second, visitation was considered a “less weighty matter than outright custody of a child,” and therefore, it did not “demand the enhanced protections, embodied in the exceptional circumstances test, [attending] custody awards.” 330 Md. at 47-48 , 622 A.2d 121 ; see also Herrick v. Wain, 154 Md.App. 222, 231-32 , 838 A.2d 1263 (2003) (applying Fairbanks in a grandparent visitation dispute), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404 , 921 A.2d 171 .

2008The rationale for this distinction, as outlined in Fairbanks, was twofold: first, the plain text of the GVS did not require a threshold showing; and second, visitation was considered a “less weighty matter than outright custody of a child,” and therefore, it did not “demand the enhanced protections, embodied in the exceptional circumstances test, [attending] custody awards.” 330 Md. at 47-48 , 622 A.2d 121 ; see also Herrick v. Wain, 154 Md.App. 222, 231-32 , 838 A.2d 1263 (2003) (applying Fairbanks in a grandparent visitation dispute), overruled in part by Koshko, 398 Md. 404 , 921 A.2d 171 .

2007See In re Karl H., 394 Md. 402, 416 , 906 A.2d 898 (2006); Boswell, 352 Md. at 219 , 721 A.2d 662 (noting that the best interests standard applies to custody as well as visitation, “because visitation ‘is considered to be a form of temporary custody.’ ”) (citations omitted); Giffin v. Crane, 351 Md. 133, 145 , 716 A.2d 1029 (1998)(“The court’s exercise of discretion must be guided first, and foremost, by what it believes would promote the child’s best interest — ”).

2007See In re Karl H., 394 Md. 402, 416 , 906 A.2d 898 (2006); Boswell, 352 Md. at 219 , 721 A.2d 662 (noting that the best interests standard applies to custody as well as visitation, “because visitation ‘is considered to be a form of temporary custody.’ ”) (citations omitted); Giffin v. Crane, 351 Md. 133, 145 , 716 A.2d 1029 (1998)(“The court’s exercise of discretion must be guided first, and foremost, by what it believes would promote the child’s best interest — ”).